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There is wide recognition of the fact that 
superpower competition may be increasingly manifested in 
"second area" political and military actions to protect 
perceived "security interests" in contested areas of the 
world--provided of course that the central nuclear balance 
remains "stable". The invasions of Grenada and 
Afghanistan have fuelled the debate on whether the 
superpowers are increasingly inclined to use military 
force in challenging each other's influence and presence 
outside the European theater. The debate is more sharply 
focused when we take into account that, in recent years, 
and while United States policies continue to be influenced 
by the "Vietnam syndrome", the Soviet Union has 
established distant power projection capabilities and has 
steadily increased its involvement with Marxist movements 
and regimes in the Third World. Superpower military 
intervention in local conflicts could be therefore a 
critical, if not the decisive, element in the maintenance 
of world peace in the 1990s and beyond. 
The central thesis of this work is that the 
"incremental" methods, employed widely in the study of the 
uses of military force as an instrument of policy by the 
superpowers, albeit useful in examining individual cases 
of military incursions, are of limited value in the 
construction of a generalized conceptual framework which, 
in turn, may lead to a diachronic model of superpower 
military intervention and involvement in local wars. This 
viii 
study was conceived as a first contribution towards such a 
model. The research design was based on two principal 
methods: first, "soft" systems thinking and practice and, 
second, the comparison of case studies. Military 
intervention was conceived as a "human activity" system 
which, like all such systems, largely defies precise 
measurement or manipulation. Thus, the main purpose of 
this study derived from a desire to offer a conceptual, as 





In the four decades since the end of the Second World 
War, the "general" peace achieved by the defeat of the 
Axis has been an almost exclusive privilege of the 
developed world. Most other areas of the globe continue 
to experience violent local conflicts which have already 
caused millions of casualties, pushed destitute people 
further into misery, and seriously undermined the long- 
term future of many smaller nations. From perennial 
guerrilla warfare in Africa and Latin America to major 
local wars like the interminable bloodletting between Iran 
and Iraq, these "smaller" conflicts are pregnant with 
escalation risks and, according to an increasing number of 
qualified observers of the international scene, should be 
treated as serious threats to international peace in the 
closing years of this century. It was the author's 
concern with such "small" wars, and their impact upon 
world order, which served as the initial motivation behind 
this study. 
The Study of War 
There is perhaps no other phenomenon in human history 
more avidly and continuously studied as that of war among 
nations. Wars have existed as long as man has. Ever 
since the first primitive hunter turned his crude weapons 
against his neighbours, wars have helped create, but also 
1 
totally obliterate, city-states, empires, nation-states 
and civilizations which, at the apogee of their power, 
seemed invincible to any plans conceived by man to 
1 
overthrow and destroy them. 
Wars have always overwhelmed the human mind, but they 
have also caused it, in a rather ironic twist, to engage 
in impressive creative activity in every conceivable area 
of endeavour. That nations are prepared to drive 
themselves beyond the limits of physical, mental, moral, 
and material endurance in order to promote war efforts is, 
to say the least, baffling and sad; and upon reflection, 
it may appear as the ultimate proof of the pessimist 
philosopher's suspicion about mankind's essential 
irrationality. Nevertheless, war, as the ultimate test of 
individual as well as collective courage, dedication, and 
strength, continues capturing the best (and without doubt 
the worst) qualities in man. And if nations are not 
actually fighting, they neither fail to invest handsomely 
in preparing for combat nor lose their interest in 
studying the phenomenon of war. 
Many thinkers throughout the ages have tried to bring 
war under "scientific" scrutiny in order to analyze its 
causes, capture its essence into "images" of international 
relations, comprehend its connection with human behaviour, 
and, last but not least, search for ways to reduce its 
occurrence and, even, abolish it altogether as an 
expression of human conflict. For all the dedicated 
labours of scholars, however, reaching a "general" theory 
2 
of war remains elusive. The analysis of the phenomenon 
itself is plagued by methodological and conceptual 
ambiguities which make the elaboration of theories an 
often hopeless task. To briefly illustrate, many 
prominent attempts have been waged in pursuit of a 
comprehensive list of the "causes" of war. Still though 
our understanding of the forces behind armed conflict is 
very much a product of intuition rather than the result of 
some universal set of attributes. Quincy Wright's 
observation, expressed over forty years ago, is quite 
relevant today: 
To some a cause of war is an event, condition, 
act, or personality involved only in a 
particular war; to others its is a general 
proposition applicable to many wars. To some it 
is a class of human motives, ideals, and values; 
to others it is a class of impersonal forces, 
conditions, processes, patterns, and relations. 
To some it is the entrance or injection of a 
disturbing factor into a stable situation; to 
others it is the lack of essential conditions of 
stability in the situation itself or the human 
failure to realize potentialities. 2 
Questions we ask about the constancy of war as an 
international phenomenon are equally perplexing. Is war 
inherent in human nature, an expression of primeval 
instincts inherited from some distant prehominids? Or is 
war the creation of homo sapiens, an "art" that he 
developed to make force a more effective instrument in 
winning power, wealth, and influence? If war is learned 
behaviour, could this mechanism of learning how to use 
one's best abilities for destruction rather than 
construction be reversed and, eventually, eliminated from 
human society? What is the relationship between a "bad 
3 
polity" and war? Do "bad" societies cultivate warlike men 
or do pugnacious men create aggressive societies? And 
does the evolution of nation-states as organized 
collectivities lead to more violence? 
Given these complex questions, the study of war has 
taken many different directions. Scholars, depending on 
their academic training and their particular analytic 
preferences, have chosen approaches drawing upon a diverse 
body of disciplines in their efforts to explain the 
nature, causes, and future of war. These different 
approaches have been discussed in greater detail elsewhere 
3 
and are presented in brief form below: (1) The 
biological approach recognizes war as a fight for survival 
of the fittest. It adopts a distinctly Darwinian line of 
argument and draws its empirical basis from the 
observation of animal behaviour, animals being "our 
4 
closest evolutionary relatives". 
(2) The Psychological and socio-psychological approaches 
identify war with learned group behaviour, implying that 
man is not necessarily aggressive by nature but, rather, 
that he is born in a "grey area" of being neither 
pugnacious nor entirely peaceful. War is thus attributed 
to feelings of "mass hostility" stemming from the clash of 
5 
"national psyches". 
(3) The anthropological approach has traditionally sought 
to explain war in terms of cultural experience and 
socialization. The main arguments here are similar to 
4 
those of the socio-psychological approach: increases in 
the sophistication of a given culture are linked to 
increases in the occurence of warlike behaviour. 
Conversely, lack of sophistication is seen as a serious 
factor in less frequent uses of organized armed violence 
6 
against "hostile" groups. 
(4) The ecological and geopolitical approaches share as 
their main point of departure man's supposed desire to 
acquire new territory and expand into richer "living 
space". Theories of war based on the territorial 
imperative are among the oldest and most influential. 
Classical geopoliticians, like Admiral Mahan and Sir 
7 
Halford Mackinder, placed secure geographical 
"positions", and policies to expand into "virgin" 
territories, at the foundation of a nation's power and 
long-term prosperity. Geopolitics have indeed survived 
the Second World War and entered the calculations of 
modern leaders: Western theories of "containment" and, 
more recently, the so-called Nixon, Brezhnev, and Carter 
doctrines reiterated the significance of "geostrategic" 
factors in the superpower competition. 
(5) The legal approach to war is less concerned with the 
nature or the causes of war; it rather focuses of the 
ramifications of a state of hostilities, trying to relate 
armed conflict to a certain body of legal rules 
collectively known as the law of war. Thus war is 
"considered a legal condition which equally permits two or 
5 
more hostile groups to carry on a conflict by armed 
8 
force". Some of the most common areas where the law of 
war tries to establish universal criteria and restraining 
practices are definitions of "aggression", aiming at 
assigning responsibility for war initiation, the 
protection of territorial integrity of states and 
sovereign rights of governments, the treatment of 
prisoners of war and rules for their exchange or 
repatriation, and the processes of negotiation with the 
view of the peaceful resolution of conflicts. 
(6) The moral approach to the study of war, being highly 
subjective and lacking any hard "operational" principles, 
remains the cause of bitter intellectual disputes. Most 
modern Christian theorists reject war as an immoral 
practice. Nuclear weapons and the visions of a nuclear 
holocaust have made ethical questions even more difficult 
9 
to contemplate. Calls for the declaration of nuclear 
weapons as "immoral" (recently supported by the majority 
of Catholic bishops) are countered by "realists" stressing 
the dangers of unilateral disarmament--or, even, the risks 
in rejecting particular kinds of conventional weapons on 
solely moral grounds. 
(7) Overlooking almost every consideration involved in 
all the previous approaches, the military-technical 
approach treats war as a separate phenomenon governed 
exclusively by the dynamics of battle and/or technical 
matters associated with the conduct of operations. 
6 
Because such analyses of war bypass the political 
dimension of conflicts, and devote little effort in 
examining the destructive consequences of armed violence, 
the military-technical approach is severely criticized by 
the liberal segments of the non-military community, and 
frequently rejected outright as the product of 
"militarism". The evils of the military-technical 
approach as an influence upon policy have received renewed 
publicity in recent decades. It is generally assumed, for 
instance, that the connection between "the military- 
industrial complex" and the unprecedented diffusion of 
weapons technologies is growing into a veritable threat to 
world peace. The nuclear arms race is only one aspect 
(but the most dangerous, it is asserted) of this wild 
proliferation of destructive weapons which has be somehow 
curbed before the final catastrophe occurs. 
Toward's a New Method 
While all the above approaches endure in the ongoing 
study of war, post-1945 analysis of international conflict 
has benefited significantly from the systems approach to 
international relations. Here the focus shifts towards an 
empirical "scientific" method of analysis which has two 
main aims: First, to devise meaningful models of the 
complex interactions among modern states (but also sub- 
national entities) on a global scale; and, second, to 
generate if not fully accurate at least rational 
assessments of the future. From the standpoint -of 
international systems analysis, war is an extreme form of 
7 
conflict and is considered a byproduct of a combination of 
variables--in contrast to the "single-track" analysis 
adopted by the above approaches to its study. It is 
therefore appropriate at this point to look into systems 
and models in some greater detail. 
The Need for Clarity 
Social science is not a field where analysis benefits 
from the predominance of accuracy and order. Concepts and 
"patterns" of action rarely--if ever--present themselves 
in a neat and coherent fashion. To take the example of 
international relations, even a cursory look at the 
"international community" reveals a mass of nation-states 
(not to mention quasi-national entities and assorted other 
collectivities like 'national liberation' movements) 
engaged in a constant game of bargaining, coercion, and, 
more often than not, violence. This game, even in the 
eyes of the occasional undaunted optimist, seems to have 
few rules and fewer players whose actions are determined 
by a universal sense of fairness rather than an incessant 
pursuit of narrowly defined interests. 
Yet the view of the world as a simple agglomeration 
of actors whose activities proceed in a disconnected and 
haphazard fashion has never appealed to scholars. 
Consequently, the search for universal principles which 
presumably lie beneath this apparent free-for-all in human 
relations has been at the center of scholarly efforts 
dating back to the days of Aristotle. In more recent 
8 
times, the study of the social sciences has grown into a 
highly elaborate form of enquiry which, aside from 
borrowing methodological tools from other disciplines, has 
evolved its own specialized methods and analytical 
devices. 
The modern social science investigator strives to 
attain two parallel goals. First, to establish a 
theoretical framework founded on methods which offer high 
analytical precision and hence validity to his findings; 
and, second, to develop rigorous processes for the 
prediction of future events (an undertaking that has 
become central in the field of International Relations). 
Since the 1950s both these goals have occupied the foci 
of intensive "scientific" research giving rise to a 
substantial (and growing) body of literature and the 
creation of various sub-disciplines dealing with 
specialized areas of investigation (characteristically, 
forecasting and prediction have prompted a range of sub- 
disciplines variously referred to as 'futuristics', 
'future research', 'global forecasting', 'future studies' 
and the like). 
The Scientific Method 
Although the connotation of the word "science" may be 
different in the minds of different people, there is 
invariably a certain sense of mystique associated with 
the term--which creates the impression that the 
"scientific" method is a highly formalized and abstract, 
if not incomprehensible, concept bordering, in certain 
9 
exaggerated cases, on the metaphysical. 10 
In practice, however, being "scientific" may be seen 
in far simpler terms. We can argue, for example, that the 
scientific method is a way of discovering and organizing 
knowledge into coherent bodies which, in turn, can be used 
in the testing, validation, modification, or rejection of 
whatever hypotheses we wish to investigate. In this 
context, the scientific method seems hardly the exclusive 
domain of the laboratory sciences. Thus, using the 
scientific method, and its verifiable and self-correcting 
processes, presumably minimizes the dependence on 
arbitrary approaches whose results may be satisfactory 
from our individual point of view but often in no 
position to claim universal acceptance (i. e. occupy the 
high ground of 'theory'). 
Devising the Scientific Method 
Three of the most commonly quoted difficulties in 
attempting to devise a scientific method for the social 
sciences are those of ambiguity, uncertainty, and 
complexity. Unlike physical phenomena whose causes and 
impact upon the environment may be-examined and analyzed 
through controlled laboratory experiments, the phenomena 
which concern social science are abstractions immune to 
the traditional scientific methods of laboratory research. 
To take again the example of international relations, the 
phenomena that occur within the "community of states" 
originate in circumstances which more often than not are 
unclear and open only to educated speculation; cause 
10 
"event chains" which may or may not be immediately 
observable; and rarely, if ever, repeat themselves exactly 
although their outcome may be similar. As Professor 
Morgenthau lucidly put it: 
The events he [the analyst] must try to 
understand are.... unique occurrences. They 
happened in this way only once and never before 
or since. On the other hand, they are similar, 
for they are manifestations of social forces. 
Social forces are the product of human nature in 
action. Therefore, under similar conditions, 
they will manifest themselves in a similar 
manner. But where is the line to be drawn 
between the similar and the unique? 11 
The effects of ambiguity are compounded by those of 
uncertainty. While the laboratory scientist is able to 
measure and control events occurring in his laboratory 
with little dispute (based on his own senses and existing, 
tested, and recorded technical criteria), the observer of 
international politics enjoys little such luxury and 
frequently depends on his intuition alone for arriving at 
conclusions about specific occurences on the international 
scene (for example, 'hostility' between states is said to 
occur when we observe steady 'deterioration' in mutual 
relations--although, in the capacity of outside observers, 
we have no way of measuring 'hostility' or controlling 
'deterioration' and have no tested method of telling when 
these apparently existing conditions will degenerate 
further into overt armed violence). 
Furthermore, "human nature in action" creates a 
bewildering array of variables which apparently co-exist 
and interact with each other to generate an infinite 
number of phenomena. Complexity makes cross-national 
11 
comparisons vague, and often meaningless, due to the vast 
amount of data one must shift through in order to form an 
empirical base for his conclusions. It imposes heavy 
research costs (although the advance in microprocessor 
technology in the last half decade is rapidly reducing the 
economic burden in this area); and it makes the process 
for establishing general criteria for the evaluation of 
the relationships that presumably exist among these many 
variables cumbersome and imprecise. 
The Systems Approach 
In the immediate post-war years, the search for an 
approach to the study of the social sciences which could 
minimize the effects of ambiguity, uncertainty, and 
complexity--and, eventually, generate the social science 
scientific method--led to the rapid rise of the systems 
approach idea. According to Simon Ramo: 
The systems approach is a technique for the 
application of a scientific approach to complex 
problems. It concentrates on the analysis and 
design of the whole, as distinct from the 
components or parts. It insists upon looking at 
a problem in its entirety, taking into account 
all the facts and all the variables, and 
relating the social to the technological 
aspects. 12 
During the 1950s and 1960s terms like "systems analysis", 
"systems concepts", "systems thinking", "system science", 
"systems research", "systems methodology", and "systems 
education" became common in the social sciences 
literature, a fact which demonstrated the adoption of the 
systems approach, a method which derived its lineage from 
the "hard" science of engineering, by the so-called "soft" 
12 
sciences as well. Interdisciplinary research based on 
systems ideas was particularly stimulated and sustained by 
the rise of a generation of systems theorists who worked 
for the RAND Corporation and by the introduction of 
systems analysis as a separate division in the Pentagon 
13 
during the tenure of Defense Secretary Robert McNamara. 
System Definition 
A "systems" approach means little indeed without a 
working definition of the concept of system. The word has 
unfortunately many common usages and relates to a wide 
range of phenomena. We often speak, for example, of 
social, economic, cultural, defence, medical, or 
biological systems, to name just a few. This "lexical 
14 
laxity" has not gone without criticism but still "system" 
has become a widely used term whose use subtly implies 
"scientific" orientation. As Professor Laszlo put it: 
System is one of the most popular terms 
currently in the scientific vocabulary. It has 
penetrated the language of everyday life, and 
has created a vague assumption that if something 
is or acts like a system, it is efficient, up to 
date, and even good. 15 
The variety of perceived systems however, leads 
inevitably to the problem of a definition generaliz. ed 
enough to grasp the richness of diversity but relatively 
free of prejudice upon its applicability. One useful 
beginning is the definition by Kast and Rosenzweig which 
identifies a system as "an organized complex whole: an 
assemblage or combination of things or parts forming a 
16 
complex or unitary whole". This statement, on the other 
13 
hand, does not mention the distinct relationships between 
system elements (or with other elements outside the system 
for that matter) and therefore needs further refinement. 
Morton Kaplan's own (but rather murky) definition tries to 
grasp this added dimension by stating that: 
A system of action is a set of variables so 
related, in contradistinction to its environment, 
that describable behavioral regularities 
characterize the internal relationships of the 
variables to each other and the external 
relationships of the set of individual variables 
to combinations of external variables. 17 
A translation of Kaplan's formulation into simpler terms 
leads to a system definition like the one offered by Brian 
Wilson: 
---the system is first of all a set; i. e. it 
contains elements that have some reason for 
being taken together rather than some others. 
But it is more than just a set, it also includes 
the relationships that exist between the 
elements of that set. 18 
Whatever definition we might choose, it is important to 
note, as Ackoff observes, that the systems we decide to 
study are indeed behavioural systems (i. e. their 
components display behaviour we wish to explore) by virtue 
of the way we conceptualize them--in other words, systems 
do not exist because some unwritten law of nature provides 
so, but rather because scholars have made choices in 
respect to the method they wish to employ in studying 
different phenomena. Ackoff's example is illustrative: 
---we would not normally think of a man who 
starts a car as a system because we do not 
distinguish the parts of the man involved in the 
component acts. We may, however, consider man 
as a biological system when studying the 
metabolic process. A physical entity is 
considered a system if the outcome of its 
14 
behavior is conceptualized as the product of the 
interactions of its parts. Therefore many 
entities may be studied either as elements or as 
systems; it is a matter of the researcher's 
choice. 19 
Applying the Systems Approach 
The central attraction of the systems approach in 
examining social phenomena was its capability to bring 
precision into areas of traditional theoretical and 
methodological "fuzziness" and its relative ease in 
generating meaningful representations of abstract 
processes and relationships (i. e. models of which more 
below). 
Moreover, the systems approach, by launching detailed 
analysis of "whole" instead of "partial" problems, and of 
their implications upon both theory building and practical 
decision-making, introduced a highly structured method to 
the tackling of previously unassailable "black boxes" 
apparently responsible for "some poorly understood 
20 
transfer function" converting inputs into outputs. 
Whereas the classical (Newtonian) scientific approach 
attempted "to derive various properties of the whole 
object directly from the properties of its parts without 
considering possible interactions between the parts at 
all", the systems approach assumed "that properties of the 
whole object depend not only on the properties of its 
parts but also on all possible interactions between 
21 
them". As Peter Checkland put it: 
The system outlook, accepting the basic 
propositions of science... assumes that the 
world contains structured wholes (which include 
15 
soap bubbles, slow-worms and social systems) 
which can maintain their identity under a 
certain range of conditions and which exhibit 
certain general principles of _ 
"wholeness". 
Systems thinkers are interested in elucidating 
these principles, believing that this will 
contribute usefully to our knowledge of the 
world. 22 
The systems approach encompasses a number of 
disciplines such as cybernetics, information and 
communication theory, artificial intelligence, operations 
research, systems analysis, and economic systems theory 
(all of which may be also viewed as components of a grand 
23 
general systems theory). Of particular interest to the 
social scientist are the methodologies of systems analysis 
and, to a lesser degree, its predecessor, operations 
research. 
The Emergence of Modern Systems Analysis 
Systems analysis grew directly out of operations 
research as it was practiced during the Second World War 
for solving problems related to war requirements. Given 
wartime constraints and pressures for speedy but effective 
solutions, operations research concentrated on producing 
"... 'cookbook' approaches to narrow and highly specific 
24 
problems" of mainly techno-economic nature. Systems 
analysis, on the other hand, pushed beyond these narrow 
limits to become "global" in its ways of looking at 
problems and attempting to associate technical elements 
with larger societal issues in a systematic, goal-oriented 
way. In its decision-making context, one of the early 
RAND systems analysts defined systems analysis as 
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---a systematic examination of a problem of 
choice in which each step of the analysis is 
made explicit wherever possible 
and contrasted this method 
with a manner of reaching decisions that is 
largely intuitive, perhaps unsystematic, and in 
which much of the implicit argument remains 
hidden in the mind of the decision-maker or his 
adviser. 25 
Systems analysis, always operating from an inter- 
disciplinary standpoint, employed diverse techniques to 
evolve into two main branches, the one quantitative- 
oriented making use- of mathematics and sophisticated 
methods of statistical analysis to arrive at 
mathematically "elegant" solutions to "hard" problems 
associated with industrial production or similar areas, 
the other addressing "soft" problems which emerge from 
human social interaction and encompass non-quantifiable 
concepts. Thus, systems analysis entered the fields of 
sociology, political science, anthropology, geography, 
psychology, and economics, and became closely associated 
with management science concerned with the development 
and control of large organizations. 
Although the idea of systems traces itself along 
historical lines extending as far back as the ancient 
Greek philosophers, the emergence of a modern general 
theory of systems is mainly credited to the writings and 
studies of a German biologist, Ludwig von Bertalanffy. It 
is Bertalanffy's central theme that classical physics and 
mathematics are inadequate means for the study of 
biological and social phenomena since both disciplines are 
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unable to offer perfect solutions to relevant problems. 
What is necessary instead is a novel form of abstraction 
based on a "unifying" science which could eventually lead 
to "exact" theories in regard to real-world phenomena. In 
Bertalanffy's own words: 
(1) There is a general tendency towards 
integration in the various sciences, natural and 
social. 
(2) Such integration seems to be centred in a 
general theory of systems. 
(3) Such theory may be an important means of 
aiming at exact theory in the nonphysical fields 
of science. 
(4) Developing unifying principles running 
'vertically'through the universe of the indivi- 
dual sciences, this theory brings us nearer to 
the goal of the unity of science. 
(5) This can lead to a much needed integration 
in scientific education. 26 
Bertalanffy's ideas, albeit not immediately popular, were 
eventually accepted as a much-needed response to the 
reductionist scientific approach with its 
"overcompartmentalized research and piecemeal analysis" 
that resulted "in particularized 'facts"' but failed "in 
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relevance to anything of human concern". 
The Classification of Systems 
Classifications may vary according to individual 
research preferences prompting many sub-groupings. One 
earlier and widely accepted hierarchical classification of 
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systems has been suggested by Kenneth Boulding. He sees 
nine system levels comprising the universe: 
(1) Static Structure or Framework (e. g. world 
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geography); 
(2) Simple Dynamic or Clockwork (predetermined 
motions, e. g. a watch); 
(3) Control Mechanism or Thermostat (self-regulating 
equilibrium, i. e. homeostasis; idea of cybernetics); 
(4) Open system or Cell (self-maintaining structure; 
beginning of differentiation between living and non- 
living forms); 
(5) Plant (absence of sensory reactions but division 
of labour among components); 
(6) Animal (information receptors, various images 
based on information processing; any animal); 
(7) Human (symbolic language, logic, self- 
consciousness; human beings); 
(8) Social (complex organization, communication, 
historical record, human emotions, art symbolization; 
any 'social' system); 
(9) Transcendental (unknowables). 
More recently, Checkland has introduced the following 
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typology of systems as summarized by Wilson: 
(a) Natural systems. Physical systems which 
make up the Universe in a hierarchy from 
subatomic systems-through the systems of 
ecology to galactic systems. 
(b) Designed systems. These can be both 
physical (tools, bridges, automated 
complexes) and abstract (mathematics, 
language, philosophy). 
(c) Human activity systems. Generally 
described by human beings undertaking 
purposeful activity such as man-machine 
systems, industrial activity, political 
systems, etc. 
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(d) Social and cultural systems. Most human 
activity will exist within a social system 
where the elements will be human beings and 
the relationships will be interpersonal. 
This is different in nature to the other 
three classes in that it spans the 
interface between natural and human 
activity systems. Examples of social 
systems would be the family, the community, 
and the boy-scout movement, as well as the 
set of systems formed by groups of human 
beings getting together to perform some 
other purposeful activity, such as an 
industrial concern, a choral society, or a 
conference. 
System Boundary 
Although, at first glance, system boundaries seem 
easy to define, in practice attempts to specify the 
frontiers of a given system may pose serious problems. 
These problems are especially pronounced in the case of 
human activity and social systems which lack the clear 
physical outlines of natural and designed physical 
systems. As the level of abstraction increases so does 
the inability of the researcher to elaborate the necessary 
conditions and/or properties which characterize system 
components/actors and thus create the dividing line 
between one particular "whole" and its fellows within the 
Universe. Boundary definition, therefore, depends to a 
great extent upon the researcher's own purposes. As 
Kramer and de Smit put it: 
It thus seems that a boundary can only be 
defined as something imaginary or conceptual 
inasmuch as everything within it can be 
considered as part of the system, and everything 
outside it as part of the environment. This 
means that the boundary is determined by a 
number of criteria which entities have to fulfil 
to be considered part of the system". 30 
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Open vs Closed Systems and the Environment 
What we may call the "permeability" of boundaries 
determines whether systems are open or closed in relation 
to their environment. As environment we may define the 
Universe (and the entities therein) which lie beyond the 
stated system boundaries (it follows that if we call the 
Universe a Super System then every system in it is in fact 
a sub-system of the Universe). Systems and their 
environment may be viewed as either in interaction or in 
total separation. In the former case, a system is termed 
open, in the latter as closed. 
Closed systems exist mainly in the physical sciences 
and "are considered to be isolated from their 
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environment". Closed system components are neither 
influenced from or influence themselves ouzsiae 
actors/systems. Closed-system thinking has been applied 
in examining the processes of internal management in large 
organizations--under the assumption that such organi- 
zations possess "sufficient independence" from outside 
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interference. On the other hand, open systems 
approaches are mainly found in the social sciences where 
there is an assumption of "dynamic interaction" between 
system elements and elements of other systems. Open 
systems receive inputs, which effect and transform their 
internal structure, and produce outputs which are directed 
towards their environment. 
One of the central difficulties in open-system 
thinking is boundary definition. Given the constant flows 
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of information, material, energy etc. from system to the 
environment there is usually little distinction between 
the two. If the level of system complexity is high then 
choosing a boundary, in Laszlo's words, "is a problematic 
and somewhat arbitrary procedure.... For example, the 
system may be said to extend only to the sets of relations 
on its particular level, and the sets of relations which 
constitute its components into systems on their own level 
may be excluded from the system and taken as its 
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(internal) environment". In fact, if we accept Hall and 
Fagen's definition of the environment as "the set of all 
objects a change in whose attributes affect the system and 
also those objects whose attributes are changed by the 
behavior of the system", then it is natural to ask "when 
an object belongs to a system and when it belongs to the 
environment". But, 
The answer is by no means definite. In a sense, 
a system together with its environment makes up 
the universe of all things of interest in a 
given context. Subdivisions of the universe 
into two sets, system and environment, can be 
done in many ways which are in fact quite 
arbitrary. Ultimately it depends on the 
intentions of the one who is studying the 
particular universe as to which of the possible 
configurations of objects is to be taken as the 
system. 34 
Reciprocal Dependence 
The rules forming the bonds between the system 
components govern the action- reaction processes taking 
place within the system. An act of one system actor (or 
the common act of many actors) induces response(s) from 
other parts of the system. The outcome(s) of the action- 
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reaction process influences both the relationships between 
actors and the state of the system as a whole. The 
examination of these outcomes lies at the heart of the 
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study of systems. 
Dynamics 
Systems are "live" collectivities which undergo 
changes over time. Systems may grow, contract, split into 
their components (which may 'connect' with others to form 
new systems) and, once their "life-cycle" has been 
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completed, perish. The existence of dynamic processes 
within systems determines system behaviour and thus its 
impact upon its environment. 
Models 
Long narrative descriptions and analyses of complex 
systems may have thorough theoretical grounding, yet they 
seldom succeed in communicating clearly the logical 
interconnections which lead to them in the first instance. 
It thus became apparent that describing, studying, and 
improving large, complex systems can be much more 
effectively accomplished with the use of either symbolic 
representations of, or brief statements in'logical order 
about, system structure and behavioural characteristics. 
These system "images", either symbolic or textual, are 
called models and the process of producing them modeling. 
Given the level of complexity involved in all but the 
simplest physical systems, models are rarely exact 
replicas of the systems they represent. They nevertheless 
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should include enough information relevant to the system 
under study to allow the development of knowledge about 
it, the examination of its impact upon the environment, 
and the analysis of the logical relationships between 
components under investigation which cause particular 
system behaviours. Moreover, models do not pretend to be 
reality but rather to represent what an observer perceives 
as reality, i. e. as "good", "bad", "adequate", "feasible", 
"negative", "positive", "operative", "inoperative" etc. 
In Richard Dawson's words: 
A model of something--a physical object, a 
living organism or a social system--is a 
physical or symbolic representation of that 
object, designed to incorporate or reproduce 
those features of that object that the 
researcher deems significant for his research 
problem. The term model, as used here, refers 
to a scientific tool. It does not connote that 
the representation is an ideal or a "good model" 
worthy of emulation. 37 
The Classification of Models 
In classifying models and modeling techniques, we may 
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distinguish four different categories: 
-- Iconic: The model is a smaller-scale replica of the 
system and is expected to behave like the original 
(e. g. the model. of a ship for testing in the 
shipbuilder's experimental tank). 
-- Analogic: The model's physical characteristics are 
different from the original but its use is expected 
to produce "representative behaviour" (e. g. flow of 
water through laboratory pipes to represent behaviour 
of molten metals inside large furnaces). 
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-- Analytic: The model is expressed in mathematical 
equations and/or logical relationships with the 
belief that it indeed represents system behaviour 
(e. g. the mathematical expression of physical laws). 
-- Conceptual: While the preceding three categories 
cover models that can be either constructed 
physically or expressed in quantifiable terms, the 
conceptual category includes those models that deal 
with the qualitative aspects of a given phenomenon 
and may be expressed in schematic or textual forms 
containing statements about activities and their 
outcomes. Conceptual models are especially useful in 
the study of human activity systems. 
Modeling "Soft" Problems 
The development of social science system thinking in 
the last twenty years has directly led to the adoption of 
modeling as a separate, and continuously evolving, tool in 
studying "soft" ill-structured real-world phenomena--as 
opposed to the "hard" requirements of engineering/ 
industrial applications. A brief review of "soft" system 
environments reveals a host of variables responsible for 
our partial (or, more often, total) inability to "manage", 
in the strictest sense of the term, "soft" situations-- 
variables such as conflicting information and objectives, 
differences in attitudes, desires, and goals, intelligence 
"blackouts", communication breakdowns, crises, 
competition, hostility and so on. Modeling "soft" 
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systems, and indeed human activity o 
not entirely meet the ever increasing 
to all sorts of perceived "problems", 
simulate reality more accurately and 
learning devices. 
Modeling human activity systems 
nes, although it does 
need for "solutions" 
it does allow us to 
thus develop useful 
is, in general, an 
attempt to build a conceptual model by gathering and 
structuring empirical data related to system components, 
their activities, and the relationships between them. 
While this may appear a straightforward job based on 
essentially hierarchical methodologies, one must not 
overlook at least two major areas which may pose 
difficulties during the actual construction of the model, 
viz. the resolution level and the expression of root 
definitions. 
Resolution Level 
Theoretically, there is no limit as to the number of 
activities/observations one may include in a conceptual 
model. On the other hand, it is practically impossible, 
but also unnecessary, to enlarge models indefinitely 
turning modeling into an end in itself without any real- 
world value. Therefore, a major prerequisite in effective 
conceptual modeling is a manageable level of detail which 
is usually achieved "by excluding marginally relevant 
variables and by translating empirical information about 
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relationships into more simplified forms... "; "one must 
strive to simplify models either by ignoring details or by 
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focusing on the relevant and important". 
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Furthermore, it should be remembered that, unlike 
physical and designed systems, human activity systems do 
not materially exist--"what do exist are perceptions of 
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them in the heads of observers" influenced by the 
unquantifiable variety and richness of human endeavours. 
Hence, it is largely impossible to express general rules 
for deciding on the resolution level of a conceptual model 
without running the risk of being totally irrelevant. 
Determination therefore, of the level of detail rests with 
the researcher's purpose and is directed by the particular 
features of the phenomena under investigation. 
Root Definition 
Modelling systems requires the formulation of 
precise and laconic statements describing the essense of 
the system to be modelled, i. e. what we may call root 
definitions. Root definitions can be developed for each 
resolution level the observer chooses to work with and 
should indicate the set of activities "the system must do 
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to be the system so defined". If we assume that human 
activity systems can be generally described as continuous 
processes of input-purposeful transformation-output 
(instead of being considered mere, and rather vague, 
agglomerations of component 'states'), then a root 
definition should be capable of communicating the nature 
of the transformation which creates whatever outputs we 
observe given a specific set of inputs. 
Again, selecting the "right" root definition for a 
particular conceptual model we wish to develop is a 
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somewhat arbitrary process. Different observers have 
obviously varying perceptions of the real world and, 
therefore, decide differently on what is important and 
what is marginal. Since the content of the root definition 
depends on the observer's careful consideration of the 
relevant activities he wishes to incorporate in his model, 
there is no technique--i. e. a process which, whenever 
applied, produces almost invariably guaranteed results-- 
that can generate "good" root definitions on demand. What 
the observer can do, however, is to formulate root 
definitions carefully according to a set of criteria that 
have been discovered to form the underpinnings of 
"successful" root definitions. Smyth and Checkland have 
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suggested such a list of elements as follows: 
(1) OWNERSHIP: Sponsor or controller of the system. 
Party concerned about the system. 
(2) ACTOR(S): Who carries out the transformation 
process? Who causes the transformation to be carried out? 
Agents. 
(3) TRANSFORMATION: The transformation process carried 
out by the system. Core of the definition. Main 
activity(ies) of the system. 
(4) CUSTOMER: Victim, beneficiary, or client of the 
activity(ies) of the system. Sub-system(s) affected by 
system. Indirect object of main activity(ies). 
(5) ENVIRONMENT AND WIDER SYSTEM CONSTRAINTS: 
Environmental impositions. Interaction with super-systems 
of which system in (1) is a sub-system. 
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(6) UNQUESTIONED IMAGE: The Weltanschauung, the world 
model which makes this particular system and 
transformation process a meaningful one to consider. 
Seldom explicitly stated in the root definition but always 
relevant. 
Systems and the Study of Conflict 
One of the primary aims of international systems 
analysis is the study of international conflict. It 
focuses on three central considerations: 
--The discovery of necessary conditions which allow a 
system to remain in equilibrium, i. e. to avoid 
significant interstate violence and achieve 
negotiated settlement of disputes. 
--The discovery of conditions which contribute to 
disequilibrium and increase the likelihood of war. 
--The examination of the linkages between war and 
system change. 
The study of conflict is usually carried out at two 
different levels of analysis. At the international system 
level, actors are treated as "behaving units that possess 
some degree of autonomy in the sense that their external 
behaviour is not wholly controlled by some other 
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actor(s)". Forecasts of violent conflict among 
international actors are mainly based on their 
"behavioural" patterns, displayed during periods of 
tension or crisis, and the identification of "trends" 
related to these patterns. At the actor level, states are 
treated as mini-systems in their own right comprising 
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different subnational groups defined along ethnic, 
linguistic, economic, religious or other criteria. The 
analysis concentrates on conflict among these groups and 
tries to identify its ramifications upon the state's 
conduct on the international scene. 
International System Models 
In modern international relations studies, global 
stability-instability hypotheses have been usually 
advanced on the basis of two main international systems 
models. In the multipolar world model, actors enjoy 
roughly equivalent shares of power and no single state 
becomes dominant. System equilibrium is assured by the 
balance of power that continues to exist as long as actors 
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are willing to participate in multilateral bargaining. 
Local wars are by no means abolished, and indeed are seen 
necessary "safety valves" in local disputes not amenable 
to other forms of settlement; but large-scale war, 
involving all or the majority of system actors, signals 
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the demise of the entire system. In a bipolar world, on 
the other hand, actors cluster around two central powers 
forming two distinct "spheres of influence". Bipolarity's 
stability rests with the ability of the two dominant 
powers to arrive at a mutually acceptable notion of the 
world balance of their respective interests--and to ensure 
that secondary actors abide by the "rules of the game" 
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thus articulated. 
The advantages and disadvantages of both models have 
been debated long and hard. Supporters of multipolarity 
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argue, for example, that equilibrium is inherent in a 
balance-of-power system: the existence of many actors 
causes attention division and prevents any one of them 
from exclusively concentrating on the acts of another-- 
thus giving rise to "bogey" theories and inflated "threat" 
perceptions. Alliance politics, on the other hand, help 
create multiple "control" layers which absorb shocks from 
local crises and lead to their dissipation without serious 
consequences for the overall balance. 
Critics of a multipolar world counter that, despite 
the complex diplomatic arrangements, multipolarity, as 
differences among its actors grow, cannot escape but 
gravitate towards two rival coalitions. The example of 
the pre-1914 European balance of power is often cited as 
an example because it was unable to avert the general 
conflagration when the ultimate crisis arrived in August 
1914. On the contrary, bipolarity, at least as it existed 
during the first two decades after 1945, passed the acid 
test of major crises (communist victory in China, the 
Korean war, Cuba, Vietnam) without resulting in a third 
world war--albeit at the expense of grave ideological 
hostility between the-United States and the Soviet Union. 
Still other analysts look critically at both models, 
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arguing that a "mixed" system is perhaps a better answer 
or even that the level of polarity itself has no clear 
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connection with the incidence and intensity of wars. 
The Superpowers and "Small" Wars 
One of the major arguments in the analyses of 
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different world models is whether the involvement of the 
two superpowers in local conflicts raise the risk of 
"accidental" events which might, in turn, provoke a major 
international crisis with unforeseen consequences. Many 
specialists often "express fears about a direct 
confrontation between the United States and the Soviet 
Union resulting from their military role in a "smaller" 
war taking place far away from their shores. Indeed, such 
a "worst case scenario" seemed to take concrete form 
during the 1973 Yom Kippur war when both superpowers made 
threatening moves of direct military intervention in the 
Middle East in support of their respective allies. 
It is an undisputed fact that the United States and 
the Soviet Union, as the two major protagonists of the 
international system, are keenly interested in local armed 
confrontations and "hot-spot" crises. Although the 
complexity of the issues involved here make 
generalizations a precarious exercise indeed, it may be 
proposed that superpower interest in local conflicts 
stems, first, from the "global" nature of superpower 
security concerns and, second, from the perceived need of 
maintaining networks of "peripheral" friends and allies in 
order to protect, enhance, and secure "global security 
zones". This statement has several important corollaries: 
--The superpowers, in the process of supporting 
friends and clients, often discover that it is 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to totally 
insulate themselves from the wider implications of a 
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local conflict. 
--"Peripheral" conflicts, with the exception perhaps 
of the Middle East chaos, have so far produced no 
clear threat to the stability of the central nuclear 
balance--and have thus sustained the impression that 
"low-level" military activities in "secondary" 
theaters may be pursued by the superpowers at an 
acceptable cost. 
--Although economic assistance plays a major role 
in 
superpower global relations, military aid is 
increasingly taking over as the decisive factor in 
retaining allies, inducing others to become more 
"receptive" to specific superpower requests, and, 
last but not least, filling "vacuums" that were 
created either by a sudden shift of an actor to the 
other camp or by the radical re-structuring of 
regional power frameworks. 
Against this backdrop, it would be premature, if not 
erroneous, to suggest that the superpowers contemplate 
seriously to curb their involvement in foreign crises for 
any number of real or imaginary reasons. A reasonable 
guess would be that neither the United States nor the 
Soviet Union are prepared, at least in the foreseeable 
future, to significantly reduce their commitment to the 
protection of established patterns of influence, or to the 
expansion of such influence as opportunity arises. 
If this assumption is indeed correct--and historical 
experience so far offers little incentive to declare it 
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unfounded--then the crucial question regarding future 
superpower strategies becomes one of type of response 
rather than overall policy guidance. This study stems, 
therefore, from the desire to contribute specifically 
towards the systematic analysis of the military response 
to perceived "major threats" against the superpowers' 
"global" security interests. Presently, "military 
response" is defined as: 
--military intervention in local wars in support of 
one of the combatants; or 
--military intervention as a means of defeating "threats" which have caused sporadic armed action but 
have not yet reached the stage of full combat 
activity. 
Thesis and Methodological Comment 
The central thesis here is that the "incremental" 
methods, employed widely in the study of superpower use of 
military forces as instruments of policy, albeit useful in 
analyzing individual cases of such action at a given point 
in time, are of limited value in the construction of a 
conceptual framework which should lead to a diachronic 
model of superpower military intervention. This study was 
thus conceived as a first step towards such a model. 
A preliminary review of the literature revealed two 
"grey areas" which complicate attempts to address 
coherently the issues of military intervention and local 
war. First, from a theoretical standpoint, there is a 
perceptible lack of agreement among scholars on the 
frontier that defines actions as military intervention-- 
not to mention the general confusion on the concept of 
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intervention itself. There is also considerable fuzziness 
on the issue of "military intervention" versus "war": 
analysts often seem uncertain on whether to label a 
specific act involving military force as "war" or as a 
mere "interventionary" action. Here, as it should be 
expected, ideology and personal value judgements generated 
by political conviction play a decisive role. 
Second, from the standpoint of operational "lessons", 
the absence of a military intervention model inevitably 
constrains "policy-relevant, cross-boundary" comparisons 
that can serve as a body of valid generalizations for 
future reference. The analyst is thus left to either 
theorize for the sake of abstract theorizing, or to focus 
on a particular section of the policy-making process and 
attempt to elaborate operational "rules of the game" as 
they apply to that section. In this context, it must be 
emphasized that purely "scientific" research into military 
intervention holds little appeal for the decision-maker 
who deals with real-life situations and, therefore, has 
fundamentally different needs from the scholar whose prime 
motivation is contribution to empirical theory. Elegant 
mathematical models, statistical distribution studies, and 
philosophical analyses of conflict seem to attract little 
attention from the policymaking community--a fact that 
creates a dilemma of sorts for the individual analyst who 
wishes to be "practical" as well as theoretically 
"rigorous". 
These preliminary findings led to certain choices 
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concerning the method, content, and direction of this 
study. It is therefore necessary to underscore that this 
work attempts to cut a middle course between "pure" theory 
and the long-narrative account of historical exposition. 
The research methodology was based on "systems thinking" 
and simple modeling as discussed above. The case study 
technique, implemented in Part II, was chosen for the 
flexibility it offers the researcher. Comparing cases 
allows the construction of a coherent picture of policy 
processes during all phases--from conception at policy- 
making level to implementation by lower echelons. It also 
allows the examination of the undelying common dynamics, 
the discovery of otherwise hidden system "errors" which 
can be thus analyzed in greater detail, and the drawing of 
policy "lessons" to serve as future guidance in 
decisionmaking. 
Organization 
The study is separated into three main parts. 
The first part elaborates on the "global security system" 
within which superpower military intervention and local 
wars occur, proceeds to an overview of postwar superpower 
military intervention strategies and preferences, and 
arrives at a general discussion on the concept of 
intervention. The second part examines the historical 
record in an effort to demonstrate superpower strategies 
of military intervention "in action". The third contains 
the conclusions. 
Six case studies were chosen. Three refer to the 
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United States (Korea, Vietnam, Grenada) and three to the 
USSR (Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan). With the 
exception of Czechoslovakia, all interventions examined 
here resulted in armed resistance from local forces 
against the intervening superpower and, therefore, conform 
to the earlier definition of "military response". 
Although no fighting took place during the invasion of 
Czechoslovakia, and the intervention in Afghanistan is 
still in progress, the importance of these cases in regard 
to Soviet interventionary policies could not be possibly 
overlooked and thus both were included here. 
The increasing complexity of international politics, 
the delicate interplay between the superpowers, and the 
absence of an effective international regime for conflict 
resolution make further systematic research into military 
intervention an urgent necessity. The following chapters 
hopefully contribute towards a clearer picture of a 
phenomenon whose real dimensions and long-term impact upon 
world order remain still elusive. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE GLOBAL SECURITY SYSTEM AND THE FUTURE OF CONFLICT 
It has now become a platitude to say that the global 
system has entered a period of declining security and 
1 
increasing threats of violent conflict. As one 
commentator put it: "In large parts of the world there is 
increasing evidence of growing incapacity to cope with 
emerging problems and crises, both domestically and 
internationally. The old confidence has given way to a 
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mood of concern, perplexity, and confusion". Specific 
exegeses regarding the deeper causes of such 
"instability" vary according to a wide range of factors-- 
from revolutionary politics and the socioeconomic 
dislocations caused by modernization to the decline of the 
nation-state and the attendant corrosion of established 
3 
norms and values. These complex theoretical questions 
aside, general agreement seems to exist on the fact that 
the present "insecure" state of flux arose due to a number 
of salient events which occurred in the late 1960s and 
the 1970s. 
Prominent among them is the demise of the familiar 
US-Soviet bipolar world model which prevailed during the 
immediate post-1945 period. Bipolarity was succeeded by 
a loose multipolar system which sprung from the breakup of 
the colonial empires, the energy crises and the diffusion 
of economic power, the growing number of regional and 
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local conflicts, the retrenchment of the United States 
after Vietnam, and the enhanced role of such actors as 
the Western European states, China, and Japan. These 
developments reduced the cohesion of existing blocs and 
reinforced the determination of lesser actors to pursue 
policies not entirely "approved" by either the United 
States or the Soviet Union. 
On the other hand, the emergence of the loose 
multipolar system, while it generated radical changes in 
the relationship of the two superpowers with the rest of 
the world, did not minimize the deciding influence of 
their confrontation upon international relations. The 
US-Soviet nuclear arms competition continues to pose the 
main threat to the longevity of the present global system 
not to mention the survival of human society. Having said 
this, the prominence of arms control issues, and the 
publicity they justifiably receive, do not necessarily 
mean that the superpower competition is by definition a 
military one. Superpower interaction is increasingly 
dominated by economic issues for example. Food exports, 
development of energy sources, trade in advanced 
electronics and other sensitive technologies are only some 
of the dominant economic themes which both sides consider 
vital for the future of world economic, and hence 
political, stability. In fact, the growing gap between 
"planned" and "capitalist" economies and the pace of 
economic modernization seem to concern the current Soviet 
leadership at least as much, and perhaps even more, than 
4 
the nuclear arms race itself. 
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The Global Security System 
Speaking of the "global security system" requires a 
certain degree of clarification. First, "global security" 
may be defined as the aggregation of relationships which 
govern the continuing survival or demise of individual 
national actors. These relationships derive from 
transnational activities (e. g. flows of foreign military 
aid, diplomatic pressures of one actor upon another, etc. ) 
and determine the distribution of power within the 
5 
system. No individual actor is capable of achieving 
total protection against outside interference, although 
the effort to protect one's interests as best as possible 
never ceases. Thus, national security strategies strive 
"... to preserve the nation's physical integrity and 
territory; to maintain its economic relations with the 
rest of the world on reasonable terms; to protect the 
nation's institutions, and governance from disruption from 
6 
outside; and to control its borders". 
Second, there should be recognition of the centrality 
of the two superpowers, and their respective foreign 
policies and military strategies, in any such system. The 
two superpowers continue to command considerable influence 
upon individual actors within their loosely defined 
"spheres of influence" and, as a result, retain the 
potential to cause fundamental changes in the system 
itself. "Influence", however, does not automatically mean 
"control". As recent history demonstrates, neither 
superpower finds it easy to dictate policies to lesser 
states. As the politics of global economic interdependency 
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grow more complex, and the revolution in communications 
dilutes national frontiers, both Washington and Moscow 
find themselves in the rather ackward position of having 
to pursue intricate accommodation policies vis-a-vis many 
literally "fourth-rate" states. Furthermore, worldwide 
proliferation of relatively cheap, but sophisticated, 
conventional weapon systems have raised the price of 
military encounters to prohibitively high levels, even for 
powers which previously could prevail over lesser 
opponents with relative immunity. 
Third, the presence and perpetuation of conflict is 
an inseparable, and perhaps the most important, property 
of the global security system. The root of conflict is 
7 
change--or, as some would prefer it, "transformation". 
Change breeds conflict and vice versa. As de Reuck put 
it, conflict has 
both destructive and constructive aspects. It 
can be both a warning and a promise: it heralds 
progress and growth as well as death and decay. 
We are thus led to view conflict as a decision 
process which selects alternative futures. 
There can be no question, therefore, of the 
suppression of conflict--alternative futures are 
forever before us--but violence can often be 
replaced by other decision processes which are 
either less costly and more rational, or more 
persuasive and less power-laden. 8 
Finally, it should be underscored that the stability 
of, and conflict within, the global security system are as 
much dependent on power relationships between actors (i. e. 
on the content and evolution of international relations) 
as on the internal developments within each separate 
national system. This is a hypothesis which, albeit taken 
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for granted by many historians and political scientists, 
has evoked controversy when subjected to rigorous 
9 
analysis. Whatever the theoretical arguments may be, it 
seems proper to realize that, given the "different forms 
of government and different policies and styles" which 
exist within the international system, political power 
elites are prepared "... to go to great lengths, even to 
war, in defending their systems and institutions against 
change, external influences, and the modifications that 
international transactions and exchange of knowledge can 
10 
promote". 
The Global Security System Model 
Building a model of the global security system 
requires a framework of component "blocks" that can be 
used to describe the real world. Since the purpose behind 
modeling is to simplify rather than attempt to grasp every 
nuance of reality, the following discussion focuses on a 
framework of eight main components as follows: 
--The strategic relationship between the superpowers 
--Opposing alliance systems (NATO/Warsaw Pact) 
--Neutral and non-aligned states 
--Emerging strategic zones and confrontation areas 
--Nuclear proliferation 
--Arms transfers to LDCs 
--Resource competition, and 
--Unconventional threats (terrorism) 
Strategic Relationship 
Historically, nuclear weapons competition has been 
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the most enduring aspect of the post-war relationship 
between the superpowers. The origins of the competition 
are not difficult to trace back to 1945-49 when American 
atomic monopoly spurred the Soviets into a concerted 
effort to develop their own nuclear capabilities. That 
Stalin was denied knowledge of the massive Anglo-American 
atomic research program, which culminated in the A-bomb 
attacks against Hiroshima and Nagasaki, was only one, 
albeit perhaps the most significant, indication of the 
distrust that separated the Second World War allies. The 
existence, let alone the awesome destructive power, of the 
atomic weapon must have come as an exceedingly painful 
surprise to the Soviet leadership--and must have convinced 
them that to possess nuclear weapons was the only way to 
11 
counter the "capitalist-imperialist" atomic threat. 
The early period of the US-Soviet strategic 
competition was dominated by the overwhelming superiority 
of the United States over the USSR in both quantities of 
deployed nuclear weapons and quality of weapons 
technology. When President Eisenhower entered the White 
House in 1953, the United States had successfully tested 
its first hydrogen bomb, was already designing, producing, 
and testing smaller-yield "tactical" nuclear weapons, and 
was rapidly expanding its strategic air force soon to be 
provided with its first long-range jet-propelled bomber, 
the B-52. In contrast, the Soviet Union, still suffering 
from the enormous losses of the war, was obliged to divert 
resources away from defence and into the civilian economy 
in an urgent effort to maintain a minimum standard of 
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living for the Soviet citizen and promote the re-buidling 
of its vital industries. Thus, the Khrushchev defence 
policy stressed reduced spending on "obsolete" components 
of the Soviet armed forces (like, for example, large 
surface ships) and concentration of resources in building 
up an ICBM force that could reach the US homeland. These 
early Soviet ICBMs were plagued by many technical 
problems, however, and thus they remained essentially 
"sledgehammer" weapons of revenge without any significant 
"first strike" capability against US targets. 
This earlier phase was also a period of relative 
confusion as both American and Soviet leaders attempted to 
grapple with the wider political implications of the 
possession of nuclear weapons. This tentative search into 
the non-military ramifications of "going nuclear" was 
though hampered by the almost obsessive preoccupation with 
numerical superiority and "systems effectiveness". 
Consequently, military employment doctrine and weapons 
development came to monopolize the attention of both 
civilian and military leaders. The impressive 
intellectual work of the American civilian "think tank" 
strategists, carried out during the 1950s and early 1960s, 
for example, was overwhelmingly concerned with the 
quantitative aspects of the emerging nuclear theology 
trying to establish "cost effective" methods of 
integrating nuclear weapons into existing force 
structures, probing for "exchange ratios" during future 
nuclear conflicts, and refining the initial versions of 
12 
"deterrence theory". As a result, the salient features 
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of the superpower nuclear competition during that time 
were apocalyptic declarations on both sides, a practice 
that left little room for any serious attempt to lessen 
tensions and to conduct what was to become the "detente 
13 
diplomacy" of the 1970s. Beginning in the mid-1960s, 
however, the US-Soviet strategic relationship entered a 
new "stability" phase due to three main events. 
First, the Soviet Union became steadily more 
confident vis-a-vis its strategically stronger competitor 
thanks to the ICBM building program which slowly 
progressed through the mid-1950s and early 1960s. As ICBM 
designs improved, and readiness of the nuclear component 
rose, the Soviets also devoted an appreciable portion of 
their defence spending to "hardening" their existing 
strategic forces, the most significant development here 
being the construction of deep concrete missile silos 
designed to protect the USSR's growing inventory of ICBMs. 
This meant that Moscow could now bring into the strategic 
equation its own credible retaliatory forces to prevent a 
surprise nuclear attack launched by the "imperialist 
14 
aggressors". Breaking the barrier of inferiority, which 
had already caused the Soviets major embarrassment during 
the Cuban missile crisis, opened the way for dealing with 
the United States from a position of strength and also 
increased the credibility of Soviet claims to superpower 
status. 
Second, American policy, beginning with the Flexible 
Response strategy of the Kennedy-McNamara years, rejected 
the massive retaliation doctrine, which had prevailed as 
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the centerpiece of US defence policy during the Eisenhower 
Administrations, and took its first tentative steps 
towards increasing readiness for conventional war. The 
initial Kennedy-McNamara assumption, prompted by the 
"bomber gap" and "missile gap" scares of the 1950s, was 
that the Soviets had already attained superiority in 
nuclear armaments. However, when this impression was 
proven false by a thorough review of the strategic 
situation during the opening months of McNamara's tenure 
at the Pentagon, Kennedy resisted a return to "all- 
nuclear" doctrines and continued with the re-buidling of 
general purpose (conventional) forces. Pursuing the 
Flexible Response strategy was reinforced by 
Administration assessments which recognized insurgency 
wars as a more immediate threat to US global interests 
than a "central" war with the Soviet Union. Consequently, 
American officials began to re-discover nuclear arms 
control as a means of "managing" the US-Soviet strategic 
competition. 
Third, by the end of the 1960s, the re-discovery of 
nuclear arms control by the Americans and a cautious but 
receptive attitude displayed by Moscow on the same issue, 
had moved the two superpowers much closer to an agreement 
than ever before. Thanks to a series of initiatives by 
the Johnson Administration and, later, by the Nixon- 
Kissinger regime, Washington and Moscow entered into 
formal negotiations on limiting nuclear arms which 
culminated in the signing of the SALT I treaty in Moscow 
on 26 May 1972. SALT I was preceded, however, by a 
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general augmentation of Soviet strategic systems with the 
exception of the long-range strategic bomber force; the 
ICBM force had numerically exceeded US deployed missiles 
in 1970; and the earlier SLBM-armed Hotel and Golf class 
submarines had been supplemented by at least fifteen 
vessels of the newer, more sophisticated Hotel class each 
carrying sixteen SLBMs. By the time the SALT I agreements 
were finally signed, the Soviet nuclear weapons building 
programs had succeeded in establishing relative numerical 
parity between the US and Soviet nuclear arsenals. 
For all its real and purported shortcomings, SALT 
proved that the strategic competition between the 
superpowers could be "managed" however imperfectly. The 
lengthy negotiations offered the two sides the first real 
opportunity since the end of the Second World War to 
join one another around the conference table--which in 
itself was a major step towards reducing the mutual 
paranoia, and towards setting the stage for the adoption 
of serious "confidence-buidling" measures. In fact, in 
certain quarters of the academic/civilian strategic 
community, SALT was perceived as the culmination of "a 
process of convergence in the strategic philosophies and 
practices of the Soviet Union and the United States" which 
made the two superpowers to accept the notion of 
deterrence and strategic stability based on the concept of 
15 
Mutual Assured Destruction. 
However, those who believed in a stable US-Soviet 
strategic relationship stemming from similar views of 
deterrence theory--and hence similar practices in 
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producing and deploying nuclear weapon systems--were soon 
disappointed and, even, "shocked" by the realization that 
the Soviets had obviously not been "educated", as it was 
16 
believed, in accepting American views on deterrence. 
Even worse for the "convergence" theorists, it was clear 
by the mid-1970s that the Soviets, taking advantage of the 
elasticity of the SALT agreements and the absence of an 
effective verification regime, had expanded their nuclear 
armory well beyond capabilities adequate for assured 
destruction (as defined in the Western lexicon) in what 
was perceived as a massive buildup to attain "superiority" 
vis-a-vis the United States. These developments aroused 
a great deal of alarm in the West, led to the demise of 
detente, and signalled the resurgence of the nuclear arms 
17 
race. In any event, a closer analysis of the Soviet 
view of deterrence does reveal "convergence" theories to 
be a mix of largely wishful thinking and fallacies 
regarding Soviet concepts induced by consistent Western 
"mirror-imaging". According to Benjamin Lambeth: 
The Soviet acceptance of SALT as an appropriate 
instrument for helping manage the superpower 
competition... in no way constituted either a 
testament to any broader change in fundamental 
Soviet security conceptions or evidence of 
Soviet convergence toward prevailing American 
notions about arms control. For Soviet 
planners, the very idea of "control" is anathema 
because of its implied relegation of Soviet 
security to imposed arrangements requiring 
conscious Soviet self-denial and reliance on the 
uncertain prospect of reciprocal enemy "good 
behavior". 18 
Thus, by the beginning of the 1980s, the superpower 
strategic relationship had returned to a state of strain 
and uncertainty. Attempts to reach a new consensus on 
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nuclear arms limitations through SALT II were 
unsuccessful. The SALT process had never won the 
confidence of a large segment of the US conservative wing, 
which continued to see it as a convenient vehicle of 
Soviet maneuvering rather than an honest negotiating 
mechanism; the undisputed Soviet weapons building programs 
of the 1970s did obviously little to dispel this view and, 
eventually, the invasion of Afghanistan confirmed the 
demise of detente and the "freezing" of SALT. The 
American response to the Soviet buildup was the 
introduction of new generation strategic systems in the US 
inventory, including such controversial ones as the cruise 
missile, the B-1 bomber, and the MX (now Peacekeeper) 
ICBM scheduled to replace the deployed systems of the 
Minuteman ICBM component, all of them specifically 
"designed to strengthen nuclear deterrence" according to 
19 
ex-Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird. 
American strategic modernization programs received a 
further massive boost with the election (and re-election) 
of President Reagan. The Reagan Administration has 
consistently stressed the "vulnerability" of the ICBM 
component of the US triad and has vowed to fully modernize 
US strategic forces in order to meet the requirements of 
20 
the so-called "countervailing" strategy. First 
articulated in the Carter Administration's Presidential 
Directive 59 (PD-59,1980), the countervailing strategy 
was endorsed and reaffirmed by Reagan in National Security 
Decision Directive-13 (NSDD-13). PD 59/NSDD-13's main 
requirement is the development of capabilities to fight a 
49 
prolonged nuclear war, one which may last for days, weeks 
or even months. The countervailing strategy also 










facilities protecting key Soviet 
targets (missile silos, C3 sites, 
naval bases), and also assorted 
ary targets (like munition plants, 
concentrations of ground troops 
At present, the superpower strategic relationship 
seems to be entering yet another cycle of attempts to 
renegotiate old arms control formulas and move towards new 
"confidence-building" measures and initiatives. The 
November 1985 Reagan-Gorbachev Geneva summit, although it 
accomplished little regarding a concrete agenda for 
further action, nevertheless generated a tentative 
rapprochement which might lead to expanded, and hopefully 
substantive, dialogue between Washington and Moscow. 
Ultimately, assessments of the superpower strategic 
relationship should not be approached as a purely 
quantitative exercise. Comparison of absolute numbers 
tells us little about the actual missions that each side 
considers essential to its military effectiveness, and 
ultimately, its survival. It is, therefore, essential to 
examine the differences between American and Soviet 
strategic thinking and doctrines. This is a crucial task. 
Much misunderstanding originates in looking at Soviet 
doctrine through Western eyes, therefore, ignoring "... the 
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possibility that two very different political systems 
22 
could deal very differently with a common problem". It 
is thus useful to briefly reiterate here the chief 
differences between US and Soviet strategies "if 
deterrence fails". - 
First, Soviet military theory emphasizes surprise as 
23 
one of the most decisive factors in war. In a nuclear 
scenario, appropriately safeguarding the element of 
surprise and maximizing the effect of Soviet nuclear 
weapons are primary factors in subduing the "imperialist 
adversaries". In contrast to the confusion over "no first 
use" vs first strike that is frequently apparent in 
American strategic deliberations, Soviet strategic 
thinking appears quite clear on what must be accomplished 
during an initial phase of a nuclear conflict: disarming 
the enemy, and frustrating his attack plans before his 
nuclear weapons are launched, instead of sitting back and 
"absorbing" a first strike from the other side, seems the 
24 
preferable path for Soviet strategists. Or as Professor 
Vigor put it graphically: 
[In case of war] the whole range and strength of 
the strategic nuclear arm must be directed to 
ensuring that the enemy's factories, his supply 
dumps, his transport, his harbours, his cities 
and all that makes possible a prolonged war 
shall be smitten into nuclear dust. 25 
Having suffered immensely in the hands of "Western" 
invaders, the Russians do not seem inclined to either 
think "limited" for the benefit of their adversaries, or 
entertain thoughts of "absorbing" first strikes for the 
26 
benefit of world peace. rMz, N 
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Second, US strategic plans typically speak of a 
"nuclear exchange", meaning nuclear war, which will 
presumably involve all of the nation's strategic forces. 
In this context, the "management" of a nuclear exchange is 
a separate exercise with general purpose forces remaining 
in reserve to be deployed as need arises. The scope of 
the conflict is rarely expanded beyond the geographical 
limits of the Soviet state, and nonmilitary factors (like 
ideology for instance) are never seriously addressed. The 
Soviet approach is entirely different. A "nuclear 
exchange" will automatically involve the total military 
structure of the USSR, both conventional and strategic, a 
fact which is clearly reflected in the Soviet combined 
27 
arms approach to military operations. The conflict, 
hardly remaining confined between the two superpowers, 
will almost immediately expand worldwide involving 
respective allies and friends--the struggle being "the 
final violent convulsion in the class conflict between 
28 
capitalists and proletarians". 
Third, the countervailing strategy's main aim is to 
provide the US President with a wide range of strike 
options and the ability to order selective "lesser" 
retaliatory attacks. This is the essence of "escalation 
control", one of current US strategy's most central 
elements. Escalation control, in turn, is expected to 
enhance the chances for "mutual restraint", a condition 
deemed desirable for a speedy end to hostilities. On the 
Soviet side, there is little evidence that "selective 
targeting" and "mutual restraint", or other such 
52 
incremental controlled escalation scenarios so prevalent 
in American literature, are concepts seriously 
contemplated. Once nuclear war is joined, the main Soviet 
aim would be the total defeat of the enemy with the least 
damage inflicted upon the USSR itself. Furthermore, while 
US strategy addresses poorly the immediate pre-war phase, 
the Soviets take a much longer view and apply considerable 
thought and planning to "special operations" designed to 
penetrate and undermine the enemy rear during a severe 
crisis and immediately before large-scale hostilities. 
These operations include "diversionary acts on enemy 
territory, the liquidation of political and military 
leaders, the destruction of lines of communication and 
29 
supply and the carrying out of terrorist operations". 
It is difficult to foresee with any certainty the 
future direction of the superpower strategic competition. 
The Reagan defence modernization programs, and his 
challenge of the accepted paradox of "mutual" deterrence 
through proposals like the Space Defence Initiative, have 
undoubtedly increased Soviet fears that the United States 
has opted for a war-winning counterforce capability. If 
this is indeed the Soviet view (and there is little 
convincing evidence to show this assumption false), then 
we must conclude that Moscow perceives "that deterrence at 
the strategic nuclear level has been rendered less 
credible and in subsequent years will become even less 
30 
assured". 
If Moscow's present "mind-set" is added to the long- 
held US conviction that Soviet offensive weapons have 
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grown in numbers and capabilities well beyond the 
acceptable margins of "parity", then the future seems less 
than promising. In the absence of significant new 
initiatives (like, for example, agreement on a 
verification regime or banning of anti-satellite space 
systems), the relative disarray that presently 
characterizes efforts to curb nuclear weapons will 
continue. The critical question is how the present (and 
future) "managers" of the strategic competition on both 
sides of the ideological divide respond to the obvious 
need for conceptual leaps -- with imagination and self- 
restraint or with the toughness of old cold warriors? 
Alliance Systems 
Any serious analysis of the global security system is 
incomplete, and indeed impossible, without a closer look 
at the NATO and Warsaw Pact alliance systems and their 
relationship to the central superpower balance. The 
creation of NATO in April 1949 preceded that of the Warsaw 
Pact by six years--a fact that has never gone unexploited 
by Soviet propaganda. Eastern Europe remained without a 
formal defence system until 1955 not so much because of 
Moscow's desire to hold the high -moral ground above 
"aggressive military blocs"--a label the Soviets attached 
to NATO from its inception--but rather due to direct 
Soviet control of Eastern European armed forces, often 
exercised through the appointment of high-ranking Soviet 
31 
officers to top command posts in the "host" country. 
In the ensuing years, both alliance systems grew in 
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political, economic, and military complexity to a point 
where relations between the two dominant superpowers and 
their allies today depend increasingly on a finely-tuned 
exercise of "coalition politics". The motivating forces 
behind this exercise, and the forms and functions of the 
alliances thus maintained, vary according to certain key 
elements--such as the degree of control each superpower 
has over allied military forces in both war and peace. 
These key areas need to be comparatively examined if any 
meaningful observations can be made about the influence of 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact upon the global security system. 
Since it is impossible to offer a comprehensive exposition 
here, the following comments take a necessarily abridged 
form. 
(a) The political dimension: Historically, alliances have 
often brought together partners with few common political 
characteristics--especially in times of war when the 
necessity to repel a common foe prevails over political 
differences. In this respect, neither NATO nor the Warsaw 
Pact conform to any such historical precedent. They were 
formed by two groups of states sharing two different 
political and economic systems and sought-to protect those 
systems through formal arrangements of common military 
defence. But neither NATO nor the Warsaw Pact could be 
perceived, or indeed survive, in the long run without non- 
military cooperation. An early NATO report, for example, 
was quick to identify such cooperation as critical in the 
confrontation with the Warsaw Pact, and to call for "the 
transformation of the Atlantic Community into a vital and 
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vigorous political reality" since, and quite correctly 
many would argue, "there cannot be unity in defence and 
32 
disunity in foreign policy". 
Cohesion on political questions, or the absence of 
it, are major distinguishing features between NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact. Moscow's grip on Eastern Europe, and the 
existence of one-party states there, remain the guarantees 
of "harmony" on matters of Warsaw Pact "fraternal" foreign 
policy. According to Soviet logic, the political 
objectives of all Warsaw Pact members are "identical" 
since all Eastern European states are "proletarian" and 
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thus "linked by a single, unified 'class interest"'. The 
continuation of Eastern European subordination to Soviet 
definitions of security and interest, however, carries a 
large price in terms of strengthening popular resentment 
and embedded, anti-Russian sentiments among some of the 
34 
ruling Communist elites (as in Bulgaria and Rumania). As 
the recent events in Poland (and before that, Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia) demonstrated, suppressing this popular 
resentment may very well be impossible in the long run 
short of harsh domestic police measures or open Soviet 
armed intervention. The fact that Moscow has refused to 
recognize nationalism as a potent force of change-- 
associating any nationalist expressions with 'counter- 
revolution'--further complicates the issue of Warsaw Pact 
political "harmony" and casts some doubt at least on its 
longevity. 
On the NATO side, "harmony" is a word often lost in 
intense wrangling over alliance "common" military and 
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foreign policies. Despite organizations like the European 
Economic Community, Western Europe has failed to achieve 
any substantial degree of political integration. Western 
European nations remain individualistic entities jealously 
guarding their "sovereign" rights and pursuing policies 
defined by narrow national interests. This condition has 
not always helped in maintaining smooth relations between 
Washington and its NATO European partners. Furthermore, 
the narrowing gap between the American and European 
economies has increased Western Europe's confidence and 
its willingness to challenge American positions over a 
wide range of issues. The previous European assumption 
that the United States provided the alliance with solid 
leadership has thus been replaced by 
---a conviction... that Washington has little 
idea where it is going vis-a-vis the alliance, 
and that its decision-making processes are so 
diffuse that it could not pursue a specific 
policy even if it is a misguided one. 35 
Political disagreements between Washington and NATO's 
European members have been also deepened by changing 
perceptions among Western Europeans as to the nature of 
East-West relations and that of the Soviet "threat". 
During the 1970s, Western European governments, prompted 
by initiatives like West Germany's Ostpolitik and a desire 
to expand trade relations with Eastern Europe, became 
increasingly weary of what seemed to them as 
---being pressed to accept poor American 
judgements which were based on over-confidence 
as to what military force could achieve and a 
misunderstanding of the intentions, capabilities 
and policies of the Soviet Union. 36 
This gradual divergence of views was not an entirely one- 
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sided affair. It coincided with US attempts to pave the 
way towards meaningful nuclear weapons control, and an 
international diplomatic regime that would prevent the 
outbreak of another world war centered in Europe, via 
direct negotiations with Moscow which largely bypassed the 
NATO allies. These parallel trends led to a dual result: 
while Western Europe began to question accepted visions of 
the Soviet "threat", the United States, by entering the 
SALT cycle, also began to re-appraise its diplomatic 
approach to the alliance--which in effect meant 
downgrading "NATO as the primary means of organizing its 
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relations with the Soviet Union". 
The lack of political consensus on the nature of the 
Soviet "threat" is perceived by most observers as a 
fundamental NATO problem. In simple terms, and as 
Professor van der Beugel aptly put it during a recent 
address, "NATO is a defensive alliance and when there is 
no consensus about what it is defending against, we are in 
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trouble". One thing remains clear, however: The United 
States, for all its size and power, could never hope to 
obtain the powers of persuasion available to the Soviet 
Union in its role as the leader of the Warsaw Pact. And 
whereas Moscow's Eastern European "allies" have almost 
nonexistent capabilities to influence the political 
strategies of the Kremlin, especially on matters of 
"alliance" direction, America's European partners, thanks 
to the principle of unanimous vote that underlies alliance 
decisionmaking, are in the position to hamper, and even 
reverse, American policies pertaining to NATO strategy 
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with relative immunity. 
(b) Common defence policy and military strategy: This is 
again an area where fundamental dichotomies exist between 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Whereas the Western alliance 
has never been free from intense, and often acrimonious, 
debate on common defence, the Warsaw Pact has experienced 
only "tranquility" produced by the complete subordination 
of potential Eastern European national defence priorities 
to the "highest duty" of protecting the Soviet cradle of 
Socialism. 
Deciding on common assessments of the military threat 
posed by the Warsaw Pact, and agreeing on the appropriate 
strategy to counter that threat, have never been easy for 
the NATO allies. Deliberations about military strategy 
have become even more complex since the erosion of 
American nuclear superiority (and hence of the certainty 
of a fail-safe American strategic deterrent against a 
Warsaw Pact onslaught on Western Europe) and Congressional 
rumblings concerning the size of US conventional forces 
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assigned to NATO's Central Theater. 
The root of these difficulties can be traced to the 
essentially antithetical approaches to East-West relations 
pursued on each side of the Atlantic. NATO's European 
members, ever since the great debates of the 1970s, seem 
much more pre-occupied with broad efforts to improve East- 
West relations and promote "peaceful co-existence" with 
the Soviet empire (with which they have to share the 
Continent) than with the steady upgrading of the NATO 
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military "deterrent"--an undertaking that appears 
incompatible with the ultimate goal of easing tensions 
with the East and avoiding another war on European soil. 
Western European responses to NATO are further conditioned 
by economic constraints, which put strict limits on the 
size of defence budgets, as well as the existence of 
domestic peace movements which, in recent years, have come 
to vociferously challenge NATO's nuclear strategy and the 
presence of US nuclear weapons in Europe. 
As a result, Western European governments have been 
traditionally reluctant to endorse American estimations of 
Warsaw Pact military power and intentions without tortuous 
consultations. With American administrations still 
influenced by the ideological conflict dialectic and 
suspicions of Soviet "grand schemes" for world domination, 
these European attitudes (frequently identified as 'foot 
dragging' if not outright appeasement by some American 
commentators) continue to cause rifts within the alliance. 
Bridging these gaps is not always easy or even feasible. 
The current controversy surrounding nuclear vs. 
conventional defence strategies is only one, albeit the 
most glaring, illustration of divergence between Western 
European and American views compounded by deep-seated 
intra-European differences on the same subject. 
On the. Warsaw Pact side, and in contrast to NATO, 
peace among the "fraternal" members is ensured by tight 
Soviet control exercised not so much with the aid of 
formal collective organs as through the permanent 
stationing of Soviet combat forces in Poland, East 
60 
Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary (currently standing 
at an approximate total of 
k irr -1 divisions), the 
pervasiveness of Soviet military doctrine and training, 
the loyalty of Soviet-educated national military elites, 
materiel dependence on the Soviet Union, and last but not 
least, the permanent "background" threat of Soviet 
military intervention in case of any "bourgeois counter- 
revolutionary conspiracies" materializing within pact 
member states (like, for instance, the Solidarity trade 
union movement in Poland). Total Soviet control is 
further reinforced by Soviet nuclear weapons monopoly 
which acts as an additional safeguard of pact "cohesion". 
This enforced "tranquility" is not free of underlying 
problems, however. Causes of friction include the 
constant Soviet pressure "to 'integrate' Warsaw Pact 
forces into the whole framework of the Soviet military 
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system", the imposition of Soviet military doctrine as 
means to prevent Warsaw Pact members from developing 
"independent" military doctrines of territorial defence 
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according to the Yugoslav and Rumanian models, and the 
various differences and traditional rivalries existing 
among non-Soviet members--"such as the Czechs poking fun 
at the Poles giving themselves military 'airs and 
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graces". 
In sum, the two opposing alliances, despite internal 
fissures and problem areas, remain primary vehicles in the 
superpower competition. Although a potential military 
confrontation between them remains the focus of attention, 
this should not prevent us from appreciating the 
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importance of two additional dimensions particularly in 
respect to the Warsaw Pact: economics and domestic 
evolution towards less rigid structures of political 
control. The lethality of these two factors for the 
stability of Eastern European satellites was amply 
demonstrated during the Polish crisis which, in the 
absence of any method of "managing" the unruly Poles other 
than military intervention, could only be controlled by 
"the semi-fiction of a semi-autonomous Polish military 
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coup". 
Non-aligned and Neutral States 
Whereas non-alignment, which evolved primarily among 
ex-colonies, can be defined as only a loose political 
doctrine referring to world peaceful change and rejection 
of politico-military blocs, neutrality has been an 
established legal status recognized by the international 
community and incorporated in international treaties. 
Furthermore, while non-alignment became identified with 
the developing and underdeveloped states of Asia, Africa, 
and South America, neutrality has been the domain of 
European affluent "stable, established states that had a 
clear sense of identity" and wished to practice a 
"passive, isolationist policy of non-involvement" in world 
44 
conflicts. 
By virtue of the differences in socioeconomic 
indicators and political development, non-aligned and 
neutral states appear as two quite distinct groups indeed. 
For example, neutrals like Austria, Switzerland, Sweden, 
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and Finland, that enjoy high standards of living and free 
democratic institutions, cannot be compared with countries 
like Bangladesh, Tanzania, or Botswana in any meaningful 
fashion except in deliberate description of the glaring 
gaps separating their respective political, social, and 
economic systems. Despite these cleavages, the broad 
consensus on issues of world peace which non-aligned and 
neutral countries share, and the fact that all four 
aforementioned neutrals have been invited as observers to 
non-aligned movement meetings, may afterall presage closer 
cooperation between the two groups especially in promoting 
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productive North-South dialogue. 
In the years since 1945, non-aligned and neutral 
states have come to play an important role in the 
international system. In contrast to the neutral states' 
consistent policy of non-involvement, which tends to 
obscure their crucial contribution as diplomatic 
arbitrators and champions of peaceful resolution of 
conflicts, the non-aligned movement has become a 
vociferous, albeit not very effective, coalition of poorer 
countries currently demanding the radical restructuring 
of the international economic system--which they see as 
the essential pre-condition for the avoidance of future 
"global class war". In fact, the issues of international 
trade and foreign aid have come to dominate the non- 
aligned movement's agenda departing from the emphasis on 
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political questions of the 1950s and early 1960s. The 
Group of 77, as this coalition of southern states has 
become known, demands freer access to the markets of 
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richer countries, commodity agreements to control world 
prices and protect single-export economies from 
catastrophic fluctuations, changes in the international 
monetary system to break the total dependence of poorer 
states on the US dollar, and revision of the regime 
governing the flows of foreign development aid through 
multilateral international agencies like the World Bank. 
Against the backdrop of the present North-South 
dialogue, and the anarchy in the world commodity markets, 
it seems unlikely that the industrialized countries will 
be willing to dilute the free-market system by moving 
towards a "new international economic order" of fixed 
price relationships or other similar centrally planned 
practices demanded by the southern states. Perennial 
dissension among the non-aligned themselves, and inability 
to agree on a universal agenda for negotiations with the 
North, will also sap the efforts of the Group of 77 to 
build Third World solidarity, and will allow the 
industrialized states to continue dealing bilaterally with 
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LDCs on unequal terms. On the other hand, there is also 
little doubt that any success of the non-aligned countries 
to promote lasting economic changes will have serious 
implications for the global political system as well. To 
grossly oversimplify, success of future Third World 
"centralists" will erode the economic domination of 
Western industrial states, and hence limit their 
capability to sustain "capitalist" systems of government 
in their present form. 
This is undoubtedly a welcome prospect in Moscow's 
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view and hence Soviet policy towards the non-aligned 
states has been characterized by steady support of their 
anti-Western pronouncements. Although this tactic has not 
produced wholesale defections to the Eastern bloc, it has 
nevertheless helped to establish the Soviet Union as an 
important ideological contributor to the whole non-aligned 
movement. This fact was highlighted by the 1979 Havana 
summit conference, signalling the final acceptance of 
Cuba, a Soviet proxy par excellence, as a leading member 
of the non-aligned after years of reluctance. 
Emerging Strategic Zones and Confrontation Areas 
The past forty years have witnessed radical changes 
in the global strategic map. The most significant change 
was Europe's transformation from the central arena of 
global armed conflict into a peace zone, its stability 
maintained by the NATO-Warsaw Pact stand-off. Outside the 
"consolidated" areas of the Western industrialized world 
and those of Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and China, 
dramatic upheavals continue to feed conflict of all sorts. 
It is indeed fairly accurate to say that "peripheral" 
areas, i. e. those in the Third World, are undergoing 
processes of fundamental political, economic, and 
territorial restructuring. 
From the point of view of the superpowers, these 
"second" and "third" regions constitute the most 
significant arenas for the present and future pursuit of 
their respective strategic interests. With the European 
balance firmly established, the "periphery" offers a 
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suitable ground for "shadow wars" with the aid of local 
surrogates and -GtI 
I 
1P5-: 
m a form of competition that 
minimizes the risk of direct armed confrontation and 
nuclear destruction while simultaneously promoting a world 
network of influence and friendly "cooperation". These 
superpower Third World activities, although they seem 
quite natural ingredients of the global power game from 
the vantage points of Moscow and Washington, evoke mixed 
feelings and reactions among lesser states whose own 
interests and national aspirations the superpowers 
manipulate and often totally ignore. In this context, the 
East-West competition in somebody else's "back yard" 
becomes extremely complex but also dangerously prone to 
escalation: the two-pronged US-Soviet interaction is 
transformed into a multifaceted conflict by the infusion 
of local elements of ethnicity, religious rivalry, 
economic differences, territorial claims, and political 
divisions. 
Identifying these emerging strategic zones and 
confrontation areas is not difficult even after a cursory 
review of the historical record. Most major post-war 
crises have occurred in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, 
in other words, the underdeveloped and developing South. 
The current map of the "periphery" includes two main 
confrontation zones, the Indian Ocean, and Latin America. 
The two aforementioned zones are not of course the 
exclusive arenas of US-Soviet competition. "Traditional" 
cockpits of crisis, like the Middle East and the Eastern 
Mediterranean, receive their due amount of attention as do 
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"crisis enclaves" such as the Southern African arc, 
extending from Angola in the west through South Africa to 
Mozambique in the east, and the North-South Korean 
theater. 
(a) The Indian Ocean: This is a vast geographical area 
whose landscape is dotted with some of the most 
intractable conflicts of the postwar period. Its 
approximately four dozen independent nations are separated 
by wide variations in every index of economic development 
and political stability. Two sub-theaters can be 
delimitated here: an eastern sub-theater that stretches 
from South Africa and Mozambique to the approaches of the 
Persian Gulf; and a western that encompasses the Indian 
sub-continent and extends further to Southeast Asia and 
the Phillipines. 
The convoluted nature of local conflicts and the 
mind-boggling variety of ethnic, religious, political, and 
economic backgrounds and rivalries found among Indian 
Ocean countries have so far limited superpower maneuvering 
in the area. However, the arrival in the late 1960s of 
Soviet warships in Indian Ocean waters traditionally 
dominated by Western sea powers signalled a new era of 
superpower competition. As early as 1966, both Washington 
and Moscow were concentrating their interest on the 
"vacuum" created by the British withdrawal from imperial 
positions, a fact that prompted the late Mrs. Gandhi of 
India to denounce the "vacuum" theory and emphasize her 
desire to see local powers occupy all ex-British 
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positions. Mrs. Gandhi's call for an Indian Ocean free 
of superpower competition was reaffirmed at the 1970 non- 
aligned nations' conference in Lusaka. In a final joint 
declaration, the participating Afro-Asian countries called 
upon both the United States and the Soviet Union to 
refrain from building up their naval presence in the 
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region and to keep the ocean free of nuclear weapons. 
The calls for neutrality have not been very 
successful, however. The United States has already a 
full-fledged naval base on Diego Garcia and the Soviet 
navy conducts regular patrols of Indian Ocean waters with 
surface combatants and submarines (the use of the Cam Ranh 
Bay naval facilities has significantly increased Soviet 
capabilities to maintain naval presence in the ocean). 
Also, the Soviet Union enjoys access to naval facilities 
at Aden, the Seychelles, and Ethiopia. The oil crisis, 
the perennial struggles in the Horn of Africa, the Iranian 
revolution and the Iran-Iraq war, and the Soviet thrust 
into Afghanistan are only a few of the major events that 
have helped to shape the contours of the US-Soviet 
competition in the area. The current focus of 
international attention is on the crisis in South Africa 
where the imminent breakdown of exclusive white rule will 
diminish Western influence over a country of significant 
economic and strategic value. 
(b) Latin America: From the American point of view, Latin 
America was until very recently a "secure" region which, 
after the departure of colonial Spain, suffered no 
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incursions by foreign powers. The Latin American post-war 
status quo, continuing traditions shaped during the 19th 
century, rested on a mixture of firmly anti-communist 
military governments, economic dependency on the United 
States, and rigid social structures, buttressed by the 
inequitable distribution of land and a conservative 
clergy. Political opposition was stifled and the 
privileged landowning and military classes, invariably 
pro-American, continued to rule undisturbed. 
After 1960 this edifice began to crumble. Political 
agitation, and the birth of Marxist guerrilla movements 
inspired by the Cuban revolution, resulted in bloody 
confrontations with military dictatorships and aroused 
popular demands for real political change. The effects of 
these conflicts were further accentuated during the 
following decade when wild borrowing spawned a foreign 
debt burden in excess of $300 billion. -During this 
period, the stark impoverishment of the masses, receding 
US power after Vietnam, and resurgence of Marxist 
revolutionary movements (notably in Central America) 
combined to make Latin America much more vulnerable to 
outside, i. e. Soviet, "penetration". Although the Soviet 
Union has been particularly careful not to dispatch 
"advisors" beyond Cuba and Nicaragua (where their number 
remains small), American fears about the Cuban connection 
with leftist anti-US forces in the region, and hence about 
an "integrated" Soviet strategy to "destabilize" friendly 
Latin American regimes through Cuban-sponsored subversion, 
have grown exponentially since the "fall" of Nigaragua to 
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the Sandinistas and the eruption of guerrilla warfare in 
El Salvador. 
Presently, the United States cannot afford the luxury 
of taking its southern neighbours for granted or lending 
only token attention to Latin America's many problems. 
Diminishing US political influence coupled with the 
general Latin American trend of seeking ways to expand 
economic relations with Western Europe and Japan have 
already eroded US "hegemony" over Latin America. The 
extent to which the Soviet Union (seconded by other 
'socialist' countries) will be able to exploit the 
decrease in US preeminence remains to be seen. Soviet 
propaganda has naturally hastened to condemn "the usurious 
policy of the principal financial centers of capitalism 
(and above all the United States)" and express Moscow's 
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solidarity to the Latin American debtors. Although 
economic, political, and social turbulence offer fertile 
grounds for leftist insurgency, it should not be forgotten 
that Latin America is a total cultural, trade, and 
political stranger to the Soviet Union and its Easten 
European satellites. 
Nuclear Proliferation 
An important point, which should be made clear from 
the beginning of any discussion on nuclear proliferation, 
is that nuclear know-how (and corresponding technologies) 
carry an unmistakable military potential. It is, 
therefore, inaccurate but also misleading to speak of 
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"good 'atoms for peace' and bad 'atoms for war"'. 
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That the current membership of the "nuclear weapons 
club" remains limited to the two superpowers plus the 
United Kingdom, France, and China is the result of 
practical constraints rather than the "peaceful" 
intentions of individual governments. To take the example 
of the "good atoms" only, "civilian" programs of nuclear 
power generation require a high level of technological 
sophistication, a large cadre of appropriately educated 
scientists and technicians, not to mention the financial 
resources to build and maintain the nuclear reactor 
facilities required. Even more significantly, fissionable 
material, the "raw" fuel for nuclear reactors, is not only 
scarce but also subject to strict international transfer 
safeguards which have so far precluded the operation of a 
free nuclear market. Provided, however, that a nation 
succeeds in developing an all-around "peaceful" nuclear 
capability, the jump to weapon-grade materials, and hence 
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to "beginner" A-Bombs, is relatively short. Once enough 
such material has been accumulated, performing a prestige- 
boosting first nuclear explosion is within easy reach--if 
of course the scientific effort was directed from the 
outset towards "additional" uses. 
The advanced technology required for a viable nuclear 
industry, the huge costs involved, the scientific 
personnel requirement, the scarcity and strictly 
controlled circulation of fissionable material, and last 
but not least, the political pressures in favour of 
nonproliferation do create a formidable array of obstacles 
that bars the nuclear path for most less developed 
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countries. Yet, optimism about the future of 
nonproliferation is guarded. Aside from those 
powers, like the Federal Republic of Germany, Canada, 
Japan, and Switzerland, which have chosen not to acquire 
nuclear weapons despite their advanced technological know- 
how, there is already another group of semi-developed and 
developed countries in the nuclear "twilight" zone. Often 
referred to as pariah or threshold states, countries such 
as India, Israel, South Africa, Taiwan, South Korea, 
Brazil, Argentina, and Pakistan are known to have nuclear 
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capabilities at various stages of development. At least 
one of the pariahs, South Africa, appears to have the 
capacity to assemble a nuclear weapon "on warning", and 
Israel is believed to possess a number of such weapons in 
operational status (kept in storage at the secret Dimona 
facility) which obviously give it the choice of an overt 
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nuclear weapons posture. Libya has clearly expressed its 
desire to build a nuclear capability and tries to effect 
progress on a "cash-and-carry" basis. Iraq, until its 
nuclear reactor was destroyed by an Israeli air raid in 
June 1981, was the most likely candidate for the 
production of the first Arab bomb. Iran, until the 
disaster of the Islamic revolution, was Southwest Asia's 
potential nuclear power. And, finally, India, with its 
"peaceful" nuclear explosion of May 1974, remains the only 
pariah to have carried out an actual nuclear test and is 
assumed to possess weapon components available for 
immediate assembly. 
An almost universal assumption is that horizontal 
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nuclear proliferation, i. e. the expansion in the number of 
states with nuclear arsenals, is inherently destabilizing 
and should therefore be subject to international control 
measures. This hypothesis provides the backbone for the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)-which came into effect in 
1970. The result of a rare joint US-Soviet effort, the 
NPT was conceived as a means of effectively prohibiting 
the free transfer of weapons-related technologies, 
materials, or other devices and obliged its signatories to 
accept strict verification procedures in order to insure 
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observance of the treaty restrictions. The NPT gained 
little popularity among the so-called Near Nuclear Weapon 
States (NNWSs) and was resented by many others, 
particularly in the Third World, as an attempt to further 
constrain the ambitions of the poorer South and as "a 
cover to promote superpower national security rather than 
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the security of other states". 
What are the motives of a proliferant's drive to 
acquire nuclear weapons capabilities as guarantees for 
national security? Some of the hypotheses usually 
advanced in regard to this question are as follows: 
(a) The most common incentive is perhaps the belief that 
a nuclear arsenal will enhance one's bargaining power and 
"increase" national security by "balancing out" the larger 
(conventional) military capabilities of a "threatening" 
neighbour. Kenneth Waltz has recently argued, for 
example, that "more nuclear weapons may be better"; this 
theory envisages nuclear weapons as generators of 
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deterrence relationships between smaller states and sees 
nuclear capabilities as mainly a bargaining chip rather 
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than a contribution to "warfighting" potential. This 
theory, however, may be criticized as too optimistic in 
regard to the stability of the deterrence relationships to 
emerge from horizontal proliferation. It ignores the 
asymmetries--political, economic, military, etc--that 
exist between potential nuclear actors and assumes that 
the "nuclearized" system of smaller states will evolve 
along the lines of the US-Soviet nuclear deterrence model. 
Whether the latter (which, in any case, remains purely 
hypothetical) will indeed work under the added strain of a 
multitude of participants is a matter of conjecture. 
(b) A second incentive can be described as "battlefield 
use". Should deterrence fail, this argument goes, small- 
yield tactical nuclear weapons may be used to break an 
enemy's conventional attack launched with superior forces. 
This "last resort" scenario is especially plausible in a 
future conflict like another Middle East war between 
Israel and the massed Arab armies--provided that a 
significant erosion in the Israeli conventional 
capabilities has occurred coinciding with a proportional 
improvement in Arab combat performance. Another pariah, 
Taiwan, could also conceivably attack Chinese mainland 
ports with air-launched or rocketborne tactical nuclear 
weapons in case of a communist amphibious operation to 
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topple the nationalist regime. 
(c) Another motive may be increased status and 
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independence of action within the international community. 
Nuclear weapons can be powerful "image boosters" for 
regimes in the Third World where "losing face" carries 
heavy political costs and is frequently feared more than, 
say, a foreign military threat. India's test explosion 
did not go unnoticed by other South Asian neighbours and 
especially Pakistan. Iraq's efforts to expand its 
"peaceful" nuclear program may be associated with Sadam 
Hussain's desire to elevate his country to a leadership 
role in the Arab world--after Egypt forfeited it through 
its bargaining with Israel. 
(d) Finally, a strong incentive may be generated by 
domestic pressures for an independent nuclear force. It 
should be remembered, for example, that domestic political 
bargaining is often the determining factor in arriving at 
choices which seem quite irrational when subjected to 
independent scrutiny. It is therefore conceivable that 
acquiring nuclear weapons can be largely independent of 
purely military considerations -- but closely associated 
with the need to satisfy political parties, industrial 
lobbies, or an influential scientific community. 
Arms Transfers to LDCs 
During the last twenty years international arms 
sales, and transfers of military equipment, have 
accelerated enormously giving rise to a market 
unprecedented in history in terms of numbers of customers 
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and diversity of merchandise. As Professor Pierre 
succinctly put it in his detailed study of the global arms 
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trade: "Arms sales have become, in recent years, a crucial 
dimension of international affairs. They are now major 
strands in the warp and woof of world politics. Arms 
sales are far more than an economic occurrence, a military 
relationship, or an arms control challenge--arms sales are 
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foreign policy writ large". 
While exports from industrialized countries to LDCs 
of assembled sophisticated weapon systems, like advanced 
fighter aircraft, is still the main dimension of the 
international arms traffic, there is also a growing 
parallel trend among weapon recipients to develop their 
indigenous industrial capabilities for arms production. 
These two dimensions are rapidly becoming intertwined, 
however, as importers and exporters conclude agreements on 
local assembly and co-production schemes, sharing of 
machining techniques, advanced training in maintenance 
skills, and co-operative research and development . 
Furthermore, the net result of joint ventures has been an 
increased number of developing countries becoming arms 
exporters themselves feeding the market with a variety of 
small arms, artillery pieces, military vehicles, and 
ammunition. 
Developing countries find the trend towards 
indigenous arms production irresistible as it reduces 
dependence for defence procurement on outsiders and 
61 
creates a high-profile prestige industry at home. Some 
developing countries, such as Israel, Brazil, South 
Africa, Taiwan, South Korea, China, and India to name only 
a few, have already succeeded in reaching a level of 
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technological expertise that allows them to produce and 
market major weapon systems like supersonic jet fighters, 
main battle tanks, warships, submarines, and an array of 
missiles in addition to advanced military electronic 
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systems and associated equipment. - 
The proliferation of both arms producers and 
consumers, the speed at which arms transfers occur, and 
the amounts of sensitive military technologies available 
to parties willing and able to pay cash for their 
procurement have raised serious questions regarding the 
influence of the burgeoning arms trade upon the stability 
of the global security system. One obvious concern is the 
potential of regional arms races to dramatically disrupt 
regional military balances and lead to surprise outbursts 
of violence. There is also the widespread impression that 
unrestrained weapon transfers further promote the outbreak 
of violence by distorting the perceptions of one's real 
capabilities vis-a-vis potential adversaries; thus, it is 
asserted, the weapons trade reduces the willingness of 
opponents to negotiate non-violent solutions to existing 
differences, and hampers economic development by 
consuming scarce resources and diverting personnel to 
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unproductive tasks. 
These views do not go uncontested of course. For 
example, the de facto correlation between the acquisition 
of weapons and the outbreak of violent conflict is 
frequently questioned. In the words of Michael Moodie: 
It is difficult to accept the argument that arms 
are inherently destabilizing and cause conflict. 
If one argues that high levels of arms 
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inventories and/or more sophisticated arms 
increase the probability of conflict, then one 
must conclude that Europe is a more volatile 
region and more prone to conflict than Africa, 
the Middle East, or Southeast Asia. Yet, this 
has not proven to be the case in the post-Wolyd 
War II world, and there is little evidence to 
suggest that it will be the case in the future. 64 
There are similar questions on the issues of defence 
expenditure as an obstacle to economic development and of 
Third World "militarization". Here, the negative 
correlations and attendant condemnation, emanating from 
the assorted Marxist theorists of underdevelopment, are 
countered by scepticism towards the methods used to 
analyze statistical data and long-term projections of 
Third World arms aquisition and production profiles. As 
Onkar Marwah suggests: "the literature and statistics 
devoted to an expose of military activities in the third 
world have tended to adopt a hortatory stance [and] to 
raise inferences from statistical data that are half 
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truths if not falsification of the real situation... " 
But even when trying to honestly avoid "falsification", 
results based on "aggregate cross-national studies" have 
been found to be unsatisfactory as they tend to "entail 
substantial costs in empirical sensitivity and 
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specificity". 
Moreover, curbing- military expenditure in no way 
guarantees that Third World rulers, most of whom run one- 
party, authoritarian governments, would rush to divert 
the funds thus saved to development programs: narrow 
political interests and prestige projects are equally 
threatening "big spenders" that can undermine development 
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budgets at least as much as defence spending, if not 
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more. 
Arms exports are crucial factors in the US-Soviet 
competition. Both countries operate complex programs. of 
arms sales to dozens of friendly states. In addition, 
they also maintain large overseas contingents of military 
advisors and instructors to insure the effective 
"integration" of weapon systems into local military 
establishments. These programs are further supplemented 
with training of foreign military personnel in the United 
States and the Soviet Union. The Soviet "gun trade" 
pattern differs markedly from its Western counterpart. In 
contrast to Western suppliers, who invariably try to 
"package" arms sales along with wider trade and 
investment agreements, the Soviet Union favours "bulk" 
arms exports without any further coupling with economic 
assistance programs. This practice may be attributed to 
several factors, but most significantly, to the inherent 
inability of the Soviet economy to offer other high 
technology items in sufficient quantities for sustaining 
a multinational foreign aid program. On the other hand, 
arms sales are important hard currency earners for the 
Soviets and open up lucrative export markets which would 
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have not otherwise existed. In 1978 alone, for instance, 
total earnings from Soviet weapon sales was $3.8 billion 
which, along with sales of gold bullion, helped stabilize 





Resource competition came to the forefront of the 
public debate during the early 1970s following the jolt of 
the energy crisis. Up until October 1973, the fact that 
the industrialized Western countries absorbed the lion's 
share of nonrenewable resources and especially fossil 
fuels, like petroleum, was accepted without the fierce pen 
battles which were to erupt in the 1970s. The havoc which 
the Arab oil embargo caused throughout the world, however, 
had the major effect of sensitizing both governments and 
citizens in all parts of the world to the reality of 
diminishing resources and to the prospect of slower 
economic growth or, even worse, no growth at all. An 
equally significant corollary to the frantic search for 
ways to tackle the oil shortage was increased awareness of 
related issue areas concerning resource management and 
exploitation: the relationship between population growth 
and resource distribution, environmental pollution by 
industrial wastes, the question of nuclear power, 
conservation, food and clean water supplies, and strategic 
minerals accessibility. 
As the term "resource competition" implies, the 
current emphasis is on the conflict-generating potential 
of resource scarcity and inaccessibility. Resource 
competition is better understood if we perceive the world 
in terms of a simplified three-level "resource 
distribution" model: First, the poor vs. rich countries 
level which addresses the problem of resource transfer 
from poor to rich at unfair prices--and which remains the 
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favourite among Marxist and Neo-Marxist thinkers. Second, 
the rich vs. rich nations level which represents 
competition between "have" states for larger slices of the 
existing resource pie--more popular among Western scholars 
in the Industrial Management and related fields. And, 
third, the poor vs. poor countries level which refers to 
bilateral arguments and/or violent clashes over disputed 
resource-rich territories--which is adopted in regional 
and comparative studies of Third World conflict. 
One of the central components of the resource 
distribution model is that of "resource-energy wars", a 
concept which is now seriously discussed as one of the 
predominant forms of violent conflict during the next few 
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decades. The parameters of these wars remain open to 
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speculation. One obvious question is whether the future 
"aggressors" will be able to achieve through military 
action what was denied to them through peaceful economic 
activities. As the early-70s oilfield seizure scenarios 
72 
have demonstrated, securing normal access to sources of 
raw materials through "contingency" military strikes is 
hardly guaranteed: first, technical infrastructure, such 
as pumping systems, refineries, deep-shaft mines, and off- 
shore drilling rigs, can be easily sabotaged by the 
defenders even under conditions of total surprise causing 
chaos at the production base; and second, the risk of 
unexpected escalation with the involvement of third 
parties is often too high and negates expected strategic 
gains. 
Another analytical difficulty in understanding the 
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dynamics of resource competition lies in the definition of 
"natural resources" which, in the Western lay vocabulary, 
have come to be almost solely identified with industrial 
minerals and fossil fuels. This restricted approach 
leaves important considerations outside the analytical 
framework and confuses issues of great significance to 
individual actors. As Dorner and El-Shafie observed, 
"Natural resources... may include anything in the material 
universe that someone considers useful or beneficial or 
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potentially beneficial". Failure to appreciate these 
definitional problems obscures keen concerns of 
disadvantaged Third World nations about such essentials as 
adequate food supplies, decent housing, and clean water-- 
all assumed to be available for the taking in the Western 
industrialized countries--in addition to, say, energy at 
affordable prices. The amount of recoverable titanium or 
platinum is indeed of little relevance and/or consequence 
in an economy where the annual corn harvest determines the 
frontier between survival and famine. It is therefore 
instructive to contemplate that, in the long run, endemic 
food shortages, especially when projected against 
population growth, may be a central cause for conflict in 
addition to being future's "principal scarcity problem" on 
74 
a global scale. 
The implications of resource competition for the 
stability of the global security system have yet to be 
fully appreciated--although there seems to be increasing 
urgency in assessing the chances of resource-energy wars 
affecting the distribution patterns of critical materials. 
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It is also important to note that shooting wars are not 
the only risks inherent in colliding resource needs. What 
is potentially far more damaging is the insidious affect 
of perennial shortages on national well-being, political, 
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economic, and social. 
Unconventional Threats (Terrorism) 
During the past two decades "unconventional" threats 
have gained a high degree of prominence thanks mainly to 
the increased frequency of acts of international 
terrorism. According to US Government sources, for 
example, in the years since 1962 "700 identifiable 
guerrilla and terrorist groups have committed more than 
8,000 major acts of political violence, a third of which 
resulted in death or injury. The number of incidents is 
growing every year, and terrorism is expanding into 
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previously unaffected countries". 
Defining "unconventional" threats rather broadly 
requires examination of a spectrum of phenomena ranging 
from such familiar concepts as guerrilla war to more 
esoteric forms of "proxy" warfare and "destabilization" at 
the subnational level through clandestine operations and 
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"home-grown" subversive activities directed from abroad. 
Currently, referring to unconventional threats almost 
automatically focuses attention on terrorism; its 
potential to erode the control of states within; and its 
ability to undermine peaceful negotiation and conflict 
resolution at the international level. 
Modern terrorism exhibits a number of salient 
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features which distinguish it from past similar 
activities. 
-- First, modern terrorists, thanks to free travel and 
communication, display a vastly improved capability to 
coordinate their actions across national frontiers, to 
recruit multinational membership, and to conduct 
simultaneous campaigns of violence against targets 
separated by significant geographical distance. 
-- Second, with the exception of the inevitable lunatic 
fringe elements, terrorists today tend to be much better 
organized. Their tactical efficiency and logistics often 
frustrate counter-terrorist measures and result in 
surprisingly durable underground groups. The revival of 
the Red Brigades in Italy, the continuing activities of 
the Irish Republican Army, and the Basque separatist 
campaign in Spain are only three examples of how effective 
modern terrorist organizations can really be. 
-- Third, the terrorist's arsenal has steadily improved in 
both quality and quantity of munitions and equipment 
available at any given time resulting in proportional 
increases in the destructiveness of terrorist attacks. 
-- Fourth, modern terrorists display an unusual tenacity 
in attacking both the organized state and society at large 
through calculated murder, hostage-taking, destruction of 
property, and extensive terror bombing of civilian 
targets. 
-- Fifth, many modern terrorist movements, in their effort 
to elicit support from receptive audiences, choose to 
engage, in addition to their violent strategies, in 
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elaborate political propaganda campaigns using as 
platforms suitable "front" political parties as well as 
other sympathetic "public awareness" groups. 
-- Sixth, international terrorists have come to benefit 
from the fact that "many states tend to tolerate, appease, 
and frequently, even support the use of terrorism as an 
acceptable legitimate tool in achieving certain desirable 
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goals". The sponsorship of terrorist groups by a number 
of regimes outside the developed world is a well- 
established fact that has led to the unique contemporary 
phenomenon of what is generally recognized as a "terrorist 
state". 
-- Finally, international terrorism continues to show 
disproportional preference for attacks on Western 
industrialized democracies than against other countries. 
Attempting to assess the impact of international 
terrorism upon national security and international 
stability is a difficult exercise given the paucity of 
reliable, public-domain information about worldwide 
terrorist links and patterns of operation, the limited 
amount of research into the ideological and strategic 
motivations of terrorist organizations, and the secrecy 
that shrouds anti-terrorist contingency planning at 
national government level. Nevertheless, a number of 
general observations, based on the existing record, can be 
offered as follows: 
(a) Although terrorist groups have been so far unable to 
cause a major disruption in the international system 
(like, for example, a full-scale war between a Western 
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power and one of the terrorist states), it would be safe 
to assume that the cumulative effect of terrorist 
activities will sooner or later produce the conditions for 
just such an eventuality. For example, if the April 1986 
American bombing raid against Libya is the precursor of, 
things to come, military retaliation against perceived 
terrorist centers should be expected to increase in 
proportion to the number and severity of further terrorist 
attacks. Decisions to launch such strikes, on the other 
hand, will depend by necessity on secret intelligence 
unavailable for any form of public scrutiny, a fact that 
may cause serious international complications in addition 
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to possible domestic constitutional crises. 
(b) There are growing fears that the immediate future 
will witness a sharp escalation of the costs and 
casualties caused by terrorist attacks. Many experts agree 
that crossing the threshold from "broadly symbolic" 
attacks into a phase of mass destruction may be imminent. 
It is feared, for example, that the use of chemical and 
bacteriological agents might be the next weapons of choice 
for terrorist groups seeking to cause "governmental 
disruption of major proportions and widespread public 
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panic. 
The possibility of nuclear terrorism is not 
discounted either. Although nuclear devices of even the 
crudest form require significant technical expertise to 
manufacture and deploy effectively if there is a source of 
weapons-grade fissionable material, it is conceivable that 
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terrorist groups under state sponsorship may eventually 
gain access to all the elements required for building a 
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"revolutionary" bomb. The intensification of conflicts 
fuelled by Islamic fundamentalism is yet another serious 
cause for concern. The Iranian revolution has already 
spawned a new breed of "martyr" terrorists desensitized to 
the certain prospect of violent death and ready to commit 
suicide missions against any and every perceived "infidel" 
adversary. Such availability of willing men and women has 
in turn produced new and highly destructive tactics like 
the truck bomb. Finally, the perennial problem of 
inadequate security of sensitive installations, like 
nuclear power stations and defence plants, invites 
terrorist attacks which can have incalculable 
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consequences. 
The problem of multinational terrorism has so far 
eluded attempts (most of them half-hearted to be frank) to 
eradicate it. In fact, with decolonization complete, 
traditional guerrilla activity, along the lines of such 
earlier preachers of people's war as Mao and Che, is 
slowly being displaced by terrorism in urban areas 
conducted by small cells of men and women who rely more on 
the psychological dislocation of the "enemy"--i. e. the 
organized state and its designated bodies--rather than on 
the physical confrontation with its military and law- 
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enforcement agencies. More importantly, modern 
terrorists have adopted, and continue to improve, methods 
of blackmailing governments in order to extract desired 
changes in policy or other tangible benefits like the 
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release of jailed comrades. In a long-term strategic 
sense, forcing individual governments to negotiate with 
shadowy groups is the most worrisome implication of 
multinational terrorism--one that might even influence the 
balance of power between Soviet-backed "revolutionary" 
dictatorships and "reactionary" liberal Western 
democracies. 
THE FUTURE OF CONFLICT 
Anticipating events that may lead to future 
"stability" or "instability" of the global security system 
is, at best, a notoriously constrained business conducted 
at the peril of one's credibility as an accomplished 
"futurist". Contrary to widespread belief, any "futures" 
analyst, claiming a fair degree of predictive capability, 
requires a much greater measure of common sense and 
intuition than ability to manipulate computerized 
statistical models. Numbers juggling without deeper 
understanding of the intricate interdependent 
relationships that exist today, let alone of human 
desires, urges, and perceptions, allows political leaders 
and military strategists only limited insights into the 
problems they face. 
It is for this reason that "events analysis", 
basically an attempt to synthesize the , rich 
intellectualism of traditional political thinkers with the 
rather more painstaking method of the modern strategic 
analyst, has, recently gained momentum at the expense of 
esoteric mathematical modeling of international conflict. 
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In this light, and in an attempt to shape a picture of the 
future of international conflict, five areas of 
potentially destabilizing "Event Chains" have been 
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recently suggested as follows: 
(i) "A major change in the strategic relationship 
between key international players attendant upon 
a technological breakthrough". 
The most obvious pair of such players of course comprises 
the United States and the Soviet Union. The Reagan 
Administration's strategic modernization program, and 
particularly the Space Defense Initiative (SDI), have 
prompted unprecedented debate and thus demonstrated the 
precariousness, but also diversity, of the existing 
perceptions of nuclear "security" espoused by the Soviet 
Union and America's NATO allies. The furore over SDI 
vividly underscores the paradox of nuclear deterrence: in 
the nuclear age, it is "considered an advantageous 
military doctrine to make your own country deliberately 
vulnerable" since according to current orthodoxy 
"vulnerability [contributes] to peace and invulnerability 
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[contributes] to risks of war". That the mere 
declaration of intent to develop SDI would provoke such 
sharp reactions only goes to prove the crucial role of 
technology in the superpower strategic relationship. 
What the future holds regarding further improvements 
in strategic as well as conventional weapon systems and 
associated technologies which can corrode established 
concepts of security, is only a matter of strong 
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imagination: increased accuracy guidance systems for 
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ballistic missiles; real-time computer command-and-control 
fully exploiting faster processors and compact megabyte 
memory modules supported by reduced-instruction operating 
systems; breakthrough in anti-submarine warfare making the 
sea-based nuclear deterrent truly vulnerable to hostile 
sea control operations; development of the ultimate 
unmanned airborne tank killer; resurgence of the chemical 
and biological warfare threat and so on. 
(ii) "A major change in a regional power 
configuration by violent action". 
The simmering Middle East crisis is an excellent 
illustration of how such changes can take place and what 
their long-term effects are. Israel's settlement of the 
West Bank and its de facto annexation of the Golan Heights 
have given the Arab world, and particularly Syria, a 
permanent cause for war. It is indeed difficult to 
exclude any Third World areas from the risk list or to 
underestimate the likely effects of violent internal 
changes in strategically important actors like the Arab 
oil producers (witness, for example, the tensions inside 
Saudi Arabia or the effects of Khomeinism in the Gulf 
area). But neither the superpowers nor Western Europe are 
immune from violent change in their own "back yards". For 
the United States, events in Central America are sources 
of great anxiety about domino effects that can eventually 
"destabilize" Mexico. Poland has caused worries in the 
Kremlin and undoubtedly prompted some unsettling thoughts 
about another Hungary or Czechoslovakia (but with the 
Poles putting up stiff resistance). And the perennial 
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disputes between Greece and Turkey promise continuing 
friction in NATO's southeast theater and even the 
unprecedented spectacle of two NATO "allies" at war over 
the Aegean. 
(iii) "A major change in the international economic 
balance". 
Although the industrialized countries weathered the 
successive oil crises, albeit at the expense of sometimes 
painful restructuring of their economies, there is little 
to raise the hopes of the Third World concerning the new 
international economic order. As many LDCs sink deeper 
into precarious borrowing, the Western democracies move 
into a new round of trade restrictions and mini-embargoes 
reminiscent of the catastrophic beggar-thy-neighbour 
policies of the 1930s. Rescheduling of debts carried by 
highly-borrowed Third World economies seem like a mere 
postponement of serious trouble; economic collapse of one 
(or all) of these states may have violent consequences--a 
glimpse of which the world received when Nigeria abruptly 
expelled over two million foreign workers from its soil in 
1983 in the wake of a steep drop in national revenues due 
to falling oil prices. Further advances in alternative 
fuels technology and conservation measures may eventually 
rid the West from its dependency on Third World oil. This 
will lead to severe contraction of the oil producers' 
economic base with unforeseen results for the stability 
and longevity of these nations. A major economic crisis 
in the Western world itself is not inconceivable either. 
The giant US deficit is presently one of the most serious 
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possible causes for concern. 
(iv) "Major changes in the interests and objectives 
of key international players". 
The current pattern of international relations is by no 
means guaranteed. Changes in foreign policy direction by 
key international actors have already created new 
alignments and reconfigured power relationships. 
President Nixon's China initiative is perhaps the best 
recent example of such sudden shifts away from established 
and apparently rigid positions. The Chinese-American 
rapprochement presented the Soviet Union with a rather 
unexpected twist in its confrontation of outside 
"threats". It can be argued that, expanding cooperation 
between Washington and Peking, especially in the military 
sphere, coupled with a rearmed Japan in economic top form, 
will further strengthen Moscow's perception of isolation 
and indeed "encirclement" by less than friendly powers. 
One has also to contemplate the possibility of sudden 
changes in the orientation of key Third World states in 
relation to the superpowers. This is a prospect that 
seems particularly plausible in light of the fluid nature 
of politics within many a Third World state and the desire 
to obtain concrete support against local rivals. 
(v) "Major changes in the strategic outlook of key 
international actors". 
The growth of the Soviet navy, and the worldwide presence 
mission undertaken by its surface fleets, are both 
indicative of Moscow's expanding perceptions of its 
strategic frontier and its determination to support this 
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expansion, dynamically if need be. China's attempt to 
launch its first sea-based ballistic missile in late 1982 
(unsuccessfully) possibly heralded a new phase in Chinese 
strategic policy, one which may fuel the Sino-Soviet 
dispute and cause regional actors to modify their security 
arrangements. In the NATO area, a non-nuclear Labour 
defence posture under a Labour government would certainly 
trigger major reassessments of current NATO structure and 
strategy. A NATO "crisis of confidence" may thus ensue 
prompting increased Congressional pressure for the 
withdrawal of US land forces from the European theater and 
a complete "overhaul" of US-European relations. 
CONCLUSION 
If historical experience is to be taken as a 
yardstick, a no-war world model seems as elusive today as 
it seemed at the time the world plunged into the war "to 
end all wars" in 1914. The divisions and violence that 
beset contemporary international society can be seen as 
"the storm before tranquility" only with a high degree of 
optimism. 
The distinct failure of international organizations 
to foster international order, the reluctance of the 
developed countries to sponsor major changes in the 
international economic system, the growing inability of 
many LDCs to escape the dual trap of blind nationalism and 
"revolutionary" ideologies, and the lacklustre performance 
of the superpowers in creating a meaningful "confidence- 
building" regime in their bilateral relations are only a 
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few of the disappointing--and foreboding--trends facing 
the world today. 
On the other hand, it should be recognized that the 
existing "stability" model of superpower relations, based 
on the present strategic equation and the continuing 
rounds of US-Soviet dialogue, seems bound to last as long 
as no particularly catastrophic "event chain" affects the 
central balance. Thus, there is a growing tendency among 
international security analysts and political commentators 
to turn to "peripheral" crises and local wars in search of 
elements which can seriously disrupt the essential 
"normality" of superpower relations (if such a term can be 
used without a fair dose of poetic license). It is 
against this background that superpower reactions to these 
crises, and especially their willingness to use military 
force in order to contain perceived "threats" arising from 
them, become crucial to the continuing existence of the 
"stability" model. In the next chapter we will therefore 
examine superpower preferences and views on military 
intervention as an instrument of policy. 
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CHAPTER II 
MILITARY INTERVENTION AND THE SUPERPOWERS 
POSTWAR PREFERENCES AND VIEWS 
Since the Second World War both the United States and 
the Soviet Union have maintained and deployed substantial 
conventional forces in addition to their nuclear arsenals. 
These forces, by virtue of their structure, weapons, 
equipment, and doctrine, remain essentially committed to 
meeting "major contingencies", the most prominent of which 
is a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict. 
Ever since the destruction of the Axis powers, 
however, such a "major" contingency has not, fortunately, 
arisen mainly because neither superpower seems prepared to 
risk escalation of. a conventional clash into a nuclear 
exchange--at least as long as they both perceive no direct 
and immediate threat against their "vital" interests 
which, in itself, would be sufficient cause for escalatory 
measures. Provided, therefore, that the existing central 
nuclear balance continues to generate the incentives for 
avoiding a direct US-Soviet confrontation, it seems only 
logical to focus on the "lesser" conventional 
contingencies and the changes, in national strategy that 




Although both Washington and Moscow eschew 
pronouncing military interference in a foreign state's 
affairs as part of their official policy, the practice of 
worldwide military deployments and "muscle-flexing" have 
become permanent fixtures of superpower global strategy. 
This postwar development has not transpired without 
controversy, of course, particularly in respect to the 
moral question of the use of force in international 
relations. The practical or "policy-oriented" side has 
not escaped either, with opinions being divided on the 
issue of the real geostrategic payoffs of military power 
projection vs. a policy of noninterference in local 
conflicts. For instance, the majority of conservative 
Western observers would agree that countering the 
influence of a "militaristic" power like the Soviet Union 
requires some version of "extended deterrence": a 
combination of the persuasiveness of strategic assets with 
a capability to mobilize and deploy' significant 
conventional forces in peripheral areas threatened by 
1 
Soviet "penetration" --a view hardly shared though by many 
"left-of-center" moderate thinkers not to mention the 
unilateralists. 
Grenada and Afghanistan have prompted renewed debate. 
on the willingness of the superpowers to use military 
force in protecting and advancing their interests. 
Many theories are hotly disputed in the literature 
revolving around two core questions: first, whether 
Grenada and Afghanistan signify the rise within the US and 
Soviet government elites of a "post-detente" group of 
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leaders who are less likely to be deterred by the 
escalation risks inherent in military intervention; and 
second, whether these two major displays of military 
might, in combination with events like the Cuban military 
presence in Africa and the undeclared war against 
Nicaragua, indicate the beginnings of a truly "militarized" 
phase in the conduct of superpower diplomacy. 
The aim of the following paragraphs is not to resolve 
these major theoretical arguments but rather to contribute 
to the debate for the purposes of this study by, first, 
plotting the postwar US attitudes and changes of policy 
towards military intervention in "peripheral" Third World 
areas; and, second, by analyzing the Soviet approaches and 
strategy shifts towards the same subject. 
It is also essential to note from the outset that 
Soviet military intervention in Eastern Europe is not 
part of this exercise for two reasons. First, suppressing 
"counterrevolution" within the Soviet European security 
zone has generally been considered an "internal" affair 
between Moscow and its "fraternal" Warsaw Pact regimes 
which could attract little Western interference beyond 
verbal condemnation. Second, without the threat of direct 
Western counter-intervention to foil Soviet "police 
actions" against disgruntled fellow socialists, Eastern 
Europe remains an arena exclusively reserved (for the time 
being at least) for Soviet military activities and as such 
it cannot serve, in contrast to the Third World, as a 
comparative area for Soviet and US actions. However, two 
case studies drawn from Soviet interventionary activities 
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in Eastern Europe are included in this study in an attempt 
to gain better understanding of the overall Soviet "style" 
of military intervention as it has manifested itself until 
the Afghanistan invasion. Finally, the worldviews from 
Washington and Moscow are also briefly examined as a 
necessary framework of respective foreign policy 
perceptions. 
The Worldview from Washington 
Estimating the American leadership's perception of 
the global landscape suffers from the typical corollary 
of information overabundance: separating substance from 
chaff is often impossible due to the sheer volume of "raw" 
data. It is, therefore, imperative to reduce the US 
avalanche of both printed and spoken words into some 
logical matrix of attitudes and actions which reflect the 
US leadership elites' worldview. Given the openness of 
the American system of government, the nature of 
congressional politics, the size and influence of the mass 
media, and the US academic community's tendency to thrive 
on abstract "assessments" of current (and future) affairs 
this is hardly an easy task and it remains an obstacle to 
any analysis that strives to be objective. 
The American leadership's woridview is shaped 
primarily by the lively public debate concerning the 
nation's approach to national security and, more 
specifically, to the means required to ensure that 
American global interests are adequately protected from 
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encroachment by rival powers. This debate is one of the 
most salient characteristics of the ongoing US domestic 
"self analysis", and, chronologically, a rather recent 
phenomenon. Until the First World War, the United 
States, insulated behind the great. oceanic barriers, 
remained preoccupied with internal matters as it 
considered itself largely immune from foreign threats (the 
Neutrality Acts of the late 1930s were the isolationists' 
last serious attempts to curb America's involvement in 
international affairs). For pre-1941 Americans, "security 
was a given fact of nature and circumstance, an 
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inheritance rather than a creation". 
Throughout the postwar years, the foundations of the 
national security debate have sprung from two prominent 
tenets: first, opposition to communism seen as an ideology 
totally alien, and in fact hostile, to the American 
democratic ideal and way of life; and second, opposition 
to the Soviet Union as the world's leading communist power 
and the sole state with the military capability to 
threaten the American homeland itself. That being said, 
the commitment to fight against world communism produced 
an equally significant determinant of postwar US policy. 
Seeking to subscribe other non-communist nations to the 
American ideal of a "Free World", the United States, 
departing from a practice that had been observed with 
almost religious devotion since its inception, rapidly 
expanded its bilateral and multilateral relationships to a 
point where, by the 1950s, it presided over a system of 
alliances spanning the globe, a phenomenon unprecedented 
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in the history of US foreign relations. As a keen 
observer of the American national security debate, the 
late Professor Brodie, put it, the United States 
---moved from a nation of "no entangling 
alliances" to being the "leader of the free 
world, " with a considerable packet of direct 
alliance commitments, and with various more 
generalized commitments sometimes attributed to 
the United Nations Charter but which seem also 
to exist independently of that document. 3 
On the level of policy, grappling with the realities 
of the US-Soviet rivalry eventually produced three main 
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schools of thought. The first, which took shape in the 
closing years of the Second World War, although it 
recognized the ideological incompatatibility of the two 
systems, adopted a generally benign view of the Soviet 
Union and saw US-Soviet differences as amenable to 
"accommodation" by negotiation--without the need for 
spurring the "horizontal" struggle between the two 
countries and creating detrimental ripple effects in the 
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form of localized "vertical conflicts". This concept of 
"termination by accommodation" was rejected by the second 
school which advocated "termination by victory" over the 
forces of communism. The basic assumptions here called 
for a broad-front assault on communism in general coupled 
with specific strategies aimed against the Soviet Union 
itself--including efforts "to transform the USSR from 
within" by stirring unrest among its people, economic 
warfare to damage the Soviet system, and development of 
"positions of strength" before any negotiations with the 
6 
Kremlin on international issues could be joined. 
Finally, striking the middle ground between these two 
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approaches, the "management" advocates underlined the 
necessity to put US-Soviet relations in a proper 
perspective and reach a balanced view of the Soviet 
"threat". The "managers", who saw no immediate risk of a 
world war with the USSR, promoted the idea of 
"businesslike" relations with the Soviet leadership, and 
emphasized the difference between what communists wished 
to happen and what real Soviet capabilities made 
7 
possible. 
The changing domestic mood and the various political 
currents helped channel anti-communism into a succession 
of intellectual "casts" by rotating supporters of each of 
the above schools into positions of power. But, despite 
changing administrations and revisions of strategic 
priorities, the essential themes remained constant: from 
Dulles' massive retaliation strategy to Nixon's detente 
and Carter's oscillating policies, the fundamental 
opposition to the USSR and its claims to superpower 
status, and the policy of "containing" Soviet influence 
outside the Eastern bloc, have shown remarkable historical 
endurance--only to be reaffirmed and strengthened by 
President Reagan as the cornerstones of his drive to 
8 
restore American power. 
The centrality of the Soviet "threat" in shaping 
American perceptions of the international environment is 
thus pervasive--although one should remain perennially 
cognizant of the numerous gradations encountered within 
the liberal constituency, and among those moderate 
"revisionist" inheritors of the "accommodation" theories. 
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As a result, Washington's postwar perspective of the 
international landscape has gone through four more or less 
distinct phases dominated by the rivalry with the USSR: 
--the Cold War, when the Soviet "grand conspiracy" 
theories predominated and American leaders perceived 
communist subversion as the main source of 
international instability; 
--the early arms control phase, when "businesslike" 
relations with the Soviets were established and 
"linkage" theories became subjects of cautious 
revision despite conflicts like Vietnam; 
--the short-lived period of detente, when "peaceful 
coexistence" with communism led to spectacular 
diplomatic moves, like the China initiative, and 
strategic nuclear parity signalled the "muting" of 
global nuclear confrontation and renewed interest 
in the strategies, implications, and long-term impact 
of local conventional conflicts; 
--and, finally, the return to confrontation following 
the invasion of Afghanistan and President Reagan's 
election to power on a political platform emphasizing 
traditional American values and conservative 
approaches to international relations. 
Irrespective of the twists and turns in foreign 
policy management, however, closer examination of these 
phases reveals one common feature of the American 
"mindset". Perceptions of the international arena, 
despite an outer layer of "flexibility", demonstrate a 
rather rigid understanding of international relations and 
deficient appreciation of what Ernst Haas sees as the 
crucial "advance-and-retreat" dynamics so prevalent in the 
Soviet analysis of the "world correlation of forces" (of 
which more below): 
We [Americans]... are at a disadvantage because 
we tend to fall back on all-or-nothing 
categories: conflict or cooperation, peace or 
war, detente or confrontation. Our reliance on 
the concept of the "balance of power" is static 
as contrasted to the Soviets' "world correlation 
of forces". 9 
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Criticisms such as the above have, in turn, led to calls 
for a comprehensive national strategy with which to cope, 
rather than simply react, to the fast-changing global 
structures, the aspirations and anxieties of less 
fortunate nations, the expectations of allies and friends, 
and last but of course not least, the competition with the 
10 
USSR. During the Carter presidency the pressures for a 
broad-based and coherent national security strategy 
increased due to events like the Teheran hostage fiasco 
and the subsequent abortive rescue operation, but also 
because of the Administration's inability to promote 
intra-NATO consensus or strike meaningful arms control 
agreements with the Soviets. By 1980, the Carter 
interlude, to the obvious satisfaction of conservative 
hardliners, was generally assessed as a failed "neo- 
accommodationist" attempt to experiment with a worldview 
based exclusively on high moral principle (human rights) 
and the quest for reduced defence spending. 
In fact, the conservatives' declared viewpoints about 
the true motives, plans, and aspirations of the USSR 
received an unexpected boost from the Carter 
Administration itself following the invasion of 
Afghanistan. It was President Carter himself who 
immediately expressed "shock" at the Soviet action and, 
shortly afterwards, promulgated the Carter Doctrine which, 
in essence, declared US determination to protect the 
Arabian oilfields against a Soviet thrust by military 
force (see next section also). Thus, the invasion did not 
only reinforce the conservative interpretation of Soviet 
103 
intentions, but also helped to erode the Administration's 
own belief, assiduously cultivated by Carter's liberal 
Democratic supporters, that Moscow could be indeed 
"trusted" to refrain from blatantly "aggressive" acts in 
the Third World. 
It was against this background that the Reagan 
Administration embarked upon its own re-definition of US 
foreign policy as it is customary with incoming 
administrations. Reagan's worldview rejected his 
predecessor's "dispiriting" approach and adopted a 
hard-line position strongly reminiscent of that which 
prevailed in the earlier years of containment. The Reagan 
anti-communist stance re-emphasized (a) the ideological 
distrust of the Soviet Union as a partner in negotiations 
(b) the linkage between local conflicts and Soviet global 
strategy, and (c) the need to meet the Soviet challenge by 
"horizontal" rather than "vertical" escalation (i. e., by 
'coupling' Soviet actions in one area with US responses 
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not necessarily confined to the same location). Early in 
the Administration's tenure, for example, the Soviet Union 
was again identified in clear-cut terms as the main threat 
to US interests and international stability. As Secretary 
of State Haig put it: 
A major focus of American policy must be the 
Soviet Union, not because of ideological 
preoccupation but simply because Moscow is the 
greatest source of international insecurity 
today. Let us be plain about it: Soviet- 
promotion of violence as an instrument of 
change constitutes the greatest danger to world 
peace. 
In regions sensitive to Western interests, in 
the littorals of critical sea passages, in areas 
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that hardly affect Soviet security, you will 
find Moscow taking a keen interest in conflict. 
Thus, Western strategic interests as well as the 
hopes for a more just international order are at 
stake. 12 
In the ensuing years, this view has been echoed by a 
variety of Administration spokesmen, although President 
Reagan's politically motivated willingness to engage in 
summitry with General Secretary Gorbachev has helped to 
minimize, and even quietly set aside, the tougher theories 
(such as 'linkage') propounded during the Administration's 
first term. 
One final component of the American leadership's 
worldview deserves special attention, viz. the post-Viet- 
nam reassessment of national security objectives. 
Until Vietnam, containment dictated blanket opposition to 
communist regimes and communist-led "revolutionary" 
movements irrespective of immediate American interests. 
This rigid approach began to change during the closing 
years of the conflict as domestic pressures against US 
military involvement in distant theaters grew. By the 
time of the Carter Administration, the "Vietnam syndrome" 
had visibly reduced the willingness of American political 
leaders to commit the country to a policy of "second area" 
military adventures without a clear and immediate threat 
to vital US interests or the life of US citizens. 
The direct result of these developments was a shift 
in national security planning towards differentiation 
between primary and secondary issue areas. Implicit in 
this change was also the acceptance of the fact that not 
all Marxist revolutionaries were willing Moscow CP&ies; 
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and that Marxist regimes around the world were equally 
exposed to the dynamics of cultural, economic, and social 
diversity as much as their non-communist counterparts 
within the international system. Preventing the spread of 
communism thus became a complex exercise of a mixture of 
approaches--political, military, and economic--which, on 
the one hand, appeared to reduce the possibility of 
military confrontation with the USSR, and on the other, 
attempted to restore US leadership among allies and 
friends and thus inject old anti-communist coalitions with 
new energy. 
The Worldview from Moscow 
Given the Soviet obsession with secrecy and the 
traditionally restricted flow of information within Soviet 
society, determining the Soviet leaders' perception of 
particular issues in international relations remains a 
difficult and complicated undertaking. The SALT dialogue 
in the late 1960s, and the corresponding growth of Western 
public interest in the Soviet "threat", caused a notable 
swelling in the until then sparsely populated ranks of 
"Sovietologists" and "Kremilinologists". This onslaught 
of "experts" did not necessarily or dramatically improve 
13 
the quality of research conducted into Soviet affairs, 
but it did help to energize debate and to foster the case 
for more coherent analysis of an ambiguous and, from the 
point of view of an English-speaking world, linguistically 
hostile body of information. 
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Historically, Soviet perceptions of the international 
environment have been shaped by the Marxist-Leninist 
dialectic and the traditional Russian fears of foreign 
invasion. As early as 1918, Lenin emphasized that 
International imperialism... could not under any 
circumstances, on any condition, live side by 
side with the Soviet Republic, both because of 
its objective position and because of the 
economic interests of the capitalist class which 
are embodied in it-- 14 
Indeed, Lenin's prophesy of inevitable war with the 
"bourgeois states", striving to destroy the Bolshevik 
revolution, seemed to materialize first during the Russian 
Civil War, when "imperialist" troops came to the aid of 
the Tsarist remnants, and then during the titanic battle 
against Hitler's armies (although in the case of the Great 
Patriotic War allowances had to be made for the alliance 
with capitalist America and Britain). On the other hand, 
neither Marx nor Lenin provided a comprehensive theory of 
international relations in book-length form to serve as a 
guide for Soviet foreign relations. In the original 
Marxist "comprehensive intellectual structure", which 
simultaneously drew from every known "bourgeois 
discipline", international relations never figured 
prominently "as a general or universal category", and 
received attention only as an element in the historical 
15 
record. Thus, the Kremlin leaders were left with the 
task of formulating their own international relations 
doctrines based on the Marxist-Leninist exegesis--a rather 
disagreeable task given the heavy reliance of Soviet 
policies on the "irrefutable", but somewhat "prepackaged", 
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Leninist principles and maxims, and the risk of rendering 
"eternal truths" hollow in the process of practical 
16 
application. 
It is safe to argue that no interpretation of Soviet 
perceptions of the world are complete without first noting 
the importance which Soviet analysts attach to the concept 
of the "world correlation of forces". As one analysis 
explains: 
The concept of the world correlation is based on 
the principal ideological assumptions, on the 
view of the general development of world 
events, and on an intuitive calculation of 
intangible values. It concerns generally- 
presented global potentialities of the opposing 
camps, and not the actual forces, which can be 
applied in particular conflicts. 17 
This dynamic approach to international relations operates 
at several levels simultaneously assessing, for example, 
the impact of superpower differences upon regional 
conflicts and vice versa, the influence and prospects of 
communist parties at the national level, the relationship 
of the "world revolutionary process" with expanding Soviet 
influence in specific countries or regions, and so on. It 
also synthesizes, and attempts to literally "calculate" 
outcomes from, a wide variety of factors ranging from 
political stability to economic performance, and from 
social and scientific-technical advances to the size and 
weapons of military forces. Continuing reliance of the 
Soviet leadership upon this concept as a predictive tool 
reflects commitment to the "conflict view of world 
relations" since " 'correlation of forces'--sootnoshenie 
sil--is itself a denial of the notion of the 'balance of 
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power' in the traditional sense. If anything, it is the 
18 
opposite, namely, 'disbalancing' power balances". 
Another, equally significant, factor in studying the 
Soviet worldview is the deep-seated hostility of Soviet 
ideology towards all enemies of the "proletariat"--i. e. 
any regime, group, or movement which is, or appears to be, 
opposed to Marxism-Leninism. Early Bolshevik doctrine 
went to particular pains to identify and name the enemies 
of the socialist revolution, presumably in order to make 
the results of combating them as effective and long- 
lasting as possible: 
Bolsheviks must not yield to a sense of being 
surrounded by unknown enemies, or entertain 
fantastic conceptions about dangers; they must 
ascertain enemies precisely and in realistic 
fashion..... 
According to Bolshevik doctrine, the enemy has 
one or a few "well-known" "centers. " He is not 
"mysteriously" "diffused" in "all, " but in 
ascertainable fashion is present in many 
places--though it often may be difficult to 
"expose" him. 19 
This division of the world into "enemies" and "fraternal, 
peace-loving" nations leads to the rejection of any 
notions of "common purpose" permeating the international 
system (a common characteristic of Western theories of 
international relations), and creates the permanent rift 
between socialist and non-socialist states which can only 
be mended with the eventual triumph of Marxism-Leninism. 
As Nogee and Donaldson explain: 
The idea of a common set of objectives or 
aspirations [between all nations] is 
substantially if not totally rejected in 
communist theory. The enemy is considered evil. 
The differences between the proletariat and the 
bourgeoisie and the states that embody these 
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class identities are fundamental and 
irreconcilable. Furthermore, these differences 
have their roots not in the behavior of the 
parties involved--after all, behavior patterns 
can change--but in the essential character or 
makeup of the enemy. 20 
Until Khruschchev advanced his "peaceful co- 
existence" doctrine in 1956, the Soviet worldview was 
dominated by the Stalinist doctrine of "capitalist 
encirclement", a vehement, and even paranoid, version of 
the Leninist bourgeois-enemy theory which unambiguously 
predicted war to the finish between the USSR and its 
21 
capitalist opponents. Stalin's departure in 1953, 
however, paved the way for questioning the total belief in 
universal "basic laws and principles", a shift which 
unavoidably put rigid adherence to ideology "on the 
22 
defensive". This development led to change of methods 
throughout the Soviet system and the area of foreign 
affairs did not remain unaffected. Khruschchev's re- 
positioned emphasis, from the inevitability of a violent 
clash between the Soviet Republic and the "bourgeois 
states" to co-existence with the enemies of socialism, was 
prompted by "a political choice in favour of avoiding 
nuclear war"; at the same time, Russian commentators, in 
order to forestall criticism of Khruschchev going "soft" 
on capitalism, insisted that 
---'peaceful co-existence' is not a means of 
easing the 'contradictions of capitalism', it is 
not a means of 'reconciling capitalism with 
socialism', nor is it opportunistic or of 
'pacifist colouration'. 23 
Thus, "peaceful co-existence" marked Moscow's 
graduation, so to speak, into a period of tentative 
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confidence vis-a-vis the Western world in general, and the 
United States in particular, and a departure from the 
Stalinist siege mentality syndrome. This emerging 
confidence was mainly due to the well-deserved pride 
emanating from the "crushing defeat" the USSR had 
inflicted upon the "shock forces of world imperialism-- 
Nazi Germany and militarist Japan", and, more 
significantly, to the apparent, and perhaps inescapable, 
conclusion that Soviet military power, by destroying the 
Axis, had "led to fundamental changes in the international 
24 
alignment of forces in favour of socialism". The main 
lesson of the Second World War had been "the invincibility 
of socialism as a social system", but also "the complete 
25 
hopelessness of anti-socialist 'crusadesill, In light of 
these assumptions, and with a fair amount of hindsight, 
the post-Stalin Kremlin collective, despite numerous 
Western assessments to the contrary, "seem to have assumed 
between 1953 and 1962 that, short of a catastrophic 
miscalculation or a cataclysmic accident, an American 
nuclear attack was out of the question"--something which, 
of course, never prevented them from exploiting US massive 
retaliation scenarios for propaganda purposes while, on 
the other hand, resting assured that a nuclear holocaust 
26 
was a rather remote possibility. 
By the time of Brezhnev's rise to power, the 
conclusion that the "world system of socialism" had become 
the decisive factor in the international arena occupied 
the center of the Soviet worldview. As a result, the 
Soviet analysis of the global situation further concluded 
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that the "imperialists" had been effectively deprived of 
their previous freedom of action--and could not as easily 
intimidate "peace-loving" states--and that it was now up 
to the "fraternal" socialist nations to steer the rest of 
the oppressed masses towards "revolutionary change and 
development". For instance, as it was stated in 1969: 
Imperialism can neither regain its lost 
historical initiative, nor reverse world 
development. The main direction of mankind's 
development is determined by the world 
socialist system, the international working 
class, all revolutionary forces. 27 
These developments were seen as stemming directly from 
"the steady growth of the economic and defence capability 
of the USSR and other socialist countries" and could only 
result in "continuous change of the world balance of 
strength in favour of socialism over imperialism"--a fact 
which did not obviously escape the attention of "the 
28 
ruling circles in Washington". 
In the span between 1969 and 1975, the Soviet 
worldview was essentially conditioned by the drive to 
attain as much benefit as possible from the Nixon- 
Brezhnev-sponsored thaw in US-Soviet relations. This 
period appeared particularly opportune to the Soviets; it 
was estimated, for example, that the United States faced 
unprecedented domestic problems in allocating resources 
between a "bloated military budget and the most costly 
systems of armaments" and "internal social requirements", 
29 
the latter supported by "broad sociopolitical forces". 
With the leading capitalist power divided from within, 
detente offered a dual opportunity to Moscow: first, the 
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possibility of improved overall relations with the West at 
a time when the Sino-Soviet dispute demanded increased 
Soviet vigilance and commitment of resources to meet the 
perceived Peking menace; and, second, an opportunity to 
cultivate better trade relations along most-favored-nation 
lines with the United States, and other Western countries, 
in order to improve the sluggish Soviet economy. However, 
30 , 
as Vladimir Petrov phrased it, "the state of euphoria 
began to evaporate by 1975, as alarming signs of 
opposition to detente appeared in the United States" and 
the opportunity for closer economic ties with the United 
States was lost; nevertheless, 
There was enough momentum left in detente to 
enable the Soviets to expand dramatically 
economic relations with Western Europe and Japan 
and to carry out the long-cherished project of legitimizing the status quo in Europe, imbedded 
in the Helsinki accords signed in the summer of 1975. 
During the 25th CPSU Congress, held in 1976, Brezhnev 
himself recognized that US-Soviet relations were being 
"complicated", albeit solely due to the activities of 
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"influential forces" in the United States --by which, the 
General Secretary meant, if one hazards a guess, the 
"economic monopoly circles" and the ever-present military- 
industrial complex. Moreover, and a on a more profound 
note, the return of the Western "ruling circles" to 
policies of confrontation did not only call for increased 
"vigilance" in the military sector, but also 
---created the necessity... of an analysis and a 
critique of bourgeois-reformist conceptions of 
globalism, models of a "world system"... and the 
like, which are being produced so bountifully in 
the West today, and serve as pseudoproofs of 
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"the convergence" of capitalism and socialism, 
the purposes of "de-ideologisation", hegemonism, 
cosmopolitanism and attempts to "substantiate" 
what is alleged to be the "supra-class", "supra- 
social" and "supra-national" nature of global 
problems. 32 
Despite the collapse of detente, Brezhnev's legacy of 
pursuing "reduction of tensions" with the United States 
survived the Andropov-Cherneko interlude and has become a 
centerpiece in the Gorbachev foreign policy. This could 
have not been achieved though without the consolidation of 
Soviet power during the Brezhnev years, and the firm 
belief, cultivated meticulously during the same period, 
that the "correlation of forces", guarded by Soviet 
military might, had irrevocably shifted in favour of. the 
USSR and the rest of the "fraternal" socialist states. 
The fact that US policy, early in this decade, turned 
again towards "the worn track of the cold war, posing a 
33 
serious threat to peace and international security" did 
not defeat the Soviet "philosophy of historical optimism" 









aware of the danger of the current 
1 situation the Soviet Union is 
that a new world war is not 
and peace can be preserved and 
by uniting... the efforts of the 
participants in the anti-war and 
movement and those of the peaceful 
As during the heyday of the Nixon-Brezhnev summitry, 
this brighter note of "historical optimism" co-exists with 
the polemics, and similarly receives the sanction of the 
top Soviet leadership. General Secretary Gorbachev, for 
instance, speaking shortly after the Geneva summit meeting 
with President Reagan, referred to a "certain change in 
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the political atmosphere [which] is already evident", and 
to "the possibility of returning to detente, terminating 
the insane arms race and developing normal peaceful 
35 
international cooperation". 
In sum, the Soviet worldview remains dominated by 
both a desire for "peaceful co-existence"--generated by 
realist considerations rather than moralist philosophies-- 
and, at the same time, by the impelling force of Marxist- 
Leninist ideology and its conflict view of international 
relations. Fusing "peaceful co-existence" with the call 
for "world revolution" though obviously creates some 
serious problems of policy, and in the end it seems 
36 
unattainable "unless Bolsheviks cease to be Bolsheviks". 
Ultimately, it is the Soviet leadership's overriding 
concern to avoid charges of "reformism and revisionism, 
i. e. ideological heresy", or suggestions that it conceives 
US for3ign policy as moving away from its "class 
nature", which shapes the Soviet perception of the 
global environment and the USSR's position in it. 
American Military Intervention 
(i) The Decision to Intervene 
The use of military force, either as a non-combat 
political instrument or as a means of "physically 
38 
imposing the U. S. will" through the initiation of combat 
action, "has never come easily for the United States, 
39 
either in conception or in practical application". This 
outward reluctance to resort to military force can be 
attributed to several factors. First, historical 
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uneasiness about large standing armies, bequeathed to 
young America by the British, combined with the 
revolutionary origins of the United States, have led to 
bouts of anti-military sentiments and an urgency to avoid 
declaratory policies that can be perceived as 
"militaristic". Second, in a country where the function 
and powers of a free judiciary are crucial components of 
the political system, matters of military intervention 
tend to be immersed in heated debates concerning 
international law and the need for the US government to 
show "due cause" for its interventionary actions. Third, 
a critical by-product of the US legal tradition is 
embodied in the constitutional limitations imposed on 
presidential powers restricting the executive's freedom to 
order, or prolong, foreign military deployments. Fourth, 
there is considerable pre-occupation with questions of 
morality and human rights which provide a powerful 
emotional base, strengthened by a liberal press and the 
religious influences of the Judeo-Christian tradition, 
against "violating" other people's "independence and 
freedom to choose". And finally, in an era of nuclear 
weapons and theories of nuclear deterrence, the concept of 
"deterring" opponents, through warning or signalling, has 
steadily penetrated into every area where use of force may 
be contemplated to the point where, as one critic put it 
---we [the US] have come more to deter ourselves 
in our response to transgressions than to 
inhibit transgressors. 40 
These factors, however, have not prevented the use of 
US armed forces as a political instrument to increase 
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precipitously since 1945, one recent study recording 215 
41 
such occasions between 1946 and 1975. Pinpointing the 
exact causes of this increase is difficult, if not 
entirely impossible. While we are always free to 
speculate about different scenarios of government 
decisionmaking, and seek "patterns" that apparently 
"explain" behaviour after the fact, the chances of 
ascertaining the true motives of key players are extremely 
limited as private "thought processes" never really reach 
the public eye; indeed, "post-facto explanations by the 
decisionmakers themselves (as in memoirs) do little to 
ease such speculation; for there is then a question as to 
42 
the motives behind the explanation". 
As a result, attempting to ascertain the reasons for 
the post-1945 increase in US military intervention has 
taken the form of numerous popular theories, but without 
the benefit of any firm conclusions. As Herbert Tillema 
observes these attempts "tend to assert necessary but not 
sufficient conditions for military intervention" and, 
therefore, are only capable of partial explanations as 
43 
follows: 
--The "official" explanation of intervening to 
protect threatened "American lives and property"; 
--Intervention "to help other countries resist 
outside aggression, especially Communist aggression"; 
--Military intervention to "contain" communism. 
--The "liberal" explanation of military intervention 
as a tool to maintain the status quo since the United 
States "has lost her revolutionary origins and now 
acts as a conservative power"; 
--Military intervention to protect US economic 
interests and investments overseas; 
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--Resort to military force in the absence of skillful 
diplomacy; 
--The "dominant group" theory which sees military 
intervention as a result of the Pentagon's pervasive 
influence on US foreign policy. 
These theoretical difficulties are further compounded by 
the postwar bureaucratic explosion which has transformed 
presidential decisionmaking. The relatively simple 
interaction of a handful of top administration officials 
with the president himself, which prevailed through the 
years of the Second World War, has grown into a highly 
complex "group" procedure involving the secretaries of 
various departments, scores of special White House 
advisors, and a far larger number of inputs from federal 
agencies, congressional committees, and ad hoc advisory 
44 
boards. 
(ii) The Lessons of the Past 
The concept of "lesser contingency" did not enter the 
American strategic vocabulary in earnest until the Korean 
conflict. Intervention in Korea spurred the debate 
concerning limited conventional war and the requisite 
capabilities to meet this challenge successfully. Given 
the expanding global presence of the United States, and 
the de facto assumption that American military power was 
now the Free World's guarantee of peace and security, 
American strategists, grappling with the possibility of 
such hostile (i. e. communist) "peripheral" conventional 
probes in the future, faced a dual task: First, to 
elaborate a strategic concept which covered the whole 
spectrum of non-nuclear contingencies and provided for 
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responses to "hot spot" conflicts outside Europe; and, 
second, to review and modify the structure, deployment, 
and support systems of existing US general purpose forces 
in order to meet the requirements of the new strategy. 
Both of 
. 
these tasks received secondary attention 
during the 1950s, when the emphasis remained on the 
massive retaliation scenario, and it was not until the 
Kennedy Administration that a serious effort to address 
the lesser contingency issue through the elaboration of a 
theory and doctrine of "limited war" was launched. This 
development was prompted by President Kennedy's desire to 
pursue an ambitious foreign policy, and the realization 
that a strategic concept anchored rigidly on nuclear 
retaliation imposed "unacceptable limits" to any such 
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endeavour. In light of this fact, the Kennedy 
Administration embarked on a "Flexible Response" strategy 
which sought, on the one hand, to retain America's nuclear 
deterrent intact while, on the other, improve conventional 
military capabilities substantially in order to augment 
the range of military options available to the US 
commander-in-chief. 
A further boost for the "limited" conventional war 
strategy came from the fact that Kennedy's "Flexible 
Response" ideas reflected themes already advanced by many 
influential civilian strategic thinkers, including William 
Kaufmann, Bernard Brodie, James King, Henry Kissinger, and 
Robert Osgood, who had similarly voiced scepticism about a 
defence policy which almost entirely depended on nuclear 
46 
weapons. In a passage typical of the "limited war" 
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thinking of the late 1950s, Osgood, writing in 1957, had 
expressed in clear terms "The Rationale for Limited War" 
which the Kennedy Administration came to share with the 
academic strategists: 
---the principal justification of limited war 
lies in the fact that it maximizes the 
opportunities for the effective use of military 
force as a rational instrument of national 
policy. In accordance with this rationale, 
limited war would be equally desirable if 
nuclear weapons had never been invented. 
However, the existence of these and other 
weapons of mass destruction clearly adds great 
urgency to limitation... the stupendous 
destruction accompanying all-out nuclear war 
makes it hard to conceive of such a war serving 
any rationale purpose... Only by carefully 
limiting the dimensions of warfare can nations 
minimize the risk of war becoming an intolerable 
disaster. 47 
The Administration's formulation of just how the 
United States could adapt to the requirements of Flexible 
Response was based on a two-pronged approach: A complete 
review of American worldwide treaty commitments to 
determine exactly who and what needed defending in a 
crisis; and the elaboration of priorities according to 
theater of operations and existing US capabilities to 
deploy rapid-response military contingents to that 
theater. The results of these investigations were hardly 
encouraging. It was revealed, for example, that the 
United States was expected to support, because of both 
"formal treaty commitments" and "informal but no less 
weighty obligations", at least fifty different allies half 
of whom "were on or near the borders of the Soviet Union 
and China"; and the conclusion was that, "even with 
significant contributions from these allies, the burden on 
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the United States looked as though it would be impossibly 
48 
large". Despite these discouraging findings though, 
planning for a "2-1/2-war" scenario--i. e. a conventional 
war with the Warsaw Pact in Europe, a major conflict with 
a communist power like China or North Korea, and a 
'brushfire' guerrilla war in a remote Third World 
country--went ahead and 
---was directed toward meeting these 
contingencies on a conventional level and based 
on the assumption that no more than two major 
and one minor contingencies would occur 
simultaneously. 49 
The "2-1/2-war" policy debate thus began to put flesh 
on the bones of a worldwide rapid deployment strategy 
built around long-range mobility forces. The use of the 
intercontinental, wide-bodied, heavy-payload, jet, cargo 
aircraft seemed to solve the problem of deploying troops 
and heavy equipment in distant theaters on short notice. 
The "limited contingency" strategy envisaged only a 
"minimum of overseas deployments" since, in combination 
with a program of pre-positioning equipment in selected 
theaters, and of introducing fast deployment logistics 
ships to "serve as floating depots" for materiel, 
---a large fleet of cargo jets would ensure that 
intercontinental mobility could substitute for- 
having forces frozen into all the theaters of 
primary interest to the United States. 50 
Beneath its neat logistics blueprint though--and aside 
from failing "to disaggregate a range of lesser 
contingencies according to levels of intensity or 
51 
adversary", a major operational flaw-- the "2-1/2" wars 
concept also failed to recognize a number of crucial 
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limitations: the inability of the United States to provide 
adequate manpower to meet the proposed commitments without 
fully mobilizing its reserves; the long-term costs of 
procuring large fleets of transport aircraft and logistics 
ships; the bureaucratic inertia, reinforced. by 
interservice rivalry, which precluded the rapid 
development of sea-land-air "combined operations" 
doctrine and tactics; and, last but not least, the need to 
"sell" the new ideas to America's allies, most of whom had 
grown accustomed to "total" nuclear defence and were 
reluctant to embrace conventional strategies as 
alternatives to "resolute" nuclear deterrence. 
(iii) Towards a Revised Intervention Concept 
By the early 1970s, the enormity of commitments 
inherent in the "2-1/2" wars strategy was beginning to 
dawn on American policymakers. The intensity of the Viet- 
nam conflict, and the demands in materiel and manpower 
which the war against Hanoi imposed on the United States, 
made it plain that, if what started as a "half" war 
against a primitive adversary could come to cost so much 
in blood and treasure, then preparing to fight another two 
major simultaneous wars elsewhere was both excessive and 
unrealistic. Consequently, the interest in military 
intervention, and in the associated limited war 
theorizing, receded sharply as "the negative education of 
52 
the American defense community by the Vietnam war" took 
firm hold, and the Nixon Administration moved to scale 
down the original "Flexible Response" to "1-1/2" wars. As 
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a result of this reassessment, the Nixon Doctrine was 
promulgated in November 1969 which 
--reiterated that the United States was not about to 
abandon its treaty commitments, but 
--announced that American manpower was to be kept out 
of small wars in remote parts of the world; 
--and indicated that friendly regimes in the Third 
World would continue to receive US military and 
economic assistance, but emphasized that any embattled 
government would be also expected to do its own 
fighting. 
It can be safely argued that the Nixon Doctrine 
represented the main vehicle of rationalizing the American 
military disengagement from Southeast Asia while, at the 
same time, attempting to (a) re-assure friendly Third 
World regimes of America's continuing support in case of a 
"massive" attack by communist forces; and (b) offer 
domestic opponents of military intervention--whose anti- 
Vietnam war campaign threatened the country's political 
stability--a major public statement marking America's 
return to a noninterventionist global policy. 
Strong sentiment against military intervention 
continued to dominate the US defence policy debate 
throughout the 1970s. With the exception of the Mayaguez 
incident in May 1975, when a US Marine detachment was 
dispatched to rescue an American merchantman captured by 
the Cambodians, the United States displayed little desire 
to engage in overseas military action. Public pressure 
against military intervention also resulted in the passage 
of the War Powers Act which, in effect, quite specifically 
restricted the president's constitutional latitude in 
ordering US troops deployed overseas or extending their 
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involvement in foreign crises (or wars) beyond a period of 
sixty days without appropriate Congressional 
authorization. As one study, published in 1976, succinctly 
noted, following Vietnam, there was "a lower threshold of 
public tolerance for the direct exercise of U. S. military 
power overseas and thus a diminishing willingness to 'send 
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in the Marines"'. 
It was not until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
in December 1979 that the need for military intervention 
capabilities was re-discovered, and serious efforts began 
"to forge a degree of national consensus on the need to 
54 
make such provisions, especially for Southwest Asia". 
The definitive testimony to changing American attitudes 
towards involvement in "lesser" contingencies was the 
Carter Doctrine, incorporated in the President's 1980 
State of the Union message, which declared that the United 
States, in view of the events near the Middle East oil 
fields, was prepared to use military force to defend its 
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"vital interests". Carter's change of course focused on 
the threat of direct Soviet intervention in the Third 
World, and more particularly, on Soviet "penetration" of 
the oil-rich Persian Gulf region. The corollary to this 
central consideration, however, was also the revival of 
the "brushfire" wars idea of the 1960s--which in the 
revised US Army Field Manual 100-20 became 'low intensity 
conflict'--along with the prospect of direct US military 
involvement in a guerrilla war waged in any Third World 
country--a mission that was now generally identified as 
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"foreign internal defense". The new version of FM 100-20 
124 
includes, for example, detailed discussion of "insurgency" 
strategies and tactics, of operational guidelines for the 
deployment of large military units in "counterguerrilla" 
missions in "host" countries, and of missions to be 
undertaken by special forces such as "long-range 
reconnaissance" and population indoctrination. 
In compliance to this shift in national defence 
guidance, plans for distant projection forces were re- 
introduced with the activation of the Rapid Deployment 
Force (RDF), whose purpose was broadly similar to that of 
previous joint forces commands that had existed since 1962 
when Secretary McNamara first activated the US Strike 
57 
Command (USSTRICOM). In its earliest form, the RDF was 
perceived as an umbrella command organization designed to 
integrate forces, stationed in the continental United 
States and drawn from all services, for rapid deployment 
in "non-NATO crises" areas. This initial RDF concept 
centered on "two major airlift and sealift enhancement 
initiatives" involving maritime prepositioning of supplies 
and heavy equipment of three US Marine brigades, and a new 
program to build a fleet of intercontinental heavy cargo 
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aircraft. 
The rather hasty designation of the RDF as a force 
with a worldwide mission was largely a political by- 
product of the furore caused by the invasion of 
Afghanistan, and the alarming exchanges about the "geo- 
strategic crisis" facing the Western alliance that 
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inevitably followed. It is safe to assume, however, that 
informed Carter Administration officials, although not 
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prepared to admit so publicly, must have been dubious 
about existing US capabilities to back the Carter Doctrine 
with deeds. It should not be surprising therefore that, 
shortly after its establishment, the RDF's tasking 
underwent modification which dropped the worldwide mission 
in favour of concentration on Southwest Asia and the 
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protection of Western oil supplies. These political 
maneuvers nonwithstanding, the designation of the RDF as a 
reaction force to specifically counter Soviet 
"adventurism" in Southwest Asia, and even more so, "the 
unilateral commitment of military force with no temporal 
limits" to an overt intervention role "with only passing 
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reference to the role of regional actors", marked the 
first, serious US administration attempt to depart from 
the "Vietnam syndrome". Although it would still be quite 
premature to assert that the impact of Vietnam upon the 
American conscience has been significantly reduced, it 
should also be underscored that the RDF concept was the 
first, post-1975 crucial "move forward" in re-defining US 
military intervention strategies and providing for the 
requisite force structures. 
The imperatives of the Carter Doctrine were readily 
endorsed by the Reagan Administration and the 
implementation of related programs was accelerated 
accordingly. In national guidance terms, dealing with 
"lesser" contingencies, until then a matter of supporting 
friendly regimes on an ad hoc basis, was explicitly tied 
with the defence of "US or allied vital interests" 
worldwide since, in the words of General Jones, 
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---it is no longer practical to design 
autonomous regional strategies, for a threat in 
one strategic zone will almost certainly have a 
serious impact on the security of the others. 62 
In order to underscore the centrality of the RDF 
intervention mission in national defence planning, the 
Reagan Administration upgraded the RDF command 
organization to the status of unified regional command. 
Redesignated US Central Command (USCENTCOM), the RDF's 
express mission became "to deter Soviet aggression and to 
protect U. S. interests in SWA [Southwest Asia]" by being 
"prepared to fight, thereby raising the cost of Soviet 
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aggression to an unacceptable level". 
(iv) The Question of "Proper" Strategy 
Criticism of the RDF's doctrinal foundations, and of 
the overall shift towards military intervention, was 
(and is) certainly not absent. Those complaining are 
hardly limited just in the ranks of the traditional 
opponents of foreign military adventures. Vagueness about 
the purpose and rationale of the RDF has not gone 
unnoticed among conservative civilian strategists or 
military men themselves, and it has generated ample 
commentaries in search of appropriate force structure and 
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mission designation. 
Being "prepared to fight", and thus to raise the 
costs of Soviet "aggression" to "unacceptable" levels, 
were obviously insufficient sources of accurate 
operational military doctrine--let alone top-down guidance 
on the size and composition of forces involved, weapons 
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systems, support systems, and mobilization procedure. 
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Furthermore, the implicit characteristic of the RDF as a 
political instrument (in addition to its military role), 
created the need for elaborating a clear set of political 
"rules of involvement" to be used in determining the 
"rungs" of escalation in times of crisis and, 
consequently, to offer distinct "threshold" points for 
the deployment of military power in crisis areas. 
However, none of these requirements were sufficiently met 
during the initial planning and declaratory phase after 
the promulgation of the Carter Doctrine. As Professor 
Waltz noted, RDF-related statements by administration 
officials engaged in much haphazard theorizing, left a lot 
to be desired, and displayed only "hazy notions about what 
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an RDF can and should do". 
In the ensuing years, articulating the rationale and 
purpose of the RDF has not significantly improved. The 
two elements that are still prominently missing from the 
current debate about the RDF--and thus from the 
deliberations about a comprehensive US concept of military 
intervention--are, first, the aforementioned political 
rules of involvement, or what has been described as the 
"basic political parameters within which the United States 
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will be compelled to act"; and, second, the main 
function of an intervention force once commitment of 
military assets has been decided, the more widely 
discussed options being : 
--"Tripwire" role: Focus on deterring Soviet actions 
by interposing token light-infantry force in the path 
of Soviet advance and the threat of escalation, both 
conventional and nuclear, if Soviet actions lead to 
military engagement. 
128 
--"Police" or "firefighting" role: Focus on 
suppressing imminent internal threat to friendly 
government through quick, "clean" action (not a long- 
term counterinsurgency commitment). 
--"Theater war" role: Focus on battling a localized 
Soviet thrust into the Persian Gulf region by 
deployment of heavy ground and air forces. 
--"Local defence" role: Focus on contesting territory 
and vital installations against resistance from one 
or more Third World countries (counterinsurgency 
operations possible). 
Despite the sense of urgency that the Reagan 
Administration's defence policy has presumably injected 
into the planning process, it is still difficult to 
discern whether these conceptual problems are being 
adequately addressed. For example, it is still unclear 
exactly how the RDF would be able to counter a massed 
Russian advance against Iran, especially if it continues 
as merely "a state of mind, backed by a reservoir of 
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resources and a determination to act" instead of moving 
towards a standing projection force with dedicated assets 
and immediately deployable "nonborrowed" elements. Public 
official statements of the Administration have failed so 
far to provide an adequate reply to these questions. In 
his recent annual reports to Congress, for instance, 
Secretary Weinberger has dealt fairly extensively with 
ongoing programs of rapid-deployment logistical systems 
procurement, but has examined the question of roles and 
functions of the RDF in only cursory fashion while making 
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no mention of the "standing force" idea. 
(v) Which Policy? 
It is difficult to say at this juncture whether the 
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present Administration (and its successors) would opt for 
a "standing" RDF, or whether it would gear existing 
capabilities towards a "heavy" combat role as opposed to a 
structure which is "relational, i. e. reconfigured ad hoc 
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for the theater, the enemy, and the situation". 
Ultimately, choosing a concept of operations suitable for 
"lesser" contingencies, and developing appropriate 
military forces and doctrine, remain functions of the 
political policy adopted to counter Soviet activities 
outside the European arena. In this respect, a recent 
Congressional research study suggested "the range of 
plausible options" open to US policymakers which in effect 
provides a typology of possible future US policy 
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responses: 
oA Confrontationist Policy 
--USSR viewed as "an expanionist-opportunist power" 
against which all instruments, nonmilitary as well as 
military, would be used. 
--Soviet influence would be confronted on a global 
scale and "desirable buildups of key allies" would be 
carried out to enhance the US position in 
"threatened" areas. 
oA Neocontainment Policy 
--Focus on responding to threats "of Soviet military 
intervention, subversion or use of military 
surrogates in the Third World not with the full range 
of U. S. policy instruments, but rather only with 
military, intelligence, covert action, and security 
assistance programs". 
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--Soviet "leverage" on Third World governments would 
not automatically invite US reaction, although any 
attempt to inject military force into the equation 
would prompt US counter-intervention. 
oA Flexible Response Policy 
--The USSR is again an "oppotunistic" power with 
ambitions in the entire Third World. 
--Due to limited resources, however, US policy would 
be geared towards protecting US interests "in areas 
of vital concern--primarily the Arabian Sea, Central 
America, and the Caribbean" with a variety of policy 
instruments. 
o An Economic Security Policy 
--The goal here would be to "diversify" US economic 
relations and cushion the US economy against "short 
to medium term losses of particular Third World areas 
to Soviet influence". 
--By restructuring the whole system of US 
international trade relations, foreign aid practices, 
and investment priorities, the United States would 
be able to challenge Soviet advances in the Third 
World by exploiting the inherent inability of the 
USSR to compete as vigorously in the economic sphere 
as it does in the military one. 
Soviet Military Intervention 
Between the early 1950s and the invasion of 
Afghanistan, commitment of Soviet combat troops to overt 
military intervention in the affairs of third states 
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remained confined to the East European sphere of Soviet 
influence. Combating "counterrevolution" in East Germany, 
Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia resulted in various 
degrees of armed violence against the population of those 
countries, and ultimately established the unassailability 
of the USSR's European security zone. At the same time, 
and beginning roughly in the mid-1950s, Moscow embarked on 
a strategy of expanding its influence overseas through a 
combination of extensive military assistance programs and 
politico-economic efforts to bolster indigenous "vanguard" 
parties. It was during this period that a permanent 
Soviet interest in Third World affairs was established. 
Soviet presence beyond the European landmass, and 
"fraternal" relations between the Kremlin and peoples 
striving to free themselves from the "colonialist yoke", 
were seen as promoting the realization of Lenin's call for 
breaking "the chain of imperialism... at its weakest 
link"--the "weakest link" being the host of underdeveloped 
countries where the "bourgeois state" was nonexistent and 
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where socialism could take root with relative ease. 
(i) The Third World in the Soviet Worldview 
Until the promulgation of the peaceful co-existence 
doctrine, the underdeveloped world remained a distant 
element in the Soviet woridview. Stalinist dogmatism had 
prevented contact with non-communist anti-colonial 
movements on ideological grounds; and it had rejected the 
prospect of colonies gaining their independence without 
the prior overthrow of imperialism by means of the 
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proletariat revolution. 73 Under Khrushchev this rigid 
position was discarded in favour of an activist policy to 
befriend the newly independent states and attach them, at 
least in theory, to the socialist commonwealth. The 
emergence of leaders in the ex-colonies who openly 
rejected capitalism and proclaimed themselves as adherents 
of "socialist development", coupled with the residual 
anti-Western feelings colonialism had bred, seemed to 
offer fertile soil for the quick growth of ties between 
the USSR and the Third World with only a minimum 
investment of Soviet resources. In addition, and 
beginning in 1961, because of the gradual erosion of the 
USSR's undisputed position as the center of the world 
socialist movement generated by the Sino-Soviet dispute, 
Moscow initiated a number of ideological innovations with 
the aim to re-assert Soviet ideological prominence over 
the Chinese and once again rally communist parties and 
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regimes under its banner But 
Although these enunciations were offered as 
guides to other states and parties, it was 
evident that each communist country and party 
would examine the new ideological wares 
and carefully select and reject in accordance 
with its own needs. 75 
In light of these adjustments, and in an attempt to 
accelerate the entry of the Third World into the Soviet 
sphere, Moscow adopted ideological accommodations which 
--accepted that national liberation could be achieved 
by peaceful means; 
--recognized "national democracy" as an acceptable 
form of government on the way to socialism even 
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though "bourgeois elements" still played an important 
role in it; 
--and accepted the "validity" of alternative roads to 
socialism and the right of individual countries to 
pursue them. 
Khrushchev's open-arms policy towards the Third 
World, however, did not have any spectacular results. 
While leaders like Castro, Nasser, Ben Bella, and Nkrumah 
embraced Moscow as an urgent alternative to an indifferent 
and often openly hostile West, the bewildering diversity 
of Third World problems, and the individual political and 
economic policies of each of the ex-colonies, left little 
room for the immediate rise of a Soviet-controlled, 
uniform, tightly-organized "peace zone" across Africa and 
Asia. The Soviet task was further hampered by Moscow's 
thinly-veiled reluctance to commit itself to a substantial 
program of foreign aid (a problem which was only partially 
alleviated by the willingness to provide arms and 
military assistance), in addition to the often unclear and 
inconsistent statements as to the method(s) it proposed to 
use in supporting the "oppressed" and the newly 
independent. In the case of Arab nationalism, for 
example, one analysis noted that: 
The Soviet Communists inflame the national and 
racial feelings of the Arabs against the Western 
"colonisers, " but when these feelings lead the 
Arabs to stray from the Soviet pattern of 
"national transformation, " the Soviet Communists 
accuse them of harboring "reactionary feelings, " 
"radicalism, " or "petty bourgeois nationalism. " 76 
Thus, by the end of Khrushchev's incumbency, only 
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three Third World countries, Cuba, North Korea, and North 
Vietnam, openly identified themselves as Marxist-Leninist 
states. The rest of the "nonaligned" practiced assorted 
"third way" versions of socialism, frequently suppressed 
indigenous communist parties with a vigour reminiscent of 
the colonial "oppressors", and shared little with Moscow 
beyond the ever-present "mutual friendship" agreements and 
a broad "anti-imperialist" vision. 
This failure to obtain full-fledged "allies" among 
the developing countries caused much introspection within 
the CPSU and eventually changes in the Soviet attitude 
towards non-communist, one-party Third World regimes. In 
retrospect, the early inability to build up Soviet 
influence in non-European areas seems only inevitable in 
light of the fact that the Soviet leadership had only 
scant knowledge of Third World affairs, and depended for 
its decisions "on a minimum amount of factual information 
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and a large amount of Marxist theory". 
Khrushchev's departure from the Kremlin in 1964 
signalled the return of ideological as well as political 
caution in Soviet Third World thinking and policies. The 
reassessment of the Khrushchev period, and political 
developments within Third World countries such as the 
wave of "reactionary" military coups that swept Africa in 
the mid-1960s, demonstrated that the optimistic 
expectations of socialism sweeping spontaneously through 
the ex-colonies were ill-founded, and from the viewpoint 
of foreign policy management, even counter-productive. 
The Brezhnev collective must have noted, for example, that 
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the majority of Third World elites remained dominated by 
"nationalistic petty bourgeois" elements with little 
appetite for "scientific socialism"; that Western methods 
of conservative state organization prevailed making the 
transition to Soviet-style socialism an extremely 
difficult exercise; that communist revolutionary movements 
looked inevitable if such transition was to be expected; 
and that strictly economic assistance could not induce 
adequate desire for the Soviet model of socialist 
development and, therefore, building Soviet influence 
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would have to follow alternative paths. 
Consequently, the Brezhnev approach to the Third 
World became dominated, in noticeable contrast to the 
rather haphazard practices of the 1950s and early 1960s, 
by the deliberate study of "the ongoing development of the 
world revolutionary process and of the national liberation 
struggle"; this painstaking process was adopted as the 
only means of reaching "theoretical comprehension" of the 
problems "involved in the building of socialism and 
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communism in the USSR and other fraternal countries... ". 
which, it would seem, was the key factor in correctly 
assessing Third World dynamics and prospects of promoting 
the development of socialist state systems. 
Thus, the lessons of the Khrushchev era spawned a 
major re-evaluation of policies towards the developing 
countries characterized by 
--a more pragmatic assessment of the future of 
individual "revolutionary" regimes, 
--a greater emphasis on weighing the long-term 
implications, instead of short-lived propaganda 
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gains, of Soviet involvement with particular Third 
World clients, and 
--additional investment of Soviet resources mainly 
in areas where the cumulative effect of Soviet 
presence was deemed strong enough to insure a 
dominant Soviet role in local affairs. 
These tenets were strengthened, refined, and 
institutionalized during the Brezhnev years and continue 
to shape the essential Soviet Third World views and 
attitudes. 
Perhaps the most crucial characteristic of this 
doctrinal shift, especially from the viewpoint of Western 
security considerations, was the rejection of the 
possibility of "peaceful transition" to socialism. It was 
now posited that the necessary condition for introducing 
socialism was a "revolutionary struggle" by domestic 
"progressive forces" led by a "revolutionary vanguard" and 
assisted in their fight by other members of "the socialist 
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community of nations". As in the past, the USSR was to 
assume the "vanguard" position in this "internationalist" 
struggle. 
This point was explicitly driven home during the 24th 
CPSU Congress (1971), when Brezhnev reaffirmed Soviet 
determination to "give undeviating support to the peoples' 
struggle for democracy, national liberation, and 
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socialism", and again during the 210Th CPSU Congress 
. (1976), when 
"Brezhnev himself described the national 
liberation struggle as part of the international class 
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struggle of the oppressed against their oppressors". 
Furthermore, Soviet commentary saw support of nations 
struggling to win and protect their right to self- 
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determination as not only a Marxist-Leninist duty, but 
also a moral obligation stemming from "international 
documents" which fully justified "helping colonial and 
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dependent peoples in their struggle for independence". 
By the mid-1970s, "national liberation" victories in 
Mozambique and Angola, and the overthrow of the Ethiopian 
emperor by a Marxist coup, balanced the Third World 
"correlation of forces" against setbacks like the ejection 
of Russian advisers from Egypt in 1972 and Somalia in 
1977. By this time, the Soviet Union maintained 
diplomatic relations with ninety Third World nations, 
relations which , at least in Soviet propaganda parlance, 
"were complemented with mutual respect and mutually 
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beneficial cooperation". Although these countries 
differed in their stage of economic development, their 
policies of achieving "socialist construction", and their 
internal balance between "progressive" and "reactionary" 
political forces, their general "anti-imperialist" 
orientation offered a firm foundation for collective 
resistance against imperialist-capitalist exploitation and 
aggression. The power of "collective measures" was not to 
be underestimated, especially since it could even prevent 
escalation to "an imperialist-inspired world war" as the 
experience in Indochina had demonstrated: 
The victory of the Vietnamese people, supported 
by the USSR and other socialist countries and by 
the world communist movement, clearly showed 
that when communist parties act in the same 
direction and mobilise the people in a 
determined struggle, imperialist aggression 
inescapably fails. 85 
In the late Brezhnev years, as detente with the West 
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slowly disintegrated and Western-Chinese "collusion" 
acquired a new momentum, the importance of "collective" 
action as the underpinning of global Soviet "peace policy" 
was further emphasized. It was suggested, for instance, 
that "neo-colonialism" engaged anew in "a vigorous 
ideological expansion in the developing countries" 
spearheaded by "the propaganda of deideologization (sic) 
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and anti-communist concepts and ideas" which obviously 
called for "resolute rebuffs" of imperialist encroachments 
upon these countries. Such defence against the capitalist 
threat could not be achieved without increasing stress on 
the model of socialist development as the guiding 
national philosophy, supplemented by the need to discard 
hybrid "national" socialist doctrines, and by exposing the 
US policies of economic aid exploitation as tools in 
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penetrating and destabilizing developing economies. 
For all the calls for a return to "pure ideology" 
among "friends" and "allies" in the developing world, the 
present Soviet attitude towards them seems to be more 
dominated by pragmatism than a blind belief in the 
"natural" alliance between Moscow-sponsored Marxism- 
Leninism and Third World states. If nothing else, the 
Soviets must have realized that treaties of friendship and 
co-operation are hardly cast-iron guarantees of permanent 
influence, let alone changes in national policy made for 
the benefit of specific Soviet interests. 
Moreover, it must also be clear to the Soviet 
leadership that reduction of Western influence upon a 
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particular client Third World state does not automatically 
generate opportunities for Soviet inroads. The foreign 
policies of developing countries, contrary to what can be 
described as the unitary orientation model, have become 
increasingly complex exercises in avoiding the often 
asphyxiating embrace of one, major, external benefactor. 
Only recently, for instance, the majority of African 
states endorsed the Soviet-Cuban assistance to the Angolan 
and Ethiopian Marxists, while the same group of states 
actively discouraged "Soviet interference in Western, and 
later British-led, initiatives to effect a peaceful 
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transition to majority rule in Zimbabwe". Echoing this 
sense of realpolitik--and perhaps in tacit recognition of 
the limitations of Moscow's ability to spur wholesale 
defection of Third World actors to the Soviet sphere--the 
current CPSU Programme proclaims that 
Relations between the Soviet Union and newly 
free countries have demonstrated that there also 
exists a realistic basis for cooperation with 
those young states that are following the 
capitalist road to development. 89 
On the other, hand though, commitment to the "anti- 
imperialist struggles" of those who strive to join the 
road to socialism remains undiluted: 
The CPSU supports the just struggle waged by the 
countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America 
against imperialism and the oppression of 
transnational monopolies... for a restructuring 
of international relations on an equal and 
democratic basis... 90 
In conclusion, therefore, the present Soviet attitude 
towards the Third World may be summed up as follows: 
--The "internationalist struggle" continues 
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throughout the global system and the developing 
countries are in need of both "proper" ideological 
guidance and material support on the road to 
socialism; 
--"peaceful transition" from capitalism to socialism 
is extremely difficult, if at all possible, "and thus 
a Soviet-sponsored revolution from outside is seen as 
the most promising way of securing Moscow a lasting 
presence" in the affairs of individual developing 
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states; and 
--in the interim, the USSR must be prepared to 
pursue relations even with those Third World states 
firmly lodged in the capitalist orbit. 
(ii) Military Intervention: The Soviet View 
In contrast to the rapid expansion of American 
military presence and involvement overseas in the 
immediate aftermath of the Second World War, the Soviet 
Union remained disinterested in overseas presence or 
bases, 
and indeed withdrew from Porkala Udd in Finland 
and Port Arthur and Dairen in China in the 
interests of better relations with the countries 
concerned. 92 
Lacking a system of extra-European alliances, 
historically oriented towards warding off Germanic 
invasions, constrained by the lack of long-range 
transport aviation and a large surface navy, and largely 
preoccupied with strengthening its strategic Eastern 
European buffer, Moscow reserved only minimal interest for 
distant conflicts and even less for "projecting" military 
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power beyond the Soviet rimland. 93 
Khrushchev's Third World policies, although paying 
lip service to the cause of "national liberation", failed 
to commit Moscow to specific forms of assistance, and even 
more so, to any undertaking entailing the participation of 
Soviet military personnel in foreign conflicts. The 
reluctance to become entangled manifested itself in 
"another doctrinal novelty" introduced by Khrushchev which 
posited that "local wars" could easily escalate to a 
global superpower nuclear confrontation--a condition which 
implied that local clashes with the United States over 
"liberation movements" must be avoided. This "novelty", 
designed as it was to preclude direct US/Soviet 
confrontations in peripheral areas, conveniently placed 
constraints "upon support of revolutionary conflicts" and 
as such "was caustically noted by the Chinese 
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Communists". 
Thus, reluctant to become involved in national 
liberation wars, the Kremlin resorted to a campaign of 
criticizing American doctrines of limited war--a practice 
which combined the advantages of being virtually risk- 
free, as far as a direct US-Soviet clash was concerned, 
with those of a high-profile exercise in the propaganda 
war against "imperialist aggression". The main focus of 
Soviet propaganda was the flexible response doctrine and 
its "brushfire" wars concept. Soviet commentators 
suggested, for example, that flexible response was in 
effect a hoax designed to deceive Washington's NATO allies 
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into believing that "general war" in Europe was a remote 
possibility, while all along striving to push "the waging 
of war as far away from U. S. territory as possible" 
without truly diminishing the risk of a nuclear 
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exchange. Particular stress was also put on the 
ideological deficiency of the "flexible response 
doctrineers" who, by virtue of their inability to 
comprehend the driving forces behind guerrilla struggles 
for freedom, condemned "imperialist aggression" to 
ultimate failure: 
One of the most serious mistakes... in the 
imperialist concept of anti-guerrilla warfare is 
failure to realise that in certain conditions it 
is utterly impossible to find the way to achieve 
victory over a popular movement which has taken 
the form of guerrilla warfare.... 
Guerrilla warfare... has its own specific and 
original features, which powerfully confirm the 
invincibility of the popular movement and the 
futility of imperialist attempts to suppress it 
no matter what methods are used. 96 
With the advent of the Brezhnev collective, the 
Soviet approach to Third World conflicts entered a more 
orderly phase of re-thinking tactics and attempting to 
reconcile specific policy objectives with expanding 
military power. The Cuban missile crisis had already 
demonstrated that brinkmanship involving a distant Third 
World "ally" carried unacceptable risks, especially in 
light of the USSR's limited power projection capabilities 
and the mathematics of the nuclear balance. It was, 
however, obvious that, if Moscow desired to arrest the 
plans and influence of the Peking "opportunists" directed 
at the "nonaligned", and if it seriously contemplated to 
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seek access to diversified "strategic positions" around 
the globe, its assistance to the "oppressed" had to take 
more concrete form. 
The Brezhnev Third World strategy thus assumed two 
parallel paths: first, arms transfers, kept to relatively 
low levels during the Khrushchev era, began rising and 
Soviet military advisers were dispatched to recipient 
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countries to serve in combat support roles; and, second, 
the "local war" edifice came under renewed scrutiny in an 
effort to construct the "proper" intellectual framework to 
serve both the requirements of Marxist-Leninist ideology 
and Soviet global policy. 
Reassessing the nature of "local wars" seemed quite 
urgent indeed in view of emerging, and rather confusing 
"contradictions": Third World nations, ostensibly united 
in their opposition to "imperialism", were now clashing 
over territorial and ethnic disputes (as in the 1967 
Middle East War and the 1965 Indo-Pakistani conflict), and 
calling for the first time for Soviet help in their 
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individual feuds with their ex-colonial brethren. 
Consequently, choosing sides in Third World conflicts 
became not only inevitable, but also the subject of 
delicate policy exercises with the aim of limiting the 
damage upon long-term Soviet interests, and ensuring a 
major Soviet role in every significant accommodation 
between non-Western regional powers. 
The growing US military intervention in Vietnam 
during the late 1960s placed a special burden on the USSR 
in its role as the leading defender of "revolutionaries" 
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around the world. Although Soviet commentary reiterated 
Moscow's faith in the ultimate futility of the small-war 
"rainbow ideas" succeeding against the ideologically 
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superior North Vietnamese communists, it was also 
"apparent that the USSR was willing to do very little. on 
behalf of the Vietnamese communists beyond the shipment of 
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arms". 
Whether this hands-off Soviet approach was due to the 
belief that the Americans could do little but simply 
postpone defeat in the face of Hanoi's "moral 
superiority", or due to a sober assessment of the 
consequences of direct Soviet military involvement in 
Indochina is a matter for debate. In any event, the Viet- 
nam war rekindled the view that "dirty local wars", 
unleashed by the United States to further its "aggressive 
plans", could indeed escalate to world war under certain 
conditions (i. e. not inevitably), but it was also 
emphasized that this prospect could not and would not 
prevent the USSR from giving "thorough support to the 
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national liberation movement". At the same time, the 
Khrushchevite link between local and nuclear world war was 
dropped and replaced with a crucial new theory: favourable 
world correlation of forces, and the expansion of Soviet 
nuclear capabilities, made possible to prevent "the 
development of local wars into an enormous clash on a 
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world-wide scale". Now, 
US imperialism must reckon with such cardinal 
factors as the military-economic and scientific- 
technical potential of the Soviet Union and the 
whole socialist camp. These factors have made 
it possible to create... a mighty nuclear 
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missile armoury, which is the decisive element 
in the Soviet Union's strength, and which 
operates as a deterrent to aggressive aspirations 
of world reaction, headed by US imperialism. 103 
This display of confidence in socialism's ability to 
command sufficient strength to challenge, without the fear 
of nuclear annihilation, "imperialist aggression" against 
"revolutionary movements" was crucial. As Katz put it: 
The ability to prevent the outbreak of world war 
through the increased strength of socialism 
meant not only that the USSR could play a 
greater role in aiding progressive forces to 
counter a local war launched by the 
imperialists, but also that the Soviet Union 
could itself make foreign policy gains through 
local wars without fear of world war. 
Previously, local wars had been thought of as 
means through which only the imperialists could 
gain. Now it was recognised that the USSR could 
gain from local wars as well... 104 
As a result, in the mid- and late-1970s "aiding 
progressive forces" in the Third World became much better 
planned, organized, and implemented. The most important 
development in the military sphere was the expansion of 
the Soviet Navy which, under the leadership of Admiral 
Gorshkov, was already embarked on an ambitious plan to 
establish permanent Soviet presence in distant oceans. 
Soviet naval patrols in "warm waters" not only underlined 
Moscow's claim to the status of a global power, but also 
reminded present and potential Soviet clients that the 
USSR was indeed building a power projection capability to 
support "anti-imperialist struggles" with both words and 
deeds. Overall, Soviet penetration of "target" countries 
became a careful interplay of three main elements: arms 
transfers, close ideological links with local Marxist 
groups, and generous use of foreign "advisory" missions 
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drawn from Moscow's Warsaw Pact satellites and countries 
like Cuba and North Korea. 
These developments appeared to win some impressive 
gains for Moscow: Soviet and other Eastern bloc advisers, 
assigned a variety of military, technical, educational, 
and internal security tasks, became almost permanent 
fixtures in the domestic scene of many Third World 
nations. More significantly, Cuban troops arrived in 
Africa to offer combat support to, but also undertake 
independent combat missions for, Marxist regimes in Angola 
and Ethiopia under the umbrella of an unprecedented Soviet 
long-range logistical operation aimed at providing the 
requisite weapons and supplies to Moscow's friends. In 
both cases, the Soviet-Cuban presence was crucial in the 
"socialist victories" of those regimes, and signalled the 
beginning of what has been described as "the new Soviet 
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proto-alliance system" in Africa. 
During the same period relations with Iraq, Syria, 
and Libya were strengthened, and broadened Soviet presence 
in South Yemen turned "that strategically important 
country into what one Western diplomat called a 'military 
warehouse"'; however, these advances were partially 
counterbalanced by the "loss" of Somalia, the "gradual 
shift Westward" of Angola and Mozambique due to their 
disastrous economic condition, the transition of Rhodesia 
into Zimbabwe without Soviet participation in the 
Lancaster House agreements, the low Marxist fortunes in 
the Caribbean, and the diminishing Soviet role in the 
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search for settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. 
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The magnitude of the support given to the African 
Marxists against "imperialist reaction", and especially 
the presence of "reliable" Cuban troops on the battlefront 
did, however, have another, less publicized, purpose: 
historical experience had already demonstrated that 
Moscow's fundamental security interests frequently 
diverged from those of indigenous Third World forces--a 
fact which increasingly called for a direct Soviet role in 
controlling events and boosting the "fraternal" fervour of 
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Marxist-Leninist Third World regimes. 
As the 1970s came to a close, the invasion of 
Afghanistan gave the signal that this direct role might 
afterall take the form of overt military intervention to 
prevent the overthrow of "progressive" Third World 
governments struggling against the "agents of 
imperialism". This possible action though in no way 
diminished the consistent Soviet policy of peace because, 
as Marshal Grechko had written earlier, a war imposed upon 
the USSR "or other socialist states" by the imperialists 
was "unjust... and a continuation of their predatory 
politics"; furthermore, 
This war would be just and progressive on the 
part of the Soviet Union and other socialist 
states. It will be a continuation of their 
revolutionary politics of defending the freedom 
and independence of their motherland and 
promoting the great cause of building socialism 
and communism. 108. 
Lest the "imperialists" forget, peaceful coexistence with 
the "bourgeois states" did not "abrogate the laws of class 
struggle", nor did it eliminate the right of a nation to 
oppose "aggressive imperialist policy by all means 
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accessible to it, including the defense of its interests 
by beginning a national liberation war with guns in 
109 
hand". Shortly after the invasion, the "external" role, 
which the Soviet armed forces assumed in "protecting" 
Afghanistan, was reaffirmed by Colonel Vorob'yev as a 
primary mission aimed at "frustrating the aggressive plans 
of international imperialism", and as part "of the 
historical mission of socialist states to defend the peace 
of the whole world"; the "external function", Vorob'yev 
indicated, could be "implemented in various forms" 
according to prevailing conditions, one of which is 
"revolutionary wars in defense of the socialist Fatherland 
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[and] of all world socialism". 
This brings us to a final observation: although 
Vorob'yev stopped short of clearly stating a concept of 
Third World military intervention, the implications of the 
"external function" appeared more or less obvious. 
However, it was also premature to forecast "massive" 
Soviet power projection in "unstable" areas with the 
active deployment of combat troops. Given the Soviet 
propensity to establish long-term strategies only after a 
critical test has been performed successfully, the outcome 
of the Afghanistan war will be crucial. If Soviet arms 
fail to subdue the Afghans (and so far there is little 
cause for Soviet optimism), then "it is doubtful that [the 
Soviets] would discuss direct Soviet military intervention 





The following points have hopefully emerged from the 
preceding discussion: 
(A) In the years since the US departure from Vietnam, and 
while American perceptions on distant power 
projection came under the restrictive influence of 
the "Vietnam syndrome", Moscow moved beyond its own 
traditional reluctance to get involved in the Third 
World and embarked upon a policy of "fraternal" 
assistance to "progressive forces" in their fight 
against "capitalist neo-colonizers". Thus, for the 
first time in its history, the USSR is able to 
contemplate challenging US security interests, and 
US-backed regimes, through a variety of military- 
political actions in areas far away from its shores 
with the hope, however limited, of actually gaining 
an advantage. 
(B) It is also important to note the significance Moscow 
ascribes to the "political effect of the strategic 
balance" upon regional political developments, a 
relationship that "has been ignored or denied in 
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orthodox U. S. strategic theory". Soviet 
confidence, based on expanded strategic capabilities, 
is perhaps the key ingredient in current Soviet 
activities in the Third World. 
(C) Although the United States clearly retains a superior 
aggregate capability to project military power 
overseas, the shift in Soviet theory and practice 
regarding commitments in the "periphery", from an 
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essentially reactive posture to one of assertiveness 
and initiative, might in the long run be a crucial 
political factor in the battle for the "hearts and 
minds" of Third World governments. 
(D) Finally, a word of, caution is due concerning the 
"risk" of "massive" Soviet intervention in Third 
World conflicts. Soviet theory and practice have 
stopped, so far, short of defining and implementing 
the "external function" of the Soviet armed forces 
broadly enough to sustain credible theories of a 




MILITARY INTERVENTION: TOWARDS A CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
Unlike the search for a theory on the causes of 
international conflict and war, military intervention as a 
theoretical concept has generated fragmented interest and 
resulted, so far, in sparse literature. One reason for 
this paucity may be the preference to look at military 
intervention as a component (sub-system) of the global 
system encompassing the entire spectrum of the uses of 
1 
military force in international relations. According to 
this view, the military intervention sub-system is 
normally activated on an ad hoc basis depending on 
objective conditions of power and the requirements of a 
particular conflict situation. 
While historical experience may support this view in 
connection to earlier stages in the evolution of the 
international system (e. g. during the 19th century 
European 'balance of power' period) the ad hoc approach 
seems ill-suited for the study of military intervention 
within the post-1945 international security environment. 
In the present uncertain days a number of significant 
factors support a different approach to military 
intervention. First, the speed of change in the less 
developed areas of the world create unprecedented 
pressures and risks of armed conflict among regional 
actors; second, the diffusion of power and the 
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multipolarity it entails limit the effectiveness of 
"spheres of influence" and impose increasing restrictions 
upon the actions (but, also, reactions) of previously 
dominant actors, a situation which offers fertile ground 
for military responses even to minor "threats"; and, 
third, the perception that the world is entering a state 
of increased turmoil and instability--not necessarily 
associated with superpower rivalry--feeds the process 
towards ever more comprehensive "contingency planning" and 
"scenario building" which, more often than not, contain 
2 
substantial military components. 
These factors create the need for viewing military 
intervention as an essential and permanent part of 
international security relations. This chapter will 
therefore (a) focus the discussion on the concept of 
intervention in general and attempt to describe it in 
general systems theory terms, and (b) further refine the 
discussion to consider the military intervention sub- 
system and its characteristics. 
The Intervention System 
"Interventionary" activities within the international 
system have traditionally triggered heated debates among 
scholars. Moral, legal, economic, and strategic concerns 
have all combined to form a rather tangled net of argument 
and counter-argument regarding the methods, rationale, and 
possible outcomes of interfering in the affairs of 
"victim" or "target" system actors. 
The pervasiveness and historical durability of the 
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concept of intervention--or, at least, what different 
analysts choose to call 'intervention'--leads to a 
continuum of definitions which identify the concept with 
innumerable "shades" ranging from phenomena associated 
with the use or the threat of force to virtually every 
activity originating in one political system and having 
3 
repercussions in another. As a result, intervention is 
variously associated with terms like "penetration", 
"coercion", "aggression", "subversion", and even 
"influence" be it political, economic, cultural, or any 
combination thereof. The propensity to use the above 
terms almost synonymously often leads to ambiguity and 
contradiction. The situation is further obscured by the 
erosion of the traditional doctrine of nonintervention in 
favor of "conditional intervention" due to changing 
perceptions on international law and methods of offering 
assistance to less developed nations. As Professor Scott 
observed: 
The doctrine of nonintervention stands in 
serious need of modification. Powerful nations 
do not, and cannot, adhere to it. They cannot 
adhere to it and offer leadership because the 
exercise of international leadership often 
involves intervention. The United States, for 
example, cannot assist a poor nation along the 
path of development while observing the 
principle of nonintervention because a full- 
scale program of assistance revolves around 
various forms of intervention. One nation 
cannot help another nation modernize and, at the 
same time, cling to the time-honored principle 
of nonintervention. 4 
The contradiction of opinions on intervention becomes 
even more sharply focused when we note that strictly- 
defined nonintervention remains the aim for all less 
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powerful developing states. In this 
traditional view that intervention should 
only the threat of or the use of force has 
as "too restrictive" for modern times as 
into account "other types" of intervention 
respect, the 
be linked with 
been challenged 
it fails to take 
such as 
-- economic pressure; 
-- diplomatic proposals accompanied by political 
threats; 
-- subversive activities and incitement to rebellion; 
-- allowing traffic in weapons and military equipment 
in order to assist a rebel band in another state; 
-- supplying government-made or government-owned weapons 
for the same purpose; and 
-- allowing persons within the jurisdiction of the 
interfering state to take part in the preparation, 
organization, and execution of a military enterprise 
designed to initiate or promote rebellion or sedition 
within another state. 5 
The historian's observations have produced, and 
continue to generate, great amounts of empirical 
information about interventionary activities. This 
reservoir of facts, contrary to what one might be tempted 
to believe, creates no firm grounds for the elaboration of 
a concept definition, let alone for constructing a general 
theory of intervention. Given the sheer complexity of 
interventionary activities, the analyst is confronted with 
the not unknown problem of trying to work his way through 
a lexical maze to a definitive typology of intervention-- 
which, in all probability, will never be able to reach. 
As Stanley Hoffman says: 
A general presentation on the subject of 
intervention is likely to contain little that is 
original, and to consist only of an endless 
series of classifications. The reason for this 
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is very simple. The subject is practically the 
same as that of international politics in 
general from the beginning of time to the 
present. 6 
Richard Little, in his attempt to address the problem of 
theory formulation created by the myriad connotations of 
the word "intervention", observes that the analyst is 
indeed prisoner of the "paradox of conceptualization"-- 
intervention is a widely used word but hardly a well- 
defined concept; forming a theory requires a concept 
although no concept can be formed without a theory. He 
concludes, therefore, that, 
an examination of all forms of behaviour 
identified as intervention will not help 
elucidate a concept. Certain a priori 
assumptions have to be made and many 
connotations associated with the word must be 
eliminated if a clearly defined concept is to 
emerge. 7 
Little's view testifies to the near frustration 
associated with the effort to force an abstract phenomenon 
into an intellectual "cast"--and the usual, if 
unavoidable, tendency to respond by relying on axioms and 
other "truths" drawn from "general observation". 
Professor Rosenau, in his well-known earlier study of 
intervention as a scientific concept, arrives at a similar 
conclusion although he rightly seems reluctant to assign 
scientific value to the gathering of ever-increasing 
amounts of data without the benefit of a set of unifying, 
explanatory (and hopefully tested) generalizations. In 
his words: 
Data and insights in themselves... do not 
necessarily lead to an ever-accumulating body of 
reliable knowledge about the conditions under 
which intervention does and does not occur--- 
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---The factors that foster, precipitate, 
sustain, channel, constrain, and/or curb 
intervention simply have not been scientifically 
explored, with the result that the literature is 
barren of any established generalizations. All 
that exists is an enormous amount of 
conventional and legal wisdom in which 
conclusions are asserted on the basis of a 
jumble of ringing affirmations, impressive 
insights, clearcut preferences, and supportive 
historical examples. 8 
Against this background, and of course the never- 
ending controversy concerning concept formulation, the 
problem of definition seems to have no obvious solution. 
In the absence of a firm consensus on the nature and forms 
of intervention, reaching a working definition has to 
inevitably rest with previous attempts to do so. 
The least ambiguous point about "intervention" is 
that it constitutes "interference" in the internal and 
external affairs of another state. According to Helen 
Stern, for example, "intervention implies an active, 
calculated step, a forcible interference in another 
nation's external and internal affairs, to maintain or 
alter a condition or situation, presuming, further, that 
this coercion will in some manner benefit or-protect the 
9 
initiator". The notion of "interference" is also present 
in at least two additional attempts to define 
intervention. Rosenau distinguishes the intruder's 
convention-breaking behaviour but also the authority- 
10 
oriented nature of his actions. This view posits that 
intervention is a "sharp break with then-existing norms" 
and that "it is directed at changing or preserving the 
structure of political authority in the target society"-- 
i. e. it is meant, primarily, to influence or alter 
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existing rules of power transfer and, presumably, create 
11 
future regimes "acceptable" to the intruder. In a 
similar vein, and again focused on interference in 
internal politics, Oran Young defines intervention as 
"organized and systematic activities across recognized 
boundaries aimed at affecting the political authority 
12 
structures of the target". An important part of such 
"systematic activities" is the overt or implied threat of 
sanctions if the target fails to comply with the wishes of 
the intervener. The threat of sanctions alone, however, 
is usually insufficient to modify the target's behaviour 
according to the intruder's wishes. As Tedeschi et. al. 
observe: 
the threat of sanction, though necessary, is not 
a sufficient condition of power because the 
availability of sanction endows the source 
[intruder] with power over the target only when 
certain conditions are met (1) the target must 
be aware of what the source wants, presumably 
through clear communication, (2) the threatened 
punishment must be perceived as costly to the 
target, (3) the cost of the target's 
noncompliance to the source's requests should be 
greater than the costs of compliance; and (4) 
the target must believe that the threatener will 
probably punish noncompliance. 13 
Assuming that these preconditions exist, and for 
intervention to take its generally accepted form 
associated with interference, the intruder should carry on 
with coercive measures to secure the target's compliance. 
Therefore, 
---the real criterion for determining whether 
there was intervention in a particular case was 
whether there was any open or disguised coercion 
to make a state do something contrary to its 
desires and interests or to prevent it from 
doing something which it could legitimately do 
otherwise. 14 
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On the basis of the above, and for the purposes of 
this study, a first-level root definition and a "textual- 
form" model can be expressed as follows: 
--An intervention system is a system controlled by the 
intruder's national authorities and designed to undermine, 
support, overthrow, or modify the behaviour of the 
target's political authority structures assuming that such 
action will satisfy specific desires (policy requirements) 
of the intruder at an acceptable cost. 
MODEL 
Express desire or policy requirement 
Determine specific goal in regard to target 
Determine mode of intervention 
Evaluate available capabilities 
Assess military force structures 
Assess non-military means 
Maintain contact with target 
Insure unbroken flow of intelligence 
Evaluate possible environment constraints 
Assess risk of counter-intervention 
Plan action and assign tasks 
Non-military planning 
Military contingency planning 
Implement intervention plans 
At this point, and in order to explore intervention 
in systemic terms, it is proposed to adopt Robinson's 
15 
approach and discuss the concept of intervention in the 
16 
systems language with the aid of what Robin Williams 
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calls "firm simplicities" available through general 
17 
historical observation. The studies of Oran Young and 
18 
Robbins and Oliva have suggested lists of general 
systems theory terms several of which are utilized below. 
SYSTEM: The intervention system may be considered an open 
human activity system where the minimum, necessary number 
of actors is two. For the purposes of this study, the 
intervention system actors are nation-states which, in a 
world-system perspective, are defined as political 
organizations representing only their own citizens and 
19 
"contending with others in a larger arena". 
Actor numbers can, in theory, be infinite. However, 
in real-world situations, and for the sake of clarity, the 
initial formulation of intervention systems should include 
only the minimum necessary number so that relationships 
between the intruder and the target can be clearly 
defined. One topic of particular interest--and one which 
should be treated with care when modelling intervention 
systems--is the delimitation of significant actor sub- 
systems. Although the traditional statecentric view of 
international relations treats nation-states as more or 
less cohesive -units with a single "personality", so to 
speak, such notions seem to have limited relevance when we 
20 
view many modern independent states. 
Many Third World countries, for example, suffer from 
political, regional, cultural, and economic fragmentation. 
Failing to recognize the significance of national sub- 
systems at the intervention system level often leads to 
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faulty systemic logic and distortion of findings. It is, 
therefore, useful to look at system actors in terms of 
their building blocks, i. e. those purposeful sub-systems 
whose interaction determines overall actor (and system) 
behaviour. 
If, for example, the intervention system consists of 
21 
one intruder and a target which is "bifurcated" because 
of internal unrest and the rise of a potent anti- 
government movement, modelling this system should be based 
on a minimum of three elementary sub-models; first, one 
representing the relationship between the intruder and the 
target's central government; second, another representing 
the target's internal conflict situation; and, third, 
another depicting the action-reaction process between the 
intruder and the movement challenging the target's central 
government authority (assuming that the intruder is indeed 
22 
supporting that government). 
ENVIRONMENT: Although intervention systems are ultimately 
components of the international system's universal 
environment, it is often useful, if not necessary, to opt 
for a lower environment resolution. Intervention systems 
other than those containing the two superpowers, as 
dominant actors are prime candidates for such treatment. 
An intervention like that of Tanzania to overthrow 
Uganda's Idi Amin, the invasion of Cyprus by Turkey, and 
Libya's intrusion into Chad may be much more precisely 
analyzed if they are examined within the regional rather 
than the global enviromment. This approach allows the 
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building of "linkage" models, representing the 
relationships between the given intervention system (taken 
as a single component) and other environment components, 
23 
with a much higher degree of confidence. 
DYNAMICS: The emphasis here is placed upon system change 
and particularly on structure and power distribution. 
Addition or removal of actors to or from the intervention 
system result in different power balances and influence 
24 
the final outcome of interventionary activities. 
Israel's intervention strategy in Lebanon had to undergo 
changes in response to active Syrian involvement in that 
country. It can be convincingly argued, for example, that 
the Syrian presence and willingness to engage the Israeli 
Defence Forces, reduced Israel's desire to create a 
security zone by semi-annexing southern Lebanon in much 
the same fashion as in the case of the Golan Heights. 
The speed of change is crucial to system maintenance. 
High speeds coupled with extreme power disparities usually 
result in catastrophe for the target actor and lead to the 
demise of that particular intervention system. The 
American invasion of Grenada is a case in point. The 
American massive military blow completed the uprooting of 
the radical Grenadian leftists and their Cuban supporters 
in a matter of days and led to an equally rapid withdrawal 
of the main intervention force. Slower speeds, on the 
other hand, may lead to long cycles of system operation 
and modification as in the case of American 
interventionary activities in Central America. 
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OVERLOAD: An intervention system is overloaded when it is 
incapable of responding to demands placed upon it. 
Overloading is undesirable as it may lead to system 
dysfunction and eventual complete breakdown. It is, 
however, difficult, if not impossible, to determine 
threshold points and take preemptive action. One way of 
guarding against overload is to avoid defining system 
goals in overambitious terms. Failing to do so may lead 
policymakers to attach "high confidence" to "expectations 
25 
that are too specific" and in fact quite unrealistic. 
Monitoring resources expended against results obtained 
(the typical 'cost-benefit' analysis approach) is another. 
Ultimately, however, overloading may be unavoidable if 
intervention becomes an end in itself and loses its 
clearly focused objective. The US-Vietnam intervention 
system became gradually overloaded between 1965 and 1968 
mainly due to American strategic oscillation--only to 
deteriorate further into dysfunction and collapse in the 
period from 1969 to 1975. In contrast, South African 
interventionary activities against neighbouring black 
African states are calculated to fully exploit existing 
power disparities and to promote South African interests 
without causing system overload (which could occur if 
South Africa chose to engage in long-term anti-guerrilla 
campaigns deep inside neighbouring territories). 
CONTROL: This is perhaps one of the most important 
concepts when dealing with intervention systems. Control 
by system actors establishes the pattern of activity 
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"flows" which occur within the system. Positive control, 
i. e. the ability to plan and implement various strategies 
towards attaining objectives, is juxtaposed to negative 
control, an essentially reactive process whereas 
threatened. actors engage in evasive action, so to speak, 
in order to minimize or avoid exposure to damaging 
26 
encounters. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviet 
Union exercised positive control over its missile-basing 
activities until American intelligence revealed the 
existence of Soviet launchers on Cuban soil. Thereafter, 
Moscow was forced into negative control measures steering 
clear of a nuclear confrontation with the United States 
but seeking, at the same time, to withdraw its strategic 
weapons from Cuba without serious loss of face. Although 
the United States appeared as exercising positive control 
during its intervention in Vietnam (at least until 1968- 
69), it may be said that most American actions were 
influenced by negative control thinking caused by the 
desire to minimize the possibility of direct Soviet and 
Chinese counter-intervention on the side of the Hanoi 
regime. 
FEEDBACK: Information about the results of interventionary 
activity, communicated from lower to top leadership 
levels, should contribute, at least in theory, to the 
improvement or change of methods, practices, tactics, and 
strategies adopted and implemented by system actors. The 
common expression "learning from experience" seems 
appropriate in this context. Feedback is hardly 
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automatic, however. Creating effective, operational 
feedback "loops" which can pass reliable information to 
central command authorities is usually one of the weakest 
27 
links in the intervention system. 
Feedback allows lessons to be "learned" and policy 
modified accordingly. Argentina's leadership did not 
ignore goal-changing feedback following the Falklands 
debacle; and as a result there is no reason to believe 
that it plans, at least in the immediate future and in 
view of the Fortress Falklands British policy, to repeat 
the military junta's blunder. Similarly, it may be argued 
that Britain has also benefited from goal-seeking feedback 
adjusting its policies to the idea of eventual negotiation 
on the future of the islands. Another example of goal- 
changing feedback would be America's "Vietnam syndrome" 
which has undoubtedly and permanently altered American 
perceptions concerning the desirability and usefulness of 
combat commitments abroad. 
GOAL/STABILITY: The primary goals of an intervention 
system are essentially two: (a) to cause changes in the 
target's policy outputs which satisfy perceived interests 
of the intruder, and (b) to secure long-term compliance of 
the target with such changes, i. e. to insure future system 
stability. Intervention systems are "stable" in the long 
term if they can maintain effective operation of a set of 
28 
rules which govern the interaction of its actors. 
Theoretically, such rules are dictated by the more 
powerful intruder, although it is also conceivable for 
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the target to manipulate weaknesses of the intruder's 
policies in order to force him into a "process of 
29 
decommitment" and eventual withdrawal. 
On the other hand, stability--at least as perceived 
by the intruder--as inherently contrary to the interests 
of the target. The exercise of continuous intruder 
authority and the tacit acceptance of the intervention 
status quo by third parties, may be impossible to break 
short of a major war or other catastrophic occurrence 
(e. g., collapse of the intruder because of domestic 
reasons). Israel's occupation of the West Bank and of the 
previously Arab-held section of Jerusalem has created 
conditions of stability which no Arab nation -- let alone 
the Palestinian 'liberation' movement -- could safely 
challenge without simultaneously causing Israel to rise 
for a "total" war of survival. In similar fashion, the 
Turkish occupation of the northern half of Cyprus has 
resulted in the destruction of the sovereign Republic of 
Cyprus and the permanent division of the island between 
two rival sectors without any realistic prospects for re- 
unification. 
DECAY: Decay is closely related to dynamics and -it refers 
to the slow deterioration of the intervention system. 
Decay may affect the nation-states/components themselves, 
usually leading to the demise or serious damage of the 
target actor, or to reduced effectiveness of 
interventionary strategies. Decay implies processes 
evolving over rather extended periods of time and thus it 
166 
is inapplicable in the case of "short-burst" 
interventionary action with radical aims. 
COMMUNICATION: Communication is a routine process of 
sending and receiving signals (information flows) which, 
in an interventionary situation, acquires a key role. It 
might be argued, for example, that lack of adequate 
communication between actors often fuels interventionary 
activities for a variety of reasons: suspicion bred by 
the absence of direct, regular contact; overdependence on 
secondary and possibly corrupted means of obtaining 
information about the other party; preemptive moves to 
counter misperceived "threats"; and inability to assess 
correctly evolving situations which come to be identified 
as "crises" calling for drastic "corrective" measures. As 
one analysis put it, many "urgent international 
problems.... require low-level bargaining and persuasive 
expertise within a multilateral framework" rather than 
30 
refusal to communicate. However, such bargaining 
processes "are typically mobilized only in later, more 
acute stages of conflict, where the range of possible 
31 
actions has become gravely restricted". 
INFORMATION: Information could prove to be of fundamental 
importance to the maintenance or breakdown of an 
intervention system. An intruder capable of thoroughly 
assessing the target on the basis of reliable information 
has the opportunity for better strategic analysis and 
planning; conversely, sparse or poorly assessed 
information may lead to ineffective action and failure of 
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the intervention system. From the point of view of the 
target, timely information concerning the capabilities, 
intentions, and activities of a potential intruder may 
spell the difference between subjugation to his will and 
an acceptable level of defense against his coercion. 
Military Intervention 
Military intervention occupies the extreme point of 
the intervention activities continuum under the label "use 
of force". In broad terms, the activation of a military 
intervention system presupposes the following minimum 
number of conditions: 
-- The intruder's decisionmakers have reached the 
conclusion that a crisis situation has deteriorated 
beyond the capacity of non-violent methods of crisis 
management; 
-- A military power projection capability exists in a 
state of readiness; 
-- The target's political authority structures are 
either unable or unwilling to exert control over the 
evolving "threat"; 
-- The "threat" affects (or at least appears to affect) 
"interests" of the intruder (defined in whatever 
fashion the intruder's policymakers choose). 
The main difficulty in drawing the boundary of the 
military intervention system is the "fuzziness" which 
seems to exist when one attempts to differentiate between 
military intervention and a "war" super-system--a problem 
compounded by the familiar levels-of-analysis arguments. 
It frequently seems plausible to argue that military 
intervention constitutes the first step in a "local" war 
which, in turn, might lead to further escalation of 
hostilities and the expansion of the geographical limits 
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of combat operations. In the cases of the American 
involvement in both Korea and Vietnam, for instance, such 
expansion, following the initial insertion of token 
"intruder" combat forces, was narrowly averted thanks to 
mainly political reasons. The potential of a "police 
action" leading to protracted hostilities is a major 
consideration for decisionmakers and perhaps the single 
most important deterrent to the use of force. 
An immediate reaction to these definitional problems 
is to point out that military intervention is indeed war 
of some form or another since it involves the use of 
military force to subdue a resisting party. Definitions 
of war have been sufficiently broad to allow military 
intervention to be listed under them without too much 
hesitation. Consider, for example, the definition of war 
offered by Most and Starr: 
A "war" is a particular type of outcome of the 
interaction of at least dyadic sets of specified 
varieties of actors in which at least one actor 
is willing and able to use some specified amount 
of military force for some specified period of 
time against some other, resisting actor and in 
which some specified minimal number of 
fatalities (greater than zero) occur. 32 
At least one analysis has gone even further to perceive 
military intervention as a "concept broader than war" and 
as one that would include "formal war", i. e. declared 
interstate war which is in essence a "hostile 
intervention... a forceful across-border interference in 
33 
the target state's internal and external affairs". 
Such high level of generalization has not failed to 
enter everyday language. Indeed, evaluations of military 
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intervention situations, especially when made by parties 
friendly to the target (or others with a genuine dislike 
for the use of force in general) tend to underline the 
"aggressive" nature of the military action undertaken and 
to swiftly conclude that the target has fallen victim of 
undeclared "war". 
This popular, if seldom non-polemical, view, ladden 
as it is with the moral rejection of violence as a means 
of conflict resolution, takes little notice of (admittedly 
ambiguous) categorizations like "limited hostile acts with 
minor costs" as opposed to "very hostile war actions" 
34 
which cause "many deaths". It does respond, however, to 
underlying human and legalistic emotions by automatically 
linking military intervention with illegitimacy; and in 
the process it leaves little analytical room for the 
elaboration of sub-categories which might help separate 
"limited military incursion" from acts of all-out war. As 
one might expect, this point causes deep and lasting 
disagreements whose resolution ultimately rests with the 
successful reconciliation of differing methodological, 
moral, philosophical, and ethical views concerning the 
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approaches to the study of war. 
Since this study is not primarily concerned with 
"total" formal war, it bypasses the above arguments and 
assumes that the main attribute of military intervention 
systems, established through common usage, is the 
"limited" nature of their goals and the military means 
employed to achieve them. The military intervention 
system, at least at the initial planning stage and despite 
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the unavoidable considerations of escalation risks, is 
conceived as a closely controlled exercise which aims to 
dislodge and neutralize particular adversary groups within 
the target rather than destroy the latter entirely (an aim 
which would be appropriate to a 'total' war effort). 
Although target catastrophe may occur as a result of 
even "limited" military actions, due to relative power 
asymmetries and changing intentions of the intruder, the 
assumption that military intervention systems are 
positioned towards the "low-intensity" conflict end of the 
conventional conflict spectrum remains. In general, "low- 
intensity" or "limited" conflict has come to be juxtaposed 
to "high-intensity" or "high-technology" conflict, a 
categorization which may not be wholly accurate but which 
has won its place in a substantial part of the literature. 
As David Tarr observes: 
This language is not very precise, of course. 
But it does suggest the difference between, say, 
an intense, large-scale battle in Europe between 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact forces, employing every 
form of advanced weapons technology, and a civil 
war waged by a poorly equipped guerrilla force 
against the regular armed forces of the 
government in an underdeveloped country in the 
Third World. 36 
While positioning military intervention at the "low 
intensity" end of the conflict scale creates a useful 
demarcation line separating "limited" military operations 
from those of major conventional war and nuclear conflict, 
this assumption does not necessarily clear the question of 
whether a military intervention system should include only 
those activities which involve the intervening forces in 
combat roles. Areas on the grey margin of combat 
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missions, i. e. "threshold" activities such as training and 
advisory assistance usually preceding the commitment of 
the intruder's forces to combat, are often seen as part of 
the military intervention system itself. One might wish 
to argue this point further although, as Macfarlane points 
out, 
---in common usage, [military] intervention 
usually carries the connotation of a more direct 
military involvement than these forms of 
assistance. Cases generally referred to as 
[military] intervention share one characte- 
ristic: the involvement in combat roles of 
either the regular forces of the external power 
or the irregulars acting in the interests and at 
the behest of the intervening power. 37 
To recapitulate briefly at this point: 
-- Military intervention is the sub-system of the 
intervention system comprising activities at the 
extreme "use-of-force" area of the intervention 
activities continuum. 
-- The assumption is made that military intervention 
activities are "limited" both in scope and objectives 
and as a result, military intervention is not 
initially, at least, conceived as a major war "forma- 
lized" through declaration. 
-- It is also assumed that military intervention, as 
understood in the context of this study, entails 
combat roles for the intruder's military forces or 
for those (regular or irregular) of its cJt S, with 
activities such as military advisory and training 
assistance assigned to the broader intervention 
environment (even if a small number of advisors 
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'observe' combat missions taking place within the 
target). 
Military Intervention: A Second-level Model 
Having considered the intervention system as a first 
level model, and bearing the above assumptions in mind, we 
will presently attempt to design a second-level model 
incorporating the specific attributes of a military 
intervention situation. This attempt centers on two main 
questions: What is the basic purpose of the system? 
What can be used to construct the system? 
1) What is the basic purpose of the system? 
The statement of purpose for a military intervention 
system could be a modified root definition of intervention 
which takes into account the use of military force in 
attaining specified system goals as follows: 
-- A military intervention system is a system 
controlled by the intruder's national authorities 
with the purpose of supporting, undermining, 
suppressing, or modifying the outputs of the target's 
political authority structures or other groups within 
the target through the application of limited 
military force assuming that such action will satisfy 
specific desires (policy requirements) of the 
intruder. 
A modified intervention model can also serve as the 
"second-level" (or derivative) model of military 
intervention: 
MODEL 
Express desire or policy requirement 
Determine specific goal in regard to target 
Determine extent/nature of military intervention 
Issue policy guidance for military planning staff 
Evaluate available capabilities 
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Assess projection capabilities over time 
Evaluate possible environment constraints 
Assess military risks of counter-intervention 
Assess target's ability to secure outside sources of 
material aid 
Implement military intervention plans 
2) What can be used to construct the system? 
Building a military intervention capability depends 
on a host of "national power" factors although, 
ultimately, the decision to use military force rests with 
the resolve of governments and the popular support they 
can mobilize for such actions. From the purely military 
point of view, intervention requires the effective 
integration of a number of attributes to form the "reach" 
and "punch" which underlie the effective application of 
force. These attributes are: 
Aggregate military power 
The term "power" is a notoriously hazy one but 
nevertheless it is used widely to denote the ability of 
given actors to exercise influence upon others. As Knorr 
put it, "power can be used either to establish influence 
by means of coercion or, without coercive intent to defend 
38 
or change the status quo between actors. " National 
power is often associated with the sum of the nation's 
human resources, economic strength, technological 
advancement, trade relations, and, last but not least, 
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military might. Although it is generally assumed that a 
truly "powerful" state requires a balanced mixture of 
these elements, if it expects to become anything 
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resembling a "great" power, military might alone is often 
sufficient to provide an effective "cutting edge" for 
otherwise less powerful actors. 
Aggregate military power is not any easier to define 
than "power" itself, but it may be said that it consists 
of the sum of at least four sub-elements: (a) The total 
number of weapons available to a given government; (b) the 
quality of both armaments and the human resources 
available to the nation's military forces; (c) the 
employment doctrine directing the national leadership on 
the use of its military forces; and (d) the ability to 
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mobilize and deploy trained reserves. 
Aggregate military power forms a major component of 
"national power" and is closely interconnected with the 
nation's grand strategy--the particular "worldview" which 
animates the plans and policies of the national 
leadership. A robust military component of national power 
does not always guarantee effectiveness in interventionary 
situations and it can quite often "produce unintended 
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effects". Both superpowers, for example, have already 
discovered from their experiences in Vietnam and 
Afghanistan that even the world's most superior military 
machines are unable to give quick and lasting military 
solutions to the problem of counterinsurgency. And 
although Israel continues to militarily dominate its Arab 
neighbours by any measure of battlefield performance 
comparison, it has also been forced to retreat from 
Lebanon in the face of relentless terrorist attacks by 
Islamic fundamentalists. 
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Capability to encounter 
Even the most powerful military establishment is 
rendered incapable of projecting its power over distance 
if it lacks the necessary lift for transporting men and 
weapons to given theaters of operation. Military 
intervention missions other than against targets 
contiguous to the intruder's territory depend entirely on 
the intruder's capability to encounter, in other words his 
ability to transport and deploy adequate numbers of 
properly armed and supported troops in the target 
environment on relatively short notice. 
It is self-evident therefore that long-range military 
intervention depends on the availability and readiness of 
air and sea lift assets. Since the opening phases of an 
interventionary situation are usually characterized by the 
need for moving an initial contingent to the target scene 
at great speed, airlift would be normally expected to bear 
the full weight of such emergency deployments. In fact, 
"under certain sets of circumstances, air mobility may 
offer the only effective means of military 
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intervention". Unless the target area is accessible by 
sea and within a reasonable distance from the intruder's 
shores or overseas naval bases (if available), airlift 
should be further expected to continue ferrying additional 
troops with their air-transportable weapons, general 
cargo, and other equipment until other viable lines of 
communication can be established. 
Airlift, while it gives a substantial speed advantage 
to the intruder, it does so at a cost. It is a highly 
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sophisticated capability, requiring constant modernization 
outlays, and, to the extent of its dependence on en route 
refueling (either in-flight or at secure airfields), 
vulnerable form of power projection. These technical 
complications are further exacerbated by uncertainties on 
"en route landing and overflight rights", a point of major 
importance for powers with worldwide power projection 
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capabilities. A credible airlift capability requires the 
maintenance of large fleets of modern transport aircraft 
along with the necessary support facilities and personnel. 
Above all, however, airlift is a fuel-intensive operation 
which can be sustained for longer periods of time only by 
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intruders with the healthy economic means to do so. 
Capability to sustain 
After the successful insertion of an intervention 
force in the "hostile" environment, the emphasis shifts 
from the capability to encounter the target opposition to 
the one of sustaining friendly forces not only during 
their initial deployment in the area of operations, but 
also for the duration of the intervention. Here, unless 
the target theater is entirely inaccessible by sea, 
sealift becomes"the crucial element. Simply put, "sealift 
is the body of ships that not only moves military 
personnel and equipment, but sustains them at their 
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destination as well". Although sealift is unable to 
compete with its air counterpart in sheer transit speed, 
it has no rival in providing longer-term support to 
distant fighting forces in terms of bulk cargo, number of 
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reinforcement troops transported, and favourable ratios of 
fuel consumed per ton delivered. 
Sealift is indeed irreplaceable when it comes to 
augmenting the firepower of rapid deployment forces with 
heavier armored-fighting vehicles, such as tanks, self- 
propelled artillery or other weapons which due to their 
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size and weight cannot be easily transported by air. 
The special combat conditions which intervention forces 
have to face, and the distance separating them from home 
bases, often create unusual logistical problems. It 
should be thus expected that the battlefield resupply 
requirements of even a modestly sized force fighting in a 
distant theater may be disproportionaly high, especially 
if resistance is stiffer than expected or intelligence has 
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failed to identify critical environmental factors. 
Another crucial aspect of sealift for military 
intervention missions is the prepositioning of men and 
supplies aboard specially earmarked naval vessels in the 
vicinity of potential theaters of operation. Although 
prepositioning cannot totally replace permanent bases, it 
does reduce dependence on politically unreliable host 
countries as well as transit time to target areas in times 
of crisis. The concept of the Maritime Prepositioning 
Ship (MPS), carrying equipment, ammunition, fuel, and 
spare parts for amphibious fighting units, is already 
being utilized by the US Navy for support of future rapid 
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deployment missions. MPS-centered rapid-response forces 
have the major advantage of arriving in the theater of 
operations complete with their organic weapons, reasonable 
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amounts of critical supplies, and the support of fully 
integrated logistics elements. 
Tactical technology 
Intervention missions are special operations 
requiring tactical technology which can adapt, quickly and 
effectively, to a variety of combat environments. This 
requirement is extremely important since one cannot 
predict with confidence the entire spectrum of possible 
intervention situations, of the adversaries to be 
encountered, of their weapons and training, and of 
particular environmental factors and constraints at the 
time of specific future operations. Thus, the careful 
"blending" of tactical technology assets may indeed spell 
the difference between success and failure of a rapid- 
deployment mission. 
In planning future force structures for such missions 
special care should be exercised in designing weapon 
systems with the view of operating in widely different 
geographic and military environments. This requirement 
becomes even more acute when planners ponder the 
proliferation of sophisticated tactical technologies among 
"secondary" or "peripheral" international actors. By the 
end of the 1970s a considerable number of states outside 
the Western industrialized world and the Soviet Union had 
come to possess adequate amounts of weaponry "designed for 
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a war in Europe" which they would not presumably 
hesitate to use against any external threat. The 
implications of this development for future military 
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intervention operations is obvious. 
Under ideal conditions, design and production of 
military hardware follows the expression of military 
requirements based on the analysis and evaluation of 
projected conflict variables. In practice, however, the 
technological innovation outpaces the military's 
inclination or ability "to modify traditional principles 
of combat and to develop therefrom corresponding 
requirements for military equipment"; the result is 
"technological supply pressure" which may create rapid 
deployment forces "to fit the equipment", a highly 
undesirable development with many adverse doctrinal and 
50 
tactical implications. 
Given the unpredictability of conflict situations, 
and the inability of planners to provide a complete range 
of intervention scenarios, maintaining "tailor-made" 
weapon inventories can be both impractical and expensive. 
Therefore, design should be geared towards producing 
"core" systems which can exploit the advantages of modular 
enhancement and modification within a broad range of 
projected operational parameters. In recent years, for 
example, the US Army has been experimenting successfully 
with a number of combat multi-mission systems and has been 
integrating them into units preparing to fight in a wide 
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variety of environments and against diverse opponents. 
Command, control, communication (C3) 
Rapid progress during the last twenty years in the 
fields of data processing, electronic communications, 
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automation, and general control systems has revolutionized 
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the way modern warfare is conducted. Extensive research 
and development efforts have produced a mind-boggling 
array of field C3 systems which have brought together the 
advantages of reduced weight and volume with those of 
modularization, low failure probability, and high volume 
of data processing and transmission. At the same time, the 
introduction of fast computers and the resultant increase 
of the capacity of vertical information flows by many 
orders of magnitude, have caused significant changes in 
the way military operations are conducted and command 
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decisions are reached. The huge amounts of "raw" 
information circulating in C3 networks at any given time 
"pose massive problems of digestion" for both civilian 
policymakers and subordinate military commanders and 
create unique difficulties in analysis, interpretation, 
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and adversary recognition. As one analysis observes, 
the essentials of a good command and control 
system are the abilities to process vast 
quantities of varying types of information in a 
format that is both accurate and easily 
assimilated, and to ensure that the information 
so presented is sufficient to enable the 
commander to make the right decision at the 
right time. 55 
Military intervention situations involving the 
elements of limited warning, rapid response, and long- 
range power projection place particular strains on C3 
capabilities. National authorities must not only receive 
regular real-time information concerning the status and 
activities of their intervention forces but, also, ensure 
that such information is rapidly and efficiently analyzed 
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to provide background for both diplomatic and military 
decisions. Secure and reliable communication, however, is 
only one leg of the C3 effort. It is flexible and 
responsive command-and-control planning which translates 
timely information from the battlefield into the 
inspiration of correct decisions. Thus, in an 
interventionary situation, the command-and-control 
function should actually combine three main activities: 
(1) ensure that the application of force is carried out in 
proportion to the perceived threat in order to avoid 
overreaction (and perhaps uncontrolled escalation) or, 
conversely, underreaction; (2) minimize reliance on 
excessive central decisionmaking by delegating authority 
for independent tactical action to field commanders under 
the guidance of general strategic directives ; and (3) 
maximize the performance of communication systems by 
implementing data processing automation plans and tackling 
identified causes of technical and organizational delays 
in the handling of messages. 
Conclusion 
The models of intervention discussed above are first 
steps towards a potentially more systematic conceptual 
framework for the study of the use of force within the 
international system. From an operational viewpoint, 
these models can be of universal applicability since their 
resolution level is sufficiently low to allow "tailor- 
made" second-level models to be constructed according to 






On 25 June 1950, in a surprise, massive thrust across 
the demarcation line of the 38th parallel, the army of the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) attacked the 
Republic of Korea (ROK) with the declared goal of 
destroying ROK's pro-Western regime and unifying the two 
Koreas under communist rule. Within days of the invasion 
ROK's army, badly equipped and trained, had all but 
collapsed, the capital city of Seoul was in communist 
hands, and a headlong retreat of what was left of the 
south's government and armed forces had reduced ROK to a 
besieged perimeter around Pusan in the southeast corner of 
the Korean peninsula. 
Thus began the Korean war which, over the span of the 
following three years, was to involve the United States, 
along with a token United Nations contingent comprising 
1 
troops from fifteen other countries, in direct armed 
conflict with Communist China, and threaten a 
confrontation with the Soviet Union. The Korean "police 
action", to use President Truman's chosen expression, was 
in fact a full-scale shooting war which eventually caused 
2 
an estimated 155,000 United Nations casualties. Far from 
being a total victory for American (and UN) arms, the 
conflict resulted in stalemate and led to the perpetuation 
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of the Korean nation's division into two separate, and 
mutually hostile, states. 
ýý# 
As it is usually the case with strategically located 
lands, Korea traditionally suffered from its position on 
the edge of expanding, rival spheres of influence. Much 
of the country's history has thus been dominated by the 
triangular contest of China, Japan, and imperial Russia to 
absorb the Korean peninsula and thus create a guard on 
their exposed "soft" flanks. It was not until 1894 that a 
Japanese invasion broke the Chinese claim of suzerainty, 
and replaced Chinese domination with Japanese colonialism. 
In 1910, and after Russia's defeat in the Russo-Japanese 
war of 1904-05 destroyed the Tzar's hopes for dominating 
the area south of Vladivostok, Korea was officially 
annexed into the Japanese empire and remained under 
3 
Japanese rule until 1945. 
At the end of the war in the Pacific, and upon 
Japan's defeat, Korea, its future freedom having been 
promised by the Allies during the 1943 Cairo conference, 
found itself divided along the 38th parallel ostensibly 
out of military necessity. This rather arbitrary dividing 
line was the result of the desire to separate clearly on 
the map the operational theaters of Soviet and American 
armed forces in the Far East. After the end of 
hostilities, however, and the surrender of all Japanese 
forces in September 1945, this wartime separation produced 
two occupation zones, one Russian and the other American, 




As East-West relations deteriorated quickly after the 
end of the war, the two temporary, occupation zones became 
two de facto separate administrative areas. In the north, 
occupied by the Soviet Army, a communist party, under the 
direction of a little-known but skillful agitator and 
organizer, Kim Il-sung, evolved rapidly into the dominant 
political force, and became a dedicated follower of 
Moscow's line. In the American-occupied southern part of 
the peninsula, Syngman Rhee, an octagenarian nationalist 
whose struggles for Korean independence dated back to the 
closing decade of the 19th century, formed a "free 
national" government with the blessing of the American 
occupation authorities. Given the diametrically opposed 
political views of Kim and Rhee, neither regime showed any 
desire to discuss unification with the other; soon 
hostility between north and south erupted into border 
clashes, virulent propaganda attacks, and communist 
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attempts to stir guerrilla warfare within the south. 
By 1948 both north and south had completed a period 
of political consolidation. Kim, after outmaneuvering and 
eliminating his rivals, proceeded with creating a Soviet- 
backed people's republic -- which had already received the 
6 
stamp of public approval following "elections" in 1947. 
Rhee, on the other hand, sharing Kim's ruthless tactics, 
had also ensured that opposition to his nationalist 
Administration was suppressed, and that the "independent" 
south organized its own police and national defence 
forces, always with the approval of US occupation 
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authorities.? Finally, on 15 August 1948, Rhee announced 
the creation of the ROK, and the transfer of sovereign 
power from the American theater commander to his 
nationalist government. Two weeks later Kim responded by 
announcing his elevation to the post of premier, the 
ratification of a new constitution, and the creation of 
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. 
It was obvious from the outset that, in real 
political terms, the north was the strongest of the two 
hostile new states. Kim's iron hand, and ample Soviet 
help, resulted in an aggressive, confident, and determined 
communist regime which hesitated little in harassing and 
pressuring the ROK. The level of cross-border violence, 
and guerrilla incidents inside the south, steadily 
increased throughout the remainder of 1948. Kim's 
prestige was further boosted in December when Moscow 
announced the withdrawal of all Soviet military units from 
the north--a move which automatically made the United 
States the only outside power still keeping occupation 
troops in the peninsula, and gave Soviet propaganda added 
opportunities to condemn American "neo-colonial 
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adventurism". An immediate American withdrawal was averted 
only upon Rhee's intense pleading, but by June 1949 the 
remaining American troops had been withdrawn leaving 
9 
behind only a small military advisory group. The year 
between the American withdrawal and the communist invasion 
was consumed in unsuccessful UN attempts to work out a 
re-unification formula, attempts which failed in the 
face of consistent Soviet veto. A UN commission, 
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dispatched to monitor developments in Korea and report to 
the General Assembly, remained a powerless witness of 
escalating violence and the deepening rift between the two 
neighbours. In the meantime, the Korean People's Army 
(KPA) prepared, trained, and husbanded its resources for 
the drive to the south which materialized on 25 June 1950. 
The communist attack came at a time when, for reasons 
that will be analyzed below, American presence in Asia was 
on general retreat. The American military advisory group, 
left behind in the ROK, was in no position to offer any 
credible help to the beleaguered South Koreans, let alone 
stem the communist onslaught by itself. Numbering only a 
few hundred men without armour, other heavy weapons, or 
air support, this token American force joined the general 
retreat into the Pusan perimeter. With the UN in 
emergency session to approve the dispatch of a 
multinational military contingent to the ROK, President 
Truman ordered the activation of Gen. Douglas MacArthur's 
Far East Headquarters, and the immediate mobilization of 
US Army units stationed in Japan to enter combat in 
Korea. On 2 July 1950, the American military intervention 
in the war between the two Koreas commenced with the 
landing of an advanced task force at Osan which 
immediately engaged the KPA in a series of localized 
10 
delaying actions. 
Between July and August, and with the bulk of the 
American expeditionary force still assembling in Japan and 
stateside locations, the KPA kept its pressure on the 
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Pusan perimeter which, as the only area under ROK control 
on the peninsula, had become the ground to be defended at 
all costs. MacArthur's immediate concern was thus to 
strengthen this defensive arc and buy the necessary time 
to complete his reinforcement plan. By early September 
arriving American units had secured the perimeter's 
defence but the communist forces were far from defeated, 
and still occupied the main part of ROK territory. A bold 
strategic initiative was the only solution to this 
precarious situation, and the American supreme commander 
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responded with the launching of Operation CHROMITE. 
A daring amphibious landing, carried out by the US X 
Corps at Inchon on the western coast of the Korean 
peninsula on 15 September, CHROMITE was an immense 
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success. Within ten days of its execution the 1st 
Marine Division had reached Seoul, and after two days of 
bitter fighting, during which most of the city was 
devastated by American firepower, the KPA units holding 
the ROK capital were forced to abandon their positions and 
retreat hastily above the 38th parallel. Simultaneously, 
the US 8th Army, besieged within the Pusan perimeter, 
broke out and pushed the remaining communist forces north. 
Caught between X Corps and the advancing 8th Army, and 
with its supply lines at the mercy of its enemies, the KPA 
invasion force disintegrated. 
Having accomplished his primary goal of defeating the 
invasion, MacArthur, acting on Truman's orders and with 
the concurrence of the UN, crossed the 38th parallel in 
pursuit of the retreating North Koreans. On 20 October, 
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the communist capital, Pyonyang, fell to a combined 
infantry and airborne assault, and the UN forces advanced 
on a broad front towards the Yalu river forming the 
natural boundary between North Korea and China. Meantime, 
intelligence reports had confirmed the presence of Chinese 
troops south of the Yalu, albeit with considerable 
13 
confusion as to their actual numbers and disposition. 
MacArthur for his part, having been refused permission to 
carry out air reconnaissance over Manchuria, and 
interpreting his instructions "to destroy the North Korean 
armed forces" rather liberally, decided at this point to 
continue his "probing" towards the Yalu, although this 
move carried the risk of confronting Chinese forces as his 
troops approached the Korean-Chinese frontier. 
On 25-26 November this possibility became painful 
reality when a massive Chinese counter-offensive, 
involving at least eighteen divisions which had silently 
infiltrated into North Korea from Manchuria, smashed onto 
MacArthur's advanced elements which had reached the river. 
The force of the Chinese blow was such that, within days, 
the UN forces fell back in disorderly retreat. Before the 
end of the year, the entire US X Corps, along with 
thousands of ROK troops and civilian refugees, had 
retreated back to South Korea in order to avoid capture or 
annihilation. In less than six months MacArthur had thus 
achieved the dubious distinction of having coupled a 
14 
brilliant victory with a humiliating defeat. 
The year 1951 opened with a renewed Chinese 
offensive. Seoul had to be evacuated again and it was not 
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until March that the UN forces reoccupied the capital. 
While Chinese and UN armies remained locked in 
inconclusive combat, a major crisis erupted in the Western 
camp. In April, MacArthur, who made no effort to conceal 
his disapproval of the "limited" war" strategy which 
prevented him from attacking Chinese bases in Manchuria 
and, ultimately, forcing a showdown with China and the 
Soviet Union, if the latter came to the rescue of its 
satellite, was summarily relieved of his duties as supreme 
commander of the UN forces and US forces, Far East, and 
was replaced by the more level-headed Lt. Gen. Matthew B. 
Ridgway. MacArthur's unceremonious ouster caused a storm 
of protest in the United States, especially from Truman's 
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Republican Congressional opposition. Still, the 
President stood firm by his decision since he was 
convinced that MacArthur's independent action, and his 
undisguised desire to debate national policy with his 
civilian superiors, bordered on insubordination which 
could have only undermined the President's own position as 
16 
the commander-in-chief. 
With Ridgway in command the UN forces returned to the 
offensive. Fighting around the so-called "Iron Triangle" 
of Chorwan-Kumhwa-Pyonyang, the main staging area of the 
communist armies, resulted in stalemate and both sides 
reverted to building in-depth defences in anticipation of 
a prolonged war of attrition. By June, however, it became 
obvious that the Chinese were in need of a respite as the 
Soviet Union presented a formal proposal for a cease-fire 
17 
to the UN. Kaesong, inside communist lines, became a 
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first negotiation site but fighting resumed shortly after 
it was clear that the communists looked for an opportunity 
to air their propaganda. In due course, and in order to 
avoid the damaging psychological influence of having to 
bargain with an enemy in his own territory, the 
negotiation site was moved to a new location, this time 
situated in the no-man's-land between the opponents, 
18 
Panmunjon. 
Much of the rest of the war remained a "slugging 
match" at the expense of considerable amounts of blood and 
materiel for both sides. Negotiations at Panmunjon 
dragged on with the prisoners-of-war issue becoming the 
focus of the bargaining. In October 1952, having 
accomplished nothing, the negotiations broke off. Gen. 
Mark Clark, who had replaced Ridgway as US/UN commander in 
May, prepared for more defensive action. As the American 
presidential election unfolded, and with the American 
public showing clear signs of fatigue over the 
perpetuation of the Korean "police action", there was 
hardly a question of attempting to resolve the situation 
militarily. Thus, the fighting became the backdrop to the 
test of political wills, and the search for a mutually 
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acceptable agenda on which to re-initiate negotiations. 
What force of arms was unable to accomplish, 
Stalin's death, in early 1953, brought about by default. 
In March, Kim suddenly announced his agreement to the 
exchange of sick and wounded POWs, and, in July, despite 
Rhee's vehement opposition to any settlement that left 
Korea divided, and renewed Chinese attacks on ROK troops, 
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negotiations at Panmunjon got off to a fresh start. On 27 
July, and following UN assurances that the battle front as 
it stood at the time, and not the 38th parallel, was the 
de facto boundary between the two Koreas, an armistice was 
20 
finally signed bringing hostilities to an end. 
The Anatomy of American Intervention 
After the Second World War, the American strategic 
policy debate centered on two major points: (1) The 
strategy of containment of communist influence; and (2) 
the defence of Western Europe from a surprise Russian 
onslaught. Containment was inaugurated in May 1947 with 
the Truman Doctrine which offered US economic and military 
assistance to Greece and Turkey in order to allow them to 
counter, in the case of the former, communist insurgency, 
and in the case of the latter, Soviet pressures for 
territorial accommodation in tune with Moscow's strategic 
interests. 
Mainly promulgated through the writings of George F. 
21 
Kennan, containment was based on a long-term assessment 
of Soviet intentions which assumed indefinite 
confrontation with the forces of "world Communism", and 
with the Soviet Union itself, the only country which by 
virtue of its size, military potential, ideological 
hostility, and historical antipathy towards the West was 
prepared to engage the United States in a global struggle 
for power. Containment quickly became the Truman 
Administration's adopted strategic theme although it was 
far from an "action plan" of specific responses to 
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individually defined adversary challenges. Thus, the new 
strategy, while it infused a strong element of ideological 
commitment into American policy, and drew up the Cold War 
lines which were to define US-Soviet confrontation for the 
next twenty five years, did not lead to any systematic 
analysis of Soviet intentions and capabilities -- leaving 
a rather vague communist conspiracy theory, without the 
benefit of more specific projections, as the sole 
22 
guideline for American policy makers. 
On a more realistic plane, however, containment did 
recognize limits to American commitments abroad, and to 
the projection of American military power overseas in 
order to meet, and defeat, communist attempts to control 
other countries either through subversion or even the 
ballot box. Thus, future American strategy was to be 
based on the recognition of the Atlantic, and Western 
Europe, as the two most vital areas for the defence of the 
United States in a future war with the Soviet Union. In 
April 1947 this view was elaborated in detail by the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff in a top secret memorandum which 
identified the "Old World" as the key to the successful 
defence of the United States itself: 
It is obvious... that in case of an ideological 
war we must have the support of some of the 
countries of the Old World unless our military 
strength is to be overshadowed by that of our 
enemies... Further, almost all potentially 
strong nations who can reasonably be expected to 
ally themselves with the United States in such a 
war are situated in Western Europe. 23 
Sending American troops to combat communist insurgents, or 
communist parties gaining control through democratic 
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means, was not recommended because, 
Direct military intervention to prevent 
communist takeovers would only propel the United 
States into a series of civil wars from which it 
would be difficult to extricate itself. 24 
On balance, containment was perceived as essentially a 
strategy of psychological warfare between the forces of 
the "Free World" and those of Communism, the ultimate 
prize presumably being the defeat of Soviet aggressive 
tendencies, and the securing of most areas, outside the 
Soviet Union, against communist penetration. 
It was perhaps unavoidable, if somewhat paradoxical, 
that containment, with its emphasis on Western Europe and 
its lack of a coherent analysis of future Soviet trends, 
would implicitly cultivate the view that the Soviets, save 
a surprise attack on the United States or Western Europe, 
were not prepared to stage "a less than total challenge" 
in some remote arena and, therefore, a Soviet "local" 
25 
adventure was an unlikely event. Indeed, the accepted 
view within the Truman Administration was "that the 
Politburo would not engage in overt forms of aggression 
which involved the risk of general war for the present and 
several years hence", and that, as far as peripheral 
countries like South Korea were concerned, no immediate 
26 
dangers of communist aggression really existed. 
This reluctance to recognize a tangible Soviet threat 
outside Western Europe was further sustained by at least 
two other reasons. First, in the aftermath of a 
prolonged, costly world war, Truman, eager to "bring the 
boys home" and assure Americans of a rapid return to 
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normalcy, presided over an unprecedented military 
demobilization. Such was the scale and speed of this 
drive to achieve a peacetime national posture that, within 
two years of V-day in the Pacific, the huge American war 
machine had been effectively dismantled, and millions of 
war veterans returned to their homes. Consequently, a 
national defence strategy which stood for continuing 
commitments in distant areas, let alone the possibility of 
employing American armed forces in another war in Asia, 
could not be implemented without attracting public 
opposition, and streching existing resources to a 
dangerous limit. Second, the crushing defeat of the 
Chinese Nationalists in their struggle against Mao's 
communist armies in 1949--which was not averted by 
generous American assistance--convinced most American 
policy makers that supporting Asian clients was wasteful 
and carried the distinct risk of drawing America into an 
"accidental", and thus quite unnecessary, local Asian war. 
In conformity to this post-war emphasis on 
streamlining resources, and limiting overseas American 
military deployments, South Korea was assessed as an area 
of "secondary strategic significance". In September 1947, 
for example, a Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum, produced 
on Truman's request, stated that South Korea, from the 
point of view of military security, was of "minor 
strategic value" to the United States, and suggested that 
US troops stationed there be immediately withdrawn before 
ROK's deteriorating domestic political situation caused 
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them to reach "an untenable position". MacArthur's own 
opinion, carrying the added weight of America's senior 
military commander in the Pacific, agreed with the Joint 
Chiefs and excluded South Korea from the perimeter of US 
27 
security interests in the Pacific. 
Feelings about South Korea within the civilian sector 
of the Administration were very much the same; "privately 
the Americans agreed that they would not allow themselves 
28 
to be drawn into a war to save the South Koreans". 
Assuming this vein the 1949 State Department White Paper 
on China noted that the communists, about to take over 
China, "seemed to be riding a relentless tide of victory 
and Korea, as in her long past, would be greatly 
influenced [i. e. would probably come under strong 
communist influence, if not outright rule] by the 
29 
tremendous developments in the mainland". These 
developments could not be reversed without the least 
desirable direct intervention of American military forces. 
The perception that America was reluctant about military 
intervention in Asia was further strengthened, this time 
in public, by Secretary Acheson who, in a speech at the 
National Press Club on 12 January 1950, drew up the 
American "defensive perimeter" in the Pacific following 
the great arc from the Philippines through the Ryukyu 
Archipelago, Japan and on to Alaska. The perimeter 
excluded both China and South Korea, and recognized Japan 
and the Philippines as the only "inescapable 
responsibilities" from the point of view of American 
30 
military security considerations. In order "to care for 
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interests outside of our own defence line"-- and therefore 
the interests of a country like South Korea--the Secretary 
underlined that America expected that the defense of other 
Pacific states under attack could not be guaranteed in any 
way and would primarily depend upon the will and 
resistance of the local people: 
So far as the military security of other areas 
in the Pacific is concerned, it must be clear 
that no person can guarantee these areas against 
military attack... Should such an attack 
occur... the initial reliance must be on the 
people attacked to resist it and then upon the 
commitments of the entire civilized world under 
the Charter of the United Nations, which so far 
has not proved a weak reed to lean on by any 
people who are determined to protect their 
independence against outside aggression. 31 
In sum, American policy, on the eve of the North 
Korean invasion, was only marginally concerned about a 
local war in the Korean peninsula, and it approached that 
possibility with noted lack of urgency. A Central 
Intelligence Agency estimate, issued only days before the 
communist attack, described the situation between the two 
Koreas as unequal, especially from the military point of 
view, but foresaw no immediate risk of a full-scale North 
Korean military effort to control the south without 
substantial Soviet or Chinese support: 
Despite the apparent military superiority of 
northern over southern Korea, it is not certain 
that the northern regime, lacking the active 
participation of Soviet and Chinese Communist 
military units, would be able to gain effective 
control over all of southern Korea. The key 
factors which would hinder Communist attempts to 
extend effective control under these 
circumstances are: (1) the anti-Communist 
attitude of the Southern Koreans; (2) a 
continuing will to resist on the part of 
southern troops; (3) the Communist regime's lack 
of popular support; and (4) the regime's lack of 
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trained administrators and technicians. 32 
Having concentrated their attention on the overriding 
concern of total war with the Soviet Union, initiated by 
an attack on Western Europe, the President and his 
advisors saw the defence of Korea-mainly through the 
lenses of such a global confrontation with the Soviets, 
and, given its geographical position on the fringe of the 
Soviet landmass and thousands of miles away from the 
United States, as more of a strategic liability rather 
than an asset. 
Against this background the explanation for Truman's 
sudden about-face, once the ROK was invaded, seems more 
like a "spasm" reaction rather than the outcome of long- 
term policy decisions. Yet, even "spasms" have many 
explanations in politics and this particular case should 
not be classified as an exception. 
It is quite clear that, once the North Koreans had 
invaded, arguments about Moscow's reluctance to engage in 
local conflicts, exchanged within the Administration, 
immediately dissipated. The President and his inner 
cabinet, influenced by the accepted Cold War wisdom, saw 
the Eastern bloc as a monolith directed by the Kremlin 
whose orders had obviously activated the hand of its North 
Korean satellite. Automatically, therefore, South Korea 
came to be regarded, despite its label of "strategic 
liability" in previous assessments, as the first line of 
defence against Moscow's aggressive plans of expansion. 
As Secretary Acheson put it later, its defence was not 
only essential for the protection of American-occupied 
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Japan, but also vital for the protection "of the power and 
33 
prestige of the United States". The North Korean 
aggression could only be seen as a first move on the part 
of the Soviet Union towards global domination; on the 
basis of this assumption, which remained central to 
American thinking throughout the war, "if this aggression 
went unchecked, it would be the first of a chain of 
aggressions that would destroy the foundations of 
international security and eventually cause a third world 
34 
war". 
Defending democratic principle within South Korea, 
and upholding the right of its people to remain 
independent of communist rule, although prominently 
mentioned in American pronouncements during the war, 
obscured only thinly the fact that the United States had 
decided to intervene as it was eager to ward off an attack 
on broader American security interests. As in the case of 
the Greek civil war, from which the American-backed side 
had emerged victorious almost a year before the outbreak 
of the Korean conflict, the imperatives of containment had 
become the vehicles of pure US power politics directed at 
preserving the status of the United States as a 
superpower. The consequences of inaction seemed all to 
clear to the American leaders. As a State Department 
analysis observed, "the liquidation of the South Korean 
government" fitted perfectly in the Soviet global plan to 
destabilize American allies and bring about a number of 
important changes in the US-Soviet balance of power: 
-- In Asia generally, the destruction of the ROK would 
199 
severely weaken US prestige in the eyes of those 
countries with anti-communist policies, and create 
the impulse for wavering governments to "get on the 
bandwagon" of Soviet-sponsored regimes. 
Additionally, absorbing the entire Korean peninsula 
into the communist sphere of influence would destroy 
a US strategic position on the approaches to the 
USSR, and enhance Soviet confidence. 
-- In the particular case of Communist China, lack of 
American resolve in Korea could be "expected to cause 
Chinese communist leaders to adopt more bold and 
militant tactics in their attempts to promote 
Communism in other parts of Asia". On the other 
hand, determined US reaction "would produce a marked 
psychological reaction" in the minds of both the 
Chinese leaders and public, ultimately producing 
weakening of Soviet-Chinese ties. 
-- Finally, and perhaps most importantly, success of the 
"Soviet-sponsored" North Korean invasion could prompt 
serious questioning of American "might and will" in 
Western Europe, enhance pressures for neutralism, and 
promote "Communism and Sovietism as a wave of the 
future". 35 
Aside from these considerations, the decision to 
intervene must have been further strengthened by another 
important fact: the outbreak of communist aggression in a 
peripheral area seemed to confirm the conclusions of the 
Administration's main, and at that time secret, strategic 
study of future global security trends, NSC 68, submitted 
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to the President in April 1950. 
NSC 68, perhaps the most important American document 
in early Cold War history, was authorized by Truman in 
early 1950 in an attempt to create "a single, 
comprehensive statement of interests, threats, and 
feasible responses, capable of being communicated 
36 
throughout the bureaucracy". Drafted by a special group 
of experts under Paul Nitze, NSC 68 put forth a 
powerful argument for a policy of dynamic opposition to 
Soviet global strategy, and the use of all means, 
including force if necessary, to stop the expansion of 
communist influence. This was reconfirmation of the basic 
principles of containment but with one crucial difference: 
whereas George Kennan's original ideas stressed 
psychological warfare and defence of selected points 
around the globe, NSC 68 introduced the concept of 
"perimeter defence, with all points along the perimeter of 
37 
equal importance". Perimeter defence had two serious 
implications for American military strategy. First, it 
advocated that Soviet aggression, either direct or by 
proxy, had to be countered by force of arms with American 
forces fighting side by side with allies supplied and 
armed by the United States. And, second, it implicitly 
recognized that a future Soviet thrust would not 
necessarily be directed at Western Europe, but that 
localized testing "probes" could be launched to harass, 
or seize, peripheral pro-Western nations, beginning with 
those nearer the Soviet landmass. 
Prior to 25 June 1950, NSC 68's course through the 
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Congressional deliberation process appeared quite 
turbulent, especially given its unambiguous and repeated 
calls for increased defence expenditure and expansion of 
American military capabilities. However, as the North 
Korean tanks rolled against Seoul, its assessment of 
Soviet intentions, and its estimate of Soviet actions, 
appeared remarkably accurate. All the elements of a 
surprise Soviet challenge away from Western Europe's 
central theater, as described or implied by NSC 68, were 
present: (1) a willing and able proxy (North Korea); (2) a 
pro-Western regime vulnerable to military coercion (ROK); 
(3) a marginal American commitment which must have 
encouraged the enemy; and (4) a theater of conflict 
geographically favouring the Soviet Union but imposing 
serious logistical problems on the United States. 
In summary, Truman's decision to send American troops 
to South Korea came about because of the desire to protect 
American prestige, and of the belief that to shy away from 
the fight could be the start of a fatal road towards 
appeasing the Kremlin. As the President later put it: 
In my generation, this was not the first 
occasion when the strong had attacked the weak. 
I recalled some earlier instances: Manchuria, 
Ethiopia, Austria. I remembered how each time 
that the democracies failed to act it had 
encouraged the aggression to keep going ahead. 
Communism was acting in Korea just as Hitler, 
Mussolini, and the Japanese had acted ten, 
fifteen, and twenty years earlier. I felt 
certain that if South Korea was allowed to fall 
Communist leaders would be emboldened to 
override nations closer to our own shores. 38 
It was perhaps inevitable that the President would be 
eventually called upon "to practice what he was preaching" 
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in his strategy of containment--although this left the 
basic question of "for whom was the war fought? " 
39 
unanswered. In retrospect, the answer seems rather 
clear. The "South Korean experiment", as John Foster 
Dulles put it, had to be preserved for the sake of the 
larger geopolitical interests of the United States in 
general, and, in particular, of the defence and 
rehabilitation of Japan which the communists sought to 
make "a point of U. S. weakness rather than of strength in 
40 
the Far East". 
## 
Once American troops had joined the fighting in 
Korea, the Truman Administration faced the difficult task 
of bringing its objectives into focus, and defining its 
overall strategy. The speed with which the crisis had 
developed, and the unpreparedness at policy level, left 
the Americans with precious little else but the high moral 
tone of Truman's declaration that South Korea would be 
defended and restored as an independent nation. From the 
outset, however, the Administration had two overriding 
concerns; first, to avoid at all costs escalation of 
hostilities to a point where a war with the Soviets was 
inevitable, and, second, to minimize as much as possible 
military operations which could invite Communist Chinese 
intervention on the side of the North Koreans. By 
definition, therefore, the American action in Korea was to 
be limited, both geographically and militarily. In the 
chaotic early days after the invasion, and with the South 
Korean armed forces all but extinct, there was indeed no 
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ground for optimism, and the objective of saving the ROK 
from complete collapse seemed the only logical focus of 
attention. 
Accordingly, as the President underlined in his 
message to Congress three weeks after the attack, American 
military action in Korea "was undertaken as a matter of 
basic moral principle, " and its aim remained to come "to 
the aid of a nation established and supported by the 
United Nations and ujustifiably attacked by an aggressor 
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force". Since the presence of all UN forces in Korea was 
based on the same principle, the immediate objective of UN 
military operations was "to bring about the cessation of 
hostilities and the withdrawal of the North Korean forces 
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to the 38th parallel. " Crossing the 38th parallel and 
threatening to take over North Korea was explicitly 
rejected because, in the words of the official analyst, 
There is ample evidence of the strategic 
importance to Russia of the Korean peninsula. 
It is extremely unlikely that the Kremlin would 
accept the establishment in North Korea of a 
regime which it could not dominate and control. 
When it becomes apparent that the North Korean 
aggression will be defeated, there might be some 
agreement between the U. S. S. R. and the North 
Korean regime which would mean in substance that 
U. N. military action north of the 38th parallel 
would result in conflict with the U. S. S. R. or 
Communist China. 43 
The decision to limit the war south of the 38th parallel 
was further supported by the fear that prolonged military 
operations, beyond ROK's frontiers, would absorb too many 
US resources, and in effect "render the United States 
incapable of meeting aggression in any of a half-dozen 
other potential trouble-spots" like Iran, Yugoslavia, or 
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Berlin. On the other hand, and if the war in Korea was 
indeed the prelude to a general Soviet assault on the 
West, as some Administration officials feared, then the 
consequences of US military overcommitment in a secondary 
distant theater entailed serious risks. This view was 
voiced by the Joint Chiefs of Staff almost immediately 
upon the onset of hostilities. America's top military 
leaders, pointing out that "political considerations" 
could lead to "excessive commitments of United States 
military forces and resources in those areas of operations 
which would not be decisive", concluded that: 
Preliminary to, or in the initial stages of a 
global war, it would be militarily unsound for 
the United States to commit large forces against 
the USSR in an area of slight strategic 
importance, as well as one of Soviet choice. 
Therefore, if major USSR combat units should at 
any time during military operations in the Korea 
area of hostilities engage or clearly indicate 
their intention of engaging in hostilities 
against U. S. and/or friendly forces the U. S. 
should prepare to minimize its commitment in 
Korea and prepare to execute war plans. These 
preparations should include initiation of full- 
scale mobilization. 45 
By late August 1950, however, the military situation 
had been stabilized and, as confidence grew about the 
eventual "roll-back" of the North Koreans, so did support 
for the view that the 38th parallel was not an inviolable 
line, and that military operations should continue into 
North Korean soil in order to bring about the total defeat 
of the enemy. General MacArthur himself had made no 
secret of his own preference for a quick, determined 
campaign to destroy the North Korean armed forces before 
the Soviets or the Chinese had enough time to offer 
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Pyongyang substantial assistance--a task which could not 
be accomplished without attacking and defeating the 
46 
opponent inside his own territory. Deliberations within 
the State Department and the Pentagon soon produced 
recommendations for the President from civilian staffs 
which adopted the same line. Correspondingly, NSC 81/1, 
dated 9 September 1950, suggested that, 
The U. N. forces are clearly committed by the 
Security Council resolutions to compel the 
withdrawal of the North Korean forces behind the 
38th parallel and there is a clear legal basis 
for taking such military actions north of the 
38th parallel as are necessary in accomplishing 
this mission. 47 
Given the "clear legal basis" for military action inside 
North Korean territory, MacArthur would be expected to 
receive authorization to undertake all operations deemed 
necessary "for the purpose of destroying the North Korean 
48 
forces. " Necessary instructions to this effect were 
indeed issued and transmitted to the General later that 
month, but with the crucial proviso "that at the time of 
such operations there has been no entry into North Korea 
by major Soviet or Chinese communist forces, no 
announcement of intended entry, nor a threat to counter 
49 
our operations militarily in North Korea". In any case, 
the decision to move across the 38th was in itself a sharp 
turn of American strategy away from the mere objective of 
repelling the North Korean invasion, and towards a much 
more widely defined effort to "liberate" the entire 
peninsula, terminate Kim's communist regime, and establish 
a unified Korean nation in the spirit of the 1943 Cairo 
agreement. After the Inchon landing, and the subsequent 
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routing of the North Koreans, the prospect of success for 
such a campaign seemed within easy grasp. 
The Chinese intervention in early November 1950 
changed this picture radically, however. As MacArthur 
reported on 28 November, 
All hope of localization of the Korean conflict 
to enemy forces composed of North Korean troops 
with alien token elements can now be completely 
abandoned... We face an entirely new war... The 
resulting situation presents an entire new 
picture which broadens the potentialities to 
world embracing considerations beyond the sphere 
of decision by the Theater Commander. 50 
The primary among the "world embracing considerations" for 
the Administration was again to avoid a collision with the 
Soviet Union. The strength and determination of the 
Chinese counterattack--but, also, its effectiveness in 
stopping MacArthur's advance--were all-too-clear signals 
that Peking was quite unhappy with the presence of 
imperialist" troops near its frontier. Moreover, given 
the American conviction that Mao, too, received his orders 
from Moscow, the Chinese intervention was immediately 
perceived as a warning directly from the Kremlin -- an act 
of deterrence which Stalin staged in order to remind 
51 
Washington that Soviet patience was diminishing rapidly. 
Accordingly, American objectives shifted back to a 
"limited" scope. On 1 May 1951, the Joint Chiefs 
instructed MacArthur's successor, General Ridgway, that 
his main objective was "to destroy the armed forces of 
North Korea and Communist China operating within the 
geographic boundaries of Korea and waters adjacent 
thereto", and that he was now authorized, 
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to conduct air and naval operations within 
geographic boundaries of Korea and waters 
adjacent thereto as deemed by you to be 
necessary or advantageous to successful 
attainment of your objective. 52 
This was hardly an open-ended authorization, however. In 
order to safeguard , against 
further "liberal" 
interpretations of American policy, the instructions from 
Washington gave Ridgway a clear outline of his mission: 
This [authorization] specifically does not 
include authority to conduct air or naval action 
against Manchuria, against USSR territory, or 
against North Korean electrical power complex 
including the Yalu River power installation, and 
as a matter of policy no operations will be 
conducted within 15 miles of USSR territory.... 
Under no circumstances will your forces cross 
Manchurian or USSR borders of Korea. 
In the conduct of naval operations care should 
be taken to keep well clear of the coastal 
waters of Manchuria and USSR. 53 
These instructions, by "capping" the American military 
effort and severely limiting the prospects for a decisive 
blow against the North Koreans and their Chinese allies, 
did indeed confirm the full turn of the Truman 
Administration back towards the gradualist approach of 
containment. As Secretary Acheson noted later, by June 
1951, the Administration had accepted that the unification 
of Korea had to be left "to time and political measures", 
and that the mission of the American troops in Korea was 
to "dig in" and, holding "strongly fortified lines", drain 
enemy power by luring the communist into persistent 
54 
attacks against these defensive positions. 
Thus, after a brief interval of seeking to gain the 
military initiative and attain the "rehabilitation" of the 
entire Korean nation under a pro-American government, 
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American goals shrunk to less ambitious levels. When Gen. 
Mark Clark arrived in Korea, in May 1952, to replace 
General Ridgway (who was assuming command of NATO forces 
in Europe), he discovered a "frozen front [which] 
represented a true balance of power", and decided that, 
Since it was not our Government's policy to seek 
a military decision, the next best thing was to 
make the stalemate more expensive for the 
Communists than for us, to hit them where it 
hurt, to worry them, to convince them by force 
that the price-tag on an armistice was going up, 
not down. 55 
Clark's pleading with Washington for measures to make "the 
stalemate more expensive" finally bore fruit in late June 
1952 when, in a rather surprising about-face, the Joint 
Chiefs allowed the bombing of power stations in North 
Korea, including the massive Suiho hydroelectric 
56 
installation on the Yalu. The destruction of almost the 
entire electricity generating capacity in the north, 
however, left the overall American plan for a defensive 
strategy unaffected. As 1952 expired, the United Nations 
forces were still locked in indecisive, and bloody, combat 
against "human wave" Chinese attacks. 
The drive towards a negotiated settlement entered its 
final phase in 1953 with the inauguration of the 
Eisenhower Administration. Presidential elections, held in 
late 1952, broke twenty years of Democratic rule and 
returned the Republicans to power under President Dwight 
D. Eisenhower. Central to the new Administration's 
platform was conclusion of hostilities in Korea, a 
commitment which won widespread support for the Republican 
party given the increasing frustration of the American 
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public with the lack of military victory in the Far East. 
Although Eisenhower was concerned at least as much as his 
predecessor about escalation, he nevertheless opted for 
decisive measures--including bombing bases in China and 
Manchuria and, as a last resort, using the atomic weapon-- 
57 
if the communists showed low interest for an armistice. 
The new President, being a firm supporter of fiscal 
conservatism and ex-military man himself, felt that an 
indefinite entanglement in Korea could only sap American 
strength through manpower drain, higher taxes to pay for 
the war, and irreparable damage to America's relations 
with Europe. The bombing of the North Korean power plants 
had already caused strong complaints from the Western 
Europeans--who feared expansion of the war in the Far East 
at the expense of American commitments to NATO. 
When the armistice was finally signed in July 1953, 
it was indeed difficult to decide what had been actually 
"won" for the Western alliance. Both Koreas existed as 
before, their hatred for each other remaining 
undiminished, their ideological positions as unbending as 
ever. Although some Americans believed, like General 
Ridgway, that "we did deliver to international Communism 
58 
its first resounding defeat", there was also a 
significant portion of those who saw the Korean "police 
action" as an unnecessary waste of American resources for 
returns of dubious value. Even more significantly, the 
critics of the war pointed to a major strategic lesson of 
210 
Korea that was to resurface with a passion during the 
Vietnam policy debates. As Robert Osgood observed, 
granting the contribution to containment of the 
decision to intervene in Korea, it certainly did 
not prove that the nation should try to resist 
aggression everywhere under any circumstance, as 
General MacArthur maintained and as the [Truman] 
administration's blanket endorsement of the 
ideal of collective security implied. 59 
From a military policy perspective, the Korean war 
served as the precursor of the deep, and frequently 
vehement, disagreements over "limited war" strategies 
which were to plague, and in the end defeat, US 
intervention in Vietnam. Although MacArthur's rebellion 
against Washington's perceived "defeatist" attitudes, and 
his unceremonious dismissal, focused public attention on a 
single flamboyant military figure, the General's departure 
did not eliminate military opposition to Truman's limited 
"police" action strategy. The majority of high-ranking 
American officers, with the possible exception of the 
Joint Chiefs, continued to disapprove of the restrictions 
placed upon them and never really "felt that they might be 
60 
of some value". In the end, what the war thus certainly 
accomplished was to demonstrated the almost outright 
rejection by the military of the "limited" war concept 
since, "A limited conflict of the kind the civilians, in 
however fumbling a manner, were attempting to devise 
61 
simply was not a part of the military lexicon". 
In sum, the American intervention in Korea ended 
without either a military victory or any significant 
political profit. It did not trigger a "roll-back" of 
Communist influence in Asia and hardly deterred other 
211 
"national liberation" movements from sprouting, 
particularly in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, the 
intervention tied American prestige to the survival of an 
anti-communist regime in Seoul which directly led to 
permanent US military presence along the 38th parallel, a 
web of US defence guarantees against any communist 
incursion, and the risk, however limited, of a future 





No conflict in the history of the United States has 
generated greater acrimony, national division, and lasting. 
political and social traumas than the Vietnam war. 
Although, from an American perspective, the term "Vietnam 
war" is generally used to describe the period from 1964 to 
1973, American involvement in Indochina can be traced back 
to 1954 and the closing days of the French colonial 
presence in Southeast Asia. Chronologically, therefore, 
the American commitment to a non-communist South Vietnam, 
and America's efforts to defeat the Viet Cong and their 
communist masters in Hanoi, may be separated into four, 
rather distinct periods beginning in the aftermath of the 
1954 Geneva Conference on the future of ex-French 
Indochina. 
During the first, so-called "advisory", decade of 
1954-64, the United States committed only a small number 
of military advisors "in country", and refrained from any 
large-scale overt military action on the side of the 
Saigon government, known as the Government of Vietnam 
(GVN). American aid was thus limited to providing South 
Vietnam with the means to bolster the GVN internally and 
ensure that it did not collapse under the pressure of the 
communist insurgency. 
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During the second period of 1964-68, the United 
States quickly "Americanized" the war in the face of 
growing political instability in South Vietnam, infusions 
of regular North Vietnamese troops in the fighting, and 
the danger of seeing what had by then grown into a major 
political, diplomatic, and psychological US commitment 
collapse under attack by communist forces. Sometimes 
called "the President's war", the period 1964-68 was 
marked by unprecedented combat ferocity as the United 
States chose to "contain" the Viet Cong, and Hanoi, 
militarily, and thus give the GVN sufficient time to 
organize a viable, non-communist state in the South. 
The period from mid-1968 to 1973 was a period of 
transition during which US military presence in the South 
peaked at more than half a million troops and, under 
President Richard Nixon, began to diminish as the program 
of "Vietnamization"--a thinly-veiled effort to cut 
American losses and withdraw from-Vietnam with or without 
'guarantees' as to Saigon's survival--was put into effect. 
The Paris "peace" accords of January 1973 brought the 
American military intervention in Indochina to its 
official end, and paved the way for the final communist 
victory in 1975. 
Finally, the two years between February 1973 and 
April 1975 witnessed South Vietnam's abandonment by 
Washington in the face of mounting military pressure from 
the North, and an acrimonious political battle at home. 
The collapse of the Saigon regime was ultimately sealed by 
a conventional North Vietnamese invasion launched in March 
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1975--which culminated, on 30 April, in the evacuation of 
the last resident US personnel from the South Vietnamese 
capital along a massive exodus of South Vietnamese 
refugees fleeing in the path of their country's 
"liberators". 
Given the prolonged and complicated nature of the 
American intervention in Indochina, which seldom makes 
systematic analysis of the war an easy task, it is often 
necessary to "compartmentalize" the conflict into 
increments which, in turn, can be subjected to focused 
analysis. Since "the President's War" period is 
considered, by most independent accounts, the turning 
point in the battle against Hanoi, this chapter 
concentrates on the years 1964 to 1968. 
1964-68: The Policymaking Process 
In late 1963, Vietnam was still a rather obscure 
issue in the United States. The assassination of 
President Kennedy in November had left little room in the 
headlines for the distant war in Indochina. But, high 
government circles had different priorities. One of the 
first acts of Kennedy's successor, President Lyndon 
Johnson, was to reaffirm the previous Administration's 
commitment to an "independent, sovereign, non-communist 
South Vietnam", and to issue detailed instructions as to 
future American policy in connection with that country. 
Four days after he assumed power, NSAM 273 outlined the 
political and military initiatives the new Administration 
proposed to take in Southeast Asia; its very first 
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paragraph placed top priority on the defence and survival 
of South Vietnam: 
It remains the central object of the United 
States in South Vietnam to assist the people and 
Government of that country to win their contest 
, against an externally directed and supported 
Communist conspiracy. The test of all U. S. 
decisions and actions in this area should be the 
effectiveness of their contribution to this 
purpose. 1 
NSAM 273 came at a time of intense political turmoil 
in South Vietnam. Almost a month before Kennedy's 
assassination, the South Vietnamese President, Ngo Dinh 
Diem, an earlier American protege, had been himself 
murdered in the course of a military coup which overthrew 
2 
his government. With Diem's demise, South Vietnam's 
political fortunes were cast in the hands of corrupt, and 
prominently incapable, generals whose infighting in 
Saigon's Byzantine power struggles left precious little 
time for attending to the country's deteriorating economy 
and, of course, the raging guerrilla war. Such was in 
fact the anarchy caused by the rivalling military factions 
that, in December 1963, the State Department was 
expressing its undisguised concern to the American embassy 
in Saigon, citing communist activity of alarming 
proportions in the countryside, and emphasizing that the 
United States had little choice but to take immediate 
3 
steps in order to stabilize the situation. 
Thus, shortly before Christmas, Defense Secretary 
Robert McNamara was dispatched to Saigon for an on-the- 
spot evaluation and for making the necessary 
recommendations for American action. McNamara's report, 
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rich in gloomy expressions, saw South Vietnam as about to 
be converted into "a Communist-controlled state". While 
Saigon's military juntas remained embroiled in their own 
infighting, Viet Cong cadres roamed the countryside 
unhindered, and infiltration from the North continued 
unabated through corridors in neighbouring Cambodia and 
Laos as well as points on the coast. The closing 
paragraphs of McNamara's report reflected clearly the 
Secretary's rather grave feelings about the future: 
My appraisal may be overly pessimistic... 
[However] we should watch the situation very 
carefully, running scared, hoping for the best, 
but preparing for more forceful moves if the 
situation does not show early signs of 
improvement. 4 
By the summer of 1964 such signs of improvement, 
which McNamara thought necessary if action on "more 
forceful moves" was to be avoided, had failed to appear 
and, if anything, the overall political and military 
situation in South Vietnam continued to worsen. It was 
now slowly but inevitably becoming clear that if "trends" 
in the fight against the Viet Cong were to be "stabilized" 
(or, even, reversed), American activities in South Vietnam 
had to expand rapidly beyond mere economic and logistical 
assistance. In October, and after the Tonkin Gulf 
incident had led to a Congressional resolution giving the 
President wide-ranging powers, including the right to use 
armed force "if necessary", in order to counter the 
5 
communist challenge, intelligence reports added' to the 
sense of urgency by finding South Vietnam "almost 
leaderless... reaching the point of anarchy"; 
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"passiveness", "apathy", 
direction", coupled with 
left little doubt that 
imminent, if the situation 
"lack of leadership and 
increasing guerrilla activity, 
South Vietnam's collapse was 
6 
was allowed to run its course. 
In February/March 1965, after Viet Cong attacks on US 
installations had caused several casualties among American 
troops, President Johnson, responding to pressure from his 
military chiefs and the majority of his close White House 
advisers, took two decisive steps towards "Americanizing" 
the war: in mid-February he ordered the commencement of 
operation ROLLING THUNDER, the sustained aerial bombing of 
targets inside North Vietnam, and, in the first week of 
March, ordered the US Marines to land two battalions near 
Da Nang with the express purpose of providing better 
"perimeter security" to nearby US bases. The expansion of 
the air war, and the marine landings, were immediately 
followed by NSAM 328, a "pivotal" document issued on 6 
April, which gave Military Assistance Command, Vietnam 
(MACV) the green light for deploying US ground forces in 
independent combat missions, and indicated that the United 
States was to seek "allied" support, in the form of 
additional troop deployments, from South Korea, Australia, 
and New Zealand. The key points of NSAM 328 were as 
follows: 
(1) An additional 18-20,000 US troops were ordered 
to South Vietnam "to fill out existing units and 
supply needed logistical personnel". Also 
approved was the deployment of another two US 
Marine battalions and one US Marine Air 
Squadron. 
(2) US Marine forces already deployed were allowed 
"a change of mission" away from static defence 
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duties and towards "active use under conditions 
to be established by the Secretary of Defense in 
consultation with the Secretary of State". 
(3) Finally, air operations in Laos, and 
particularly those aimed at blocking communist 
infiltration routes, were to be stepped up in 
order to reduce the flow of arms, supplies, and 
men from North Vietnam. 7 
In the following months, American military presence 
in South Vietnam increased rapidly reaching, by July 1965, 
75,000 troops--and with Secretary McNamara recommending 
the immediate deployment of, additional forces to bring the 
8 
US troop level to 175,000 men. These injections of US 
military power did very little, however, to either stem 
communist activity or bolster the South Vietnamese 
government which, in June 1965, had landed in the hands of 
yet another military cabal under Air Vice Marshal Nguyen 
Cao Ky. A pause in ROLLING THUNDER, ordered by Johnson in 
May with the apparent hope of opening up an avenue of 
negotiations with Hanoi, was met with total communist 
rejection, and a similar move in December had no better 
luck. The communist response to these American 
enticements was to denounce Washington's initiatives as 
"deceitful" and "hypocritical" and insist on the immediate 
withdrawal of all US troops from Vietnam. As President 
Johnson put it, "The choice was either peace on North 
9 
Vietnam's terms or no peace at all". 
Such communist confidence, quite baffling for most 
American observers who thought that Hanoi was bending 
under US military pressure and the promise of yet more to 
come, was to be a familiar sign of Communist behaviour 
throughout the war. In fact, it is clear that Hanoi's 
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leadership never lost its conviction as to its "just" aims 
and its eventual victory in its struggle with the American 
"aggressor". In April 1966, for example, Gen. Nguyen Van 
Minh, chief of the North Vietnamese communist party's 
"reunification" department, delivered a speech which is 
indicative of the frame of mind that guided the North 
Vietnamese 'leaders. General Minh, seeking to spell out 
the conditions under which Hanoi would negotiate, 
underlined that when there is a war between a powerful 
nation and a weak one, still struggling to acquire more 
power, "a situation where fighting and negotiations are 
conducted simultaneously does not exist": 
Fighting continues until the emergence of a 
situation where both sides are fighting 
indecisively. Then a situation where fighting 
and negotiations are conducted simultaneously 
may emerge. In fighting while negotiating, the 
side which fights more strongly will compel the 
adversary to accept its conditions. Considering 
the comparative balance of forces, the war 
proceeds through the following stages: 
-- the fighting stage 
-- the stage of fighting while negotiating 
10 
-- negotiations and signing of agreements. 
It was therefore the communist party's intention "to 
continue fighting until a certain time when we can fight 
and negotiate at the same time"; meantime, the enemy was 
to be repulsed "step by step" until "decisive success" was 
achieved. If and when negotiations came, they were to be 
conducted "simultaneously with fighting" which was to 
11 
remain vigorous until the conclusion of an agreement. 
In retrospect, this was a remarkably accurate presentation 
of the future course of the war. 
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By mid-1967 it was clear that the fight to keep 
South Vietnam from succumbing to the communists would be 
neither short nor easy. While the North endured all the 
limited military blows directed at it, American casualties 
rose steadily, their average monthly numbers nearly 
doubling in comparison to 1966 levels. Rising casualties, 
and what seemed to be inability on the part of the US 
military to deliver concrete results, despite the huge 
resource commitments to the war, had a predictable impact 
on the US domestic scene. Anti-war protests intensified 
and, as a prominent American journalist observed, evidence 
was growing that the American people were not going to be 
"patient enough for a long struggle"--they were becoming 
increasingly convinced that no "permanent victory" could 
be achieved especially "given the political endurance of 
the Viet Cong and their ability to lie low and rise 
12 
again... ". To make things even worse, increasing 
outside aid to North Vietnam made hopes for a speedy 
"choking" of the communist war effort a very deem 
prospect. In May 1967 the Joint Chiefs of Staff warned 
that the Soviet Union was about to introduce new, 
sophisticated weapons into North Vietnam's arsenal, 
including surface-to-air missiles (which were soon to 
begin extracting a heavy toll from American aircraft), 
various types of artillery, and electronic defence 
systems. The military chiefs recommended immediate air 
raids against North Viet Vietnamese ports as well as naval 
interdiction missions to severe Hanoi's sea lines of 
13 
communication. Their recommendation was rejected. 
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President Johnson's response to this rapidly 
deteriorating situation at home and in the overseas 
battlefield was at best confused. Firmly opposed to 
mobilizing the reserves, especially because of the 
political impact of such a move, the President temporized. 
With US manpower in South Vietnam standing near 500,000 
men, MACV's requests for additional troops could not be 
met without calling in the reserves, and thus all 
14 
additional manpower recommendations were set aside. 
Instead, the Administration, lacking any further coherent 
plans to combat the seemingly indestructible communists, 
pinned its hopes on a program of sweeping political reform 
which it was expected to begin after the South Vietnamese 
15 
national elections scheduled for September 1968. 
At the end of 1967, however, Washington was dominated 
by a sense of gloom thinly disguised by the continuing 
optimistic public assessments of the war. The siege of 
the US Marine base at Khe Shan absorbed public as well as 
the President's own attention. At the same time, secret 
intelligence reports spoke of communist preparations in 
the South Vietnamese countryside indicating an imminent 
"unusual offensive". Shortly before Christmas, MACV's 
commander, Gen. William Westmorland, informed Washington 
that the North Vietnamese seemed preparing for "a major 
effort", and "perhaps a radical switch in strategy", to 
begin sometime around the Vietnamese New Year (Tet) on 30 
January 1968. During a military briefing, held on 15 
January, Westmorland repeated his warning, and put the 
chances of a major communist attack occurring before or 
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16 
around Tet at sixty/forty per cent. 
On 30-31 January MACV's fears materialized when a 
communist general offensive was launched simultaneously 
throughout South Vietnam. Viet Cong assault teams 
attacked pre-selected military, administrative, and 
communication targets, including American bases and other 
facilities. The US embassy in Saigon was a prime Viet 
Cong objective, too, but the attack failed to occupy the 
building. In all, the Viet Cong attacked thirty six out 
of South Vietnam's forty four provincial capitals, one 
third of all district capitals, and numerous other small 
17 
towns and even hamlets. While the majority of the 
attackers were local Viet Cong, the holy city and imperial 
capital of Hue received the blow from a well-coordinated 
force of two North Vietnamese army regiments. 
Although the Tet offensive did not achieve total 
surprise, and was effectively defeated within a week, it 
was nevertheless the turning point in the American 
involvement in Vietnam. American casualties rose to an 
18 
estimated 3,895 killed-in-action. Although the 
communists had allegedly suffered fifteen times as many 
casualties, few Americans at home did indeed pay any 
attention to Viet Cong losses. The American mind was 
simply absorbed by the depiction of the savage fighting 
that was taking place, among others, in the US embassy's 
own yard. After so many public reassurances about 
"winning" a "brushfire" war, the scenes from the burning 
streets of Saigon shocked and demoralized a nation used to 
quick, "clean" victories. 
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From the purely military point of view, Tet was a 
resounding communist defeat. The South Vietnamese 
forces, despite their reputation for docility and low 
morale, did react with relative firmness, held their 
ground, and repulsed most Viet Cong attacks at heavy cost 
to the attackers. The people of South Vietnam, despite 
Hanoi's declared expectations for a "people's uprising", 
did not welcome the attackers, and did not revolt against 
their government. The Saigon government itself, often 
accused of complacency and corruption, also seemed to 
respond to the economic and social dislocation caused by 
the offensive with unexpected energy. Measures to deal 
with the thousands of refugees, and the devastation of the 
cities, were implemented "swiftly and fairly effectively" 
and relieved, at least in part, the suffering of the 
19 
people. 
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, Tet 
signalled the end of the once deadly Viet Cong urban 
infrastructure. Thousands of war-hardened and experienced 
guerrillas perished in the fighting, and as a result, 
South Vietnam's indigenous "liberation" fighters ceased 
being a credible party in the prosecution of the war after 
February 1968. From that point on the burden of fighting 
"the imperialists and their puppets" was transferred 
20 
largely to the shoulders of the North Vietnamese army. 
In the post-Tet years, Hanoi, abandoning much of its 
"people's war" strategy, would wage a conventional "big 
unit" campaign against South Vietnam until the very end. 
Psychologically, however, Tet was a decisive 
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communist victory. After months of American confident 
statements, the massive scale of the assault and the chaos 
it caused literally demolished the Johnson 
Administration's credibility--despite a favourable tally 
"on the ground" in South Vietnam. Tet, while it proved 
that Hanoi could not force a military decision in the face 
of American presence in Southeast Asia, had also 
demonstrated that the United States could not achieve a 
"total" military victory either (at least under the 
restrictions imposed by Johnson's strategy of 'controlled 
escalation'). As a prominent North Vietnamese communist 
commented in later years: 
The American command had always been under the 
illusion that victory was in the palm of their 
hands. Tet destroyed that illusion. As to the 
actual losses in human life on our part, I don't 
recall the exact number, but... that was the 
price that had to be paid to win this strategic 
victory. 21 
The impact Tet had on the American public, and on the 
President himself, was devastating. Universal bleak media 
reporting of the Tet events fanned the anti-war sentiment 
and prompted loud calls from political leaders, prominent 
academics, and media personalities for a thorough 
22 
reappraisal of the US role in Vietnam. Shortly after 
Tet, Defense Secretary McNamara resigned, his position at 
the Defense Department hopelessly weakened by lack "of 
light at the end of the tunnel" and his own doubts about 
any further American military commitments. His successor 
at the Pentagon, Clark Clifford, was thus left with the 
unenviable task of forming a special study group to review 
the Vietnam situation and make recommendations to the 
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President. 
After much deliberation--which again revealed the 
conflict between the 'hawks' and 'doves' within the 
Administration--the Clifford report presented little more 
than a compilation of doubts expressed -by various 
officials. On the crucial issue of reserves mobilization, 
it simply compromised by neither approving nor rejecting 
23 
it. It was obvious, nevertheless, that the majority of 
Johnson's advisers had experienced a radical change in 
mood, leaning for the first time since 1965 towards de- 
escalation rather than further increases in the US 
presence in Indochina. 
In the aftermath of Tet President Johnson was near 
political, emotional, and physical exhaustion. His 
prestige as the nation's leader had been eroded by the 
relentless public outcry against the war, and within the 
Democratic Party he was challenged by rivals largely on 
the grounds of his failure to bring an end to the 
conflict. With his frustration over the military quagmire 
mounting, and with his health failing, the President, on 
31 March 1968, announced his withdrawal from politics 
24 
along yet another halt in the bombing of North Vietnam. 
To his surprise Hanoi responded favourably. Shortly after 
the bombing halt, a first round of negotiations opened in 
Paris only to witness endless North Vietnamese 
deliberation of insubstantial matters--in a carefully 
orchestrated effort to stall any real progress while the 
military situation grew more favourable for the communist 
side. Ultimately, North Vietnamese endurance paid off. 
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The "fighting while negotiating" phase was at hand, and a 
powerful opponent sat across the table--his morale sapped 
and his determination to continue fighting diminishing 
steadily. The countdown for the US presence in Indochina 
was under way. 
The Bombing Campaign 1965-68 
In the latter part of 1965, and as American troop 
levels in South Vietnam rose rapidly, US air operations 
expanded both in scope and intensity. In the ensuing 
years air power became one of the primary military tools 
employed against Hanoi. A great number of missions, 
varying from aerial transport and air mobility to tactical 
ground support and interdiction of communist lines of 
communication, were undertaken by the US Air Force and the 
25 
air arms of the US Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. 
While each mission contributed in its own right to 
overall US combat operations--and therefore deserves 
separate analysis and evaluation--the air war in Indochina 
was dominated by the bombing campaigns against North 
Vietnam, and the communist supply routes that carried men 
and materiel into the South through neighbouring Laos and 
Cambodia (it was estimated, for example, that only 25 
percent of all attack sorties flown during the entire war 
'were closely linked to combat taking place on the ground 
26 
or to a freshly sighted target'). Consequently, one of 
the major foci of the post-Vietnam controversy has 
centered on the conduct of the American bombing campaign. 
Many critics have blamed "indiscriminate" bombing for 
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great human suffering and little strategic advantage, 
while others have chosen to attack the half-hearted way in 
which the Johnson Administration used US air power and, 
thus, concentrate on its failure to extract maximum 
strategic benefits from American air superiority. 
The idea to expand the air war against the North, 
beyond the retaliatory strikes by the South Vietnamese air 
force, had circulated in the White House as early as the 
beginning of 1964. In January of that year, a Joint 
Chiefs of Staff memorandum spoke of the need "to conduct 
aerial bombing of key North Vietnamese targets, using US 
resources under Vietnamese cover, and with the Vietnamese 
27 
openingly assuming responsibility for the actions". In 
March, assuming a similar line, Assistant Secretary of 
Defense William Bundy, in a detailed memorandum to the 
President, analyzed US options in South Vietnam and 
concluded that direct military action against North Viet- 
nam was the most promising "track" to follow--with the 
specific purpose of showing "the US hand" and forcing 
Hanoi, if not to stop completely, at least reduce 
28 
considerably its role in the South. At about the same 
time, Secretary McNamara himself, speaking during a public 
engagement, reiterated, now openly, the threat of US 
military action against North Vietnam in defence of US 
29 
interests in Southeast Asia. The Secretary presented 
the same views in a secret report to the President 
referring to a program "of graduated overt military 
pressure" upon Hanoi, which would in due time include "air 
attacks against military and possibly industrial targets" 
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north of the Demilitarized Zone. 
The Tonkin Gulf incident, and the subsequent Viet 
Cong attacks against US bases in South Vietnam, came to 
boost the case for an air campaign against the North. 
Initial plans centered around three different options. 
The first provided for sharp, punishing attacks only "in 
retaliation for specific operations in the South" on the 
basis of the "tit-for-tat" principle. The second, which 
was particularly popular among some air force generals, 
aimed at bombing North Vietnam "back into the 'Stone Age' 
and thereby end the war by destroying its cause at the 
source". The third option, which eventually came to be 
the principal method of applying American air power 
against the communists, saw "a gradual but intensifying 
campaign" designed to put the "squeeze" on Hanoi and force 
31 
it to stop supporting the Viet Cong and negotiate. 
Using the air force to combat communist aggression in 
South Vietnam carried considerable appeal. It promised 
to inflict a great deal of destruction on the enemy with a 
relatively small investment of resources, and, most 
importantly, it (theoretically) made large-scale 
commitment of American ground troops unnecessary. The US 
Air Force's confident predictions helped curb any doubts, 
and the poor state of North Vietnamese anti-aircraft 
defences added to this confidence. Indeed, the early 
ROLLING THUNDER raids seemed to bear this optimism out. 
During the first ROLLING THUNDER mission, carried out by 
111 aircraft on 2 March 1965, only four were lost to 
32 
ground fire. According to earlier intelligence reports, 
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the North Vietnamese air defence system was known to 
possess no surface-to-air missiles; it was estimated to 
deploy only about 700 anti-aircraft guns, and a mere 
twenty early warning radars with little tracking 
capability. The whole communist air defence system, far 
from being either dense or sophisticated, was thus 
restricted to engaging attacking air formations at 
altitudes below 20,000 feet, a ceiling which American 
33 
planners felt was safe for sustained operations. 
From the outset of ROLLING THUNDER in 1965, however, 
President Johnson, concerned about Soviet or Chinese 
reaction, insisted that the bombing remained under strict 
White House control, and brushed aside calls for a massive 
air offensive against the source of the communist 
insurgency in the South. Placing his political concerns 
above the requirements of his air strategists, the 
President approved personally target "packages", worked 
out by lower-echelon intelligence officials, deliberating 
the final target selection with his personal advisers and 
34 
a select group of Congressional leaders. Despite the 
difficulties that this laborious and cumbersome process 
created, ROLLING THUNDER was never allowed to "drift" into 
the hands of the military and continued as a tool of 
"ascending" political pressure, instead of as a weapon for 
subduing Hanoi, until its total halt on 31 October 1968. 
The hesitant manner which characterized the 
employment of US air power over the North met the 
disapproval of not only the generals, but also that of a 
significant portion of the intelligence community. 
230 
Shortly after the first ROLLING THUNDER strikes, John 
McCone, CIA chief, expressed his doubts as to the 
effectiveness of such a piecemeal bombing campaign quite 
clearly. In a secret report to top Administration 
officials, the-intelligence chief argued that air strikes 
not designed to "heavily" damage North Vietnam, and "hurt" 
Hanoi's military machine, were products of an ill- 
conceived strategy. The restraints placed upon ROLLING 
THUNDER could only interpreted by the communist leadership 
as the result of America's desire "to temporize". If the 
bombing was not carried out with sufficient vigor, McCone 
underlined, the United States ran into the risk of being 
"mired down" in a jungle war which it could not win, and 
from which it could have great difficulty extracting 
itself. Concluding that "we must hit them harder, more 
frequently, and inflict greater damage", the CIA director 
rounded up as follows: 
A bridge here and there will not do the job. We 
must strike their airfields, their petroleum 
resources, power stations, and their military 
compounds. This, in my opinion, must be done 
promptly and with minimum restraint. 35 
Another CIA analysis of the same period went even 
further by suggesting that the bombing could actually 
strengthen the North's determination, instead of sapping 
its war effort. In words that in retrospect sound 
prophetic indeed, the CIA analyst stressed the risk of 
causing Hanoi to intensify, instead of reducing, its 
support for the Viet Cong; a "militant majority" within 
the North Vietnamese communist party leadership, the 
document noted, could be expected to view the US bombing 
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campaign as an attempt of "a foe endeavoring to ward off 
defeat", a fact which called for endurance rather than 
surrender to the "imperialists": 
They almost certainly believe that, while the US 
could destroy much of their country by air 
attacks, these alone would not cause their 
regime to collapse or prevent them from 
continuing to support the insurgency in the 
South. And they may believe that their 
international political position would improve 
if they became the object of sustained air 
attack from the US. Accordingly, they might 
decide to intensify the struggle, accepting the 
destructive consequences in the North in the 
expectation of early victory in the South. 36 
These misgivings about both the incrementalist 
approach to the air war, and its long-term strategic 
advantages, did not prevent ROLLING THUNDER from gradually 
assuming massive proportions. Although the President 
consistently refused to give in to the military's demands 
for a "knock-out blow", bombing sorties against the North 
increased from 25,000 in 1965 to 108,000 in 1967, with the 
37 
bomb tonnage climbing from 63,000 to 226,000. At first 
target selection kept the bombs as close to the 
Demilitarized Zone as possible and allowed strikes on 
military targets only. These hesitant missions, aside 
from conveying a rather dubious "signal" to Hanoi, did not 
cause any significant damage to targets of strategic 
importance. No strikes were allowed north of twenty 
degrees latitude, a fact which rendered the Hanoi/Haiphong 
38 
area, and its vital plants, immune to air attack. 
Slowly, however, the bombing map extended northwards and 
US aircraft were allowed to strike at industrial and 
communications targets. The impact of the air campaign 
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upon the North Vietnamese economy grew proportionately. 
Whatever industrial output the North could manage was 
steadily reduced; traffic arteries were disrupted and 
agriculture came under strain; oil storage capacity fell 
dramatically; and food stocks came to dangerously low 
levels. The North Vietnamese population, already 
subsisting under Spartan conditions, was forced to live 
under even more severe deprivation--especially after food 
rationing was imposed, and black marketing pushed the 
price of all major commodities, including rice, to as much 
39 
as ten times higher the officially controlled levels. 
These quite palpable signs of suffering, however, 
were deceptive as to the real effects of the bombing. 
Despite an easing in the rules of engagement during 1967, 
which allowed attacks on industrial targets around Hanoi, 
and the spectacular raids on the Paul Doumer bridge (the 
main transportation link over the Red River near the 
communist capital), bombing of Hanoi itself, the port of 
Haiphong, and railheads on the Chinese border still 
remained on the exclusion list. These were crucial 
omissions. Declaring Hanoi a "protected" zone was, 
ironically, the most effective air defence the communists 
could hope for. Although plans to move key government 
agencies away from the city had been made shortly after 
the bombing began, the North Vietnamese were never forced 
to execute them--and thus continued "business as usual" in 
the midst of a "total" war. Similarly, avoiding Haiphong 
ensured that North Vietnam's main seaport remained 
undamaged, and continued to receive an uninterrupted flow 
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of cargo from the Soviet Union and other Eastern bloc 
countries which included such vital items as sophisticated 
anti-aircraft defence systems, food, and medical supplies. 
These shipments, along with the ones arriving from China 
via rail from Nanning in the east and Kumming in the-west, 
armed, fed, and bolstered North Vietnam until the end of 
the war. When ROLLING THUNDER was finally halted in late 
1968, the United States had lost nearly one thousand 
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aircraft, at an estimated cost of six billion dollars, 
whereas the North Vietnamese, although bloodied, had 
suffered no appreciable dent in their morale and went on 
fighting as before. 
#*# 
Aside from the self-imposed protection zones, which 
was perhaps the single most crucial limiting factor in 
ROLLING THUNDER's conduct, the failure of the bombing 
program to force Hanoi into negotiations should also be 
sought in a number of other factors. 
First, American strategists obviously overestimated 
the impact of bombing on an underdeveloped nation existing 
at near-poverty levels. In early 1968, a special study, 
undertaken jointly by the Joint Chiefs and the Office of 
International Security in order to asses the effects of 
the bombing, concluded that "after two years of the air 
war, North Vietnam could, within two months, recover 
almost completely from the damage done to its strategic 
lines of communication", and that it could move to achieve 
a favourable military balance in the South within half a 
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year after the bombing halt. Given the constraints 
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imposed upon the air war, the communists, relying almost 
entirely on outside aid in order to carry on with the war, 
and with a pre-industrial agricultural economy had no real 
manufacturing base or other sophisticated assets which a 
strategic bombing campaign could disrupt or destroy. With 
foreign benefactors paying for most of the resources lost 
due to bombing, North Vietnam was at no time faced with a 
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crippling "true logistics crisis". 
Second, the initial "tit-for-tat" attacks, and 
Washington's reluctance to commit itself to an 
unrestricted air campaign, allowed Hanoi "to start work on 
a comprehensive and efficient air defence system that 
would eventually come to include Migs, SAMs and AA 
artillery, all linked into a centralized warning and 
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control system". Although North Vietnamese air defences 
(and particularly the fighter/interceptor force) never 
came to the position of imposing unacceptable casualties 
on the attackers, their often deadly fire forced 
"compromise" tactics during bombing runs and thus reduced 
accuracy and overall effectiveness. 
Third, North Vietnam "demonstrated great ingenuity 
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and dogged perseverance in coping with the bombing". 
Popular mobilization reached total proportions. As one 
analyst reports, "no fewer than two million civilians 
formed 'shock brigades' traveling where needed to man the 
bridges or repair road and rail lines ensuring the flow 
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and pocket-storage of food, fuel, and ammunition". In 
addition to these repair gangs, 50,000 Chinese engineer 
troops were also "voluntarily" dispatched to help with the 
235 
functioning of the North's transportation system, and the 
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repair of bombing damage. Extensive camouflage and 
concealment of supply trails through South Vietnam and 
Laos ensured relative immunity from air attack at least 
until technological innovation allowed 24-hour attacks 
beginning in 1968. When the bombing took its toll in 
motor vehicles, human convoys, using carts and bicycles, 
took upon them the task of transporting supplies and 
ammunition. This massive effort kept fighting communist 
troops adequately supported, and helped minimize the 
impact of ROLLING THUNDER. 
Last but not least, constant interference on the 
operational level by the President and his civilian 
advisers created insurmountable obstacles in executing 
even this severely restricted air strategy. Each separate 
mission was thus transformed into a bureaucratic nightmare 
requiring prior specific approval from Washington. One 
indication of the "strapping" imposed by the White House 
was the refusal to allow pre-attack photo reconnaissance 
and no follow-up secondary strikes against targets of 
opportunity; unexpended ordnance had to be jettisoned 
before return to base. And in case that specific strikes 
had to be cancelled, due to weather or other conditions, 
the approval procedure for that particular target had to 
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be repeated from the beginning. 
In summary, ROLLING THUNDER ended as a distinct 
failure in the overall US effort to influence events in 
Vietnam. Although the Nixon Administration was to return 
to massive strategic bombing in its search for an 
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"honourable" extrication from Southeast Asia, the 
effectiveness of a modern air force used against a semi- 
primitive, but highly motivated, enemy had already been 
shown to be limited. 
The War on the Ground, 1965-68 
Prior to the US Marine landings at Da Nang in March 
1965, American military presence in South Vietnam was 
limited to deployment of advisory personnel along with 
required logistical units. In 1961, for example, there 
were only 3,164 American troops "in-country" and, by 1964, 
this number had grown to 23,310, still a far cry from the 
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massive deployments which were to follow in later years. 
Before 1965 American advisers remained attached to 
units of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), and 
to the other services, with the express purpose of 
training junior South Vietnamese officers, and advising 
ARVN commanders on tactics. Contact with the enemy in 
combat was rare, and most of the American casualties until 
the "Americanization" of the war occurred as a result of 
49 
terrorist attacks by the Viet Cong. From 1961 to 1964, 
the US Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG)--which, 
in early 1962, became MACV--placed strong emphasis on 
improved mobility for the GVN forces, and the introduction 
of close air support for ground operations. The United 
States provided helicopters and transport aircraft, and 
expedited training in air reconnaissance, air-ground 
support techniques, and the collection of special 
intelligence. Small craft for controlling coastal waters 
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against infiltrators were also provided, and the training 
of a national civil guard was accelerated in order to free 
regular troops from static defence duties and return them 
50 
to offensive operations. 
These measures, designed to reinvigorate the ARVN and 
give the South Vietnamese a fighting edge in the guerrilla 
war, had limited success. The size of the country, the 
poor political control exercised by Saigon over the 
provinces, and the low morale of the GVN forces combined 
to allow the Viet Cong to roam the countryside largely 
unmolested. By mid-1965 the military situation had 
deteriorated to such a point that General Westmorland 
warned CINCPAC, Adm. U. S. Grant Sharp (who exercised 
operational control over the Southeast Asia theater) that, 
unless additional US troops were not immediately 
dispatched to South Vietnam to cope with the increased 
communist activity, no guarantees could be made about a 
successful defence against the guerrillas and their 
Northern allies. As Westmorland put it: 
In order to cope with the situation... I see no 
course of action open to us except to reinforce 
our efforts in SVN with additional US or third 
country forces as rapidly as is practical during 
the critical weeks ahead. 51 
The proposed strategy for the increased American forces 
was based on standard US practices encompassing the 
experience of previous wars. Westmorland's main purpose 
was to "bring the war to the enemy" by utilizing his 
superior firepower and mobility. As he explained in the 
same message to CINCPAC: 
Ground forces deployed to selected areas along 
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the coast and inland will be used both 
offensively and defensively. US ground troops 
are gaining experience and thus far have 
performed well. Although they have not yet 
engaged the enemy in strength, I am convinced 
that US troops with their energy, mobility, and 
firepower can successfully take the fight to the 
VC. The basic purpose of the additional 
deployments... is to give us a substantial and 
hard hitting capability on the ground to 
convince the VC that they cannot win. 52 
In another message to CINCPAC, on 14 June, Westmorland 
sought to further clarify his intentions and alleviate 
fears that heavy fighting would take place near or in 
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densely populated areas. The MACV commander described 
his strategy as one of "mobile warfare" which would allow 
his troops to carry out major operations in remote parts 
of the country. The principle behind these operations was 
to be "search and destroy" which, applied immediately, was 
expected to "attrite" Viet Cong and North Vietnamese main 
force units. As the general explained, his intention was 
to direct his troops "against the hardcore North Viet- 
nam/Viet Gong forces in reaction and search and destroy 
operations and thus permit the concentration of Vietnamese 
troops in the heavily populated areas along the coast, 
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around Saigon and in the Delta". 
Throughout the period from mid-1965 to the end of 
1967, the search-and-destroy strategy brought about major 
engagements between US and communist forces. Relying 
heavily on air mobility, aerial bombardment, and 
artillery, operations like MASHER/WHITE WING, THAYER 
I/IRVING, FAIRFAX, CEDAR FALLS, and THAYER II, brought 
American attack forces sweeping over large areas of South 
Vietnam in search of enemy concentrations, supply depots, 
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staging locations, and command/control posts. These 
actions were essentially large-scale tactical offensives, 
carried out by regimental or divisional-sized units 
employing armour and air elements, and designed to find, 
fix, and defeat the enemy-in "decisive" battles. Although 
American forces prevailed almost invariably during these 
engagements--and the communists paid a heavy toll, at 
least in "body count" terms--by late 1967 it was obvious 
that MACV's plan to "attrite" Hanoi into submission was 
not paying off. Communist resistance showed no signs of 
breaking under the American "big unit" pressure. The Tet 
Offensive came to prove the enemy's resilience, and marked 
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the beginning of a reduced ground role for US forces. 
The failure of search-and-destroy to achieve a 
decisive US military victory in Vietnam has naturally 
become, like ROLLING THUNDER, the focus of heated debate. 
Overall, as critics have pointed out, the main flaw in 
Westmorland's strategy was that it tried to reconcile 
essentially contradictory politico-military requirements 
into the same military operational plan. Carrying the 
fight to the Viet Cong was indeed much easier said than 
done. Unlike previous wars the United States had fought, 
the Vietnamese conflict offered no organized "fronts" with 
predictable dimensions. This was an "unconventional" war 
where population security, and various police operations, 
were as crucial as finding and destroying Viet Cong and 
North Vietnamese army units. 
Fighting away from populated areas was equally 
impossible. Westmorland's express desire to avoid 
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civilian casualties did not change the fact that the Viet 
Cong, seeking primarily to undermine Saigon's authority 
over its people, were not bound by "conventional" military 
necessities. As a result, it was not long before the 
American juggernaut, in pursuit of an enemy that sought 
protection in the midst of the civilian population, began 
ploughing through South Vietnamese towns and villages with 
disastrous outcome for the people themselves, the 
popularity of the GVN, and the future of American-South 
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Vietnamese "friendship" and "cooperation". 
Another serious criticism of the US ground war 
strategy has been based on the inaccurate, and often 
overoptimistic, assessments of what deployed American 
manpower could actually achieve. Given the unpopularity 
of the war, and the increasing public pressure on the 
White House, troop levels in South Vietnam came under 
restrictive "ceilings" which, when considering the 
enormous task of fighting a "big unit" war alongside a 
"pacification" population-security campaign, made MACV's 
mission simply impossible. General Westmorland's comment 
is indicative: 
Because neither the Americans nor the South 
Vietnamese possessed overwhelming numbers, the 
cordons erected when the enemy was found were 
sieve-like, and many of the enemy escaped. Nor 
was it possible to occupy the sanctuaries and 
other pieces of terrain permanently, so that 
foray after foray had to be launched. 57 
Expectations that US aggressive and munition- 
intensive operations would cause the communists to sustain 
"unacceptable" casualties were also way off the mark. In 
the long run, the enemy's capability to absorb losses 
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proved quite sufficient to balance out, and eventually 
defeat, the US attrition strategy. By skillfully 
manipulating the time and place of combat, and having 
secure sanctuaries in Cambodia and Laos to retreat to, the 
communist leaders were able to control the expenditure of 
their human resources, choose the time and place of 
fighting, and to plan realistically for a protracted war. 
In the words of George Herring: 
An estimated 200,000 North Vietnamese reached 
draft age each year, and Hanoi was able to 
replace its losses and match each American 
escalation with one of its own... The North 
Vietnamese and the Viet Cong fought at times and 
places of their own choosing and on ground 
favorable to them. If losses reached 
unacceptable levels, they could simply melt away 
into the jungle or retreat into sanctuaries in 
North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. 58 
Tactics "on the ground" did not escape criticism 
either. One of the most common such complaints was the 
lack of tactical surprise which American commanders rarely 
failed to bring upon themselves. It was the movement of 
often multibattalion assault formations, "accompanied and 
supported by cumbersome and noisy mobile equipment", into 
relatively restricted combat areas which gave ample 
warning to the enemy; the routine practice of "prepping" 
helicopter landing zones with artillery, and the deafening 
noise of approaching helicopters invariably guaranteed 
putting enemy spotters on the alert and causing the quiet 
retreat of Viet Gong and North Vietnamese forces into the 
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safety of adjacent sanctuaries. 
The blanket use of firepower, aside from achieving 
very poor ratios of expended ammunition vs. confirmed 
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"kills", inflicted frightful destruction on the 
countryside, and forced millions of peasants into crowded 
refugee camps and the already cramped cities of South 
Vietnam. The designation of large areas of the country as 
"free fire" zones, where any movement was met with massive 
fire "response", only added to the misery of the civilian 
population--without disrupting enemy movements which were 
usually re-routed through safer areas of compensatory 
communication. And to round off the bill of suffering, 
operation RANCH HAND, in an aerial effort to deprive the 
enemy of natural cover and food supplies, sprayed millions 
of gallons of herbicide, including the notorious Agent 
Orange, over great expanses of jungle canopy and arable 
land causing, in most cases, long-lasting and even 
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irreversible ecological damage. 
Conclusion 
The defeat the United States suffered in the hands of 
ail : 1.1pdc. 4_, &e/pý Third World nation has prompted much 
painful introspection among American political leaders, 
military writers, and scholars. Although many "lessons" 
have been elaborated, it is still difficult to offer the 
definitive list of strategic mistakes, outright political 
blunders, and other miscalculations responsible for the 
ultimate failure of the American attempt to keep South 
Vietnam from falling to communist hands. While the 
Johnson period marked the highest intensity of US military 
operations in Southeast Asia, the trail of Vietnam-related 
decisions can be traced from the Eisenhower presidency 
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straight through the final dramatic moments of the Nixon 
White House and the tentative Ford Administration of the 
mid-1970s--a time span of almost twenty five years. 
The mere length of the war therefore, makes the 
identification of specific intervention causes, and 
analysis of their origins and development into generators 
of policy and military strategy, a complex and not always 
successful quest. This difficulty is further accentuated 
by the broad dimensions of the war, the sheer volume of 
the bureaucratic process involved, the turnover of 
policymakers, and the tortuous policy debates, often 
deadlocked, which were all salient characteristic of the 
years after 1964 in particular. 
But it is generally accepted that "the President's 
war" of 1964-68 was the period during which the United 
States, although winning quite a few battles, did 
surrender the strategic initiative to its communist 
adversaries. What then created the apparent inability of 
the Administration to pursue a "war-winning" strategy and 
protect South Vietnam from conquest? 
Inevitably, a large--perhaps the largest--portion of 
the responsibility should be attributed to President 
Johnson himself. Although his was the reputation of a man 
who hated "losers" (and who had privately often expressed 
his determination 'not to lose this one'), Vietnam 
immediately assumed impossible dimensions because the 
President chose to approach it as a contingency which 
could be met without any serious dislocation of peacetime 
American society but, also, without unleashing "unlimited" 
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war against Hanoi. From the beginning, 
Johnson's strategy rested on three interrelated 
principles: gradual escalation, a highly 
restrictive list of permissible operations... 
and a declaratory policy that made clear that 
America had no intention of threatening the 
existence of the North Vietnamese regime. 61 
This strategy suffered from at least two fundamental 
flaws: first, it failed to identify Hanoi as the main 
adversary in the war; and second, it gave no impetus to 
creative diplomacy capable of curtailing fears of Soviet 
or Chinese counter-intervention. 
Refusing to focus on Hanoi as the major opponent in 
the Indochinese conflict gave the Johnson White House the 
opportunity to "push under the carpet" the fact that the 
United States was at war in Southeast Asia. This 
reluctance may be explained persuasively in terms of 
domestic politics. Johnson's supreme effort to rectify 
the ills of American society, and notably the civil rights 
issue affecting America's black citizens, required maximum 
concentration on the domestic front, and indeed as little 
friction with Congress as possible. The President later 
referred proudly to "the season of accomplishments" which 
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the nation experienced in 1965-66. It is safe to assume 
that neither he nor his close advisers wished to jolt 
Great Society's building with a declaration of war against 
North Vietnam. Being in Vietnam, in fact, was presented 
more as a matter of commitment to a rather vague policy of 
protecting American interests in Southeast Asia, inherited 
by the Johnson Administration, rather than an all-out 
effort to defeat communist aggression. As President 
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Johnson himself put it during a speech at Johns Hopkins 
University: 
We are there because we have a promise to keep. 
Since 1954 every American President has offered 
support to the people of South Viet-Nam. We 
have helped to build and we have helped to 
defend. Thus, over many years, we have made a 
national pledge to help South Viet-Nam defend 
its independence..... 
We are also there to strengthen world order. To 
leave Viet-Nam to its fate would shake the 
confidence... in the value of America's word. 63 
Similar rhetorical commitments "to stay the course" 
and "pay the price" were often made during the years 1965 
to 1968. Both civilian and military leaders concentrated 
on the broadly stated objective "to keep South Vietnam 
free", and they all suffered in the process from the lack 
of direction on who was the real enemy and what to do 
next. Like his predecessors, Johnson saw the American 
mission in South Vietnam as denying to the communists the 
control of that country, but not destroying the source of 
the insurgency. The result was a multitude of rubrics-- 
"counter-insurgency", "population security", "attrition 
strategy", "search-and-destroy", "big-unit war" etc. --but 
no streamlined, effective strategy. Colonel Summers, 
commenting on this confusion within the American national 
security establishment, wrote: 
Although in theory the best route to victory 
would have been a strategic offensive against 
North Vietnam, such action was not in line with 
U. S. strategic policy, which called for the 
containment rather than the destruction of 
Communist power... Instead of focusing on North 
Vietnam--the source of the war--we placed our 
attention on the symptom, the guerrilla war in 
the south. 64 
Failing to see the "strategic offensive" against Hanoi as 
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the necessary condition for eventually suppressing the 
communist guerrillas in the South allowed the "people's 
war", fed by the North, to become the focus of operations, 
something which, in the long run, 
(a) forced the United States to expend its forces on a 
"secondary" objective, i. e. battling guerrillas in 
the South Vietnamese countryside, and 
(b) led to the wrong ARVN deployments and made their 
reaction to a conventional North Vietnamese invasion 
impossible. 65 
As Professor Berman aptly put it, "Johnson would not lose 
Vietnam by running away" but rather lose it "slowly"; 
indeed, "... in retrospect it seems perfectly clear that 
the United States had little chance of achieving its 
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limited goal against a country waging total war". 
On the diplomatic front, the Johnson Administration 
seemed equally reluctant to wage an enlarged campaign 
exploiting Sino-Soviet differences which could insure 
against, or at least greatly minimize, the possibility of 
Russian or Chinese direct involvement in the war. By 1966 
it was obvious that the rift between Moscow and Peking was 
widening, and that the Chinese would be receptive to some 
form of rapprochement with the United States in order to 
gain support in their "struggle for physical survival vis-. 
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a-vis the Soviet Union". The two communist giants, 
although forced to agree in principle that communist North 
Vietnam could not be abandoned in the hands of the 
"imperialists", had very different views on how to achieve 
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victory for Hanoi. While Moscow ultimately favoured a 
negotiated end to hostilities, Peking assumed a much 
harder line which, in the Chinese leadership's estimation, 
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not only exposed the gutless "revisionist clique" ruling 
in the Kremlin, but also reasserted China's exclusive 
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dominance over a region in its own "back yard". 
Had Johnson been prepared, like his successor, 
President Nixon, to undertake bold initiatives in 
improving relations with both communist giants the course 
of the war might have been very different. Shortly after 
Johnson's withdrawal from politics, Nixon was able to re- 
escalate the war while, at the same time, opening the door 
to China and establishing detente with Moscow. Nixon's 
decisive diplomacy can only be contrasted unfavourably 
with the static posture which the Johnson Administration 
assumed. 
Johnson's relative inactivity in searching for a 
diplomatic advantage in the Washington-Moscow-Peking 
triangle can be attributed to a number factors. In the 
mid-1960s it was still the inflexible attitude towards 
Peking, and Communism in general, generated by the "loss" 
of China to Mao in 1949, that still prevailed in 
Washington. Johnson, like Kennedy and Eisenhower before 
him, perceived the Vietnamese conflict as part and parcel 
of the American struggle against a monolithic communist 
block, and saw Hanoi as just another Chinese proxy. There 
is little evidence that he and his advisers took seriously 
into account Hanoi's nationalist aspirations, or the view 
that the clash between the two Vietnams was essentially a 
civil war with deep roots in the historical experience of 
Southeast Asia. One would assume that precisely because 
of this pre-occupation with the communist monolith, an 
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attempt would have been made to negotiate more extensively 
with the perceived center, i. e. Moscow, directing Hanoi's 
campaign against South Vietnam. This was not done, 
however. While Nixon would depend on detente for finding 
an acceptable method of extricating . the United States from 
its Indochinese quagmire, Johnson chose instead a dubious 
"signalling" tactic, based on various levels of military 
activity, which promoted neither a rapid American 
disengagement nor the long-term bolstering of South Viet- 
nam. In the final line, it was this inability to define 
the true dimensions of the war--with Hanoi not a mere 
proxy, but rather a prime actor in the conflict--that 
defeated Johnson's unimaginative diplomacy and led to the 





Grenada, a tiny island of the Lesser Antilles 
approximately one hundred nautical miles off the 
Venezuelan coast, became an independent nation on 7 
February 1974 after three centuries of French, and later, 
British colonial rule. At the time of independence 
Grenada faced serious economic and social problems. The 
1 
government of Sir Eric Gairy, which came to power in 1967 
following elections conducted by the British colonial 
Administration, was retained after independence but could 
offer no effective solutions to the new state's pressing 
problems. The island suffered from endemic corruption and 
mismanagement. The economy, entirely depended on 
agricultural exports (such as bananas and spices) and 
tourism, continued to deteriorate. Between 1974 and 1979 
Grenadian "finances collapsed into chaos" as Gairy 
resorted to "indiscriminate government borrowing" to 
2 
resolve his government's short term cash flow problems. 
The net result of these reckless financial tactics was 
loss of foreign development aid, general deterioration of 
the Grenadians' already poor standard of living, and 
further rumblings of discontent among the island's working 
class masses. 
With no hope of recovery in sight and with public 
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unrest growing, police brutality became the sole 
instrument of government control in an effort to ensure 
that no political opposition worthy of the name 
materialized. Repression, however, could not control 
mounting criticism of Gairy's Administration by a small, 
yet vocal, group of foreign-educated political activists. 
Prominent among them was Maurice Bishop, an articulate 
British-educated lawyer, who envisioned Grenada, as a 
socialist state governed by a national coalition of 
intellectuals, labourers, and peasants. In 1973, Bishop 
and Kenrick Radix founded the Movement for Assemblies of 
the People as an anti-Gairy party and soon merged it with 
a similar movement, the Joint Endeavour for Welfare, 
Education, and Liberation (JEWEL), to form Grenada's main 
opposition party, the New Jewel Movement (NJM). The NJM 
gathered under its wings leftists of various persuasions 
including doctrinaire Marxists. Its declared purpose 
became the ousting of the Gairy regime and its replacement 
3 
by a socialist reformist government. Bishop emerged as 
the dominant personality in the NJM early on, and although 
he made no secret of his socialist philosophy, he remained 
ambivalent vis-a-vis more radical NJM members and avoided 
describing the party's principles as "Marxist-Leninist". 
NJM activities were greeted with increased police terror 
and the personal persecution of Bishop and the rest of the 
party's leading members. 
Against this background of economic malaise and 
violence, general elections in December 1976 showed that 
Gairy's grip on power was less firm than previously 
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thought. The ruling party narrowly escaped defeat at the 
polls and, for the first time since 1967, was forced to 
face a genuine opposition in parliament headed by Bishop-- 
who, despite intense police harassment, had been the 
propelling personality in the pre-election drive against 
the government. The unmistakable signs of diminishing 
popular support, however, did little to change Gairy's 
tactics. Finally, with the economy in shambles, Grenada's 
external credit all but exhausted, and no prospect of 
relief from police terror, Bishop and the NJM, bolstered 
by popular support, staged a bloodless coup on 13 March 
4 
1979 and seized control of the government. 
As soon as the initial euphoria subsided, it became 
clear that the NJM, for all its previous declarations 
about participatory "mass" democracy, was tightly 
centralized and controlled not by "people's assemblies" 
but by a 16-member central committee under Bishop -- who 
had been declared Prime Minister of the self-appointed 
People's Revolutionary Government (PRG). In true 
"revolutionary" fashion, the PRG- banned all other 
political parties, suspended the constitution, promised 
(but never allowed) elections, and began arresting those 
who raised dissenting voices. These acts, although 
reminiscent of the Gairy regime, did not significantly 
affect the image of the revolution thanks mainly to 
Bishop's charismatic leadership and his personal 
popularity. On the other hand, 
By the indefinite suspension of the 
constitution, the NJM made clear to the world 
that the events of 13 March 1979 were designed 
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to do much more than just replace a dictator in 
order to return to the forms of representative 
democracy drawn up for Grenada by Whitehall 
civil servants and lawyers. It was to be a 
continuing revolution, in thought as well as in 
deed. 5 
From the outset, however, the NJM's "continuing 
revolution" was torn by ideological tension. Politburo 
hardliners, congregated around deputy Prime Minister 
Bernard Coard, pressed for a rapid transition to a fully- 
fledged Marxist-Leninist system that guaranteed the 
prominence of the "proletariat". These pressures were 
resisted by the moderates around Bishop who adhered to 
principles of democratic socialism and insisted on a more 
cautious path. This uneasy co-existence within the top of 
the NJM was destined to have catastrophic consequences. 
Divisions over ideology were coupled with 
disagreements concerning the economy and the pace of 
Grenada's socialist transformation. The PRG was able to 
halt the disastrous economic trends inherited from the 
Gairy years and to stabilize the economy. Emphasis was 
placed on food production, efforts were made to encourage 
tourism from Western countries, and private enterprise was 
tolerated although private industry came under pressure 
6 
"through seizures, taxation, -and various laws". There 
were at least four major factors responsible for Grenada's 
economic difficulties. First, the world economic slump 
depressed the prices of Grenada's main exports, such as 
bananas, cocoa, and spices, and led to significant revenue 
contraction. Second, the generally adverse publicity 
which the Grenadian revolution received in the Western 
253 
press eroded the island's tourist trade and almost totally 
eliminated a crucial source of foreign exchange. Third, 
differences over agricultural policy between Bishop and 
his more ideologically eager comrades resulted in 
haphazard planning and inefficient utilization of the land 
available for cultivation. And fourth, the PRG, despite 
initial rejection of prestige projects, became deeply 
involved in the building of an international airport at 
Point Salines, with the declared purpose to promote 
tourism, which seriously depleted the island's meager 
foreign exchange reserves. 
Despite these difficulties, and although achieving a 
lasting economic turn-around was to remain elusive, the 
average Grenadian experienced real improvements in his 
daily life, unemployment was reduced to tolerable levels, 
and the island's economic infrastructure became the focus 
of a conscious modernization effort. Grenada received "a 
glowing annual report" from the World Bank for 1981-82 but 
it was also warned that long-term growth could only be 
secured by better export performance and improvement in 
7 
its terms of trade. 
By early 1983, and despite the PRG's confident 
predictions, it was obvious that the Grenadian revolution 
was in crisis. With no significant economic improvement 
in sight, with ideological differences within the PRG 
mounting, and with Bishop still refusing to budge to the 
Coard faction's pressures for faster transition to 
Leninism, the ruling group of the NJM became polarized to 
the point of open conflict. The presence of Eastern bloc 
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advisors did little to correct the revolutionary failures 
8 
or to restore harmony in NJM ranks. Coard, who had 
organized his devotees into a semi-secret Marxist 
discussion group called the Organization for Educational 
Advancement and Research, was now vociferously demanding 
an immediate reassessment of party organization and 
tactics according to Leninist doctrine. And even more 
ominously for the Bishop moderates, Coard insisted on the 
creation of a collective leadership with himself elevated 
to the post of joint leader of the NJM next to the Prime 
Minister. Although Bishop initially refused to consider 
the joint leadership issue, it was not too long before he 
was forced to submit to Coard's demands in the hope of 
avoiding a potentially fatal rift within the NJM. 
Since Bishop's "wavering" was considered dangerous 
"reaction" by the Coard group, the hardliners took further 
steps to "protect" the revolution. In September, and 
while the Prime Minister was on a trip to Eastern Europe, 
the Coard supporters won control of Grenada's tiny army 
and effectively pushed Bishop out of power. On 13 October, 
the founder of the NJM was stripped of his powers and 
9 
placed under house arrest. But news of the prime 
minister's confinement aroused immediate public protest 
and spontaneous demonstrations challenged Coard's action. 
On 19 October, a crowd of Bishop supporters freed the ex- 
Prime Minister who still believed that a peaceful 
resolution of the situation was possible. Later that same 
day, however, soldiers confronted a pro-Bishop 
demonstration, fired into the crowd causing numerous 
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casualties, and re-arrested Bishop along with a number of 
his colleagues. Within minutes of their arrest, they were 
all executed by pro-Coard troops inside Fort Rupert 
10 
overlooking the capital of St. George's. A 16-man 
Revolutionary Military Council (RMC), under Gen. Hudson 
Austin was pronounced and the PRG was dissolved. But the 
new junta's rule was short-lived. On 25 October, and 
following five days of uncertain military rule, US forces, 
supported by a token military and police force from 
neighbouring Caribbean states, invaded Grenada to 
ostensibly restore order and protect the lives of American 
citizens. The Grenadian revolution thus came to a rather 
unceremonious end. 
Background to Invasion 
Before Gairy's overthrow Grenada attracted little 
official American attention. It was the seizure of power 
by the NJM which prompted Washington's interest and, in 
conjunction to events in Nigaragua and El Salvador, 
caused the United States to "rediscover" Central -America 
and the Caribbean after almost two decades of benign 
11 
neglect. 
Grenada's revolution coincided with a period of 
overall policy reassessment within the Carter 
Administration. During 1979-80, Carter's original policy 
towards Latin America, emphasizing human rights and 
peaceful resolution of internal conflicts, underwent major 
changes as the Administration became more sensitive to the 
global Soviet challenge and traditional American security 
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concerns. In the Caribbean, three events contributed to 
the shift of the American approach towards more 
conservative tactics. To begin with, the dispatch of 
Cuban troops to support African Marxist regimes destroyed 
hopes for an eventual rapprochement between Havana and 
Washington within Carter's liberal policy framework. 
Secondly, the collapse of the Somoza dictatorship in 
Nigaragua brought to power a Marxist junta which favored 
close links with Castro and was avowedly committed to a 
Nigaraguan "people's republic". And, thirdly, El 
Salvador's leftist insurgents intensified their attacks on 
the central government making that tormented country 
another potential security "risk" on the immediate 
American periphery. 
In light of these developments, Washington received 
the news of the Grenadian revolution with reservation. 
Although Gairy's departure marked, theoretically, a 
victory for the forces of democracy and respect for human 
rights, the NJM's Marxist inclinations, the suppression of 
its political opponents, and the failure to hold free 
elections combined to strengthen American misgivings about 
the Bishop regime. Thus, the PRG's declared intentions of 
cultivating closer ties with Havana, if only to bolster 
Grenada's defences against the ever-present fear of 
12 
"mercenary" invasion, drew an unusually sharp warning 
from the American Ambassador to the Eastern Caribbean, 
Frank Ortiz, who visited Grenada shortly after the 
revolution: 
Although my Government recognises your concerns 
over allegations of a possible counter-coup, it 
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also believes that it would not be in Grenada's 
best interest to seek assistance from a country 
such as Cuba to forestall such an attack. We 
would view with displeasure any tendency on the 
part of Grenada to develop closer ties with 
Cuba. 13 
Grenada, Cuba, and the Soviet Union 
Such US warnings hardly minimized Grenadian 
determination to promote links with Cuba, the Soviet Union 
and other "fraternal" socialist states (and, if anything, 
they must have strengthened resentment of the 'American 
imperialists' and the desire to obtain Soviet help). 
Cuba, both geographically closer and the undisputed 
motherland of Marxist revolution in the Western 
hemisphere, became the NJM's mentor from the very 
beginning. Within a month of Gairy's overthrow, Havana 
had dispatched Julian Torres Rizo, a former head of the 
Cuban mission to the United Nations and a senior 
intelligence officer, as its first charge d'affaires at 
St. George's--an appointment which demonstrated the 
significance Cuba assigned to offering Bishop the correct 
"guidance" in his quest for "socialist transformation". 
In November 1979, it was also announced that the two 
countries had also agreed on an aid package for the 
construction of the new international airport at Point 
14 
Salines. The personal rapport between Fidel Castro and 
Maurice Bishop, and the fact that the PRG was the first 
truly "revolutionary" regime in the circum-Caribbean, 
helped these initial contacts to evolve rapidly into a 
complex relationship. Not before long the Cubans were 
offering assistance in "amounts which were incongruous to 
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the small size of the island, its limited resources, and 
15 
doubtful strategic value". Cuban involvement in 
Grenada's domestic life extended well beyond the bounds of 
the airport construction site. By mid-1980, several 
Grenadian government delegations had visited Cuba to 
consult with Cuban counterparts on a variety of economic, 
political, educational, and technical issues. During that 
same period, Cuba maintained at least sixty civilian 
advisors, diplomats, and technicians in Grenada (forty of 
whom were directly involved in the Port Salines 
construction) and planned to increase this presence to 250 
personnel as the airport project entered its advanced 
16 
stages. 
Collaboration was not limited to civilian aid 
programs but was enlarged to include assistance in 
military matters as well. In a separate secret treaty, 
Havana agreed to grant scholarships to Grenadians enabling 
them to study in Cuban military schools, and to dispatch 
twenty seven "permanent military specialists" to Grenada 
in order to "strengthen" its People's Revolutionary Army 
and Militia and assist in the 
---combative and campaign training of the troops 
and staffs in the preparation of cadres and 
minor specialists, and in the elaboration of the 
operative and mobilization plans for the defense 
of the country. 17 
The links with Cuba, although by far the most 
extensive Grenada maintained with a "fraternal" socialist 
country, were augmented by ties with the Soviet Union and 
18 
other Eastern bloc countries. Contacts with the Soviet 
Union were initiated as early as December 1979 when a team 
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of Soviet trade officials visited Grenada to investigate 
areas for possible assistance. In March 1980, the island 
received the visit of the Soviet Navy chief and Deputy 
Minister of Defence, Adm. Sergei Gorshkov. In May, deputy 
Prime Minister Coard, heading a tree-man delegation, 
visited the Soviet Union, followed by East Germany and 
Bulgaria, to discuss foreign aid and to acquire 
instruction on "techniques of agro-industrial 
19 
production". 
The Coard trip inaugurated a period of continuous 
Grenadian efforts to develop closer links between the PRG 
and the Kremlin. In contrast to Cuba, however, the Soviet 
Union seemed to choose a less enthusiastic approach to 
Grenada's "internationalist" regime. The exchange of 
official visits, and even Grenada's support of the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, did not result 
in any immediate expansion of diplomatic relations per se; 
it was not until September 1982, and following an official 
visit to Moscow by Bishop, that the Soviet Union finally 
established a full diplomatic mission at St. George's and 
dispatched Gennadiy Sazhenev, a high-ranking official of 
the military intelligence directorate, as Ambassador to 
the island. 
This Soviet reluctance to fully and unconditionally 
endorse the Grenadian revolution sprung from at least two 
main reasons. First, official NJM ideology, influenced by 
Bishop's own utopian populist ideas, lacked the 
underpinnings of Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy necessary to 
win the NJM a place in the brotherhood of true 
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"communist" parties, at least in Soviet eyes. At the time 
of the revolution, as the Kremlin must have observed, the 
NJM did not even have "a coherent political platform or a 
realistic set of policies for dealing with the island's 
20 
problems", let alone the painstakingly detailed, and 
preferably five-year, program typical of "scientific" 
Marxist movements. In the aftermath of Gairy's overthrow 
the NJM's "socialist" vocabulary undoubtedly improved but 
gaps still remained. For example, Bishop, as late as 
1982, saw the Grenadian revolution not in strictly Marxian 
terms but at a rather vague "national democratic stage"-- 
although he clearly perceived the PRG as "an anti- 
imperialist government" leading Grenada through a 
21 
"socialist orientated stage of development". Similarly, 
the Grenadian Prime Minister, in his capacity as chief NJM 
ideologue, did not promote the Movement as the "vanguard" 
revolutionary party preferring instead to philosophize on 
the merits of broad popular support; no conscious attempt 
was made to recognize "class conflict" as the cause of 
Grenadian social and economic ills or to elaborate the 
benefits of the "dictatorship of the proletariat"; the PRG 
placed emphasis on agriculture rather than manufacturing 
industry; and even "scientific" Leninist hardliners like 
Coard admitted that the Grenadian "national bourgeoisie", 
i. e., the private sector, had a role to play in the 
22 
"revolutionary" economy. 
Second, the Soviets, weary of previous 
"revolutionary" experiments in the Third World (and 
particularly in Latin America) and with little experience 
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in circum-Caribbean affairs, viewed the prospects of the 
Grenadian revolution with a healthy dose of scepticism. As 
one analysis put it, "Grenada was not high on the Soviet 
list of priorities because of its rather insignificant 
size, remote location, viability, and vulnerability to 
'imperialism' (i. e., American power)" although its 
"potentially strategic location" made it a prime candidate 
23 
for Soviet aid. The Russian reservations were clearly 
detected by W. Richard Jacobs, the Grenadian Ambassador in 
Moscow, who, in one of his reports to his government, 
wrote: 
---the Caribbean -- as they [the Russians] 
repeatedly state (though often in different 
contexts) is very distant from them. It is, 
quite frankly, not one of their priority areas, 
and this is reinforced by their interest in 
reducing the areas of conflict with the USA. 
Furthermore, the CPSU has historically been very 
cautious in developing relations with parties 
that are new to them. This is due to their 
bitter experiences in places like Egypt, Somalia 
and to a lesser degree Bangladesh and Chile. 24 
The result of the Soviet uneasiness with dealing directly 
with Grenada led to a clear-cut "division of labour" among 
those members of the Soviet bloc prepared to assist the 
PRG in its "socialist path". While Moscow "provided 
overall guidance and direction", East Germany organized 
the Grenadian internal security apparat, Czechoslovakia 
supplied arms, and Cuba provided the technical expertise 
and trained personnel for building up Grenada's economic, 
25 
educational, and medical infrastructure. 
Grenada and the Reagan Administration 
Improving cooperation with "fraternal" countries, 
262 
however, meant steadily deteriorating relations with the 
United States. Bishop's own preoccupation with CIA 
"conspiracies" and "plots" against the PRG fed a steady 
stream of anti-American rhetoric--which only made matters 
worse by adding to the mistrust and ill- feeling already 
separating the two countries. In the closing months of the 
Carter Administration, Grenadian-American relations were 
at an all-time low following the American refusal to 
accept Dessima Williams as Grenada's Ambassador in 
Washington and to offer assistance to the PRG after 
Hurricane Allen destroyed almost half of the island's 
26 
banana crop. 
This poor state of'affairs deteriorated further with 
the election of President Reagan. The new Administration 
perceived the Caribbean basin in considerably darker 
colours than its predecessor. The Caribbean was labeled 
a "crisis" area where the "lack of order" created fertile 
grounds for the growth of a Soviet/Cuban "conspiracy" to 
27 
undermine Western hemispheric security. In accordance 
with this view, the Reagan Central American/Caribbean 
policy became permeated by an attitude of "toughness" vis- 
a-vis avowed as well as potential allies of the Soviet 
Union in the area. Diplomatic and economic measures aimed 
at isolating Cuba and Nicaragua were soon extended to 
include Grenada, the latter being specifically targeted 
for development funds denial. 
During 1981, this policy led to major difficulties 
for the Grenadian economy. US pressures resulted in the 
cancellation of a $19 million loan from the International 
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Monetary Fund triggering loud protests from the PRG. 
Later in the year, similar American pressures for 
excluding Grenada from the list of aid recipients caused 
the Caribbean Development Bank to decline handling a $4 
million loan earmarked for distribution among Eastern 
29 
Caribbean states. Another focus of American economic 
measures was the Point Salines construction project. When 
it became known that the PRG was seeking European 
financing for finishing the airport, the United States 
launched a vigorous diplomatic campaign to ensure that the 
30 
Grenadians received no such aid. This attempt failed, 
however, when the EEC countries agreed not only to assist 
Grenada in raising the requisite airport construction 
funds but, also, to increase overall economic aid to the 
PRG--a victory which Bishop predictablly hailed as a 
31 
"humiliating defeat" of "imperialism and Reaganism". 
US economic denial directed at Grenada came again to 
the forefront when President Reagan announced the 
Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) in early 1982. The CBI, 
designed as a regional foreign aid package, based on a 
combination of free-trade and investment measures, was 
meant to counter Cuban and Soviet influence by improving 
the competitiveness of local economies and raising general 
living standards. Since the plan centered on ways and 
means to develop private-sector enterprises, both 
Nicaragua and Grenada, pursuing the "socialist 
transformation" of their economic systems, were pointedly 
excluded from receiving CBI aid. This exclusion prompted 
Bishop's angry reaction who described the CBI as "chicken 
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feed" and "an insult" to Caribbean states "only aimed at 
32 
achieving military interests". 
While such "vulgar economic intimidation" remained 
one of the chief Grenadian concerns, the aspect of the 
Reagan Caribbean policy which alarmed the PRG even more 
profoundly was the intensification of American military 
exercises in the area. Increased military activity in the 
Caribbean was well under way at the time of President 
Reagan's election, his predecessor having already set up 
a Caribbean Joint Task Force Headquarters at Key West, 
Florida with the express purpose of coordinating and 
controlling expanded US air and naval deployments in this 
"critical" theater. In August 1981, for example, Ocean 
Venture '81, a major US exercise conducted in the waters 
around Puerto Rico, included "Operation Amber", a 
simulated invasion of the imaginary "unfriendly" Amber 
island nation to rescue US citizens, install a "free" 
government, and give the "Amberines" the opportunity to 
prepare for free elections. The PRG perceived this 
exercise not only as a provocation but also as a "full- 
scale dress rehearsal" of an imminent US invasion of 
Grenada and expressed its fears officially to 
33 
international organizations and foreign governments. 
American military activities continued to worry the 
PRG throughout 1982-83, especially in light of US 
reconnaissance flights in the vicinity of Grenada and 
President Reagan's mounting charges that the Point Salines 
airport was primarily a Cuban military project. In March 
1983, tensions increased further when President Reagan, 
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during a national TV address, displayed aerial photographs 
of Point Salines and described the airport's intended use 
34 
as "military and unfriendly". In related statements, 
senior Administration officials also pointed to planned 
upgrading of Grenadian port facilities, warehousing, and 
telecommunications as intended to enhance Cuba's 
capability to penetrate other regions and warned that 
Grenada was about to become "a clandestine off-shore 
35 
base"of such Cuban activities. This major publicity 
coincided with renewed military exercises which brought US 
warships in the immediate vicinity of Grenada and led 
Bishop to declare, for yet another time, that the "fascist 
clique in Washington" planned an imminent invasion of the 
island--which, as in previous similar occasions, was 
36 
again proved a false alarm. 
The Invasion Decision 
Although leftist commentators saw the Ocean Venture 
'81 exercises as a prova generale for the invasion of 
Grenada, there is little public evidence, aside from 
speculation, suggesting that the United States had 
specifically decided to invade the island prior to 
Bishop's execution on 19 October 1983. In fact, a visit 
by the Grenadian Prime Minister to Washington in June of 
that year seemed to indicate that Grenadian-American 
relations were on the road to relative normality with 
Grenada taking the initiative. During his visit, Bishop, 
although unable to secure a meeting with the President 
himself, met White House national security adviser William 
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Clark and, according to documents captured by US forces 
after the invasion, expressed his desire (but not 
necessarily that of his Marxist colleagues) for improved 
37 
relations between the two countries. 
Between the June meeting and Bishop's overthrow in 
October, however, no progress was made in normalizing US- 
Grenadian diplomatic relations, although the anti-American 
rhetoric emanating from St. George's was considerably 
reduced. The American Ambassador to the Eastern Caribbean 
continued having no official contacts with the PRG; and 
Grenada's Ambassador in Washington remained accredited 
only to the Organization of American States. The net 
result of this diplomatic "blackout" was reduced ability 
on the part of American decision makers to correctly 
assess the significance of the intra-NJM power struggle 
but, also, Bishop's chances of surviving the concerted 
38 
attack upon his personal leadership. 
At the time of Bishop's overthrow and arrest on 13 
October, the two main determinants of US policy in 
relation to Grenada were 
(a) approximately 1,000 US citizens residing in Grenada, 
700 of whom were students enrolled at St. George's 
University Medical School, a potential group of 
hostages in the hands of the NJM extremist faction, 
and 
(b) the possibility of an open invitation to Cuba by the 
new Grenadian rulers for regular Cuban military units 
to reinforce Grenadian defences against both internal 
opposition and external intervention. 
While the safe evacuation of all Americans took precedence 
over other considerations, a possible Cuban move to 
exploit the situation must have also been a prime subject 
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in the high-level deliberations triggered by the events in 
Grenada. Given the perennial concern about Cuban 
activities, it seems safe to argue that, between 13 and 19 
October, American decision makers were already 
contemplating some form of direct intervention, beyond the 
noncombatant evacuation of US nationals, to "stabilize" 
the situation in Grenada and preclude a Cuban "solidarity" 
move in support of the Coard faction. It was reported, 
for example, that, by 15 October, the Reagan 
Administration had already approached Barbados at an 
unofficial level to discuss the prospect of a rescue 
operation to free Bishop and transport him to a 
neighbouring friendly Caribbean country thus giving 
Grenadian moderates a second chance to reassert their 
39 
power. 
It was not, however, until after 18 October, and the 
murder of the NJM founder and his supporters, that the 
crisis management mechanism at presidential level became 
operative. Immediate concern focused on the medical 
students, Washington being anxious to avoid another 
hostage fiasco ala Teheran. Planning for the evacuation 
of all US citizens commenced immediately upon the news of 
the executions and the declaration of a shoot-on-sight 
curfew throughout Grenada. As a result, a naval task 
force, formed around the carrier Independence, and 
carrying 1,900 marines, sailed from Virginia on 18 October 
ostensibly on its way to Lebanon to relieve US Marine 
units on duty with the multinational peacekeeping force in 
Beirut. Additional naval and air force units were also 
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mobilized and ordered to forward deployment positions on 
standby for "any eventuality". 
On 20 October, President Reagan formally requested 
Vice President Bush to activate a special White House 
situation group in order to take charge of the Grenada 
crisis management in conjunction with the National 
Security Council. The group's first decision was to 
divert the Independence carrier task force towards Grenada 
in a move that was described as simply "prudent" and not 
40 
intended to cause any alarm in Grenada. The following 
day, the Administration's preparations were given a 
critical boost by the official declaration of the 
Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) calling 
for intervention in Grenada and the OECS members' 
unanimous vote to ask the United States, along with 
Barbados and Jamaica, for assistance. The OECS invitation 
served two significant purposes. First, it sharply 
focused public attention on the Grenada situation and the 
fact that US citizens might soon be in danger. And 
second, it offered a perfect political pretext for 
proceeding with a "multilateral" effort to restore "order 
and democracy" in the troubled island and thus minimize 
the effects of the political and diplomatic fallout which 
41 
a military operation was bound to cause. 
With President Reagan away from the capital on a two- 
day golfing trip to Georgia, the situation group, 
including Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and Gen. 
John Vessey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
continued its deliberations under the direction of Vice 
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President Bush and Secretary of State Shultz. These 
discussions were hampered by the confusion as to what was 
exactly happening in Grenada, the lack of "friendly" 
observers on the island, and a complete breakdown in 
telephone communications (by the time of the invasion, 
contacting US citizens was almost entirely up to amateur 
radio operators). Up until the evening of 21 October, 
therefore, the paucity of information, and the need to 
know more about the situation on the island, imposed an 
emphasis "on the collection and assembly of information, 
not its analysis" and on efforts to clearly define the 
problem at hand before expressing specific alternatives 
42 
for action. 
The uncertainty shrouding develonments on the island 
did not prevent, however, instructions to Adm. Wesley 
McDonald, commander-in-chief, US forces, Atlantic, to 
43 
begin planning for an invasion of Grenada immediately. 
Although the military commanders had no reservations about 
the feasibility of the operation at hand, they were 
nevertheless worried by the same shortage of "hard" 
intelligence as their civilian counterparts and the 
"telescoped time basis" available for planning. There was 
little reliable information, for example, about the 
composition, weapons, and training of the Grenadian 
forces, and conflicting reports concerning the size, 
equipment, and character of the Cuban contingent stationed 
44 
at the Point Salines construction site. Furthermore, 
detailed maps of the island were lacking and the planners 
were eventually forced to rely on tourist ones which 
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failed to identify properly landmarks of non-tourist 
45 
interest. 
By 22 October, and after further consultations with 
the President, who remained in Georgia in order to 
maintain the Administration's outer cover of normality, 
the special situation group had decided to respond 
favourably to the OECS request for assistance in doing 
"something" about Grenada. Accordingly, Ambassador McNeil 
and Major General Krist were dispatched to Bridgetown, 
Barbados to "explore carefully with the leaders of the 
OECS and Jamaica and Barbados their information, their 
46 
analysis and their intentions". 
On 23 October, the Grenada crisis was momentarily 
overshadowed by the suicide bombing of the US Marine 
headquarters in Beirut which forced President Reagan to 
return to the White House. Beirut had an indirect, but 
crucial, influence on the Grenada decision. As the news 
about the numerous American casualties poured into 
Washington, and the impression that "America was being 
kicked around as it had been when Carter was in charge" 
mounted, the President came under pressure to demonstrate 
convincingly the nation's resolve to fight back against 
its unseen enemies; since the Beirut bombers could not be 
reached, it was decided that Grenada, closer to home and 
under the imminent threat of "Cubanization", was going to 
47 
be "rescued". Thus, and after final discussions with 
the military chiefs, the invasion date was set for 
Tuesday, 25 October and the appropriate order for 
Operation Urgent Fury, as the invasion was codenamed, was 
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signed by the President on Monday afternoon. Within 
twelve hours, US airborne and amphibious formations began 
landing in Grenada. 
Conclusion 
While the shooting in Grenada lasted for only a few 
days, the war of words persisted long after the last US 
combat troops had left the island. The American action 
was met with almost universal condemnation from the NATO 
allies, not to mention of course the vehement 
denunciations from the Warsaw Pact and most Third World 
49 
countries. Domestic criticism of the invasion was also 
strong, particularly from academic personalities and the 
media, but the President's initiative received strong 
grass-roots support, a key factor in the minimal 
50 
Congressional opposition to Urgent Fury. 
The speed with which the invasion was planned and 
executed led to charges that the Administration had barely 
reviewed, if at all, peaceful alternatives to using 
military force. This contention seems quite plausible, 
especially given Grenada's deliberate diplomatic 
blacklisting by the United States, and the Reagan 
Administration's consistent branding of Grenada as a 
developing platform for the export of Cuban-inspired 
insurgency into neighbouring areas. Assuming that 
military force was indeed the favourite option during the 
White House deliberations prior to 25 October (the records 
of which are all classified), one important question 
arises: since military force is generally perceived as an 
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instrument of last resort, how did the Reagan 
Administration come to react as if the developments in 
Grenada prejudiced American interests to a degree 
requiring a military response? 
At the outset, there should be a definition of 
American interests in relation to Grenada. From the 
economic point of view, American interests were almost 
non-existent--unless special weight was given to a small 
Coca Cola bottling factory and the minimal investment of 
a few American tourist operators. 
Politically and strategically, however, Grenada, by 
virtue of its pro-Marxist regime, its proximity to the 
United States, and its Cuban sympathies, occupied centre 
stage for an American Administration which made no secret 
of its fears about the "worldwide Communist threat" and 
its determination to challenge communist efforts to 
"undermine" the "free world". These views fundamentally 
affected the Reagan foreign policy towards Latin America 
and the Caribbean which were collectively seen as 
"dominoes" vulnerable to the Cuban/Soviet conspiracy. It 
appears, therefore, that Washington had come to the 
conclusion that a potential "second Cuba" in the eastern 
Caribbean--America's "soft underbelly"--was simply 
unacceptable long before Bishop's murder and the alleged 
51 
threat of a Cuban takeover. 
In this light, the violent end of the Bishop regime, 
although principally the outcome of intra-NJM quarrels, 
gave the Reagan Administration a signal that was 
interpreted not according to objective analysis but rather 
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according to a pre-conceived notion of "threat": since 
Bishop had resisted the total Leninisation of the 
Grenadian revolution, his overthrow was perceived as the 
result of covert Soviet action which had directed the hand 
of the Coard-Austin group as part of the wider scheme to 
52 
communize the Caribbean. 
Thus, American decision makers, having by most 
indications accepted the hypothetical Soviet 
destabilization scenario as truth, became convinced that 
not only Grenada was about to be "lost" like Cuba twenty 
five years earlier, but also that US citizens on the 
island were facing the risk of being killed in the "random 
fighting" or taken hostage by the "leftist thugs" who had 
53 
exterminated Bishop. The threat to the US citizens' 
safety has been seriously questioned, however, and while 
it became a centerpiece in the Administration's 
justification of the invasion, it should be viewed with 
scepticism. Echoing the invasion critics' doubts about 
the safety risks which American citizens in Grenada 
presumably faced, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. wrote: 
Nearly every country in the world contains 
American citizens to be declared in potential 
danger. Nearly every country in the world can 
be defined as of strategic importance to 
American security -- if not directly in itself, 
then indirectly through the convenient doctrine 
of "credibility", by which every local conflict 
is invested with global significance and becomes 
a test of American will... When we cut ourselves 
adrift from neutral standards of international 
conduct and make military action the first 
rather than the last recourse of national 
policy, we sail in exceedingly dangerous 
areas. 54 
One last point deserves attention. As it was already 
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mentioned, the invasion was proved to be quite popular 
within the United States, an indication of changing 
popular mood vis-a-vis military intervention, especially 
when such an operation produces results quickly and with a 
55 
minimal cost in American lives. In this respect, Urgent 
Fury's significance lies not so much in the perceived, 
short-term, regional benefits to the security of the 
United States as in the revived American willingness to 
commit US forces in attacking Soviet a 
LLie.. 
-, for the first 
time since Vietnam. The impact of this departure from 
"complacency", as particularly practiced during the Carter 
presidency, is difficult to assesiýat this early stage. 
Nevertheless, there is little doubt that potential Third 
World Soviet clients may already be taking notice and 
modifying their policies accordingly, at least for the 





Prelude to Revolution 
The events which culminated in the abortive Hungarian 
revolt of October 1956 can be traced back to the closing 
days of the Second World War. Hungary, having fought on 
the side of Nazi Germany under the fascist regime of 
Admiral Horthy, capitulated to the Red Army in early 1945. 
The coming of the Soviet troops, and the collapse of the 
fascist government, paved the way for the Hungarian 
Workers' party to climb to power and ensure that Hungary 
was firmly lodged in the USSR's expanding East European 
1 
buffer zone. Led by Matias Rakosi, a devoted Stalinist, 
the communists proceeded with eliminating the opposition 
of other political parties, taking over trade unions, and 
securing the obedience of the police and what was left of 
the country's public administration. 
Although national elections in late 1945 showed 
little popular support for the communists--the bulk of 
the vote going to the 'bourgeois' Smallholders party-- 
Rakosi, facing no other source of forceful opposition, 
persisted with Hungary's Stalinization unmolested. By 
1952, after eliminating most of his non-communist 
opponents and many of his own party's prominent leaders, 
Rakosi reigned supreme, a "mini Stalin" who held both the 
post of Prime Minister and the powerful position of the 
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communist party's Central Committee First Secretary. 
Rakosi's regime was distinguished for its brutality 
and callousness. Secret police terror, directed by the 
feared state security agency, AVH, left every Hungarian 
citizen potentially exposed to arbitrary arrest, torture, 
2 
and "termination. " Deviation from the party line brought 
comparable fate to party members as well, irrespective of 
one's past faithful "revolutionary" record. To make 
matters even worse, Rakosi's blind espousal of Soviet- 
dictated economic policies depressed further an already 
devastated economy, and led to a steep drop of the 
national standard of living (which, after 1945, steadily 
deteriorated in any case because of energetic Russian 
3 
measures to punish one of Hitler's past allies. ) 
Stalin's death in March 1953 prompted important 
changes at the top of the Soviet pyramid, and East 
European satellites did feel the impact of these changes 
almost immediately. Stalin's successors, eager to 
preserve their own authority by neutralizing Stalinist 
supporters, both at home and abroad, wasted little time in 
seeking to replace Stalinists in East European communist 
parties with more "liberal" personalities. Thus, Rakosi's 
grim-faced regime became a target for prompt reform. In 
June 1953, the Hungarian dictator was summoned to Moscow 
where he met the new collective Soviet leadership of 
Beria, Malenkov, Molotov, and Khrushchev. It was during 
this visit that Rakosi was ordered to turn over the reins 
of power to one of his ministers, Imre Nagy, a reputed 
anti-Stalinist and moderate. Although deprived of his 
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previously absolute authority, Rakosi managed to retain 
the post of party First Secretary and continued commanding 
the crucial loyalty of the party apparat mostly staffed by 
his own appointees. 
Imre Nagy, whose later "trial" and execution by the 
Russians led to much Western praise of his brave 
"democratic" convictions, was in fact an orthodox 
communist of the old guard. Yet, his interpretation of 
Marxism-Leninism was conditioned by the desire to avoid 
excesses "on the road to socialism", restore 
constitutional processes (within the party, at least), and 
observe the "basic moral and social values of justice, 
fairness, decency and respect for all other men as 
4 
equals... " As a result, Nagy's first move as soon as he 
assumed the premiership was a "New Course" speech to the 
Hungarian parliament, delivered on 3 July, denouncing 
police terror, criticizing Rakosi's economic policies, and 
promising religious toleration, freedom for peasants to 
choose between collectives and private ownership of land, 
and a higher standard of living for all Hungarians. 
Nagy's speech, delivered upon a country still under 
the control of Stalinist diehards, excited the Hungarian 
people enormously. Overnight, Nagy became the focus of 
vast popularity. Such was the impression made by this 
proposed New Course that Nagy's words "... took on a 
significance which was almost symbolic in certain cases, 
and had little to do with the proposed measures and 
5 
changes they were announcing. " Whatever the case, the 
new PM's message marked a turning point on the road to the 
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1956 revolt. The exposure of the rift within the 
Communist party, and the attack on "previously 
unassailable idols", triggered the open clash between 
Stalinists and moderates which would eventually lead to 
6 
armed rebellion in the streets. 
The sheer speed with which Nagy proposed to "thaw" 
Hungary surprised everyone. Although Moscow had 
presumably agreed in principle with the need for reforms 
by sanctioning Nagy's elevation, the new Hungarian 
leader's sweeping proposals were well outside what the 
Soviet presidium was prepared to tolerate. Rakosi, 
encouraged by the obvious Soviet displeasure, went 
immediately to action mobilizing his supporters in 
critical sectors of the state administration to sabotage 
7 
and undermine Nagy's efforts at reform. Through 1954, 
entrenched "Muskovites" frustrated most of the "Nagyist" 
attempts to change the direction of the economy or to 
proceed with the liberalization of party structures. In 
February 1955, with Moscow anxious to retain its control 
over developments in Hungary, Rakosi was able to stage a 
counterattack, have Nagy stripped of the premiership and 
expelled from the party's leadership, and instruct the 
Central Committee to publicly condemn the New Course as 
"rightist deviation. " With Nagy out of office, Andras 
8 
Hegetus, a trusted Rakosi stooge became Hungary's new PM. 
Nagy's unceremonious dismissal was followed by the 
reintroduction of "correct" policies--although Rakosi, 
aware of Nagy's great popularity, ordered no general 
purge, and allowed the ex-premier, along with other 
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prominent "revisionists", to remain free but under the 
AVH's watchful eye. Several victims of the Stalinist 
period were posthumously rehabilitated, and the release of 
political detainees continued in an attempt to boost 
9 
Rakosi's public image. While these measures succeeded in 
temporarily averting widespread unrest, they also 
demonstrated the Stalinists' inability "to turn the clock 
back" and defeat the "deviationists" in the battle for the 
hearts and minds of the Hungarian people. With Moscow 
growing impatient with the mounting signs of unrest caused 
by the Hungarian experiment, and with the Hungarian people 
approaching quickly the point of open defiance of a 
discredited regime, the road to revolution had been 
irrevocably joined. 
Revolution and Intervention 
The first loud signals of public discontent began in 
mid-1956 with the activation of the Petofi circle, an 
independent body of intellectuals invariably critical of 
Rakosi and his policies. Neither secret police harassment 
nor threats of legal sanctions could silence Petofi; the 
tone of the Petofi meetings grew more polemical, and 
public gatherings in universities became equally 
10 
defiant. A ban on the Petofi circle sparked public 
outcry and, by July, Rakosi could do little, short of an 
outright police crackdown, to silence his opponents. 
After yet another visit to Moscow, the old Stalinist was 
again dismissed (this time permanently) and was replaced 
by his closest associate and disciple, Erno Gero. 
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Gero's selection, an obvious Soviet attempt to keep 
in power a man who could control the party and, 
simultaneously, restore some internal order, infuriated 
most Hungarians, who correctly perceived Gero as Rakosi's 
alter ego. The country's worsening economic plight, and 
the clear reluctance of the party to do away with the 
remaining vestiges of the "personality cult", solidified 
public opposition to the ruling communists; in October, 
with Gero away to Belgrade, the floodgates finally broke 
open bringing three years of almost continuous agitation 
11 
to their dramatic conclusion. 
On 22 October, a mass student meeting in Budapest 
demanded a program for a "new Hungary" free of the 
presence of Soviet troops, neutral like Austria, and in 
open communication with the West. The students called for 
immediate, multi-party elections under an Imre Nagy 
government, for freedom of the press, and for the 
12 
punishment of Rakosi's criminal followers. The following 
day a new student demonstration surged into the city's 
Parliament Square demanding Nagy's return to office. 
Gero, who had rushed back home from Yugoslavia, responded 
with an aggressive radio speech branding the students 
traitors and enemies of the people. When crowds tried to 
force their way into the radio station, AVH guards opened 
fire, and several demonstrators were either killed or 
wounded. Within hours of the radio station riot, masses 
of demonstrators were raiding arsenals and munitions 
factories for arms, and the first armed civilian bands 
13 
appeared in the streets. 
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Between the 24th and the 28th the revolt spread out 
of control. Although Nagy reappeared at the head of a 
coalition government which included non-communists, and 
all political leaders along with the high Catholic clergy 
appealed for calmness, Budapest remained a city under 
siege. As attacks against AYH troops and Communist party 
offices continued unabated, Soviet armoured units, 
stationed in the vicinity of the city, entered the 
Hungarian capital and were immediately involved in 
skirmishes with armed citizens. Meantime, Gero was 
finally forced to resign, and Janos Kadar, himself a 
victim of Stalinist purges, was installed as First 
Secretary. Neither Nagy's government nor Kadar's 
appearance, however, could possibly stem the avalanche. 
Following the so-called Parliament Square Massacre, 
fighting between Hungarians and Soviet tanks was joined in 
14 
earnest. Soon the revolt had spread in the provinces 
and, as the Soviet army outside Budapest stood largely 
inactive, revolutionary committees claimed control over 
most local areas before the end of October. 
Late on 29 October Soviet units began withdrawing 
from Budapest, and by the 31st no Soviet troops could be 
sighted within the capital. At the same time, however, 
Soviet reinforcements were crossing the eastern Hungarian 
frontier en masse. Despite Nagy's announcement that the 
Soviet withdrawal had been jointly agreed upon with both 
representatives of the Soviet government and local 
military commanders, the Soviet military movements 
confirmed a rapidly developing plan to gain control of the 
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entire country. On 1 November, Nagy made the 
unprecedented declaration of Hungary's withdrawal from the 
Warsaw Pact and, in an open radio message, appealed to the 
United Nations to guarantee his country's neutrality. 
15 
This was a last, and indeed desperate, call. In the 
early morning of the 4rth, main rail links, airports, 
bridges, and other vital facilities having already been 
seized, the Soviet forces launched their final surprise 
attack. Within one week, and after much bitter fighting, 
Hungary had been "saved" from the "counter-revolutionary 
threat", and returned among Moscow's loyal satellites. 
The Anatomy of Soviet Intervention 
The image of Soviet armour mowing down Hungarian 
street fighters tends to obscure the fact that the Soviet 
involvement in defeating the "counter-revolution" passed 
through some quite agonizing moments. Although the 
secrecy shrouding the inner workings of the Kremlin will 
most likely never allow historians to establish a fully 
accurate sequence of events, it is beyond doubt that 
Nagy's surprise "thaw" jolted the Soviet leaders into a 
major foreign policy crisis whose handling was to tax 
their skills severely. 
Much of the soul-searching that gripped both Russian 
and East European communists in the late 1950s has been 
blamed, and rightly so one might argue, on Khrushchev's 
now celebrated "secret" speech at the 20th CPSU Congress 
in February 1956. Khrushchev's attack on the "cult of 
personality", and his denunciation of Stalinist methods, 
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was received with mixed emotions--among which stunned 
16 
disbelief predominated. 
To the Eastern Europeans the "secret" speech brought 
a sense of relief, renewed expectations for relaxation of 
Soviet control, and guarded optimism as to Khrushchev's 
"democratic" intentions vis-a-vis "fraternal" communist 
parties. Although Moscow's interference in the internal 
affairs of its satellites hardly ceased following the 
speech, its regularity was reduced causing the erosion of 
the "techniques of coercion", but also a widespread 
popular desire "for a change from the set pattern of 
17 
controls" which had existed ever since the final 
communization of Eastern Europe. 
In Hungary, where communism was imposed on a very 
reluctant population, the need for deep reforms had been 
apparent even during Stalin's final years. Rakosi's 
disastrous handling of the economy had already drawn 
18 
Moscow's dissatisfied attention. The 1950-54 Five Year 
Plan, exclusively concerned with Hungary's forced 
industrialization, left little doubt that the Hungarian 
people were facing a prolonged period of great hardship-- 
something which prompted Rakosi's party opponents to warn 
that "the impoverishment of the population... would 
19 
eventually be harmful to Communism as such". Nagy and 
his followers, although principled communists themselves, 
could see no benefit in repeating the tragic mistakes of 
the Soviet leadership during the USSR's own 
industrialization with its millions of dead and its mass 
police terror. Against this backdrop, the voices against 
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mass industrialization drew further strength from the 
country's appalling agricultural state and its increasing 
20 
inability to feed its own people. 
The existence of this rather vocal opposition within 
the Hungarian Communist party created the first serious 
difficulty for the post-Stalin Soviet leadership. While 
in the years of Stalinist tyranny such "deviation" would 
have been dealt with swiftly and effectively--by 
liquidating the unpleasant comrades involved--Stalin's 
successors, still struggling among themselves for power, 
and, following Khrushchev's speech, involved, willingly or 
not, to the Soviet Union's own pale "liberalization", had 
limited room for such drastic tactics. 
Amidst the deteriorating economic situation and the 
first, positive signs that the Hungarian people stirred 
uncomfortably in this sorry predicament, Rakosi's 
dismissal in 1953, and Nagy's appointment to head the 
Hungarian government (an experiment in 'civilized' 
transfer of power and containment of popular unrest) 
backfired badly. Instead of consolidating communist 
predominance, and allaying Moscow's fears prompted by 
Rakosi's mounting troubles, Nagy, with his New Course 
speech, dispelled any residual hopes which might have 
existed in the Kremlin as to the possibility of 
reconciling Soviet control with the Hungarians' own 
nationalist aspirations, not to mention their expectations 
21 
for improved standards of living. 
A temporary return to the Stalinist model, with 
Rakosi's reappearance in 1955-56, did not contain the 
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"counter-revolutionary" drift, convinced most Hungarians 
that the Soviet Union, even under its new cloak, remained 
an oppressive, intrusive, imperial power, and left both 
sides inevitably closer to a violent confrontation. 
Khrushchev's rather exasperated remark to Marshal Tito 
that he, Khrushchev, had to retain Rakosi in Hungary 
22 
because "the whole structure will collapse if he goes" 
clearly illustrated the impasse created by a Soviet- 
generated contradiction: "liberalizing" the Soviet system 
of party control while simultaneously attempting to stem 
similar changes within "fraternal" people's democracies 
was simply not possible (at least at the price of 
relinquishing, sooner or later, dominant influence over 
'disciplined' satellites). 
Rakosi's final departure in July 1956, and the 
elevation of Gero to fill the leadership vacuum, was 
Khrushchev's last-ditch attempt to restore a semblance of 
party unity among the Hungarian communists, and offset the 
expanding influence of Nagy's increasingly pronounced 
"bourgeois moralism". In retrospect, Gero's appointment 
seems to further strengthen the impression that the Soviet 
leaders were unwilling, and perhaps unable, to recognize 
the fundamental changes taking place in Hungary at the 
time. Gero, Rakosi's closest associate and 
industrialization boss, could have been no worse choice at 
23 
a time of bourgeoning popular restlessness. The hurried 
organization of Kadar's "centrist" group next to an old 
Stalinist strongman did nothing to change the party's 
corroded image, or to pacify angry intellectuals and 
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students. 
In the stormy months preceding October, Soviet 
responses to the Hungarian crisis also included efforts to 
"rehabilitate" Nagy, lest his complete disappearance 
24 
unnecessarily inflamed the situation. In fact, this 
Soviet design was facilitated by Nagy's own hesitant 
manner, and his inability to articulate a clear-cut reform 
philosophy--which, many Hungarians expected, would reject 
communism as the basis of the country's political, 
economic, and social system, and proclaim Hungary's return 
to a truly socialist democracy. But for all his New Course 
proclamations, Nagy remained torn between his orthodox 
Marxism-Leninism and the mounting opposition of his 
countrymen to the Hungarian Communist Party (and of course 
the Marxism-Leninism it espoused). As Lomax observes: 
The central weakness of Nagy's position derived 
from the fact that, despite the radical 
divergence between his socialist ideals and the 
reality of the communist state, he believed that 
the errors and mistakes of the stalinist era 
were simply the result of the usurpation and 
misuse of power by a group of evil and 
unprincipled leaders. The disease had only 
affected the elite; it was not a structural 
defect in the system itself. It could be cured 
by a "changing of guard", enabling a return to 
the correct policies and the noble ideals of 
socialism. 25 
On the same day Nagy was reinstated (24 October), 
Anastas Mikoyan and Mikhail Suslov, acting as Khrushchev's 
emissaries, arrived in Budapest to endorse Nagy, fire 
Gero, and appoint Kadar to the party's top post. The two 
old Bolsheviks, having completed their last-minute 
manipulations to prop up the sagging fortunes of their 
local comrades, flew back to Moscow thoroughly alarmed by 
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the deteriorating situation in the streets of the 
Hungarian capital, and by the stark realization "... that 
after eight years of uncontested control, in a matter of 
days the Hungarian Workers' party had completely lost its 
26 
influence". 
Such reporting, the first by two of the politburo's 
most experienced and trusted members, must have caused 
considerable alarm in the Kremlin. It seems plausible to 
assume, therefore, that the decision to send Soviet troops 
into Budapest for the first time began taking shape at the 
time of the Mikoyan-Suslov fact-finding mission. Although 
what exactly transpired during politburo meetings is a 
matter of conjecture, there is evidence that the outgoing 
Gero, along with Hegedus, sought Soviet military help to 
quell the riots--although they immediately conspired to 
shift the blame to Nagy whose credibility in the public 
27 
eye suffered accordingly. 
It is also evident that the intensity and size of the 
popular uprising caught the Russians by total surprise. 
28 
As Miklos Molnar shows, the initial Soviet reaction to 
Gero's desperate calls for troops was erratic and showed 
no immediate preference for a military "solution". As the 
news of Hungarian civilians acquiring weapons poured in, 
however, the Kremlin was spurred into action--albeit 
issuing orders only to units in the vicinity of the 
capital to enter the city under "the proviso that they be 
used with caution". The lack of adequate military 
preparation was further underlined by the "military 
blunder" of sending armour into narrow city streets 
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without supporting infantry. Thus, the Soviet troops 
could take possession of vantage points but not 
penetrate all the blocks of flats and other 
hiding places of the snipers. They could only 
have won the battle by exterminating Budapest. 
But that was neither their instructions nor 
their desire. They were baffled and bewildered, 
restricted to defensive action while the 
Hungarian teenagers dictated events in the 
streets of Budapest. 29 
Between 25 and 29 October, and while the fighting in 
Budapest continued unabated, Soviet attempts to reach a 
compromise with Nagy proceeded apace. Mikoyan and Suslov 
returned from Moscow for fresh talks. This apparent 
Soviet willingness to negotiate, even in the face of a 
clear challenge to their authority staged by the armed 
Hungarian civilians, kept alive Hungarian hopes of an 
eventual acceptance by Moscow of the extensive program of 
internal changes and, even, Hungary's neutrality on the 
30 
Finnish or Austrian model. As if to confirm Hungarian 
hopes, on 28 October, and after marathon meetings with the 
Soviet delegation, Nagy finally emerged to announce that a 
cease fire had been agreed upon with the Soviet military 
commanders, and that the withdrawal of the Soviet forces 
31 
from the capital was to commence immediately. 
What prompted Moscow to conclude this first phase of 
its military intervention? Available evidence makes a 
strong case for the Soviets agreeing to a cease fire 
because of military considerations. The speed with which 
the Hungarian crisis evolved into street fighting left the 
Soviet commanders with almost no time for either the 
regularly observed thorough logistical preparation or for 
giving the troops, saddled as they were with a thankless 
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mission, the appropriate indoctrination boost. Political 
officers must have made an earnest effort to stir their 
soldiers against the "fascist counter-revolutionaries", 
yet many units carried on reluctantly, and some of them 
abstained completely from fighting since their ranks could 
not be brought to see the Hungarian workers and students 
32 
as "fascists". It also became obvious from the outset 
that, in order to suppress the revolt, a substantially 
larger "police" force was required--at a time when Soviet 
commanders around Budapest had only limited manpower at 
their disposal. As Vali notes, 
if they [the Russians] had continued to fight, 
they might have lost their remaining armor. It 
is thus not unfounded to maintain that the 
Soviet forces broke off the engagement because 
of inability to sustain pressure on the 
insurgents. 33 
As the Soviet forces evacuated Budapest, Mikoyan and 
Suslov arrived again, this time on 30 October, to find the 
city in the grip of what they must have thought was total 
anarchy. Sporadic fighting continued, revolutionary 
committees or simply mobs dealt summary justice on AVH 
policemen, and Nagy, unable to control the violent 
outburst of his people, had taken the step of organizing a 
coalition cabinet, complete with non-communist members. 
Whatever the personal feelings of Khrushchev's 
emissaries might have been, they did present the 
Hungarians with an unprecedented document--an official 
declaration by the Soviet government regarding relations 
between socialist states. In an unusually conciliatory 
tone, the declaration spoke of relations between the 
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Soviet Union and "other socialist countries on the strict 
34 
Leninist principle of equal rights for the peoples". It 
also specifically referred to the stationing of Soviet 
troops in Warsaw Pact countries, and recognized that such 
arrangements could only be made "with the consent of the 
state on the territory of which, and on the demand of 
which, these troops are to be stationed". Even more 
surprisingly for the Hungarians, the declaration, after 
what seemed a routine reference to the forces "of reaction 
and counterrevolution", laid the door open for the 
negotiated withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary before 
concluding with the usual ideological platitudes. 
For all the Western tendency to view similar Soviet 
initiatives with strong suspicion, the October declaration 
should be considered a genuine attempt on Moscow's part to 
calm the Hungarians and create an atmosphere conducive to 
35 
a peaceful settlement. As one analyst observed, for all 
the "distorted descriptions", transmitted to Moscow by 
Ambassador Andropov, "the very fact that the Soviets were 
doing all the fighting in attempting to suppress the 
uprising was powerful evidence that this was a genuinely 
popular expression of will", an assessment that must have 
been duly supported by Mikoyan's own "hardnosed" 
impression of what was going on based on his first-hand 
36 
observation. 
Whatever sincere intention for concessions the 
Soviets might have had at the end of October they quickly 
lost on the first day of November. On that day, Nagy, 
still struggling to catch up with the flood of popular 
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demands engulfing his government, announced Hungary's 
withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and appealed to the United 
Nations for protection of his country's neutrality. This 
was the final straw for the Kremlin--and within three 
days, the second Soviet intervention had put an end to the 
Hungarian experiment. 
The scope and severity of this second blow reinforces 
the view that military intervention had been seriously 
contemplated at least as early as the first disturbances 
in the streets of Budapest (a multi-divisional operation, 
like the one carried out by the Soviet army on 4 November, 
is extremely difficult, if at all possible, to organize 
and launch in a mere four days). In light of this 
assumption, the tactical mistakes of the earlier "police" 
action--for which the devastating massed attack of 4 
November more than adequately compensated--should be 
attributed to poor timing in troop deployment rather than 
37 
genuine desire to avoid the use of force. 
The limited information that is available about the 
politburo deliberations gives us a measure of the feverish 
consultations that took place during the period 
immediately prior to the final blow. According to 
Khruschev himself, the primary Soviet concern throughout 
the crisis was the possibility that the "counter- 
revolution" would gain the upper hand and allow NATO 
to take "root" in Hungary--with threatening consequences 
for neighbouring socialist countries "not to mention the 
38 
Soviet Union itself". After many shifts and turns in 
opinion, executed under the pressure of an unbroken stream 
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of gloomy reports from Budapest, it was agreed that it 
would be "inexcusable" for the USSR "to stay neutral" 
while Hungary's working class struggled against the forces 
of reaction. Upon this decision (reached probably around 
25-26 October), Marshal Ivan Konev, commander of the 
Warsaw Pact forces, was ordered to stand by for military 
39 
operations against the Hungarian "fascists". 
Moscow's irresolution prior to the second invasion is 
further illuminated by Khrushchev's consultations with 
Marshal Tito, and a high-level Chinese delegation which 
arrived in Moscow during the crucial final days of the 
Hungarian revolt. The Yugoslav leader, himself only 
recently reconciled with the Kremlin after being branded a 
"deviationist criminal" by the Stalinist propaganda, was 
especially sympathetic towards Nagy's desire to promote 
Hungarian "national" Communism. Indeed, Tito, having led 
his own country to its unique "road to socialism", felt 
that Hungary was only too ripe for a change according to 
the Yugoslav model and away from Moscow's stifling 
influence. As a result Belgrade was able to keep 
excellent communications with Budapest throughout the 
revolt. It is therefore plausible to assume that 
Khrushchev, as his channels of communication with the 
Hungarian government became gradually blocked by the 
confusion in Budapest, sought to exploit the Yugoslav 
conduit in- order to gain whatever leverage he could 
extract from Tito's amiable relations with Nagy. 
When, however, Soviet diplomacy failed, paving the way for 
the military invasion, the Yugoslavs--who, until the very 
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last minute, felt that a Yugoslav formula could be worked 
out without bloodshed--were appalled "by the ruthlessness 
of Soviet military actions" and "the flagrant disregard of 
points of agreement reached between Khrushchev and Tito in 
40 
regard to the treatment of 'Socialist'. countries". 
Recalling his exchanges with Khrushchev, and the rest of 
the Soviet leadership, during September 1956, Marshal Tito 
later wrote: 
We [Tito, Rankovic, and Pucar] realized that it 
would be rather difficult to do anything since 
the Soviet leaders had different viewpoints as 
to other countries; they looked on their 
relations with other countries, with Poland, 
Hungary and others, from a wrong and defective 
angle... they lack sufficient confidence in the 
internal revolutionary forces in these 
countries... 
We declared that Rakosi's regime, and Rakosi 
himself, had no qualifications whatsoever to 
lead the Hungarian state and bring about 
national unity... 
[But] the Soviet comrades stated that he was a 
clever man, that he would succeed, and that they 
did not know anyone else whom they could rely 
upon in that country. 41 
Consultations with the Chinese, whose chief delegate, 
Liu Shao-chi, maintained constant telephone communication 
with chairman Mao, revolved, according to Khrushchev, 
around the question of military force. The Soviet 
leader's memoirs reveal the Chinese advising restraint and 
suggesting "to let the working class [in Hungary] build 
itself up and deal with the counterrevolution on its 
42 
own". This view was initially accepted by the Soviets 
but changed soon after in favour of military intervention 
because, as Khrushchev related, it would have been 
"unforgivable, simply unforgivable, if we stood by and 
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refused to assist our Hungarian comrades". Liu, when 
presented with the news as he boarded the plane for the 
trip back to Peking, expressed his concurrence and assured 
his Russian hosts that their decision would also certainly 
receive Mao's endorsement. 
A few years later, however, the Chinese would claim 
that they had pressed the Soviets for immediate military 
action against Hungary's "counterrevolutionary 
government", and had thus effectively taken the decision 
44 
their "confused" comrades were unable to reach. In fact, 
according to one account, the Soviet-Chinese consultations 
prior to the invasion were far from amiable, and were 
capped by a letter from Mao to Khrushchev where the 
Chinese leader, 
while ackowledging the necessity of military 
intervention, reproached Khrushchev for seeking 
China's advice too late -- the time for 
consultation was before Khrushchev decided to 
"becloud the name of the great leader of the 
international workers' movement, the true 
Marxist-Leninist, Comrade Stalin". In this 
letter, the Chinese were openly giving notice 
that Khrushchev could no longer be accepted as 
the leader of international communism; he had 
betrayed the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and 
become a revisionist, and the leading role in 
the world communist movement would now belong to 
the Chinese Communist party. 45 
Conclusion 
Viewed in retrospect, the Soviet intervention in 
Hungary accomplished both its short- and long-term 
objectives. The Soviet tanks, although unable to avert 
the brutalities against minor Communist party officials 
and secret policemen, preserved the one-party state, 
destroyed the Nagy "revisionist clique", and saved 
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Hungary's Communism from certain complete disintegration. 
Of equal significance was the fact that Hungary's 
"pacification" served a clear message to the rest of 
Eastern Europe. Moscow had just demonstrated, rather 
brutally, to say the least, the limits of its patience 
with liberal experiments. 
Western inaction, despite the Hungarian premier's 
frantic pleas for help, reconfirmed the European status 
quo as it had been agreed at Yalta and Potsdam, and dashed 
hopes of a grand Western crusade to liberate East European 
peoples. Although it is doubtful that the United States, 
or any other Western power, would have extended any 
tangible help to the Hungarians against the almost certain 
prospect of a military clash with the Soviet Union, the 
Anglo-French attack on Suez, which materialized at the end 
of October, ensured that Western attention was diverted 
elsewhere. This must have come as a welcome relief in 
Moscow and given the opportunity to the Soviet leaders to 
wholly concentrate on the Hungarian problem. 
There is indeed little point in speculating about 
what would have been the outcome of the Hungarian crisis 
if the Soviets had indeed blinked and allowed Budapest to 
follow a neutralist course. The ramification for Moscow's 
Eastern European security buffer, but also for the Soviet 
empire as a whole, are more or less obvious. As one 
analysis aptly put it: 
As it was, the doom of Prague in 1968 was 
sealed. The "Brezhnev Doctrine" was born on 
November 4,1956, and Leonid Brezhnev had very 
little to do with it. When the USSR was able to 
crush the Hungarians with impunity, there was 
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little reason to procrastinate over how to deal 





As in the case of Hungary, the events which led to 
the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 
developed around the conflict between progressive and 
conservative forces within the Communist Party of 
Czechoslovakia (CPCS). In this context, "progressive" 
referred to the party group which rejected Stalinism, 
condemned the purges of the 1950s, supported economic 
reform, and sought (like the pro-Nagy Hungarian 
communists) greater autonomy in Czechoslovakia's external 
policies and relaxation of police controls within the 
country. On the other hand, "conservative" CPCS members, 
although not necessarily staunch proponents of Stalinist 
methods, rejected the idea of party "liberalization", 
favoured a pro-Moscow line in foreign affairs, and 
remained firmly in support of a centrally planned economy. 
In addition to this overall disagreement on matters 
of policy, the power conflict within the CPCS was also 
centred on a revival of old ethnic claims concerning 
greater autonomy and the question of a federal state. 
While the primary concern of Slovak conservatives was 
enhanced autonomy for Slovakia through the creation of a 
Czechoslovak federated socialist republic with Moscow's 
support, the majority of Czech progressives drew their 
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inspiration from the tradition of independent democratic 
1 
politics in Bohemia and Moravia. 
In January 1968 the divisions within the CPCS came to 
the fore with the ouster of Antonin Novotny, the party's 
First Secretary who had held the post-since 1953, and his 
replacement by Alexander Dubcek, a Slovak, who, until his 
elevation to the top CPCS post, was First Secretary of the 
2 
Slovak Communist Party. Novotny's fall was sealed when, 
in late January, Dubcek, in his new capacity as the CPCS 
First Secretary, visited Moscow for talks with the Soviet 
leadership--a fact which demonstrated Kremlin's approval 
of the new CPCS chief. 
Although Dubcek's ethnic origins left many Czech 
party members rather suspicious, his initiative in 
challenging the Novotny apparat and in exposing the 
incompetence, autocracy, and poor economic judgement of 
his predecessor, won him widespread popular approval. At 
the same time, the battlelines were being drawn between 
the "technocrats", supporting a transition to a "rational, 
scientific" bureaucracy, and those who still rejected the 
need for reforms, especially in the areas of "economic 
3 
efficiency" and "scientific management". It is probably 
correct to say that Dubcek had limited ambitions as to the 
degree of change he wished to or would implement. But, 
like Imre Nagy twelve years before, Dubcek, who had played 
a major part in exposing earlier Stalinist scandals in 
Slovakia, supported a range of reforms whose very nature 
4 
was an invitation to crisis: a less centralized party 
structure allowing the "democratization" of procedures 
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especially in relation to the appointment and promotion of 
officials, relaxation of police contr-ols, greater freedom 
for intellectuals and the press, increased flexibility in 
the economic sector, and, last but not least, greater 
independence for Czechoslovakia's ruling communists to 
decide for themselves on matters of foreign policy and 
economic ties with the West. 
Dubcek's apparent espousal of such principles, and 
his energetic efforts to neutralize the Novonty apparat 
made increased public debate of future policies 
inevitable. Furthermore, and although not a "progressive" 
himself in the strictest definition of the term, the new 
party leader, by virtue of his anti-Novotny stance, became 
identified with the emerging progressive coalition within 
the CPCS. By March, the progressives, whose work all 
around the country was gradually removing the controls on 
information imposed by the Novotny regime and helping to 
publicize the progressive aims, had succeeded in stirring 
up the debate about Czechoslovakia's present and future to 
an unprecedented level; in mid-month, annual party 
district conferences, held in almost half of 
Czechoslovakia's districts and following secret ballots 
held for the first time in the history of the socialist 
republic, expressed their demand for "the replacement of 
senior officials and guarantees that the new policies 
5 
would be put into effect". 
Such pressure for prompt reforms had predictable 
victims. On 21 March, Novotny, who had retained the 
republic's presidency after his forced retirement from the 
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CPCS Central Committee, received a "recommendation" from 
the Czechoslovak National Assembly to resign immediately; 
the following day, his resignation -- submitted along with 
the customary self-defensive letter -- was followed by a 
wave of similar actions by many of his devotees throughout 
the party and public administration. As the old guard 
marched out, the CPCS Central Committee, seeking to pre- 
empt accusations of anti-Sovietism, released an official 
statement where it made clear that, 
the party will unhesitatingly defend the line of 
socialist construction and friendship with the 
socialist countries, particularly the Soviet 
Union. 6 
Efforts to allay Soviet fears concerning the 
country's democratization, shared by the rest of 
Czechoslovakia's Warsaw Pact allies (with the exception of 
Rumania), were led by Dubcek whose remarks warning that 
"the wave of free political discussion in Czechoslovakia 
could go too far"--and that the CPCS Central Committee 
must "carry out its work logically, step by step" -- were 
7 
already a matter of record. Shortly after Novotny's 
resignation, Dubcek met with the Soviet leadership, and 
the leaders of Hungary, Poland, East Germany, and Bulgaria 
at Dresden to reassure Czechoslovakia's "friends" that the 
liberalization process was carried out under the close 
scrutiny of the CPCS. A few days later, and in an 
apparent tactical maneuver to dispel the impression that 
the pace of reforms could soon be out of control, the CPCS 
Central Committee named Gen. Ludvik Svoboda, a veteran 
soldier of conservative sympathies, to assume the 
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presidency -- a choice which angered many progressives who 
saw Svoboda's election as a symbolic concession to the 
8 
Soviet Union. With the old Stalinists' grip over the 
state administration finally broken, Dubcek turned to the 
reorganization of the party Presidium while a new cabinet, 
under Premier Oldrich Cernik, another progressive, took 
over from the cabinet of Premier Jozef Lenart who had 
9 
announced his resignation on 6 April. 
Dubcek's position was now openly on the side of the 
progressives. Speaking about the future course of 
Czechoslovakia during an interview in early April, the 
CPCS First Secretary described "the unprecedented 
political activities [taking place in Czechoslovakia]... 
as a spontaneous democratic movement from below" and he 
dismissed fears that the party could be pushed aside by 
developments; as a matter of fact, Dubcek underlined, the 
only way for the party to regain popular approval, and 
continue leading the way as the "only decisive, organized, 
progressive force" in Czechoslovakia, was to consolidate 
10 
the new freedoms and protect them by law. 
Towards that end, the Central Committee, after a 
short debate during the first week of April, made public 
its 24,000-word Action Program entitled "Czechoslovakia's 
Road to Socialism" with the declared aim to form the new 
political line and announce the measures designed to 
insure citizen rights and freedoms. Although the Action 
Program was "an eclectic document" which "left a great 
deal to be concretely determined in future laws and 
11 
measures", " it nevertheless presented an unprecedented 
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array of reformist policies: 
-- It guaranteed the freedom of assembly, speech, and 
movement of all citizens (travel abroad was now a 
right and not a privilege); 
-- It promised the rehabilitation of all the victims of 
judicial injustice; 
-- It recognized the urgent need for economic reform in 
order to stimulate rapid growth; 
-- It announced measures to curb the powers of the 
secret police and to separate state from public 
security functions; 
-- It urged the recognition of legal rights to 
opposition parties; 
-- It reiterated Czechoslovakia's commitment to a strong 
friendship with the Soviet Union and the rest of the 
socialist world but on the basis of sovereignty and 
equal rights; 
-- It recognized the need for peaceful coexistence with 
the advanced capitalist states; 
-- And it pledged to rid Czechoslovakia of the last 
vestiges of its Stalinist past. 12 
While the publication of the Action Program came as the 
official recognition that Dubcek and his supporters were 
committed to irrevocable reform, the general nature of its 
announcements served a two-pronged purpose: To help ease 
the pressure for wider changes at an accelerated pace, and 
to reassure the conservative faction that no universal 
purge was under way. At the same time, however, it also 
demonstrated 
the contradictory tendencies of the leadership 
--its desire to continue along the chosen path 
to reform as well as its reluctance to take 
decisive action to break the back of potential 
resistance within the party. 13 
On 4 May, Dubcek, leading a Czechoslovak delegation 
that included President Svoboda, Prime Minister Cernik, 
and conservative presidium member Vasil Bilak, visited 
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Moscow "to explain matters further" and to listen to the 
expression of Soviet fears about the "'anti-socialist' 
14 
excesses" apparently occurring in his country. During 
the talks, Dubcek finally bowed to Soviet pressure and 
agreed to allow Warsaw Pact '-'Staff maneuvers" to take 
place in Czechoslovakia in June -- something which he had 
steadfastly refused to do earlier because he felt that 
such military exercises did not coincide with his view of 
"noninterference" in Czechoslovakia's affairs. That the 
CPCS leader agreed on this occasion must have been 
prompted by his increasing concern about Soviet intentions 
(and diminishing patience) and by the ongoing political 
15 
debate within the CPCS itself. 
Against this background, the CPCS Central Committee 
met on 1 June in order to chart the least hazardous path 
for the reform movement and ensure that Moscow received 
adequate assurances as to Czechoslovakia's continuing road 
to socialism. Thus, the five-point resolution adopted at 
the plenary session was an attempt to tone down the 
proclamations of the Action Program and project an image 
of unity and friendship with the Soviet Union. The 
resolution stated 
that the leading role of the Party should be 
ensured; that the development of socialism 
should be safeguarded, with the freedom of 
workers and all working people; that the new 
political system should be consistent with the 
development of socialism; that all attempts at 
violating the legal order and disrupting the 
state apparatus should be opposed; and that the 
relations of Czechoslovakia, with the Soviet 
Union, the other socialist countries and the 
world communist movement should be further 
developed, based on the principles of 
internationalism. 16 
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Simultaneously with this resolution, the Central Committee 
announced a party extraordinary congress for 9 September 
to review the new policies, including a new constitution, 
and the program for economic development. These 
announcements coincided with the first ominous signal of 
how the Warsaw Pact "allies" planned to insure 
Czechoslovakia's adherence to the socialist path: on 1 
June it was also announced that a Warsaw Pact "Command 
staff", headed by Russian General Kazakov, had arrived in 
Prague to prepare the June maneuvers agreed upon by Dubcek 
17 
during his Moscow visit. 
By July, it was obvious that neither Dubcek's 
reassurances nor the caution expressed by the CPCS Central 
Committee could satisfy Moscow and the rest of the Warsaw 
Pact. What must have particularly alarmed the Kremlin and 
the Warsaw Pact leaders was the final abolition of 
censorship which the Czechoslovak government enacted into 
law during the last week in June. According to the new 
law, "any intervention against the freedom of word and 
image and their dissemination by means of newspaper, 
18 
television, and radio" was forbidden --which in effect 
meant that state censors had lost all their pre- as well 
as post-publication powers. 
Immediately upon the abolition of censorship, and 
while Warsaw Pact forces maneuvered inside Czechoslovakia 
pursuing their "routine" military exercises, a statement 
entitled "2,000 Words to Workers, Farmers, Scientists, 
Artists, and Everyone", composed by progressive writer 
Ludvik Vaculik and carrying the signatures of numerous 
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intellectuals and workers, appeared in a number of 
19 
newspapers on 27 June. Charging that "this moment of 
hope... is still threatened" and that "fears have been 
recently expressed that the process of democratization has 
stopped", the statement emphasized that the pace of reform 
from above was slow, that more action on the part of the 
people themselves was needed to complete the "retirement" 
of those party functionaries who still espoused pre- 
January ideals, and that there was a "possibility that 
foreign forces may interfere with our internal 
development". 
The response to this manifesto, if not entirely 
unpredictable, was an unpleasant jolt for all less patient 
reformists. The "2,000 Words", although "moderate and 
practical both in tone and content, demanding nothing more 
(and even less) than that which had already been demanded 
20 
on many public platforms" aroused strong condemnation 
from various CPCS and government leaders and was even 
21 
branded "an open appeal for counterrevolution". Its 
signatories came under attack and threats of legal 
sanctions were leveled against them. Although such an 
outburst did appear to be the outcome of genuine 
counterreformist tendencies within the CPCS Central 
Committee, it would be fairer to say that, with Soviet 
troops delaying their departure after the end of the 
Warsaw Pact exercises on 2 July, Dubcek and his supporters 
had little choice but to try to placate Moscow by 
disassociating themselves, at least verbally, from the 
22 
producers of such "inflammatory" literature. 
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The final phase before the Soviet invasion on 21 
August was marked by increasing friction between the CPCS 
and the rest of the Warsaw Pact as Czechoslovakia's 
"allies" became visibly restless over democratization. On 
10 July it was announced that the government of 
Czechoslovakia had formally rejected Soviet demands for 
guarantees that the democratization "will not go too far". 
According to the CPCS Central Committee, the decision to 
reject the Soviet note was based on the simple fact that 
"nothing" had happened to justify Moscow's and the rest of 
the Warsaw Pact's anxiety and, therefore, there was 
23 
nothing which required an explanation. 
With his latest attempt to bring the CPCS leaders to 
a conference involving all "concerned allies", Secretary 
Bhrezhnev responded with a Warsaw Pact meeting held in 
Warsaw on 14-16 July which took place without any 
Czechoslovak representatives. At its conclusion, the 
participants, having agreed that the reform movement in 
Czechoslovakia was a menace to the unity and security of 
the socialist world, dispatched an open letter of warning 
-- which was immediately dubbed the 'Warsaw Letter'-- to 
the CPCS leadership. Noting that "the developments in 
your country have aroused profound anxiety among us", the 
five Warsaw conferees continued: 
---the reactionaries' offensive... threatens to 
push your country off the path of socialism and, 
consequently, imperils the interests of the 
entire socialist system... 
---we cannot assent to hostile forces pushing 
your country off the path of socialism... This 
is no longer your affair alone. It is the 
common affair of all communists... united by 
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alliance, cooperation, and friendship. It is 
the common affair of our countries which have 
united in the Warsaw Pact... 
Each of our parties bears a responsibility... to 
the international working class and the world 
communist movement... 
This is why we believe that it is not only your 
task but ours to deal a resolute rebuff to the 
anticommunist forces and to wage a resolute 
struggle for the preservation of the socialist 
system in Czechoslovakia. 24 
The "Warsaw Letter" was the most explicit statement 
that Moscow's tolerance of its wayward Prague "comrades" 
was running thin. Instead, however, of eliciting a signal 
of compliance from the CPCS Central Committee, the Warsaw 
ultimatum triggered another respectful but firm reply from 
Prague--a clear indication that the "Dubcekites" still 
refused to be intimidated. The CPCS response rejected the 
accusation that it was losing control of the internal 
situation and expressed surprise at the anxiety of the 
other socialist countries. It painstakingly listed all 
the measures taken to strengthen Czechoslovakia's 
socialist system, it reiterated the CPCS's desire to 
continue friendly relations with all "fraternal" communist 
parties, and concluded in a conciliatory note: 
We do not want our relationships to continue 
worsening and we are willing on our side to 
contribute to the calming of the situation... 
We expect, however, that the other parties will 
aid these efforts of ours and will express 
understanding for our situation. 25 
From the Soviet standpoint, this was clearly an 
unsatisfactory turn of events and hence the Czechoslovak 
leaders came under renewed pressure to meet with their 
"allies" for further talks. Dubcek, having successfully 
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evaded being pinned down for a multilateral Warsaw Pact 
conference until then, was again able to avoid a congress 
of all Warsaw Pact members--at least briefly. This time, 
however, he was forced to agree to a bilateral meeting 
with the Soviet leadership which was held on 2 August at 
the East Slovak village of Cierna-nad-Tisou just across 
26 
the border from the Soviet Union. During the brief 
encounter that took place in the village railway station 
building, it became clear that the Soviets had indeed 
accepted the bilateral talks in order to browbeat the 
Czechoslovak delegation into a broader conference. Having 
been outflanked by this Soviet move, Dubcek could only 
agree to meet with the rest of his "partners" but under 
the condition that the conference, to convene at the city 
of Bratislava on 3 August, was not going to discuss the 
27 
Czechoslovak internal situation. The joint communique 
that followed Bratislava made indeed no direct reference 
to the "anti-socialist" forces operating inside 
Czechoslovakia, although there was little departure from 
28 
the standard phraseology dictated by Moscow. 
In the two weeks between Cierna/Bratislava and the 
invasion, both Marshal Tito and President Ceausescu of 
Rumania visited Prague to demonstrate their solidarity to 
Dubcek's independent stance. Their visits were coupled 
with a brief visit by East Germany's Walter Ulbricht whose 
reception, unlike the receptions for the Yugoslav and 
Rumanian representatives, unfolded in a frosty atmosphere. 
After a brief conference, the East German party leader 
stated that the purpose of his visit was to discuss 
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"economic matters" with his hosts--although issues 
pertaining to "bourgeois ideology" and the Czechoslovak 
"experiment" had also received some attention. 
Meantime, the Soviet press, after a brief lull in 
late July-early August, resumed- its polemics against 
liberalization. On 18 August, two days before the 
invasion, Pravda carried yet another attack against the 
"antisocialist forces" trying to destroy the "foundations 
of the socialist system in Czechoslovakia" and warned that 
29 
"the enemies' schemes are doomed to failure". Within 
forty eight hours troops drawn from the Soviet Union, 
Hungary, Poland, East Germany, and Bulgaria began the 
massive invasion which brought the brief but bright 
"Prague Spring" to an abrupt and permanent conclusion. 
The Anatomy of the Intervention Decision 
Unlike Hungary where the political situation reached 
an explosive point in the span of only three weeks, 
political developments in Czechoslovakia followed a 
notably slower pace. Until 1967-68, Czechoslovakia gave 
no indication of becoming a major threat to the stability 
of the communist bloc and thus caught little Soviet 
attention. Enjoying a measure of prosperity, thanks to 
its industrial base, and with a solidly Stalinist regime, 
Czechoslovakia, even after Khrushchev's "Secret Speech", 
remained calm and seemingly apathetic to the wind of de- 
Stalinization sweeping Eastern Europe. Such was the 
entrenched power of the Novotny apparat that Prague 
refrained from any changes in its internal policies 
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despite Moscow's willingness to see the Stalinist past 
quietly buried. This picture of undisputed control, which 
Novotny was able to project thanks to his oppressive rule, 
masked the intra-party activities of the progressive group 
and left the impression that no effective opposition to 
the Novotny-dominated presidium could indeed take shape or 
cause any discomfort to the ruling faction. 
Against this background, it can be reasonably assumed 
that Moscow was not alerted to the full scale of the anti- 
Stalinist feeling in Czechoslovakia until Novotny's 
position became untenable in December 1967. At that time, 
Brezhnev's visit to Prague must have convinced the 
Russians that, given Novotny's weakened position within 
the CPCS and the widespread popular dissatisfaction with 
the incumbent autocrat, it was only sensible to allow his 
political demise. Moscow's apparent abandonment of such a 
devoted comrade raised few eyebrows. The need for 
domestic reform was obvious if only to revive the sluggish 
economy and boost faith in the CPCS as the "vanguard of 
the working class". Novotny's obstinate presence had to 
be removed--if Czechoslovakia was to avoid popular unrest 
similar to that which had almost toppled communist rule in 
Hungary and had threatened it in Poland. Dubcek, on the 
other hand, satisfied the Soviet leaders as both a popular 
party figure, with an impeccable reputation for hard work, 
30 
and a good Marxist with a thorough Soviet education. To 
underline its approval, Moscow greeted his January 
election to the post of First Secretary with an unusually 
warm congratulatory telegram from Brezhnev. 
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Yet Dubcek's appointment carried implications which 
the Soviet politburo had failed to appreciate fully. A 
young man, in comparison to the leaders of most 
"fraternal" parties, the new CPCS leader brought with him 
a distinct style of leadership which stressed cooperation 
rather than coercion as the foundation of political life. 
In public, Dubcek was "a simple but effective speaker, who 
31 
projected warmth and friendliness", qualities which 
immediately earned him the confidence and approval of not 
only party workers but citizens at large as well. It also 
brought into sharp relief the difference between him and 
his rigid predecessors, not to mention the grey clusters 
running Czechoslovakia's neighbouring "allies". Because of 
the genuine popularity he enjoyed, Dubcek became the key 
figure in Czechoslovakia almost overnight. Although his 
effort to unite the CPCS Central Committee behind his 
reformist propositions during the following months was 
going to be unsuccessful, in early 1968 the wave of change 
he had initiated seemed irreversible. 
During January-February, the Kremlin leaders must 
have realized that Dubcek's views on internal reform and 
foreign policy, given his personal appeal and the apparent 
disarray of the anti-reformist opposition, were to be the 
moving forces behind Czechoslovakia's future course. 
During this early period, the new Czechoslovak leader was 
presumably given the benefit of the doubt even by those 
Soviet politburo members who may have seen his moderation 
as a possible sign of sympathy vis-a-vis the "anti-party 
clique". Hence, it was a rather uncomfortable Brezhnev 
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who, on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the 1948 
Czechoslovak communist coup, shared the platform with 
Dubcek only to listen to the CPCS First Secretary call for 
the rethinking of the party's role in light of "the new 
conditions created by the reform" in order to find 
32 
solutions to Czechoslovakia's "burning problems". This 
must have been an unwelcome message in Soviet ears coming 
from Novotny's "safe" successor. Official admission that 
the party line was in need of "rethinking" could only 
further encourage the kind of public debate on ideological 
and political issues the Soviets had never tolerated-- 
either inside the Soviet Union or within their Eastern 
European sphere. 
Indeed, there were already strong signs that Dubcek's 
brief tenure promoted the freedom to criticize state 
policies, the party itself, and the country's relations 
with the socialist world. Although official statements 
remained scrupulously moderate, the relaxation of 
censorship was an "unprecedented experiment of, granting 
33 
the population far-reaching freedom"; and it resulted in 
an avalanche of candid press reporting on both domestic 
and international issues. Turmoil among the lower ranks 
of the CPCS increased and debates on past excesses 
revealed a desire for genuine change which focused, 
naturally, on those pro-Soviet elements that had thrived 
during Novotny's totalitarian rule. Above all, however, 
the resurgence of dissident intellectual opinion, with its 
vocal criticism of party corruption and nepotism, 
signified the most alarming break with the country's 
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orthodox communist past. 
Thus, by early spring, Moscow's willingness to 
refrain from interference in Czechoslovakia's peaceful 
experiment must have been wearing thin. Several factors, 
similar in many ways to those that had nagged the-Kremlin 
during the Hungarian crisis, must have contributed to the 
decision to see the Czechoslovak "revisionists" defeated 
in their effort to drag their country to "counter- 
revolution": 
-- Genuine democratization in Czechoslovakia could only 
lead to erosion of single-party rule and the 
emergence of "reactionary" political formations 
prepared to oppose Czechoslovakia's continuing 
participation in the Warsaw Pact and "fraternal" 
relations with the Soviet Union. 
-- Loss of control over the Prague regime could 
seriously undermine Moscow's leading position within 
the socialist camp and jeopardize Russian efforts to 
prevail over Peking's ideological challenge. 
-- A neutralist Czechoslovak government could cause 
penetration of the East European Soviet security zone 
by the West German "revanchists" and their American 
allies, and advance NATO plans to eventually 
undermine the post-war European status quo. This 
Soviet assessment obtained particularly sharp relief 
because of "an almost irrational fear of increasing 
West German economic and political influence" in 
Eastern Europe and the belief that this was only a 
34 
preliminary move in the "revanchist" conspiracy. 
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-- Success of the Dubcek "clique" could trigger a chain 
reaction in other Eastern European countries with 
unforeseen consequences for Soviet control over its 
satellites. 
-- Last but not least, the emergence of a pluralistic 
political structure within a fellow socialist state 
could further encourage "bourgeois" tendencies among 
dissident Soviet intellectuals and create an 
undesirable debate about increased freedom within the 
Soviet Union itself. 
At Dresden, in late March, Soviet anxiety over 
Dubcek's policies was translated for the first time into 
open disapproval of the reform movement. Seconded by an 
uneasy East German delegation, the Soviet leaders 
apparently communicated to their Czechoslovak counterparts 
that the Soviet Union (and the rest of the Warsaw Pact) 
"worried" about the developments in Czechoslovakia. To 
underline Soviet concern, Brezhnev made an explicit offer 
of sending Soviet troops to Czechoslovakia in order to 
35 
assist the CPCS in retaining control over the situation. 
As it turned out, the meeting failed to produce any 
spectacular change of mind in Prague. But Dresden 
established the Moscow tactic of collective pressure upon 
Dubcek which was to continue until days before the 
invasion. 
During the period from April to June, Soviet 
apprehension increased proportionally to the proposed 
reform measures debated in Czechoslovakia. The April 
Action Program, although it reaffirmed with no apparent 
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hesitation the socialist principles guiding the CPCS, was, 
in Soviet eyes, a particularly disturbing document (the 
proposition to give support to 'the realistic forces in 
the German Federal Republic', for example, must have 
36 
struck-a raw Soviet nerve). If nothing else, the Action 
Program confirmed that the anti-reformists were losing the 
debate battle inside the CPCS and could hardly block 
Dubcek's way towards further democratization, let alone 
impose their Soviet-dictated views on their party comrades 
and the Czechoslovak people. In simple power terms, the 
rapidly declining political fortunes of the pro-Moscow 
elements reduced Soviet leverage inside Czechoslovakia to 
dangerous levels and increased the pressure on the Soviet 
leadership to take action against the "Dubcekites". 
Coming only weeks after the Action Program's 
publication, Dubcek's visit to Moscow in early May, when 
he grudgingly agreed to Warsaw Pact maneuvers inside his 
country, was far from successful in convincing the 
Russians about Czechoslovakia's stability. The Moscow 
talks, and separate meetings that followed between Dubcek 
and the leaders of East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and 
Bulgaria, neither allayed Soviet fears nor satisfied the 
rest of the Warsaw Pact allies. This fact was clearly 
demonstrated by "strong and active polemics against the 
Czechoslovak reform movement" which appeared in the Soviet 
and East European media immediately after Dubcek's visit 
to the Kremlin and which attacked a variety of 




While the May developments brought military 
intervention closer, there was still the question of 
devising suitable "threats" to justify a military move 
against the "counterrevolutionaries". The continuation 
of spontaneous public activity in Czechoslovakia added to 
the Soviet fears of an impending uncontrollable crisis 
but, in contrast to what the Soviets expected (or perhaps 
wished for), failed to produce violence or other incidents 
which could double as excuses for suppressing the 
Czechoslovak reformers. In fact, the unfolding of events 
in Czechoslovakia had followed a consistent path which 
served Soviet purposes poorly. 
First, despite continuing political turmoil, there 
was no armed revolt against the country's communist rulers 
or any indication that one was imminent. Although, from 
the Kremlin's point of view, the Dubcek reforms created a 
clearly unacceptable political debate within 
Czechoslovakia, it was also undeniable that the 
confrontation between the progressive and conservative 
groups was confined to crossing pens rather than swords in 
the arena of public media. Moreover, the reformist 
measures did not include liquidation of prominent Novotny 
supporters and Dubcek, eager to promote his policy of 
consensus over confrontation, neither supported nor 
encouraged violent reprisals against lower-level 
functionaries associated with the previous regime. 
Second, this rather benign atmosphere coupled with 
Dubcek's own deliberate and patient approach to the 
program for democratization (in addition to his 
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painstaking efforts to reassure his "allies" about 
developments in Czechoslovakia) deprived Soviet propaganda 
of villains. Throughout the crisis Moscow could exploit 
neither of the focal points which had played such a 
crucial role during the Hungarian crisis: The existence of 
a violent opposition to communist rule, ultimately 
manifested in popular armed rebellion, and the presence of 
a prominent figure like Imre Nagy who, although opposed 
as much as Dubcek to a revolution, found himself, by 
commission or omission, in the forefront of the "thugs and 
bandits" seeking "return to capitalism". 
Third, the reformist movement was far from anti- 
communist and indeed went into pains to proclaim its 
socialist foundations (unlike the Hungarian freedom 
fighters whose aims were, at best, unclear). While Dubcek 
went ahead with his declared overhauling of the CPCS and 
of unpopular domestic policies, there was still no 
decisive sign that he was indeed about to scrap the 
existing system and replace it with a truly pluralistic 
framework. 
Under such conditions--among which the Russians could 
hardly find the "threat" allowing them to create the 
excuse for a military move against the "counter- 
revolutionaries"--the invasion option carried a risky and 
even damaging potential. This fact was especially 
recognized by the "noninterventionist coalition" within 
the Soviet leadership which included such sceptics as 
Kosygin, Suslov, Ponomarev, and the latter's deputy, V. 
38 
Zagladin. Their reluctance to sanction sending the 
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tanks against the Dubcek government was based on several 
39 
considerations. According to Professor Lowenthal: 
-- Many communist parties could reject Moscow's guidance 
and refuse to accept the use of force against another 
socialist country; 
-- rejection could be particularly strong among Western 
European communists whose commitment to "peaceful 
change" through the ballot box left little hope for 
blanket approval of an invasion; 
-- Russian troops marching into "the heart of Europe" 
could strengthen NATO and jeopardize any dialogue 
with the United States; and, 
-- the Czechoslovaks could resist triggering reactions 
in Hungary, Poland, and even East Germany, with 
incalculable risks for the health of the Warsaw Pact 
and the Soviet position in Eastern Europe. 
The sceptics might have retained their misgivings had 
the publication of the "2,000 words" manifesto not given 
support to the case of those in favour of drastic measures 
against Prague. This document which, according to one 
Soviet source, sought "to nullify all socialist gains of 
the Czechoslovak people [and] to subvert the friendship 
between the Czechoslovak people and the peoples of the 
40 
fraternal socialist states" left little room for debate. 
Its tone and content were proof-- or, at least, they were 
interpreted as such--that the "Dubcekites" had 
sufficiently "subverted" the socialist system in 
Czechoslovakia and now threatened to turn the country into 
a breakaway. By the end of June, therefore, the Soviet 
319 
leaders must have found themselves in relative harmony 
41 
over the question of military intervention. 
The arrival of internal consensus on the ultimate 
sanctions against Czechoslovakia did not prevent Moscow 
from increasing, once again, its psychological pressure on 
the Dubcek regime. This was most likely a last-ditch 
effort to prod the Czechoslovak leaders back to their 
senses by confronting them with the full might of the 
Soviet propaganda machine. Throughout July, this campaign 
to sap the morale of the Czechoslovak leaders took a dual 
form: almost daily virulent Soviet press attacks against 
the reform movement; and political maneuvers to convince 
Prague that its experiments had become an unacceptable 
liability soon to cause "corrective" action by its 
"allies". Moscow's menacing posture was underlined by the 
delay in the withdrawal of Warsaw Pact troops which, on 20 
July, had apparently completed their exercises inside 
Czechoslovakia. It was only after strong representations 
by the Czechoslovak government to General Yakubovskii, 
Soviet commander of the Warsaw Pact, that the troops began 
to withdraw without, however, dispelling the impression 
42 
that a "mini-invasion" had already occurred. 
The last confrontation, before the invasion, between 
the Soviet and Czechoslovak leaders took place during the 
Cierna/Bratislava meetings. For Czechoslovakia, these 
talks were a "stay of execution" rather than an added 
opportunity to attempt dissuading its "allies" from 
invading its territory. Soviet troop movements along the 
Czechoslovak-Soviet frontier and reports of Soviet units 
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stationed in East Germany moving towards Czechoslovakia 
formed the backdrop to this final act. 
Conclusion 
In the aftermath of the invasion, the Kremlin 
continued to justify the "temporary" measures against 
Czechoslovakia on the grounds of "collective defence" of 
socialism against internal "bourgeois threats". This line 
of reasoning eventually crystallized into the so-called 
Brezhnev Doctrine, first expounded by S. Kovalev in Pravda 
43 
approximately one month after the invasion. 
The Brezhnev Doctrine reinforced the conclusion that 
the Soviet leadership had again drawn the line on liberal 
experiments within the "socialist commonwealth" as it had 
already done some twelve years before in Hungary. The 
invasion was also evidence that Khrushchev's successors 
were settling into a tougher, conservative, anti-reformist 
policy which reasserted Marxist rigidity over whatever 
limited freedoms had been allowed since the death of 
Stalin both abroad and at home. As one analyst poignantly 
put it: "The threat which the Kremlin was afraid of was 
not the growing influence of imperialism in 
Czechoslovakia, but the growing influence of 
Czechoslovakia in the U. S. S. R. and neighbouring 
44 
countries". 
In terms of intervention decisionmaking, the Soviets, 
as during the Hungarian crisis, seemed to defer decisions 
about a military move, and to take considerable time in 
searching for diplomatic alternatives and/or methods to 
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coerce Dubcek into changing his policies. It has thus 
been suggested that the firm consensus on military 
measures did not form until the Cierna/Bratislava 
conferences--which in effect meant that 
---it took the Politburo almost seven months to 
understand the implications of Dubcek's 
ascendancy for Czechoslovak policy and Warsaw 
Pact solidarity, to agree on a firm line of 
policy vis-a-vis the new Prague regime, and to 
decide upon a concrete course of action. 45 
In broad terms, the invasion helped achieve the 
primary Soviet aims: to neutralize the Dubcek progressive 
group and to secure Czechoslovakia's continuing obedience 
within the Eastern European Soviet buffer zone. But, in 
contrast to Budapest in 1956, where an armed revolt, 
threatening the Hungarian Communist Party with complete 
collapse, gave Moscow at least a pale measure of 
justification for sending in its tanks, the Prague Spring 
presented the Brezhnev collective with a far more 
complicated political situation. In the aftermath of the 
invasion, for example, such was the Czechoslovak 
resentment that Moscow was not even able to master an 
adequate number of collaborators into a Radar-style 
government. Dubcek had to be embarrassingly retained well 
after the invasion. It took a second, direct act of 
coercive diplomacy in 1969 to displace him and finally 





In the late evening hours of 24 December 1979, and in 
the face of an increasingly chaotic situation inside 
Afghanistan caused by universal armed resistance against 
the country's Marxist rulers, a Soviet air armada 
"involving at least 280 transports" began landing airborne 
1 
troops at Kabul international airport. This was the 
spearhead of an invasion which rapidly unfolded during the 
next few days. By 27 December, Soviet troops in the 
Afghan capital numbered approximately 8,000 men in 
2 
addition to 4,000 military advisers already "in-country". 
As this force proceeded to seize control of the government 
by deposing and executing Prime Minister Amin, four Soviet 
divisions, massed along the Soviet-Afghan border, 
descended into the country and quickly advanced towards 
Kabul and the border with Pakistan. On 28 December, 
having secured Kabul and established control over the 
Afghan army, the Soviets installed their favoured man, a 
long-time pro-Moscow communist, Babrak Karmal, as 
Afghanistan's new Prime Minister. In the ensuing six 
years of a guerrilla struggle between the Mujahidin--the 
Moslem freedom fighters--and Soviet forces "assisting" a 
decrepit Marxist regime, the initial Soviet invasion has 




The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan came as a jolt to 
Western powers and Third World states alike. On the 
surface, the Soviet action directed against a poor, semi- 
feudal country, divided by perennial struggles between its 
dozens of tribal and linguistic groups, made little sense. 
On the other hand, one had to take note of the fact that 
Soviet interest in this rugged mountainous country, far 
from being a novelty, derived directly from Tsarist 
policies which forced upon Afghanistan the role of a 
"buffer" state during imperial Russia's attempts to block 
3 
the expansion of British influence on its rimland. 
Yet, and although Moscow had continued to meddle in 
Afghanistan throughout the postwar years, Kabul did not 
become a recognized member of the "socialist community" 
until mid-1978 following a Marxist coup. Until that time, 
and since Afghanistan was not an established "fraternal" 
socialist state, the Soviets had permitted a semi- 
neutralist government, albeit' reluctantly, to steer the 
country towards modest relations with the United States 
and other Western powers. However, the invasion itself, 
and the subsequent investment of Soviet military resources 
in the continuing war against the Mujahidin, revealed a 
much higher level of Soviet interest in that rugged part 
of Southwest Asia than previously thought. 
The beginnings of the historical process that 
eventually led to the 1979 invasion can be traced back to 
the July 1973 coup which dethroned King Mohammed Zahir 
Shah and dissolved the Afghan parliamentary monarchy. 
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King Zahir was thus replaced by Mohammed Daoud who 
proclaimed the Republic of Afghanistan and sought to 
institute political and economic reforms. Daoud--and 
indeed the coup that brought him to power--received the 
support of one of the country's two main communist 
factions, the Parcham (flag, banner), led by Babrak 
Barmal. As a reward for their support, a number of 
prominent Parchamists received portfolios in the new 
government; however, Daoud, who was known for his 
political caution, denied most emphatically suggestions 
that Moscow had anything to do with the overthrow of the 
4 
monarchy. Within a year though, Parcham was slowly eased 
out of power as Daoud moved to counter claims that his 
regime had leftist leanings and to underscore his 
government's neutrality vis-a-vis "any ideological 
5 
faction". In 1977, Parcham, now deprived of its 
government participation, and the orthodox Marxist Khalq 
(people's) group, led by Noor Mohammed Taraki, agreed to 
reunite and recreate the People's Democratic Party of 
Afghanistan (PDPA), after a long period of bitter rivalry 
and out of fear of "remaining indefinitely in the 
6 
political wilderness". 
Daoud's rule, which after an initial period of 
attempted reforms came to depend heavily on political 
patronage and police methods to insure popular compliance, 
became entangled in severe economic and political 
problems. Unfulfilled promises led to growing popular 
opposition which was further aggravated by Daoud's 
antagonism with Moslem fundamentalists and disgruntled 
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army officers. On 27 April 1978, spurred into action by 
the surprise arrest of its leaders, the PDPA, whose 
organizers/agitators had campaigned aggressively to 
increase membership and penetrate the armed forces, 
staged a coup with the help of pro-communist military 
officers which overthrew and executed Daoud and 
established the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA). 
Power landed in the hands of a shadowy Armed Forces 
Revolutionary Council, under the leadership of a certain 
Colonel Qadir, although a few days later the PDPA 
leadership formed its own Revolutionary Council which 
7 
incorporated the military officers. Taraki was made 
Prime Minister and President of the Revolutionary Council, 
Barmal was named Deputy Prime Minister, and Hafizullah 
Amin, an energetic Khalq organizer who had played a 
crucial role in winning the support of army and air force 
officers, as second Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign 
8 
Minister. 
There is speculation as to the exact role Moscow 
played in the overthrow of the Daoud regime, although 
Daoud's reported leanings towards "true nonalignment", and 
a rather unpleasant visit to Moscow in April 1977 which 
revealed the Afghan leader's resentment of Soviet 
9 
domination, must have won him few friends in the Kremlin. 
It should also be noted that Soviet military advisers were 
reported joining Afghan troops in coup activities. Given 
the Soviet practice of strict political control exercised 
in similar situations, it is inconceivable that these 
Soviet officers would have acted "without prior high-level 
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10 
authorization". It is also plausible that Moscow's 
prodding was responsible for the 1977 reconciliation 
between Parcham and Khalq which united the Afghan Marxist 
movement, strengthened its opposition to Daoud, and gave a 
11 
future coup increased chances of success. 
That being said, the PDPA was far from a potent 
communist organization under tight Soviet control. 
Numbering only a few thousand, mainly urban, members in a 
country with an overwhelmingly Moslem, rural population of 
almost sixteen million, the PDPA had to tread carefully 
and in fact stage a veritable game of political deception 
which deliberately avoided identifying the party with the 
USSR--or with Marxist ideology for that matter: even after 
the coup had succeeded in toppling Daoud the PDPA 
leadership firmly denied any Soviet connection, let alone 
Soviet backing of the anti-Daoud plot: 
Taraki emphasized to Western correspondents that 
there was no party called "Communist" in 
Afghanistan, and he branded all reports that the 
PDPA was under Soviet influence or control as 
"seditious fabrications. " He called the 
neighboring Islamic states of Pakistan and Iran 
"brothers, " acknowledging no such fraternal 
bonds with the USSR. 12 
These pretensions did not last for long, however. 
Soviet presence in Afghanistan rose steeply after the 
coup, with Soviet military and "diplomatic" personnel 
arriving in droves to "assist" the Taraki regime in 
public administration and internal security. Moscow's 
diplomatic recognition of the new Kabul government was 
immediate; it was followed by the arrival of diplomatic 
envoys from the Warsaw Pact members and, for the first 
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time in Afghanistan's history of foreign relations, of an 
ambassador from Cuba. 
More significantly, in December 1978, Moscow and 
Kabul concluded a Treaty of Friendship, Good 
Neighbourliness, and Cooperation. The contracting parties 
declared "respect for national sovereignty, territorial 
13 
integrity and noninterference in each other's affairs"; 
and in Article 4, Kabul and Moscow agreed, in an ominously 
prophetic manner, that "in consultation" with each other 
they would also "take appropriate measures with the view 
of ensuring the security, independence and territorial 
14 
integrity of the two countries". Thus, "the friendship 
treaty signified that the radical transformation of 
Afghanistan would be underwritten and guaranteed by Soviet 
15 
power". 
Behind these diplomatic exchanges though, Moscow 
faced serious problems with the process of "socialist 
development" in Afghanistan. The country was not only 
pathetically primitive with no "proletariat" class worthy 
of the name according to the Marxist lexicon, but it was 
also in the hands of a divided "vanguard" party with only 
embryonic understanding of the finer points of "scientific 
socialism". Overall, the Khalqis, aside from 
their "revolutionary" fervour derived from the reading of 
a few basic Marxist texts, displayed little intellectual 
vigour necessary for a serious analysis of the Afghan 
condition. Taraki and Amin, while well versed in the 
conspiratorial tactics which led to the PDPA's rise to 
power, demonstrated no visible talents for either public 
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administration or economics; and being absorbed in their 
own infighting with the Parchamis further reduced their 
effectiveness as government leaders. Moreover, the party 
remained permeated by an "elitist" outlook which tended to 
equate the "revolution" with its own tiny membership base 
and ignored the necessity to mobilize the "working class" 
and the rural masses in support of the new socialist 
16 
state. 
Another Soviet worry stemmed from the different 
relationships which Moscow had developed over the years 
with the two PDPA factions. Khalq, dedicated to 
clandestine tactics and fiercely opposed to both the royal 
family and the Daoud regime, had followed a secretive path 
before the April coup and maintained relatively few 
"advisory" links with the Soviets. In contrast, the 
Parchamists, headed by Barmal who thrived as a public 
speaker and kept in close contact with the Soviet embassy 
in Kabul, had chosen to pursue a policy of participation 
in Afghanistan's political life, involved themselves in 
the Daoud government and became acquainted with individual 
Soviet leaders, and leaned towards an open style of 
agitation which seemed to offer better chances of building 
17 
popular support for the communist cause. 
Soon after the coup, the semblance of unity among the 
ruling Marxists, established by the 1977 reluctant 
alliance between Parcham and Khalq, fell victim to fierce 
intra-PDPA power struggles. In the course of summer 1978, 
the Khalq, through a series of purges in the armed forces 
and the state administration, succeeded in ejecting 
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Parcham from the ruling coalition and in driving Barmal to 
18 
thinly-veiled exile as ambassador to Prague. The purge 
was completed in September when Kabul dismissed the 
Parcham leaders from their ambassadorships as well and 
declared them traitors (Karmal failed to return to 
Afghanistan and settled in Eastern Europe). 
Parcham's removal from the government did not, 
however, alleviate the legitimacy problems which beset the 
communists from the outset, nor did it ease rivalries 
within Khalq itself. By late 1978, it was obvious that 
the Marxist reform programs, which the Taraki-Amin regime 
attempted to force upon the Afghanis with a sense of 
urgency exaggerated even by the standards of most neophyte 
Third World "revolutionaries", collided disastrously with 
conservative tribal customs not to mention the values and 
teachings of fundamentalist Islam. To make matters worse, 
the imposition of the reforms was carried out with 
considerable haste and harshness which resulted, among 
other things, in thousands of indiscriminate arrests, 
executions, and torture cases. Consequently, within 
months of the coup, and aroused by communist brutalities 
and the grave attacks on their Islamic way of life, 
various tribal groups, beginning with those inhabiting the 
provinces of Kunar and Paktia, began to rise spontaneously 
19 
in armed resistance against the Kabul government. 
Against this background, the post-coup purge of the 
Parchamists presented Moscow with a difficult choice: 
while it was clear that Khalq's ruthlessness and superior 
organization were winning the PDPA internal power 
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struggle, it was equally obvious that working with the 
sullen Khalq stalwarts--whose willingness to fully heed 
Soviet 'advice' was still questionable-- could turn out to 
be a serious obstacle for Moscow's interests. On the 
other hand, and despite Parcham's amicable links with the 
Kremlin, support for the Khalq, which by the autumn 1978 
had emerged as the sole government in Afghanistan, could 
not be diminished for fear of "imperialist" penetration or 
the resurgence of neutralist tendencies in Kabul. 
Faced with the dilemma of supporting the powerful 
Khalq while foregoing Karmal's personal loyalty and 
Parcham's long-standing dedication to the "Soviet model", 
the Soviets chose a middle course which seemed to resolve 
the problem--at least in the short run--and at the same 
time to preserve Moscow's image of "noninterference" in 
Afghan internal affairs. Relations with the Taraki-Amin 
regime continued without any visible signs of strain, but, 
in a subtle though crucial "background" move, those 
Parchamists exiled in Eastern Europe as "traitors" were 
immediately gathered into a "shadow cabinet" and kept 
under "Soviet patronage" in the wings for any 
20 
eventuality. 
Meanwhile, Khalq's own divisions were approaching a 
critical stage. By early 1979, Taraki's power had been 
effectively curbed by Amin who had emerged as the 
strongman behind the coup and the radical Marxist 
theoritician of the Khalq. Taraki, while retaining his 
post as President, was reduced to the role of a 
figurehead. On 27 March, five days after insurgent bands 
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had attacked and briefly held the city of Herat in what it 
turned out to be a massacre of PDPA officials and Soviet 
advisers, Amin assumed the post of Prime Minister which 
allowed him almost unlimited freedom of action in 
21 
manipulating the state apparatus. Amins elevation led 
to the concentration of power in the hands of a cabal of 
trusted cronies and in further erosion of Taraki's 
position. Amin followers were placed in sensitive posts 
within the military, the police, and the intelligence 
service giving the Prime Minister close control of these 
instruments of power and ensuring that Taraki-sponsored 
counter-plots were swiftly suppressed. Moscow did not 
welcome these developments. Amin was not trusted mainly 
because of his "questionable" educational background in 
the United States, but also because, after the April coup, 
he had "prevented the KGB's attempt to gain control of the 
security services and insisted on maintaining his party's 
22 
independent control of the army and the secret police. " 
Finally, the Taraki-Amin rivalry came to a head in 
the autumn when the Afghan President, following a visit to 
Cuba and a stopover in Moscow for "consultations" with the 
Soviet leaders, returned to Kabul with apparent plans to 
reassert his authority and liquidate the Prime Minister. 
The plan did not work as expected, however, and indeed 
backfired when, on 14 September, Amin, warned by one of 
his military insiders, escaped unscathed from a shoot-out 
in the presidential palace and responded by arresting 
Taraki whose death due to "a long illness" was announced a 
23 
few weeks later. 
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Taraki's elimination had little influence upon the 
domestic situation which continued to deteriorate despite 
efforts by Amin to win popular support by dressing the 
"revolution" in Moslem attire. Armed revolt affected all 
twenty eight Afghan provinces at various levels of 
intensity. Insurgent bands harassed army garrisons, 
attacked isolated outposts, and ambushed government 
convoys travelling between cities. The Afghan army, its 
senior officer ranks decimated by successive purges, could 
neither take control of the military situation nor 
discipline its own demoralized recruits whose performance 
against the hardened mountain tribesmen, never of high 
calibre to begin with, deteriorated steadily by the day. 
It was thus evident that the Amin regime was rapidly 
losing the fight on both the political and military 
fronts. On the eve of the Soviet invasion, the prospects 
of the "Great Saur [April] Revolution" seemed even deemer 
in the face of Amin's stubborn refusal to seek 
reconciliation with Parcham and the Taraki group whose 
followers he continued to persecute with vigour. 
The Decision to Intervene 
Examined from a historical perspective, the 1979 
invasion was far from an isolated phenomenon and should be 
perceived as yet another phase in the protracted imperial 
Russian/Soviet involvement in Afghan affairs. The 
historical element becomes especially important when one 
notes that the Soviet Union had already established a 
precedent by staging three small-scale military 
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incursions into Afghan territory in 1925,1929, and 
24 
1930. What differentiated the 1979 intervention from 
these previous Soviet forays was the assault upon and 
liquidation of the country's incumbent leader, the size of 
the intervening force, the, immediate deployment of Soviet 
troops in combat around the country, and last but not 
least, the apparent Soviet determination to continue the 
military effort until the "reaction" was either defeated 
or forced by exhaustion to the negotiations table. 
There can be little doubt that the April 1978 coup 
served Soviet purposes perfectly. For the first time in 
Afghan-Soviet relations, Afghanistan was under the 
authority of a Marxist regime which was expected to 
"accommodate" the Soviets in the same fashion as the Warsaw 
Pact "allies" and to raise a barrier across the path of 
Western influence in Southwest Asia. Moreover, a 
"fraternal" Afghanistan would offer ample strategic space 
for maneuvering Soviet military power in the proximity of 
the Arabian oilfields and the shores of the Indian Ocean. 
It was therefore imperative that the Afghan communists 
consolidated their control within reasonable time in order 
to secure Kabul in the Soviet orbit. 
Soon after the "Great Saur Revolution", however, 
Soviet hopes for a safe, secure, socialist Afghanistan 
began to fade. In an ironic twist of events, the Taraki- 
Amin regime, by virtue of its callousness, its inability 
to grasp the long-term implications of haphazard radical 
measures, and its myopic insistence on ramming social 
structures which had existed undisturbed for hundreds of 
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years, had been transformed into its own worst enemy--and 
that of Soviet interests. It is safe to assume, judging 
from the history of the initial phases in "building 
socialism" in satellite countries, that Moscow did not 
give its blessing to Khalq's general assault on 
Afghanistan's traditional Islamic customs and tribal 
practices. Indeed, the Soviet leaders, not the least 
because of Moscow's own experiences with Islamic 
populations of the Central Asian Soviet republics, must 
have been keenly aware of the disastrous effects inherent 
in such antagonistic policies--policies which ignored the 
need to expand the popular base of the "vanguard" party 
and to unite the Afghan "progressive forces" under the 
banner of the PDPA. 
In Moscow's eyes, Khalq's wave of repression at the 
first indication of unrest was as discouraging as the 
obviously miniscule following the Marxists could command 
among their own people. An equally discouraging 
development was the gradual erosion of Taraki's authority 
which shifted power into the hands of Amin and the 
dogmatic Khalq wing. Thus, the Soviets found themselves 
in the uncomfortable position of having to try and 
reconcile two essentially contradictory tasks: first, it 
was imperative to safeguard the Afghan "revolution"--which 
meant support for the PDPA regime under any circumstances; 
and, second, it was also imperative to promote moderation 
among the Kabul Marxists--which meant conflict with Amin, 
the Khalq's most powerful figure and the man who 
controlled the PDPA apparat with an iron hand. Agreement 
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on the first objective must have been unanimous, but 
Soviet patience with the second was running thin. By mid- 
1979, and after Herat provided a vivid picture of the fate 
expecting both Afghan communists and their Soviet advisers 
if the Mujahidin were allowed to gain the upper hand, 
Amin, as far as the Soviets were concerned, had failed and 
his removal from office was imperative: 
So long as he remained in charge in Kabul there 
was no hope of consolidating the grip that 
Communism had gained in Afghanistan with the 
April 1978 coup. There was, instead, the danger 
of losing it, of having the country fall into a 
chaotic anti-Communist condition. 25 
Therefore, it seems that the Politburo, anticipating 
further undesirable convolutions and wishing to maintain 
control over events in Afghanistan , initiated plans for 
military action to "save" the Afghan "revolution" sometime 
26 
in late March or early April 1979. Between April and 
October the Soviet leaders watched apprehensively as the 
Taraki-Amin duo sunk deeper into crisis. In early April, 
the Moslem guerrilla activity had increased to such a 
point, that the Soviet leaders felt necessary to dispatch 
General A. A. Yepishev, Chief of the Main Political 
Administration of the Soviet Army, for an "on-the-spot" 
inspection in Afghanistan. The Yepishev visit, carried 
out over a period of two weeks, confirmed the widespread 
deterioration of Khalqi rule and the threatened, complete 
27 
disintegration of the Afghan military. Soon after the 
Yepishev mission was completed, Vassily Safronchuck, a 
veteran Soviet diplomat, was also assigned to the Kabul 
embassy with express orders to reconcile Khalq with 
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Parcham and to devise a political strategy for combatting 
the spreading Islamic resistance--objectives which he was 
28 
though unable to accomplish. 
The first tangible indication of the invasion option 
taking shape in the Kremlin deliberations was the 
movement, in mid-summer, of elements of one Soviet rifle 
29 
division to positions inside Afghanistan. At the same 
time, an airborne battalion arrived at the Bagram air base 
30 
near Kabul "to provide airfield security" i. e. to 
establish Soviet control on the base that was to serve as 
a strategic "bridgehead" during the invasion. The summer 
deployments were followed by a three-week long 
"reconnaissance in force" in October by General I. G. 
Pavlovskii, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Ground 
Forces, "accompanied by a substantial group of Soviet 
31 
officers". The reports which the two generals 
presumably made to the Politburo must have contained 
powerful arguments in favour of a military move-- 
especially if one takes into account Yepishev's similar 
tour of Czechoslovakia before the 1968 Warsaw Pact 
invasion of that country and the fact that the general 
"had been one of the most outspoken advocates of the 
32 
military intervention". 
It is doubtful, however, that the Soviet leadership 
reached a definite consensus on exercising the military 
option until only a few weeks before 24-25 December. 
Although there is little conclusive evidence to support 
this theory, post-invasion Soviet statements about "the 
central committee and the Soviet government" acting (but 
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not deciding) together on the Afghan situation probably 
indicated 
that there was considerable debat e within the 
politburo, a division among key people about 
what to do despite later claims of leadership 
unanimity. 33 
What were the central elements of this purported debate? 
Here we can only speculate as follows: 
(a) Despite the unquestionable, from the Soviet 
perspective, place of Afghanistan within the de facto 
"security perimeter" of the Soviet Union, there must 
have been deliberation about West ern reactions to a 
large-scale military invasion of an ostensibly 
independent Third World nation in close proximity to 
the Arabian oilfields. Special attention must have 
been paid to possible American reactions and, to a 
lesser degree, to those of China. 
(b) The Islamic revolution in Iran was an additional 
source of Soviet anxiety over developments in 
Afghanistan and must have been one of the central 
themes in the Kremlin pre-invasion deliberations. 
Khomeini's not-too-happy coexistence with the Iranian 
communist party (and indeed, with all non-Islamic 
political forces), the ayatollahs' proclaimed 
intention to "expand" the Islamic revolution, and the 
fearsome fervour of the Iranian "soldiers of Allah", 
raised the spectre of some future alliance between 
Iranian fundamentalists and Afghan "counter- 
revolutionaries" which could cause immense grief to 
the Kabul Marxists. Even worse, the Iranian 
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revolution must have prompted visions of a similar 
fundamentalist government emerging in Afghanistan, if 
the PDPA regime was allowed to collapse, a 
development totally incompatible with Soviet 
interests. Although no serious challenge to a Soviet 
military move could be expected from Iran, the 
potential of a protracted 'iý had, a holy war, against 
Soviet forces was not unlikely and it must have 
attracted attention during the final assessment of 
the invasion option. 
(c) The seizure of the US embassy in Teheran must have 
figured as a particularly adverse development since 
it raised the possibility of a US military attack on 
Iran and of "imperialist" troops arriving dangerously 
close to the Afghan "reactionary bandits". In the 
end, however, the American factor must have been 
downgraded in the face of President Carter's distinct 
reluctance to engage in energetic measures against 
the Iranian mullahs, although the likelihood of 
future American military activity in the region must 
34 
have not been discounted entirely. 
(d) The invasion option might have created anxiety among 
those in the Soviet leadership who were more mindful 
of the consequences of Soviet action upon detente and 
nuclear arms negotiations. They might have pressed 
for alternative tactics such as a total cut-off of 
assistance to Amin and support of a Parchamist coup 
35 
to oust him without the presence of Soviet troops. 
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(e) Finally, another serious "cost" factor from a 
"globalist" perspective must have been the reaction 
of the nonaligned nations whose cooperation and 
goodwill the Soviet Union continued to cultivate. A 
heavy-handed Soviet reaction in Afghanistan carried 
the potential of alienating many of them or even 
driving others to the "imperialist camp". 
The invasion came to confirm that the Soviet 
leadership had at the end of the day agreed that 
Afghanistan had become an essentially military problem 
which, if left without the proper response, would have 
eventually forced the Soviet Union to guard "2,500 extra 
36 
kilometers of frontier". 
Official justifications of the invasion pointed to 
"security for socialism in Afghanistan, security for its 
socialist revolution, and ultimately security for the 
Soviet Union itself" as the primary motivation of the 
37 
Soviet actions. Shortly after the occupation of Kabul, 
Pravda accused the "imperialist circles" with a broad 
range of subversive activities against the Marxist regime 
and declared that the USSR would never allow Afghanistan 
to become a "bridgehead" of "imperialist aggression 
38 
against the Soviet Union". Amin was a CIA agent who had 
"entered into collusion with the counterrevolutionary 
39 
rabble... entrenched... in Pakistan". His "treachery 
created the threat of a counterrevolutionary takeover. 
Furthermore, there was a threat to the independence, 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Democratic 
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Republic of Afghanistan, for imperialist powers were 
40 
drawing up plans to invade and dismember Afghanistan". 
Brezhnev's own remarks reiterated the security theme and 
underlined that inactivity of the part of the USSR "would 
have meant passively watching the creation on our southern 
border of a source of serious danger to the security of 
41 
the Soviet state". As Bradsher put it: 
It is doubtful that pulling out was ever more of 
a real option than it was for the United States 
in Vietnam around 1964 or 1965.... The whole 
activist history of Soviet involvements abroad 
argued against quitting, against letting a 
Communist position once seized be relinquished, 
letting the wheel of history turn back. 42 
The Lengthening War 
In the early stages of the war, the main objective of 
the Soviet command was to secure major cities and 
provincial capitals and to control the paved roads 
connecting them. The Soviets divided the country into 
seven regional commands under the direct orders of Soviet 
generals but avoid attempting "to cover the country with 
a large expeditionary force--a move which would have been 
43 
costly and probably ineffective". Particularly intensive 
operations were waged in the areas adjoining the Soviet 
border due to fear that the unrest might spread among 
Tazhiks and Uzbeks inhabiting the neighbouring Soviet 
44 
Central Asian republics. 
In a country where the average altitude is 2,000 
meters, preparations for mountain warfare are critical, 
but the early performance of the Soviet troops indicated 
poor training and tactics--shortcomings which were soon 
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alleviated by changes in the Soviet exercise patterns and 
the introduction of the rocket-firing helicopter in the 
45 
dual role of weapons platform and troop carrier. Also, 
by the end of 1980, the great bulk of poorly conditioned 
Central Asian conscripts, who had been sent to Afghanistan 
in the hope of eliciting friendlier responses from their 
co-ethnic Afghan population, had been pulled out and 
replaced with divisions composed of tougher Russian 
46 
troops. 
In the ensuing years, Soviet military efforts to 
defeat the Mujahidin have evolved into a sophisticated 
antiguerrilla campaign which, despite localized successes, 
has been unable to eliminate the Afghan resistance. 
Although the Soviet forces enjoy the enormous advantage of 
home staging and re-supply bases across the common 
frontier of the USSR with Afghanistan, operations inside 
the latter are-severely restricted by the inhospitable 
terrain and the primitive road system. Harsh winters 
further restrict Soviet movements and produce the 
inevitable high-low activity cycles which allow the 
resistance to regroup and prepare for the next round of 
fighting. It is important to note, however, that the term 
"Afghan resistance" hardly implies a united movement 
against the Soviet occupation. The Mujahidin, apart from 
being poorly armed and trained, remain historically 
divided by century-old tribal feuds, the cause against the 
Soviets and their Kabul puppets apparently an inadequate 
47 
incentive to unite in the face of the common enemy. 
To date, Soviet commanders "have pursued a strategy 
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of consolidating their control of the urban areas and the 
major transportation and logistics networks of the 
country, while denying any significant or lasting gains to 
48 
the mu_iahidin". Ambushing Mujahidin supply columns and 
staging camps has become a common- tactic; heliborne 
assaults have also increased in an effort to gain tactical 
surprise and avoid movement through treacherous mountain 
49 
passes. Although the number of combat engagements where 
Soviet troops take the initiative has risen since 1980, 
the Soviets have consistently sought to minimize their 
casualties. They avoid exposure outside fortified 
positions, delegate much of the fighting to the Afghan 
army, and increasingly rely on air power, and especially 
the Mi 24 helicopter gunship, to attack guerrilla bands 
50 
and to disrupt their supply network. The Mujahidin have 
been unable to obtain a steady supply of modern 
antiaircraft weapons, such as shoulder-launched surface- 
to-air heat-seeking missiles, and "as a result, the 
Soviets are able to operate with virtual impunity in the 
51 
air, precluding any lasting mujahidin gains". 
Mastery of the air, however, has not entirely solved 
Soviet problems in battling the hardened Afghan tribesmen 
whose advantages mainly lie with intimate knowledge of the 
terrain and a natural inclination towards mountain 
guerrilla warfare. Moving through valleys without first 
"sweeping" the ridges overlooking them can still be a 
dangerous exercise even for heavily armoured Soviet 
columns, as the bitter fighting in the Panjshir valley has 
demonstrated. The Mujahidin regularly mine roads and 
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bridges, a tactic to which the Soviets, in the absence of 
a more effective response, have reacted by 
indiscriminately bombing villages and even towns near 
52 
roads. 
In the long term, unless they decide to multiply 
their troop strength substantially and commit themselves 
to multibattalion thrusts similar to the American "search- 
and-destroy" operations in Vietnam, the Soviets may face 
a deadlock akin to that confronted by the British army in 
its efforts to pacify the Afghan tribes during the better 
part of the 19th century. Until now, the prospect of 
climbing casualties seems to have acted as a deterrent to 
such escalatory measures, with Soviet troop strength 
increasing only moderately since the opening months of the 
53 
war to 110,000-115,000. Although accurate statistics are 
unavailable, reliance on air power and other modern 
weaponry, as opposed to troop-intensive tactics, appears 
to have succeeded in keeping Soviet casualties at 
relatively low levels while inflicting ten times as many 
54 
casualties upon the Mujahidin. 
Prospects for the Future 
A complete withdrawal of the Soviet "limited military 
contingent" from Afghanistan is not likely in the near 
future unless drastic diplomatic decisions, involving 
neighbouring Pakistan, the United States, the Afghan 
resistance, and the Kabul regime, can be reached. 
Moscow's predicament is complicated by the total failure 
of the Kabul government to gain support in the 
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countryside--'which prompted one observer to quip that 
Afghanistan is now a good example of socialism in one 
55 
town' --the tenacity of the Mujahidin, and its own 
apparent unwillingness for a full-scale military 
commitment which results in the prolongation of the 
military deadlock. Karmal's dismissal from the post of 
General Secretary of the PDPA in May 1986, and his 
subsequent resignation from the largely symbolic 
56 
presidency for "health reasons", proved that, even in 
the world of the hopelessly fragmented Afghan politics, 
the persistent "image of being a Russian puppet" can 
potentially defeat any Soviet effort to create an 
57 
acceptable "fraternal" government in Kabul. 
Karmal's replacement, Dr. Mohammed Najibullah, chief 
of the KHAD secret police, has a reputation for 
ruthlessness as well as for "getting the job done". 
Immediately upon his appointment, Najibullah criticized 
the PDPA's "lack of energetic action" which resulted in 
the Afghan Marxists becoming "poor practitioners" of 
"revolutionary" ideology and failing to establish 
"ideological influence on certain strata of the 
58 
population". His elevation, therefore, may indicate a 
toughening of the Soviet attitude which, when combined 
with persistent signs of the Soviet troops literally 
"digging in" (as, for example, the building of permanent 
bases, storage facilities, a new bridge across the Oxus 
river on the Afghan-Soviet border, and paving of strategic. 
roads) argue against any negotiated settlement until, if 
ever, Moscow deems the "reaction" as defeated. 
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Moscow's position on troop withdrawal has hardly 
changed since 1980 and remains hinged on the dogged 
assertion that "the forces of the past would hardly be 
able to hinder the onward march of the new had it not been 
for the direct interference in Afghanistan's affairs by 
59 
imperialist circles headed by the United States". The 
continuing presence of the Soviet "limited military 
contingent" is in fact blamed directly on Washington. As 
Likutov wrote: 
---by continuing to give material and moral 
backing to the Afghan counterrevolution Washing- 
ton seeks to make sure that the external threat 
to Afghanistan remains and that as a result the 
Soviet military contingent whose task is to 
repel this threat stays on in Afghanistan. 60 
On the other hand, the Soviets have avoided rejecting 
outright the negotiation process if only to serve their 
own long-term interests and accomplish the "sovietization" 
61 
of Afghanistan with a minimum of international friction. 
It seems therefore that Moscow's insistence that troop 
withdrawal is a strictly "bilateral issue to be discussed 
only with its Afghan client", and that "the Kabul regime 
62 
is not subject to international discussion", is a device 
designed to delay, or even frustrate, efforts at a 
meaningful accord. The prospect of such an agreement 
appears even deemer when juxtaposed to the fiercely anti- 
Soviet Afghan resistance and the necessity to destroy it 
before Soviet security interests can be satisfied. 
Against this background, the "proximity" talks 
between Pakistan and Afghanistan, sponsored by the United 
Nations and held on and off in Geneva since 1982, comprise 
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the only platform utilized by the Soviets for cautious 
diplomatic maneuvering. The talks have often 
bQýn'ý{ek 
r- 
because Moscow has repeatedly charged "that the undeclared 
war that imperialism has unleashed against the Democratic 
Republic of Afghanistan is being waged primarily from 
63 
Pakistani territory", and Pakistan has countered by 
insisting on Soviet troop withdrawal as a pre-condition 
for negotiations. 
Any significant move towards peace will depend, 
therefore, on the emergence of a formula which will allow 
Soviet "good will" moves coupled with Pakistani pressures 
on the resistance to accept some form of cease-fire 
agreement until an all-party conference (including the 
Kabul government) can be arranged. Statements made during 
Secretary Gorbachev's visit to India at the end of 1986 
might indeed be signs of Soviet willingness to negotiate, 
for the first time, future "principles" of a troop 
64 




The global security system has been seriously 
affected by changes which mainly occurred during the last 
two decades. While these changes have effectively eroded 
the strict bipolar world model, the two superpowers 
continue to play the central role in the ultimate survival 
of the international system. The complexity of the 
superpower competition is such, and the number of 
variables which enter the "global" assessment so 
extensive, that the "broad picture" of the present 
"balance" is, at best, the result of educated guessing, 
and at worst, the outcome of propaganda exercises waged 
for political purposes. Thus, this study chose to focus 
on only a small segment of the superpower competition 
spectrum, that of military intervention. 
General Conclusions from the Cases 
The six case studies we examined here reveal the 
diversity of superpower military intervention policies. 
They also demonstrate the inherent difficulties the 
analyst faces when confronted with the question of "why", 
and because of "which" specific stimuli, the choice of 
force was made. 
(A) US Intervention 
1. Korea is an example of a "limited" war which 
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nobody in Washington really wanted, or thought 
it would indeed occur in the first place. 
Discomfort about the idea of another Asian war, 
so soon after the end of the war in the Pacific, 
confused US political and military goals in 
Korea and generated poor statements of overall 
policy guidance. In addition, prevailing 
perceptions about the communist monolith 
precluded the full appreciation of nationalist 
motivations behind the North Korean invasion. 
This in turn led to overestimations of Soviet 
intentions and worries, perhaps quite undue, 
about an imminent Soviet counter-action either 
in Asia or Europe. Thus, the Chinese 
intervention in support of North Korea was 
perceived as a precursor of a Soviet "plan" that 
never materialized--with all the resultant 
strategic and operational implications. 
2. The desire to terminate the Korean "police" 
action did not prevent oscillation between a 
"total" victory concept, calling for the re- 
unification of the two Koreas under a non- 
communist government, and a "limited options" 
strategic plan which eventually reduced the 
American military effort to a defensive posture. 
As an example of how "limited" war strategies 
can defy and even defeat timetables for war 
termination--assuming that the original 
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intention of policymakers in keeping a conflict 
"limited" is to allow rapid conclusion of 
hostilities--the American intervention in Korea 
could only be compared with the tortuous way, 
three decades later, towards "Vietnamization" of 
the war in Indochina. 
3. The Vietnam intervention resembles Korea in at 
least two important aspects: first, despite the 
willingness of successive US administrations to 
increase support for the Saigon regime, US 
military presence in South Vietnam was never 
clearly rationalized in terms of a wider, 
coherent strategic concept; and, second, 
excessive pre-occupation with Soviet and Chinese 
intentions especially during the crucial period 
1965-68, which was not always entirely 
justified, frustrated military planning to the 
point where Hanoi was offered the unexpected 
bonus of a reluctant and self-limiting 
adversary. As in Korea, the US desire to 
"limit" the war did not moderate the level of 
violence, or convince the communist side as to 
the essentially "benign" US intentions provided 
Hanoi would cease its "aggression" against the 
South. 
4. The intervention in Grenada is quite dissimilar 
from the preceding two cases both in scope and 
length. It nevertheless demonstrates that the 
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traditional imperatives of containment, which 
played a significant role in decisionmaking 
during both Korea and Vietnam, are still very 
much a part of the American perception of the 
"Threat". Creating a "firebreak" against the 
proliferation of Marxist movements in Latin 
America was one of the American justifications 
for the invasion--and, without perhaps any 
question, the most important one. 
5. It is doubtful that the United States would have 
resorted to force if Prime Minister Bishop had 
succeeded in curbing his party's internal 
disputes and carried on with the "revolutionary 
transformation" of the island. Bishop's murder 
though, and the disputed threat against the 
American students in Grenada, created the excuse 
for a "law-and-order" mission which was a 
thinly-veiled intervention to neutralize a 
potential communist regime uncomfortably close 
to the American mainland. Thus, the sequence of 
warning and decision that preceded the invasion 
has triggered charges of American "opportunism" 
which, in strict legal terms, resulted in the 
violation of Grenadian sovereignty at a time 
when that island state could not have been held 
responsible for any hostile act against either 
its Caribbean neighbours or the United States 
itself. 
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6. In Korea and Vietnam, US intervention was not 
averted by the fear of Soviet counter-measures, 
but, once American troops joined the battle, 
self-regulatory tactics were imposed in order to 
minimize the risk of reaction from Moscow. In 
Grenada, such risk simply did not exist. 
(B) Soviet Intervention 
1. The Hungarian intervention was far from a 
smoothly-executed operation. In contrast to the 
popular view of the Soviet leadership being able 
to implement interventionary policies swiftly 
and effectively, thanks to the absence of the 
complex decisionmaking processes present in a 
parliamentary democracy, Hungary proved that 
centralized control does not eliminate either 
indecision or the need for consensus building 
before drastic steps are taken. The Soviet 
withdrawal after the first intervention 
demonstrated that the Soviet leaders were 
unhappy with the thought of prolonged operations 
in an environment where Soviet military power 
could not seize the initiative; and that at 
least some of them, even at that final hour, 
were willing to promote a diplomatic settlement 
over military measures. 
2. If Hungary thrust upon Moscow an armed challenge 
to communist authority, Czechoslovakia twelve 




intellectual insurrection which, potentially, 
appeared to carry an even graver threat against 
the "socialist commonwealth" than the Hungarian 
freedom fighters. Ironically, Dubcek's refusal 
to provoke the Soviets by striking a "national 
defence" posture, and by imposing upon Moscow 
the prospect of fighting to subdue an "ally", 
seemed to complicate rather than simplify the 
job of the Soviet leaders. Again, military 
intervention was decided upon after prolonged 
deliberations and only when it was fairly clear 
that Prague was not responding to "fraternal" 
warnings. 
Afghanistan resembles the two previous cases in 
that it posed, at least in Moscow's view, an 
open threat to the integrity of the Soviet 
Union's defence perimeter. In addition, 
Afghanistan's location in the middle of a 
perennially turbulent region, and the Islamic 
fervour of Kabul's opponents, gave emphasis to 
the danger of a crisis which, if allowed to get 
out of control, might become extremely difficult 
to contain. 
It is important to note that in all three cases 
the Soviet Union intervened at a time when there 
was minimum or clearly nonexistent risk of 
Western counter-intervention. The events in 
Hungary, for example, were overshadowed by the 
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Suez crisis and Czechoslovakia occurred at a 
time when the first, tentative steps of detente, 
in combination with US involvement in Vietnam, 
ensured Western noninterference. Similarly, at 
the time of the invasion of Afghanistan, 
Washington's attention was focused on the 
American hostages in Teheran and, in any case, 
American willingness to undertake military power 
projection after Vietnam was seriously 
questioned by friends and foes alike. 
Towards a Conceptual Framework 
The study of complex human activity systems, 
irrespective of their level of methodological 
sophistication and their success in analyzing relevant 
historical material, often suffer from one, perhaps 
unavoidable, shortcoming: they are unable to penetrate the 
decisionmaking "black box" sufficiently to establish 
definite links between given inputs (or policy directions) 
with desired outcomes (or policy results). 
Rational analysis of "situational" variables alone, 
while it produces a coherent picture of policymaking, is 
insufficient as a conclusive method of establishing cause- 
and-effect relationships, let alone the true motives of 
policymakers. Accounts of significant events, produced at 
a later stage and away from the stress of "crisis 
management", are rarely capable of capturing the intensity 
and sense of uncertainty which more often than not plague 
decisionmakers. 
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This is particularly true in attempting to determine, 
not to say measure, the effectiveness of specific 
interventionary strategies. For instance, to establish 
with certitude that the use of military force resulted in 
achieving system goals and long-term system stability is 
usually no more than an exercise in informed speculation. 
It is very difficult, if not entirely impossible, to 
discuss with real authority the "success" of the 
interventionary activity in question and its true, as 
opposed to the perceived, impact upon the actions of the 
target's policymakers. 
The familiar assertion that "history repeats itself" 
is a reminder of how mechanically we often view "similar" 
events, and how close we frequently are to drawing 
"lessons" which we then assume to be of universal 
applicability. A word of caution is, therefore, due 
against sweeping "predictive" statements or elevating 
"futurology" to the level of engineering science. 
As it was stated in the Introduction, the central 
thesis of this study "is that the 'incremental' methods, 
employed widely in the study of superpower use of military 
forces as instruments of policy... are of limited value in 
the construction of a conceptual framework which should 
lead to a diachronic model of superpower military 
intervention" (pp. 34-5). This conceptual framework, in 
the first instance at least, should be based on a number 
of generalizations which emerge from the discussion in 
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Chapters I and II and the conclusions drawn from the case 
studies: 
(1) There is no "cast iron" way of depicting future 
conflict or describing superpower reactions to 
unexpected crises, especially if these events are to 
disturb the stability of the "central" system 
anchored in the strategic relationship between the 
superpowers and the opposing NATO/Warsaw Pact 
alliance systems. 
(2) Given the presence of nuclear weapons, "formal" or 
"total" war between advanced industrialized states, 
which carries the potential of nuclear escalation, 
has become a highly undesirable, and as some would 
argue, totally unacceptable method of continuing 
politics by other means. 
(3) By contrast, the "periphery" of underdeveloped and 
developing countries will continue to experience 
violence both within and between states. These 
upheavals can be termed "post-colonial wars of 
redistribution" and, as the Gulf War demonstrates, 
may be lengthy festering affairs not amenable to any 
of international diplomacy's traditional methods of 
conflict resolution. 
(4) Defining specific military responses by the 
superpowers in "lesser" contingency environments, and 
developing relevant operational doctrine, will remain 
a highly ambiguous exercise because of the 
unpredictability of local conflicts, the inevitable 
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lapses in both strategic and tactical intelligence, 
and the proliferation of sophisticated conventional 
military technology. 
Having made these assumptions, we might then advance 
to the stage of attempting to relate the second-level 
model of military intervention, discussed in Chapter III, 
with projected theaters of superpower military 
intervention. Since this exercise is essentially 
experimental, "projected theaters" may be easily 
identified from a broad review of the literature 
(obviously, if this exercise is carried out at government 
policymaking level, national policy guidance and national 
security planning define such 'projected theaters' in much 
greater detail). A simple matrix showing the military 
intervention model attributes in relationship to the 
chosen theaters can then be drawn up (Fig. 1). Certain 
observations should be made in connection with this 
matrix: 
(1) The terms "effective" and "non-effective" are 
inserted to establish the relevance of military 
intervention as a response to a particular crisis in 
the indicated theater. For example, the pair 
"Aggregate Military Power--Non-effective" corresponds 
to the likely conclusion that a military "solution" 
to a specific event may be unavailable for a number 
of reasons (one such reason, which can be drawn from 
the matrix itself, may be that there is no capability 
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relationship exists in 
Encounter--Non-effective). 
(2) The matrix is intended 
the pair "Capability To 
as an iconic aid in 
deliberating the feasibility of a military 
intervention operation and constructing specialized 
structures of specific rules of engagement. 
(3) The statement in (2) means in effect that this 
exercise is not "complete" in the sense of addressing 
all conceivable variables in an interventionary 
situation--a fundamental shortcoming which no amount 
of additional inputs can totally eliminate. As a 
result, this matrix is limited to showing whether 
existing capabilities can be applied in given 
theaters and makes no assumptions as to the intensity 
of operations or the escalation risks involved. 
This modeling effort can be further focused by 
considering a list of additional key variables which can 
influence the relationships of the matrix pairs (Fig. 2). 
This list can be drawn by analyzing the superpowers' 
declared policies in respect to specific regions, their 
military strategy and tactics applicable in "lesser" 
contingencies, the composition, structure, weapons, and 
logistics of their general purpose forces (and/or forces 
specifically 'earmarked' for distant power projection), 
and, last but not least, their past behaviour in 
intervnetionary situations, preferably through the 
"focused" comparison of case studies. 
It should be underscored that developing, magnifying 
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-- Size and military capabilities of the target 
-- Availability of overseas bases and willingness of 
host nations to allow use of these facilities for 
interventionary activities 
-- Projected size of interventionary force 
-- Projected composition of interventionary force (e. g. 
primarily 'special' forces as opposed to regular 
general purpose forces) 
-- Long-range projection capabilities "in being" (naval, 
air) 
-- The nature of the target's physical enviroment 
-- The nature of the cause of intervention (e. g. support 
of local government against insurgents, rescue 
operation) 
-- Projected costs of the operation 
-- Projected duration of the operation 
-- The organization of military command authority 
-- Political and combat intelligence 
-- Manpower constraints 
Fig. 2--A List of Key Variables To Be Used in Conjuction 
With the Military Intervention Matrix (*) 
(*) Not necessarily in order of importance. 
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and manipulating the matrix can be best achieved with the 
use of computers utilizing, if possible, custom-designed 
expert-system software. However, if the "in-house" 
software development capability is limited, and the 
research is being carried out by largely nonprofessional 
computer users, "off the self" software is obviously the 
alternative solution. If such is the case, currently 
available relational databases, with report-generating 
functions, and professional graphics and design programs 
offer reasonably structured environments for carrying out 
this project. 
Model Applicability 
The matrix thus developed can be applied in the 
analysis of specific interventionary actions, as well as 
in examining the long-term possibility of superpower 
military incursion into "regional" theaters (e. g. the 
Persian Gulf). It can also be modified, as in Fig. 3, to 
serve as a comparative tool in examining action-reaction 
scenarios in cases where there is possibility of 
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Historically, preventing the "spread of communism" 
has been the bedrock of postwar American foreign policy. 
From President Truman to President Reagan, battling 
Marxist-inspired "revolutionary" movements, and real or 
imaginary Moscow have been the propelling forces 
behind America's global security policies. The main aim 
of this contest with the "forces of totalitarianism" has 
been, first, to restrict Moscow's freedom of maneuver in 
areas outside the "stable" European theater as much as 
possible, and, second, to ensure that regimes friendly to 
the West are not threatened by communist "penetration". 
During the 1970s, however, the emergence of the 
Soviet Union as a global power with nuclear assets at 
least equal to those of the United States, and 
increasingly credible distant projection capabilities, 
allowed Moscow to assume a more assertive international 
posture. Breaching the US-imposed containment barrier, 
which had began in the 1960s, was completed thanks to a 
combination of factors: forward naval deployments, 
introduction of Soviet proxy forces, like the Cubans, into 
unstable local theaters to bolster Marxist regimes with 
extensive Soviet logistical support against internal armed 
opposition, and a greater emphasis on consistent aid-- 
military, economic, and in maintaining domestic security-- 
to Third World clients who otherwise might have fallen 
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prey to the "imperialists" or their "puppets". 
The new Soviet assertiveness has thus triggered a 
debate in the United States, and elsewhere in the West, on 
whether Moscow is now implementing a "grand strategy" 
scheme to dislocate Western interests in the Third World, 
or whether Soviet "expansionism" is an opportunistic, 
largely tactical, exercise that can be checkmated by ad 
hoc Western actions. Both scenarios have come to include 
a strong military element. For example, there is a 
tendency among many conservative Western observers to 
insist on a prompt reaction--one that must convey the 
'message' to Moscow in an unmistakable, preferably 
military, fashion--to every Soviet initiative in contested 
areas irrespective of scope or apparent goal. This view 
conveniently blurs the fact that American power in the 
aftermath of Vietnam is subject to often severe 
limitations; and fails to recognize that Soviet 
initiatives and instruments of leverage can also be 
buffeted by the unpredictability and instability of Third 
World politics. 
Such attitudes, particularly at policymaking level, 
can be sources of ill-conceived "contingency" planning and 
serious, but unnecessary, political and military risks. 
No doubt, the thinly-veiled paranoia that often underlies 
Western assessments of the Soviet "threat" is undoubtedly 
shared by many Soviet leaders versed as they are in a 
xenophobic political tradition loaded with "threats" 
descending upon the Russian motherland "from all 
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azimuths". This brings us back to a point which is 
recognized as the main undoing of East-West relations: the 
absence of trust--not a whole lot of it, but rather just 
enough to allow for meaningful negotiations and agreements 
concerning exactly these "peripheral" problems which -are 
lately blamed for much of East-West friction. 
Indiscriminate military incursions by the superpowers 
in the Third World or in their own "back yards" will 
scarcely promote bilateral trust. Although military 
muscleflexing is an unavoidable expression of national 
power, and as such it should not be realistically expected 
to vanish in the name of peaceful coexistence, its 
frequency and scope can be certainly controlled. 
The linkage between local conflicts and the worldwide 
military balance is still poorly understood and, to many 
analysts, it will remain the "great unknown" that can 
cause dangerous, and perhaps ultimately fatal, 
confrontations between the superpowers. 
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NOTES 
An Explanatory Note 
Given the length of Notes, a full first citation of 
individual sources has been included in each separate 
section of chapter notes irrespective of whether the same 
source has appeared, and been cited in full, previously. 
For example, if Adam Ulam's Expansion and Coexistence was 
first cited in Chapter I and is cited again in Chapter 
III, its first citation in Chapter III appears again in 
full form and not as "Ulam, op. cit. " as it is routinely 
done. It has been found that this method saves frequent 
referrals to the Bibliography in search of the complete 
details of a given source. 
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CHAPTER III 
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3. The complexity of the issues involved in the study of 
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challenged when the protection of human rights is at 
stake (witness the pressures for 'sanctions' against 
South Africa). For a relevant discussion see Coronwy 
J. Jones, "The Principles of Non-intervention in the 
Internal Affairs of States, With Special Reference to 
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47-9. 
49. See World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 
1981, (London: Taylor & Francis, 1981), p. 71. 
However, the transfer of major weapons systems to 
Third World countries began to decline after 1980 
mainly due to tightening budgets caused by world 
recession; see Thomas Ohlson and Michael Brzoska, 
"The Trade in Major Conventional Weapons" in World 
Armament and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook, 1984 
(London & Philadelphia: Taylor & Francis, 1984), pp. 
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CHAPTER IV 
1. Troop contributions came from Australia, Belgium, 
Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Phillipines, 
Thailand, Turkey, South Africa, and the United 
Kingdom. In addition, Denmark, Italy, India, and 
Sweeden contributed field medical units. 
2. Not to mention 300,000 South Korean and one-and-a 
half to two million Chinese and North Korean battle- 
related casualties--in addition to perhaps four 
million civilian casualties in both Koreas; see 
Harold Hakwon Sunoo, America's Dilemma in Asia: The 
Case of South Korea (Chicago: Nelson Hall, 1979), p. 
95; see also the tables of battle casualties in 
Appendix C in David Rees, Korea: The Limited War 
(London: Macmillan, 1964), pp. 460-61. 
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of the Japanese empire see C. I. Eugene Kim and Han- 
Kyo Kim, Korea and the Politics of Imperialism, 1876- 
1910 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1967) and, also, Han Woo-keun, The 
History of Korea, trans. Lee Kyung-shik, ed. Grafton 
K. Mintz (Seoul: The Eul-Yoo Publishing Co., 1970), 
pp. 361-492. 
4. For background in regard to American policy towards 
Korea at the end of of the Second World War and prior 
to the North Korean invasion see Mark Paul "Diplomacy 
Delayed: The Atomic Bomb and the Division of Korea, 
1945" and Stephen Pelz "U. S. Decisions on Korean 
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Policy, 1943-1950: Some Hypotheses" in Bruce Cumings, 
ed. Child of Conflict: The Korean-American 
Relationship, 1943-1953 (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 1983), pp. 67-132. 
5. The emergence of the two Korean regimes between 1945 
and 1947 is exhaustively treated in Bruce Cumings, 
The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the 
Emergence of Separate Regimes 1945-1947 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1981); see especially pp. 
179-213 and 382-427; see also William W. Stueck, The 
Road to Confrontation: American Policy Toward China 
and Korea, 1947-1950 (Chapel Hill, NC: The University 
of North Carolina Press, 1981), pp. 22-8 
6. Rees, op. cit. pp. 11-2. 
7. Establishing exclusively southern national defense 
forces only three months after Japan's defeat was an 
"extraordinary and insubordinate act"; also, most of 
the south's policemen came from the Korean element of 
the Japanese national police, a fact which certainly 
added very little to the reputation of the new force 
let alone Rhee's own credibility; see Bruce Cumings 
"Introduction: The Course of Korean-American 
Relati, ons, 1943-1953" in Cumings, ed., Child of 
Conflict, op. cit. p. 15. 
8. Withdrawing the troops was a deft diplomatic maneuver 
on the part of the Russians. Their interests in 
Korea, given the dedication of the Kim regime, were, 
no doubt, in good hands. Confident that factionalism 
and corruption would soon do away with Rhee in the 
south, Moscow refused to involve itself with UN 
efforts to resolve the Korean crisis, and made clear 
that the UN Temporary Commission, charged with paving 
an avenue for an eventual north-south re-unification, 
could not "carry out its tasks above the thirty- 
eighth parallel"; see Stueck, op. cit., pp. 90-1. 
9. Both the Joint Chiefs and General Douglas MacArthur, 
US Far East commander, "took the lead" in insisting 
that the troops withdraw at the earliest possible 
time because of the permanent fear of weakening 
America's commitment to Europe; see Stueck, op. cit. 
p. 154-55. 
10. American military reaction to the North Korean 
invasion was limited due to the low state of 
readiness of the understrength US Army forces in 
Japan. By 30 June, the only unit available for 
immediate deployment to Korea was this small infantry 
task force of about 440 men under Lt. Col. Charles B. 
Smith; see US, Department of the Army, Office of the 
Chief of Military History, United States Army in the 
Korean War: South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu 
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(June-November 1950) by Robert E. Appleman 
(Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1961), 
p. 61 (henceforth referred to as 'Appleman'). 
American unpreparedness was starkly illustrated not 
only by insufficient manpower levels, but also by the 
poor state of the equipment and weapons with which 
American soldiers were expected to carry on in 
combat; see J. C. Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story of 
the War (New. York: McGraw, 1983), p. 141. 
11. The history of the fighting between July and mid- 
September 1950 is covered in detail in Appleman, op. 
cit., pp. 248-487; see also Edwin P. Hoyt, The Pusan 
Perimeter: Korea (Scarborough House, NY: Stein & Day, 
1984). 
12. An amphibious landing at Inchon was met with almost 
universal opposition in Washington. The daring 
nature of the operation, the physical obstacles 
present at the proposed location, and the conviction 
of the Joint Chiefs that the days of Normandy-type 
operations were over combined to block the Inchon 
landing. It was only MacArthur's singleminded 
support of the plan as the only way out from the 
impossible military situation that finally won the 
day; see the general's own account of the debate over 
CHROMITE in Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (London: 
Heinemann, 1964), pp. 346-51; according to the then 
Secretary of State Acheson, MacArthur himself 
assessed the odds of success at Inchon as "5,000-to- 
1"; see Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My, 
Years in the State Department (London: Hamish 
Hamilton, 1969), p. 447; the detailed history of the 
operation is in Appleman, op. cit. pp. 488-514; see 
also Rees, op. cit. pp. 77-97. 
13. In fact, missing a 200,000-man Chinese army amounted 
to a disastrous intelligence lapse. Predictablly, 
there is some confusion as to how this could happen. 
The official historian lists various intelligence 
estimates by both field intelligence officers of X 
Corps and MacArthur's Headquarters predicting 
possible Chinese intervention -- which, however, 
grossly underestimate the size of the Chinese forces 
never placing it above 78,000 men; see Appleman, op. 
cit., pp. 760-65. MacArthur gives no answer to the 
question, although he blames Washington's refusal to 
allow bombing of the Yalu river bridges as the major 
contributing factor to the successful Chinese 
infiltration; see MacArthur, op. cit., p. 374. In any 
case, it is reasonable to attribute this grave lack 
of warning to at least three salient factors: (a) 
lack of air reconnaissance over Manchuria, the main 
staging area of the Chinese armies, (b) the 
remarkable camouflage control exercised by Chinese 
forces in North Korea, and the almost total absence 
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of daylight activities by Chinese troops, and (c) the 
inadequate training of American field intelligence 
personnel accentuated by the absence of Wold War II 
veteran intelligence officers. 
14. See Rees, op. cit., pp. 155-77; and John W. Spanier, 
The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War 
(New York: W. W. Norton, 1965), pp. 114-34. 
15. Although MacArthur's strong views about how to combat 
Communism in Asia were well known, it was generally 
believed that the commander-in-chief, Far East 
complied with the Administration's views. The Wake 
Island conference between him and Truman, held in 
early October 1950 shortly before the Chinese 
intervention, seemed to confirm the "harmony" between 
Washington and its military commander directing the 
war in Korea. Truman himself reported in his memoirs 
that Wake had been "a most satisfactory conference"; 
see Harry S. Truman, Memoirs: Years of Trial and 
Upheaval, vol. 2 (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, 1956), 
p. 367. MacArthur, however, later wrote that Wake 
made him realize "that a curious, and sinister, 
change was taking place in Washington... there was a 
tendency towards temporizing rather than fighting it 
through. The original courageous decision of Harry 
Truman to boldly meet and defeat Communism in Asia 
was apparently chipped away by the constant pounding 
whispers of timidity and cynicism"; see MacArthur, 
op. cit. p. 363. On balance, the meeting at Wake, 
designed primarily as a political public relations 
act to boost Truman's fortunes in the elections 
campaign, left MacArthur "with a greater sense of 
freedom" -- something which the President almost 
certainly had no intention of doing; see Stueck, op. 
cit. p. 238; see also Spanier, op. cit., pp. 105-13; 
and "Substance of Statements Made at Wake Island 
Conference on 15 October 1950" in US, Department of 
State, Historical Office, Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1950, vol. VII, Korea (Washington DC: 
Government Printing Office, 1976), pp. 948-60 
(henceforth referred to as FRUS followed by vol. 
number, part, and year of publication). It was 
MacArthur's letter to Joseph Martin, Minority Leader 
of the House of Representatives, written on 20 March 
1951, and openly critical of the handling of the 
Korean War by the Truman Administration, which 
hastened the general's dismissal; MacArthur asserted 
that he "attached little importance to the exchange 
of letters" since they were only part of a "polite 
response" to Representative Martin; see MacArthur, 
op. cit. p. 386 where part of the crucial letter is 
also reproduced. But, as Spanier points out, the 
general was aware beyond question that his letter 
would receive maximum publicity by such a prominent 
member of Truman's opposition; see Spanier, op, cit., 
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p. 203. MacArthur's assertion that he was merely 
engaging in polite correspondence is further weakened 
by the fact that, on the same day he wrote to Martin, 
he was informed by the Joint Chiefs that the United 
Nations were about to begin discussions for a 
diplomatic settlement of the Korea issue; see "The 
Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far 
East (MacArthur)" in FRUS, VII(1951) 1,1983, p. 251. 
As Secretary Acheson summed it up, the general had 
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47-8. For a detailed discussion of Nagy's personal 
attitudes and political beliefs see Ferenc and 
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BIBLIOGRAPHY 
An Explanatory Note 
The nature of the topic, and the enormity of the 
literature, dictated the necessity to "cast the net wide" 
in an effort to strike a reasonable balance between 
(*) 
theoretical and historical sources. This bibliography 
contains, therefore: 
--all the materials which have been specifically 
cited in the Notes; 
--and in addition, all those which were consulted 
during the course of my writing, in an effort to 
better clarify theoretical questions or establish 
background details of historical events. 
In the opening phases of the research, certain 
choices had to be made as to the kind of materials to be 
examined and, eventually, selected for the final 
bibliography. In broad terms, at least four areas of 
potential interest were identified: First, international 
relations with particular emphasis on conflict/war 
studies; second, superpower foreign policy and relations; 
third, military and strategic affairs; and, fourth, 
historical accounts pertaining to the case studies. A 
(*) Since the author has no affiliation, contact, or 
official connection with government agencies here or 
abroad, this study has been entirely based on unclassified 
material available in the public domain. 
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fifth area, that of systems theory and analysis, emerged 
as soon as it was decided that "systems thinking" should 
become the guide to the research. 
The scope of one's bibliographical search is 
generally determined and more narrowly formed by the 
emphasis one chooses to give to certain aspects of a given 
topic. In this present case, a number of initial rough 
"sketches" of the study were considered, in conjunction 
with the working bibliography, to determine the further 
direction of the work. It was clear, for example, that 
the availability of sources, dealing exclusively with the 
finer points of the development of military concepts and 
the technicalities of military operations in general, was 
astonishingly small outside specialized libraries reserved 
for the exclusive use of military and government 
personnel. As I discovered, the access of civilian 
researchers to these establishments is severely rationed 
and requires complicated arrangements not routinely made. 
These practical considerations thus severely constrained 
the option of concentrating on the purely military aspects 
of intervention,, policies. By contrast, the publicly 
available body of literature which focuses on superpower 
foreign relations, the development of their policies 
towards specific regions over time, and their military 
developments is practically endless allowing the 
researcher a considerable degree of flexibility--not to 
mention what I thought was the luxury of actually 
discarding material without any pronounced feeling of 
guilt. 
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Having said this, it was also apparent from the 
outset that military intervention (as opposed to 
intervention in general), despite its pervasive impact 
upon international relations, attracts limited interest 
from those specialists concentrating on pure theory. 
Whether this is a major drawback or a relatively benign 
shortcoming is a matter for debate--although I am inclined 
to believe that operational issues, as opposed to abstract 
theories of military intervention, are much more relevant 
here. The use of military force is often compared with 
the wielding of a scalpel, an act which, taken in itself, 
requires precise, and constantly updated, techniques much 
more so than discussions of the ethics of surgical 
practice. An effort was thus made to approach the choice 
of bibliographical material with the operational aspects 
of foreign policy in mind. 
The relative paucity of theoretical material on 
military intervention comes in sharp contrast to the large 
(and constantly expanding) historical literature dealing 
with specific cases of military intervention. This is 
another indication of the growing demand for "how to" 
works which analyze in depth the "lessons" of a particular 
action. The recent growth, especially in the United 
States, of policy studies and, more specifically, of 
comparative defence policy studies, seems bound to further 
stimulate the proliferation of "after action" monographs 
and reports. As a result, the researcher is confronted 
with a lopsided situation, to say the least. In the 
absence of a better solution, I have attempted to rectify 
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this problem--partially at least-- by searching for 
theoretical statements which elaborate on the relationship 
between the use of force with the broader international 
system; and on the way military intervention may, or may 
not, affect existing power balances or the longevity of 
international actors. 
One point which also deserves attention is the manner 
in which one gains insights into Soviet decisionmaking 
processes and views on important issues. The problems 
associated with analyzing Soviet political and military 
strategy are well known; the language barrier is the most 
serious one followed by the relative inability of all but 
the most seasoned researchers to determine whether a 
particular Soviet source is authoritative or mere 
propaganda. Thus, in the absence of long experience and 
linguistic fluency, one has to compensate by relying on 
translated material and the work of Western Soviet experts 
of established reputation. 
Accordingly, this work benefited from the Soviet 
Military Thought series and other similar translations, an 
extensive number of articles written by Soviet experts and 
published in English, and books, papers, and reports 
produced by prominent Western Soviet analysts whose 
research is almost exclusively based on primary Soviet 
sources. Furthermore, my "Soviet education" was crucially 
affected by two additional, and indeed vital, factors: the 
guidance offered by Professor Erickson through the 
extensive (and constantly growing) collection of Soviet 
materials held by Defence Studies; and the informal 
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discussions and constant interaction with the senior 
Research Fellows appointed annually to the Department. 
Finally, it should also be noted that the 
chronological cut-off line for material cited is roughly 
late 1985. In the case of Afghanistan, this rule was 
obviously broken and material as of late 1986 was also 
included. 
ýýý 
For convenience and clarity, the bibliography has 
been broken down in a "user-oriented" manner into two 
parts. 
Part I contains Western sources and has been further 
broken down into the following sections: 
(1) Official Documents and Publications 
(2) Systems Methodology (books and articles) 
(3) International Relations and Global Security 
(books and articles) 
(4) Superpower Military Intervention (books and 
articles) 
(5) Case Studies (books and articles) 
(6) Papers and Reports 
(7) Newspapers and Newsletters 
(8) Annual Publications 
Part II contains Soviet sources published in Russian or 
English and has also been broken down into sections as 
follows: 
(1) US Government Translations 
(2) Books (in English and Russian) 
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(3) Articles (in English and in translation from 
Russian). 
(4) Booklets and Pamphlets. 
(5) Newspapers 
PART I 
(1) Official Documents and Publications 
This section contains: 
--Congressional hearings on US foreign and defence policy 
The official record of each annual hearing amounts 
thousands of pages of both the testimony by various US 
Government officials, as well as, documents deposited with 
Congressional Committees for inclusion "in the record". 
An indispensable tool here is the annual official 
Congressional Directory which describes in some detail the 
different committees' investigative assignments and serves 
as a compass, so to speak, for one's initial searches. Of 
particular value to those researchers interested in US 
national security policy are the annual hearings (held 
before Senate as well as House committees) on the defence 
budget and appropriations for the different US armed 
services. 
--Monographs published by the National Defense University 
(NDU), Washington, DC on a wide range of both specific and 
broad foreign and military policy issues. The volume on 
The Future of Conflict, for example, is a typical sample 
of NDU edited collections of essays written by a variety 
of both military and civilian academic specialists 
participating in its programs. NDU publications are 
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especially useful for expanding one's background on policy 
"trends" and equally for use in obtaining authoritative 
insights into American interpretations of crucial events-- 
as in Nagy's Crisis Decision Setting and Response: The 
Hungarian Revolution (the author is not related to Imre 
Nagy). 
--Annual reports to Congress from the Secretary of Defense 
as well as publications of the US Department of the Army, 
including Field Manual 100-20 on Low Intensity Conflict. 
The Defense Department reports offer concise statements of 
US national security policy, describe in some detail 
ongoing procurement programs for both strategic and 
general purpose forces, and serve as the official 
indicator of current US perceptions of the Soviet "threat" 
and proposed responses to it. They should be read, 
however, in conjunction with testimony before the 
Congressional Qommittees by the Secretary himself and the 
different military chiefs, who all go to much greater 
length in explaining current force structure, doctrine, 
and missions. 
--Published US State Department documents that include 
telegrams, reports, national security estimates, and 
briefings on important policy meetings of US 
administration officials and military chiefs. 
--Speeches and various statements made by US presidents 
and other US administration officials released for public 
distribution through the US International Communication 
Agency and the US Information Service (US Embassy, 
London). 
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(2) Systems Methodology 
This section covers only a small sample of the 
extensive literature relating to systems analysis, design, 
and modeling. Strictly speaking, this is uncharted 
territory for the historian or political scientist without 
a strong background in mathematics, computers, and 
statistical techniques. In recent years, however, there 
has been a noted upsurge in interest for "soft" systems 
modeling which largely depends on non-quantitative 
techniques like scenario-building and case studies 
"focused comparison". Peter Checkland's Systems Thinking, 
Systems Practice, and Brian Wilson's Systems: Concepts, 
Methodologies, and Applications, albeit conceived as 
studies of systems methodology in business and industrial 
environments, deserve special mention as extremely useful 
guides in conceptualizing and working with any "soft" 
human activity system. User Centered System Design, edited 
by Norman and Draper, is an extremely useful volume 
dealing with man-machine interfacing and computer system 
design which should be made part of any effort to build 
computer-assisted modeling projects of "soft" problems. 
Also, it would be an omission to overlook Robert Krone's 
Systems Analysis and Policy Science which indeed succeeds 
in putting an extremely dry and arcane subject into plain 
English. 
(3) International Relations and Global Security 
The material in this section contains both general 
theoretical works and publications on specific topics of 
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international relations and global security. It refers 
essentially to Chapters I and III. The selection here is 
so large that inevitably no "selected" bibliography can 
possibly fit all the criteria of completeness. It would 
be impractical to attempt extensive annotation of sources 
in this brief note, but nevertheless I thought a number of 
entries deserve special mention. The Defense Policies of 
Nations: A Comparative Study, edited by Murray and Viotti, 
offers a surprising degree of comprehensiveness in a 
single volume. Hedley Bull's The Anarchical Society and 
Aron's classic Peace and War were always indispensable in 
my struggles with international relations theory. 
McKinlay and Little presented an intriguing and lucid 
analysis of global problems in Global Problems and World 
Order. The Global Possible, edited by Robert Repetto, 
left little doubt in my mind that we often dangerously 
overlook the problems of global resource distribution. The 
Future of Conflict in the 1980s, edited by Taylor and 
Maaranen, presented a range of informative essays on the 
risk potential and management of future crises. The late 
Bernard Brodie's Strategy and National Interests: 
Reflections for the Future gave an illuminating 
interpretation of the concept of national interest, and 
its relation to national security, by one of America's 
most prominent civilian strategic thinkers. Soviet 
Military Thinking, edited by Derek Leebaert, and Soviet 
Decisionmaking for National Security, edited by Valenta 
and Potter, offered invaluable insights into Soviet 
foreign policy and national security decisionmaking. 
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(4) Superpower Military Intervention 
This portion of the bibliography basically--but not 
exclusively--supports Chapter II. Professor Osgood's 
Limited War and Limited War Revisited were crucial in 
understanding postwar US attitudes towards "small" wars 
and the role of the United States in them. Herbert 
Tillema's Appeal to Force, although dated, proved an 
excellent "broad review" work. Gregory Foster in his "On 
Selective Intervention" expressed the current attitudes 
towards a strategy of military intervention shared by 
members of the conservative community in the United 
States. Fabyanic's "Conceptual Planning and the Rapid 
Deployment Force" was a particularly interesting analysis 
of the problems encountered when attempting to plan for 
the rapid deployment mission. The Third World in Soviet 
Military Thought, by Mark Katz, Soviet Policy and Practice 
Toward Third World Conflicts, by Hosmer and Wolfe, and The 
Soviet Union in the Third World: Successes and Failures, 
by Robert Donaldson, served as systematic guides of the 
evolution of Soviet military and political thought towards 
the Third World. Last but not least, Kaplan's Diplomacy 
of Power, and Force Without War, by Blechman and Kaplan, 
analyzed the postwar nonviolent uses of military power by 
the USSR and the United States respectively. 
(5) Case Studies 
The case studies chosen have generated an extensive 
historical literature. It is often said, for example, 
that the Vietnam war is perhaps the most documented war in 
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the history of the United States and this is hardly an 
overstatement. Material for the other five case studies, 
although not as overabundant, was relatively easy to 
locate. Certain works emerged as the principal sources of 
information in each case study. Korea benefited from 
David Rees's Korea: The Limited War; Vietnam from George 
Herring's The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975, 
Colonel Summers's On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context, 
and from The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked, by Gelb 
and Betts; Grenada from American Intervention in Grenada, 
edited by Dunn and Watson, and Grenada and Soviet/Cuban 
Policy, edited by Valenta and Ellison, which included a 
very useful appendix of captured Grenadian government 
documents; Hungary from Vali's Rift and Revolt in Hungary; 
Czechoslovakia from the most comprehensive 
Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution, by H. Gordon 
Skilling, and Golan's Reform Rule in Czechoslovakia; and, 
finally, Afghanistan from Thomas Hammond's chronicle Red 
Flag Over Afghanistan. 
(6) Papers, Reports, and Pamphlets 
This section lists four categories of sources: 
-- First, papers and reports published by the RAND 
, 
Corporation covering mainly issues of US national 
security, US-Soviet relations, and Soviet power 
projection; 
-- second, papers published by Defence Studies, 
University of Edinburgh on Soviet views of 
deterrence, global strategy, and ideology; and, 
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-- third, research papers and reports on international 
security and foreign affairs by various authors. 
(7) The final two sections include the titles of 
newspapers and newsletters cited throughout the study, as 
well as those of annual publications. 
PART II 
(1) US Government Translations 
This section contains translations into English of 
Soviet military works published by the US Air Force. USAF 
translations of important Russian publications on military 
thought, science, and strategy are perhaps best known to 
students who do not read Russian through the Soviet 
Military Thought series which has been widely distributed 
since the late 1970s when its first volume was published. 
The USAF also issues a monthly selection of translations 
from Soviet military service journals, but this collection 
is not normally available to the public and the materials 
therein remain protected by the original copyright. All 
these publications provide valuable insight into Soviet 
defence decisionmaking, military strategy, and tactics. 
(2) Books 
This section includes works in both English and 
Russian dealing mainly with international relations and 
the foreign policy of the USSR. It should be noted here 
that the established Soviet discipline of Qlobalistika has 
caused a steady stream of works that receive only limited 
distribution in the West and are, therefore, relatively 
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unknown to the Western academic community. The Department 
of Defence Studies holds a significant number of such 
original monographs in Russian; a small number of relevant 
ones have been included in this section. 
(3) Articles 
The material in this section is essentially drawn 
from Social Sciences and International Affairs, Moscow, 
and covers a wide time span from the 1960s to the present. 
There are also articles appearing in the Joint 
Publications Research Service, an extremely useful 
compilation of Soviet materials in English translation 
which is available only through the British Library 
Lending Division, a fact which restricts its use rather 
severely. 
(4) Booklets and Pamphlets 
This section covers mainly pamphlets published in 
English by the Novosti Press Agency, Moscow and made 
available to the public through its London office. 
(5) Newspapers 
The section cites the titles of Soviet newspapers 
consulted and cited from translations in' the Current 
Digest of the Soviet Press. 
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PART I 
(1) OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS AND PUBLICATIONS 
The Pentagon Papers. The Defense Department History of 
United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam. The Senator 
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